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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Certain socia l events take people by s u rp r i s e ,  and revolu tions 
are  among the most su rp r is in g  socia l phenomena. "Indeed, i t  has often 
been pointed out th a t  vast  socia l changes have taken place without even 
the c l e a r e s t  contemporary minds being conscious o f  what was happening, 
and [ t h a t ]  . . . th e  nature o f  the i n s t i tu t io n s  involved in the process 
of change could not adequately have been understood t i l l  placed in the 
c ru c ib le  o f  h is to ry"  (Andreski, 1969:66-67). In t h i s  same regard , 
Robertson (1981:582) a lso  emphasizes t h a t ,  "Indeed, some social movements 
have occurred a t  times when v i r tu a l ly  nobody, including s o c io lo g is ts ,  
foresaw th a t  they would."
These statements are  su b s tan tia ted  with ample fa c ts .  To focus 
on the  Iran ian  Revolution (1978-9), in which we have a special concern 
in th i s  d i s s e r ta t io n ,  some examples a re  mentioned. In 1971, Marvin 
Zonis, a p ro fesso r a t  the University  of Chicago, had concluded in 
The P o l i t i c a l  E l i te  o f  Iran th a t :  "While monarchs and presidents
throughout the  Middle East and the developing world have been deposed 
or dismissed and p o l i t i c a l  chaos has been r i f e ,  Iran does appear as an 
is land  of s t a b i l i t y "  (1971:338). D ifferen t w r i te rs  and p o l i t ic ia n s
1
followed in the same view and spoke o f P e rs ia /I ra n  as "The Immortal 
Kingdom", "Oasis o f  S t a b i l i t y " ,  or "Is land o f  S ta b i l i ty "  in the  most 
troubled  area of the world, the  Middle East.
Further, "A CIA assessment in August 1978 claimed th a t  ' I r a n  
i s  not in  a revolu tionary  o r  even a "prerevolu tionary" s i tu a t io n '  and 
a Defense In te l l ig en ce  Agency (DIA) In te l l ig e n c e  Appraisal dated 
September 28, 1978 announced th a t  'The Shah is  expected to  remain 
a c t iv e ly  in power over the next 10 y e a r s '"  (Ledeen and Lewis, 1980:11). 
A few months l a t e r ,  in February 1979, the " is lan d  of s t a b i l i t y "  sank, 
u s rp r is in g  observers worldwide.
On the o ther hand, ". . .even th eo r ie s  o f  revolu tion  which 
attempt to  id en tify  more than a s ing le  v a r ia b le ,  perhaps as many as two 
or th ree  major in g red ien ts ,  simply cannot provide an adequate explana­
t io n  o f  t h i s  phenomenon. I t  seems th a t  many fa c to rs  are involved and, 
ty p ic a l ly ,  not the same ones in  each revolu tion" (Blackey and Payton, 
1976:39). As a r e s u l t ,  the fac to rs  th a t  have caused previous revo lu­
t io n s  have not been f u l ly  e laborated  and, r e la te d ly ,  the p red ic tion  of 
the would-be others has become a d i f f i c u l t  ta sk .
To overcome the  problem—th a t  i s ,  to  be able to  explain  the 
causes o f  h is to r ic a l  revo lu tions  s u f f i c i e n t ly —and to  "an t ic ip a te "  the 
occurrence of  s im ila r  phenomena as adequate as p o ss ib le ,  a fou r-s tage  
s t ra teg y  is  proposed and concentrated on throughout th is  d i s s e r ta t io n .  
This s t ra teg y  consis ts  o f  both theory and empirical observation as 
sketched below.
(1) In the  f i r s t  s tag e ,  the p reva len t th eo r ie s  o f  rev o lu tio n ,  
in the sense th a t  they have many th ings in common to  be in teg ra ted  and
synthesized , are  evaluated . Further, from the d if fe ren ces  o f these 
th e o r ie s ,  more in s ig h t  can be gained to  supplement the  proposed syn thesis .
(2) In the second s tag e ,  the involved th e o r ie s  a re  applied to  
a case o f  mass revo lu tion  to  a id  in iden tify ing  the  s im i l a r i t i e s  and 
d iffe rences  among the  th e o r ie s .  In th i s  p ra c t ic e ,  in  f a c t ,  the v a l id i ty  
o f  each theory can be assessed and, in accordance, a decision  regarding 
a synthesiz ing  e n te rp r is e  can be made.
(3) In the  th i r d  stage and based on the  a p p l ic a b i l i ty  o f  the 
addressed theo ries  and t h e i r  points of emergence and departu re , a 
syn thes is  w ill be developed. Here, two issues  must be emphasized. F i r s t ,  
the intended ap p lica t io n  does not n ecessa r ily  mean th a t  each theory w ill 
(or should) be as ap p licab le  as the o ther. Nor does i t  imply th a t  each 
revolu tion  i s  a d up lica tion  of o ther revolutions to  be explained by any 
given theory . One must remember th a t  whatever i t s  s im i la r i ty  to  o th e rs ,  
each socia l phenomenon, based on i t s  soc iocu ltu ra l  s e t t in g  and circum­
s ta n t ia l  cond itions , i s  unique and unpara lle led .
Second, the  intended synthesis  does not (and should not) 
e s s e n t ia l ly  handle any given revolution in exac tly  the  same way as the 
o the r phenomena of the  kind. The p la u s ib i l i ty  o f  t h i s  a sse r t io n  can be 
sought in the very natu re  o f the  previous po in t ,  t h a t  i s ,  each social 
f a c t  i s  id e n t i f ie d  with i t s  own p ecu la r i ty  r e l a t iv e  to  o th e rs .  To shed 
l i g h t  on t h i s  problem and to  assess  i t s  th e o re t ic a l  im plica tions through­
out t h i s  d i s s e r t a t io n ,  the  l a s t  stage will be considered.
(4) To determine i f  the proposed sy n th e s is ,  derived from 
d i f f e r e n t  th eo rie s  o f  rev o lu tio n , is  v a l id ,  an attempt w ill be made to  
t e s t  the  syn thesis  a g a in s t  another case o f  h i s to r ic a l  revo lu tions . I f
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such a t e s t  is  successful to  an acceptable degree, then the  u t i l i t y  
o f  the  syn thesis  as a newly developed theory o f revolution w ill be 
acknowledged.
As i l l u s t r a t e d  above, th is  fo u r-s tag e  en te rp r ise  is  a departure 
from theoriz ing  on the grounds of a case study or comparative inves t iga ­
tion  to build ing a theory on the basis o f  the  already developed theo ries .  
Such a kind o f theory co n s tru c t io n ,  however, i s  also lodged on two cases 
o f  revo lu tions  as mentioned e a r l i e r .  This theoriz ing  s h i f t  i s ,  indeed, 
the  underlying in t e r e s t  in th is  d is s e r ta t io n  which may have some impli­
cation  f o r  Merton's observation th a t :  "We may have many concepts but
few th e o r ie s ;  many poin ts  o f  view, but few theorems; many 'approaches' 
but few a r r iv a l s .  Perhaps a s h i f t  in emphasis would be a l l  to  the good" 
(1968:52).
Chapter I I ,  th a t  is, the  Study of Revolution, w ill  embrace a 
review of the  l i t e r a tu r e  on revolution including d e f in i t io n ,  meaning, 
ideology, leadersh ip , typology, a summary statement of th eo rie s  of 
rev o lu tio n ,  and o the r re lev an t  concepts and ca tegories . In th i s  chapter, 
i t  w ill a lso  be argued th a t  the study o f socia l revolu tions i s  basica lly  
the  task  o f  sociology which is  considered to  be the " in te g ra t in g  science"— 
the science concerned with in teg ra tin g  the  data of a l l  o th e r  social 
sc iences . However, th i s  perception o f sociology does no t mean th a t  the 
study of revolu tion  is  a "p riva te  property" o f  so c io lo g is ts .  Nor does i t  
ignore the  f a c t  th a t  almost every o ther socia l d is c ip l in e  ( e . g . ,  h is to ry ,  
p o l i t i c a l  sc ience, socia l psychology) has a c e r ta in  concern with the 
study o f revo lu tions . What w ill  be argued i s  th a t  sociology can be 
defined as th a t  kind o f  t r a d i t io n  th a t  conjoins various routes  of social
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sciences. I t  regards " . . .  i t s e l f  as something l ik e  a universal 
science o f social l i f e  embracing a l l  aspects o f  socia l re la t io n s"
(Dowes and Hughes, 1979:4).
Further, th is  chapter w ill emphasize how and why the  study o f 
revolu tion  (within the socio log ica l t r a d i t io n )  f i t s  in  the area of 
"social change," and th a t  revo lu tions  can be viewed as occasional 
rad ica l  changes in a soc ia l  system. I t  a lso  w ill  be argued th a t  revolu­
tio n s  have usually  been s tu d ied  with reference  to  t h e i r  "causes," but 
without regard to  t h e i r  consequences. Such d isregard  can be understood 
as one o f  the major common flaws o f many th e o r ie s .  Causal analys is  of 
revolu tions  which does not account fo r  th e i r  achieved goals—id e a l i s t i c a l l y  
and id eo log ica lly  c ry s ta l i z e d  in a new social o rder—may mean nothing 
more than in v es t ig a t in g  th e  process of s h i f t s  in  the  balance of power 
or the  sudden c i rc u la t io n  o f  the e l i t e .
Chapter I I I  i s  devoted to  the category o f  Methodology, which 
covers (1) case study, (2) comparative method, and (3) theory construc­
tion  technique. All these  th ree  procedures deal with e i th e r  the  applied  
th e o r ie s ,  the t e s t  case rev o lu tio n s ,  or the  attempted syn thes is .  However, 
some points must be emphasized in advance. F i r s t ,  the  c r i t e r io n  in 
terms o f  which theo ries  o f  revolu tion  are se lec ted  and applied is  simply 
t h e i r  prevalence in the  l i t e r a t u r e .  In order to  examine these  prevalen t 
theo ries  as such, both the  o r ig ina l works and c e r ta in  re levan t i n t e r ­
p re ta t io n s  will be considered.
Second, the t e s t  case revolu tions are  the  Revolution o f  Egypt 
in 1952, and the Revolution o f  Iran in 1979. The l a t t e r  revolu tion  i s  
employed as the  event to  which theories  o f  revo lu tion  will be addressed
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and thus from which the  syn thesis  w ill be derived. The Egyptian Revolu­
tio n  w ill  serve as the  t e s t  case fo r  the  would-be syn thes is .  In each 
case , only the  revolu tionary  causes and episodes up to  the take-over 
s tage  w ill be considered and hence the in s t i tu t io n a l i z a t io n  o f  the  
revolu tionary  ideals  w ill  not be addressed.
I t  should be noted th a t  the two revo lu tions  d i f f e r  in some 
respec ts  and the q u a l i ty  o f  m obilization fo r  a c t io n ,  ideological emphasis, 
and the  process of revo lu tionary  "take-over" are  examples. Such d i f f e r ­
ences, however, w ill be useful in producing the  synthesis  from one 
revo lu tion  and te s t in g  i t  with the o the r.  This can be regarded as one 
reason fo r  the choice o f  the two revo lu tions . The o ther reason i s  the 
a u th o r 's  c u l tu ra l  acquaintance with these  events . Under c e r ta in  condi­
t io n s ,  th is  type of  f a m i l ia r i ty  is  f r u i t f u l  in the process of in v e s t ig a ­
t io n .  An in v e s t ig a to r  may have a b e t t e r  understanding i f  he knows the 
"native  language" and the  " h is to r ic a l  background" of a given revolu tion  
(Bordewich, 1980:71).
The preceding claim, however, does not hold th a t  unless one 
be Caesar one cannot understand Caesar. All i t  means is  t h a t ,  o the r  
th ings being equal, soc io cu ltu ra l  a f f i n i t y  with social f a c ts  w ill 
provide unique in s ig h t  in to  them. But, th is  kind of acquaintance 
could a lso  be an academic d is a s te r  i f  " im personalization" in the  course 
o f  in v es t ig a t io n  is  not secured. This is  why one should be watchful 
to  avoid any penetra tion  o f  personalized bias and value judgment to  
h is  a n a ly s is .  This commitment, which i s  su re ly  s tre ssed  in th i s  d is s e r ­
t a t i o n ,  touches the very heart of the research  e th ic  and s c i e n t i f i c  
n e u t r a l i ty .
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Chapter IV deals with the th eo r ie s  o f  revolu tion  th a t  w ill  be 
applied  and synthesized. Herein, each theory w ill  be summarized and 
charac te r ized  in the way th a t  the o r ig in a l  thought w ill be demonstrated. 
This chap te r  w ill  be followed by chapter V in  which the t e s t  case 
re v o lu tio n .  The Islamic Revolution o f  I ran ,  w ill  be described in both 
h i s to r ic a l  terms and immediate o r ig in s .  The h is to r ic a l  inc iden ts  th a t  
con tr ibu ted  to  the c rea t io n  o f  th is  revo lu tion  w ill be p ic tu red  in the 
"H is to r ica l Background." "The Analysis o f  the  Root Causes o f  the  
Revolution," w i l l  follow in  the next s ec t io n .  In th is  con tex t ,  the 
economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  id e o lo g ic a l ,  e th n ic ,  and leg itim a tion  sources and 
o r ig in s  o f  the revolu tion  w ill  be s ing led  ou t.  The "Shah's moderniza­
tion"  a lso  w ill be considered as another v a riab le  which, in tu rn ,  con­
t r ib u te d  to  the emergence o f  the Revolution. The overall p resen ta tion  of 
t h i s  revo lu tion  w ill  be somewhat lengthy, fo r  two reasons. F i r s t ,  s ince 
several theo rie s  w ill  be applied  to  the addressed rev o lu tio n , a s u f f ic ie n t  
account is  required l e s t  the  explanatory capacity  o f  the th eo r ie s  is  
d i s to r te d  in the  process. Next, the recency, o f  the Iranian Revolution 
a lso  n e c e s s i ta te s  a thorough observation of  i t s  roots  and an tecedents .
Having thus approached the t e s t  case revo lu tion , the th eo r ie s  
w ill  be applied  in the  next chapter, chapter VI. In th i s  co n tex t ,  the 
im plica tion  of each theory  fo r  the revo lu tion  w ill  be s t re s s e d .  Accord­
ing ly ,  a t  l e a s t  one "proposition" w ill be ex trac ted  and formulated.
These propositions  w ill  a l l  be in teg ra ted  in  an attempt to  c re a te  the 
sy n th es is .  The sy s th e s is  w ill eventually  c o n s t i tu te  the attempted 
" In teg ra l  Theory o f  Revolution" as an a l l - in c lu s iv e  model w ithin which 
revo lu tions  are  viewed and analyzed.
In Chapter VII, th e  new theory i t s e l f  w ill be te s ted  agains t 
the  Egyptian Revolution, where the  causes o f  t h i s  revo lu tion , in tu rn ,  
w ill  be sketched simultaneously. F ina lly , an overa ll  conclusion will 
follow in chapter V III, which is  the term inating chapter o f  t h i s  d is s e r ­
ta t io n .  In th is  chapter several issues r e la t in g  to  the proposed syn­
th e s is  and the two t e s t  case revolutions w ill  be emphasized, including 
the re la t io n sh ip s  between "social s t ra in "  and "resource mobilization" 
in the revolu tionary  process.
CHAPTER II
THE STUDY OF REVOLUTION
"More than ever before , revolu tion  is  seen as having played 
an in teg ra l  p a r t  in  the  evolution of man. I t s  study cannot be neglected 
to  the corners o f  academic re sp o n s ib il i ty "  (Blackey, 1976:xvi). In 
l in e  with such a view the phenomenon o f  revolu tion  and i t s  major ca te ­
gories  are p resently  examined. This examination, aimed a t  shedding 
some l ig h t  on what w ill follow throughout the  d is s e r ta t io n ,  deals with 
the " id e n t i f i c a t io n ,"  "d esc r ip tio n ,"  and "explanation" o f  revolution 
as i t  i s  p ic tu red  in the  re lev an t l i t e r a t u r e .
A. D efinitional Appraisal 
What revolution r e a l ly  is  and how one can define i t  accurate ly  
is  a problematic issue . This perp lex ity  i s  ev ident, fo r  example, in 
the f a c t  th a t  there  i s  no agreed-upon d e f in i t io n  of the phenomenon of 
revo lu tion . Revolution usually  means d i f f e r e n t  things to  those who 
attempt to  define i t .  Hence, a complex o f d e f in i t io n s  is  a t  hand, none 
o f which is  e i th e r  completely va lid  or e n t i r e ly  i r r e le v a n t .  I t  seems 
th a t  th is  d e f in i t io n a l  disagreement r e s u l t s  from the very nature  of 
social f a c t s ,  the q u a l i ty  of th e i r  m anifesta tion  in everyday l i f e ,  and
the  way in which they are  re f le c ted  in our consciousness.
This dilenma can be traced  in c e r ta in  fa c ts .  F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  
the  long-standing problem of "nominal" versus "operational"  d e f in i t io n  
i s  a t  is su e .  That i s ,  whether "words" have l i t t l e  or nothing to  do with 
"concepts,"  and whether "operational d e f in i t io n s"  operate  on a " re fe r ­
e n t ia l"  level in add ition  to ,  or r a th e r  than, a symbolic o r  l in g u is t i c  
one (B iers ted t:1977). As long as such a problem is  confronted, many of 
our soc ia l  concepts cannot be defined thoroughly and e a s i ly .
Second, the in te l l e c tu a l  roots out o f  which, and the  p o l i t ic a l  
p o s it ions  based on which, a d e f in i t io n  o f  revolution is  developed are 
usually  d i f f e r e n t  and sometimes co n trad ic to ry . Students o f  revolution 
view revo lu tion  d i f f e r e n t ly  as a " p o l i t i c a l , "  " so c ia l ,"  " reac tionary ,"  
" ra d ic a l ,"  " re l ig io u s ,"  "secu la r ,"  "o rdea l,"  and f in a l ly  "successful" 
or "abortive" phenomenon. Since what i s  seen by one observer i s  not 
what is  observed by the o th e r ,  common agreement on the  d e f in i t io n s  
cannot be expected. In T r is tram 's  words, "More genera lly , revolutions 
a re  s tud ied  by those who e i th e r  support, made, opposed, o r  abhor them... 
th e re fo re ,  the in te r e s t s  and values o f  th e o r is t s  have had a considerable 
bearing on the name given to ,  and the d e f in i t io n  offered  o f ,  the p o l i ­
t i c a l  phenomenon being studied" (1980:71-72). Furthermore, where the 
" m a te r ia l i s t ic "  v is ion  versus the " id e a l i s t i c "  perception o f social 
r e a l i t y  i s  advocated, our understanding o f  and approach to  socia l 
fa c ts  (including revo lu tion ) w ill vary s u b s ta n t ia l ly .  Attacking the 
Hegelian " idealism ," Marx and Engels (1970:47) argue th a t  " .. .m en, 
developing th e i r  m ateria l production and th e i r  m aterial in te rco u rse ,  
a l t e r ,  along with t h e i r  real ex is tence , t h e i r  real thinking and
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product o f  th e i r  th ink ing . Life is  not determined by consciousness, 
but consciousness by l i f e "  (emphasis added).
Third , and somewhat in connection with the l a t t e r  p o in t ,  social 
fa c ts  are  not only "out th e re ,"  "ex ternal"  to ,  and exerc is ing  "constra in t"  
and "coercion" over us (Durkheim, 1964:3-4); i t  i s  argued th a t  they are 
a lso  ' " i n  here ' p a r t  o f  our innermost being" (Berger 1963:121). Given 
the  l a t t e r  con ten tion , one may be engulfed in the bo rderline  o f  "o b jec ti­
v ity "  and i t s  co u n te rp ar t ,  " s u b je c t iv i ty " ,  in his approach to  social 
r e a l i t i e s .  When th i s  happens, our id e n t i f i c a t io n  of the observed 
phenomenon w ill  be b lu rred  and ambiguous. We are reminded th a t  sc ien ­
t i f i c  misconception can r e s u l t  more from ambiguity than e r ro r .
Fourth, in many cases revo lu tions  a re  confused w ith , or not 
accu ra te ly  d is t ingu ished  from, o ther somewhat analogous phenomena such 
as " re v o l t , "  "coup," "war o f  independence," " secess io n is t  movement," 
and the l ik e .  As such, many d e f in i t io n s  o f  revolution a re  e i th e r  so 
broad th a t  they encompass a wide range of nonrevolutions (and hence 
b lu r  the concept of rev o lu t io n ) ,  or they a re  so r e s t r i c t i v e  th a t  the 
empirical and schematic u t i l i t y  o f  the d e f in i t io n  remains a t  stake 
(Stone, 1966:159-162; Blackey, 1976:xvii) .
F in a l ly ,  when the study of revo lu tion  is  attempted, "a paucity 
of data" i s  usually  confronted. A dd itiona lly , as S a le r t  in d ic a te s ,  "the 
type of data  on revo lu tions  th a t  are  a v a i lab le  to  us i s  o ften  not 
r e l i a b l e , "  and th a t  "socia l s c i e n t i s t s  ra re ly  witness a revolu tion" 
(1976:20).
With the foregoing considera tions  in mind, a sample of the 
d e f in i t io n s  o f  revo lu tion  w ill  be addressed, and an overa ll  assessment
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of the  included d e f in i t io n s  w ill  follow. Needless to  say, i t  is  
intended th a t  th i s  sample be rep resen ta t iv e  of d i f f e r e n t  i n t e l l e c t u a l -  
p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t io n s ,  embracing the most p reva len t d e f in i t io n s .
(1) According to  Yoder, revolu tion  is  "the change in the 
socia l  a t t i tu d e s  and values basic to  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  in s t i tu t io n a l  
order" (1926:441).
(2) Marxism defines  revolu tion  in a broad sense as "c lass  
consciousness" which i s  "the locomotive o f  h is to ry ."  In a sp e c if ic  
meaning revolu tion  " is  the  ac t  whereby one p a r t  o f  the population 
imposes i t s  w ill upon the  o ther p a r t  by means of r i f l e s ,  bayonets, 
and cannon--au thorita rian  means, i f  such th e re  be a t  a l l . . . "  (Engels, 
1952:639).
(3) Amman notes th a t  " revolu tion  i s  a breakdown, momentary 
or prolonged, o f  the s t a t e ' s  monopoly o f  power, usually  accompanied 
by a lessening o f the h a b i t  o f  obedience" (1962:36).
(4) Arendt claims th a t
only where change occurs in the sense o f  a new beginning, where 
violence is used to  c o n s t i tu te  an a l to g e th e r  d i f f e r e n t  form of 
government to bring about the formation o f a new body p o l i t i c s ,  
where the l ib e ra t io n  from oppression aim a t  l e a s t  a t  the 
co n s t i tu t io n  of freedom can we speak o f  revolution (1963:28).
(5) Eros defines revolu tion  as a "sudden, rad ica l change 
which takes place both in p o l i t i c a l  and soc ia l  conditions , t h a t  i s ,  
when an 'e s ta b l is h e d '  government (as well as a social and legal order) 
is suddenly, sometimes v io le n t ly ,  rep laced  by a new one" (1964:602).
(6) Eckstein considers revo lu tion  as one type of " in te rna l 
war" and defines the l a t t e r  in a broad sense as "any re s o r t  to  violence 
w ith in  a p o l i t i c a l  order to  change i t s  cond itions , r u le r s ,  o r  p o l ic ie s"
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(1965:133).
(7) According to  Brinton, revo lu tion  i s  a " d ra s t ic ,  sudden 
s u b s t i tu t io n  o f  one group in  charge of a t e r r i t o r i a l  p o l i t i c a l  e n t i ty  
by another group h i th e r to  not running the  government" (1965:4).
(8) For Johnson, "revolu tions are social changes," and 
"revo lu tionary  change i s  a special kind o f  social change, one th a t  
involves the in tru s io n  o f violence in to  c iv i l  social re la t io n s "
(1966:1).
(9) In Huntington's view, "a revo lu tion  is  a rap id ,  fundamental, 
and v io le n t  domestic change in the dominant values and myths o f  a 
so c ie ty ,  in i t s  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  socia l s t ru c tu re ,  leadersh ip , 
governmental a c t i v i ty  and p o l i t ic s "  (1973:264).
(10) Hagopian contends th a t
revo lu tion  i s  an a c t iv e ,  prolonged c r i s i s  in one or more of 
the  t r a d i t io n a l  systems o f s t r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  (c la s s ,  s t a t u s ,  power) 
o f  a p o l i t ic a l  community which involves a purposive, e l i t e -  
d irec ted  attempt to  abolish  o r  to  reconstruc t one o r  more of 
socia l systems by means of an in te n s i f ic a t io n  of p o l i t i c a l  power 
and recourse to  violence (1974:1).
(11) F in a lly ,  Blackey and Paynton observe th a t
revo lu tion  i s  a p o l i t i c a l  and/or social and/or economic and/or 
c u l tu ra l  upheaval which c a l l s  fo r  a fundamental change in  the 
e x is t in g  order; i t  i s  r e l a t iv e ly  rap id  and genera lly  employs the 
use o f  th re a t  of force ; i t  i s  d irec ted  agains t p r in c ip le s  and 
in s t i t u t i o n s ,  not ind iv idua ls  (1976:18).
The d e f in i t io n s  c i te d  above i l l u s t r a t e  some common charac­
t e r i s t i c s  o f  revo lu tions  including "strugg le  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  freedom,"
"the overthrow o f  the  e x is t in g  o rder ,"  "use o f  v iolence,"  and "funda­
mental socia l change." All these d e f in i t io n s  tend to  id e n t i fy  revolu­
t io n  with i t s  "goals" and "causes," but overlook or even d isregard
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i t s  actual consequences. This p o in t seems to  be evident a t  l e a s t  in 
the concentration on the "sudden" downfall of the old regime through 
the "use of violence."  As such, pu tting  an abrupt end to  the e s tab lished  
order seems to  be an end in i t s e l f  but not a new beginning f o r  the 
implementation and execution o f the advocated ideology. Hence, de­
emphasizing the in s t i tu t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  the revolutionary  ideology is 
a basic  flaw in the study o f  revo lu tion .
On the o ther hand, with the exception of the overa ll  Marxist 
d e f in i t io n  of revo lu tion , the element o f  "ideology" and "co l le c t iv e  
consciousness," c r i t i c a l  to  the emergence and success o f  revo lu tionary  
a c t io n s ,  are absent in the involved d e f in i t io n s .  Apparently, taken 
to ge ther ,  these d e f in i t io n s  t r e a t  revolu tion  as a "simple event" which 
takes place overnight, in one spot of time. Revolution is  not a 
"spontaneous generation;"  i t  is a r e l a t iv e ly  prolonged "movement" th a t  
an tedates  the very downfall of the e s ta b l ish e d  order,  and w il l  proceed 
a f t e r  the l a t t e r  is abolished. In LeBon's words "the true  revo lu tions , 
those which transform the d isc ip l in e s  of people, are most f requently  
accomplished so slowly th a t  h is to r ian s  can hardly p o in t to  t h e i r  
beginnings" (1913:25).
I t  seems th a t  i f  revolu tion  is  viewed and defined as an 
"accomplished revolu tionary  movement," much ins igh t would be given to 
i t s  understanding. In such desired  concep tua liza tion , the "emergence" 
and "evolution" of the revolu tionary  episodes in the dimension of time 
and socia l context may be b e t t e r  rea l iz e d  and assessed. In such 
trea tm en t,  fo r  example, "resource m obiliza tion  e f fo r t s "  in the process 
of confronta tion  with so c ia l  control and the operation of the l a t t e r
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can be n icely  p ic tu red  and examined. Based on such sp ecu la tio n .
G arner 's  d e f in i t io n  of socia l movement in general,  and revolu tionary
movement in p a r t i c u la r ,  is  informative. According to  Garner
. . .  a socia l movement is a s e t  o f  actions  of a group o f  people. 
These actions have the following c h a r a c te r i s t i c s :  They are s e l f ­
consciously d irec ted  toward changing the social s t ru c tu re  and/or 
ideology of so c ie ty ,  and they e i t h e r  are ca r r ied  on outside of 
ideo log ically  leg it im a te  channels o f  change or use these channels 
in innovative ways (1977:1).
Garner a lso  d is t ingu ishes  five  types o f social movements among which
only "class-conscious" movement " th a t  is  aimed a t  se iz ing  the s t a t e ,
the apparatus of coercion , in order to  a l t e r  c lass  s t ru c tu re "  is
considered as a revo lu tionary  movement (Garner, 1977:6).
Garner 's  d e f in i t io n  of (revo lu tionary ) socia l movement is 
sugges tive , but s ince he employs the concepts "consciousness" and 
"c lass"  in the Marxist sense, th a t  i s ,  in the sense o f  economic-based 
a c t io n ,  his d e f in i t io n  is of narrow scope and r e s t r i c t i v e .  According 
to  Morris and Murphy (1966:298-313) c la s s  conscious p o l i t i c a l  action is 
but one kind of p o l i t i c a l  activism th a t  is based on economic in te r e s t s .  
The o ther  types of such activism can stem from and be grounded in 
p o l i t i c a l ,  n a t io n a l ,  e th n ic  or r e l ig io u s  causes, o r  a combination 
of  these  elements.
Based on the v a r ie ty  of d e f in i t io n s  th a t  are touched upon 
above, and th e i r  individual m eri ts ,  the following d e f in i t io n ,  which is 
hoped to  provide a b e t t e r  p ic tu re  of the phenomenon under s tudy, is 
e labo ra ted  and s e t  fo r th .  A revo lu tion  is a social movement which is 
r e l a t iv e ly  v io len t  and massive, group-conscious and p rocessual;  such 
a movement gets organized gradually  in a rou tin ized  way, and i t s
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ideo log ical goal i s  overthrowing the old  o rder  in  favor o f  a new social 
system, ch rac te rized  by rad ica l  s t ru c tu ra l  and/or valuational change.
B. Typology o f  Revolution
C onstitu ting  a typology of re v a lu a t io n ,  l ik e  defin ing  revolu­
t io n ,  is  not an easy ta sk .  The main o b jec t iv e  o f  constructing  a typology 
o f revo lu tion  i s  (1) to  s in g le  out revo lu tions  from non-revo lu tions,
(2) to  shed l ig h t  on the  causes o f  rev o lu tio n ,  (3) to  genera lize  the  
find ings on a revo lu tion  to  o th e r  rev o lu t io n s ,  and (4) to  a n t ic ip a te ,  
to  any possib le  ex ten t ,  the  occurrence o f  fu tu re  rev o lu tio n s . In a 
word, " c l a s s i f ic a t io n  i s  . . .a  necessary p re re q u is i te  to ana lys is"  
(Wilson, 1973:14).
In order to  co n s tru c t  typologies o f  rev o lu t io n s ,  socia l 
s c i e n t i s t s  have focused on one or more t r a i t s  as the  c r i t e r i a  o f  
c l a s s i f i c a t io n .  Such a ttem p ts ,  based mainly on (1) the  revo lu tionary  
ideology, (2) the  t a r g e t  o f  revo lu tionary  a c t i v i ty  ( i . e . ,  government, 
regime a t  la rg e ,  or so c ie ty  as a whole), and (3) the s c i e n t i s t ' s  own 
p o l i t i c a l  va lues, have produced various ca teg o rie s  o f  rev o lu tio n s .
They a re :  (1) communist, f a s c i s t ,  n a t i o n a l i s t ;  (2) l i b e r a l ,  moderate,
conserva tive ;  (3) r a d ic a l ,  reac tionary ; (4) s o c ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  c u l tu ra l ,  
r e l ig io u s ;  (5) urban, r u r a l ;  (6) Eastern, Western; and f i n a l l y  (7) 
successful versus abortive  revo lu tions . I t  a lso  should be noted th a t  
the  typology o f  revo lu tion  involves a d i s t in c t iv e  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  
between revolu tions proper and o ther s o r t s  o f  s o c io -p o l i t ic a l  activ ism . 
Examples o f  the  l a t t e r  a re  coups, r e v o l t s ,  and s e p a ra t i s t  movements 
which sometimes are  confused with rev o lu t io n s .
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According to  Edwards (1927:127-155), once a revo lu tion  e ru p ts ,  
th ree  nearly d i s t i n c t  fa c t io n s  w ill  emerge--the " ra d ic a ls ,"  the "moder­
a te s ,"  and the "conserva tives."  The moderates do not aim to  change the 
important fea tu res  o f  the old regime—they have a minimal revolutionary  
program. In c o n t ra s t ,  the rad ica ls  work to  change the whole e s ta b l i s h ­
ment. The conserva tives, the coun terrevo lu tionaries ,  wish to  preserve 
as much from the old system as po ss ib le .  Once each fac t io n  is in 
power, a c e r ta in  kind of revo lu tion— i . e . , moderate, r a d ic a l ,  or abortive— 
is a t  hand.
Some s tuden ts  of revolu tion  ( e . g . ,  Dorso, 1955; Lasswell and 
Kaplan, 1950) make a d i s t in c t io n  between "soc ia l"  and " p o l i t ic a l"  
revo lu tions . P o l i t i c a l  revolu tion  involves only power t r a n s i t io n  
"within" the ru ling  c l a s s ,  th a t  i s ,  w ithout changing the whole e s ta ­
blishment. In th i s  s i tu a t io n ,  then, only the reshu ff l ing  o f  the 
governing groups and the r e v i ta l iz in g  of the ex is t in g  government is 
involved. When the opposing groups destroy and replace the ru ling 
c lass  and crea te  a new socia l o rder, soc ia l revolution w ill  occur.
Viewed from the Marxist theory of revo lu tion , the preceding 
d i s t in c t io n  is not v a l id ,  fo r  "an au then tic  social revo lu tion  . . .
[has] to  be p o l i t i c a l  as well" (Hagopian, 1974:105). On the o ther 
hand, almost any p o l i t i c a l  revolution produces some socia l consequences. 
Therefore , to  avoid t h i s  terminological confusion, i t  is  s a fe r  to  
drop the label " p o l i t i c a l "  from any " revo lu tion ,"  and to  use the terms 
coup and re v o l t  wherever only the replacement of the governing in d iv i­
duals (and not the des tru c tio n  of the whole order) is the case.
Huntington (1970:266-274) d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  between Eastern and
17
Western revo lu tions , though he cautions th a t  geographical lab e ls  do 
not r e f l e c t  the  rea l basis  o f  t h i s  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n .  He speculates 
th a t  Western revo lu tions  ( e .g . ,  French, B r i t i s h ,  and Russian revolu tions) 
have occurred in t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  regimes ru led  by landed a r i s to c r a t s .  
Eastern s ty le  revo lu tions  ( e .g . ,  Cuban, Chinese, and Egyptian revolu tions) 
have taken place in s o c ie t ie s  in which some modernization has already 
occurred.
I t  seems th a t  i t  i s  the b i r th  date and not the  b i r th  place of 
revolu tions th a t  can serve as a useful c r i t e r io n  fo r  an attempted 
d i f f e r e n t ia t io n .  In o the r  words, i t  i s  th e  dimension of time linked 
to  the  s o c ie ty 's  socioeconomic stage of development t h a t ,  among other 
f a c to r s ,  can determine the  s ty le  o r  the  very charac te r  of revolutions. 
However, no Western soc ie ty  is  immune from revo lu tion , and a l l  Eastern 
s o c ie t ie s  undergoing some modernization w ill  not in ev itab ly  experience 
the eruption o f  revo lu tion .
Concerning o the r  labels  o f  rev o lu tio n s , some points  should be 
made. F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  i t  could be argued th a t  i t  i s  not contrad ictory  
to  have a " n a t io n a l i s t"  revolution which is  a lso "communist" o r ,  in 
f a c t ,  " s o c ia l i s t "  ( e . g . ,  Cuban Revolution o f  1959). I t  seems th a t  each 
revolu tion  i s  n a t io n a l i s t  unless by th i s  a t t r ib u te  an ti c o lo n ia l i s t  
a c t io n ,  in a t r a d i t io n a l  sense o f  co lonialism , is  meant. Second, to 
label a revolu tion  as "reactionary" ( i . e . ,  heading backward to  a "golden 
age") is  misleading, fo r  even these  revo lu tions  base t h e i r  objectives on 
a contemporary t e r r a in  and employ modern means to  reach th e i r  id ea ls .  
Third, i f  a socia l event is  considered as a successful revo lu tion , then 
the d is t in c t io n  between "conservative", "moderate", and "rad ica l"
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revo lu tions  is meaningless. A tru e ,  or su ccess fu l ,  revolu tion  is 
fundamental s t ru c tu ra l  change, and where such a change is lack ing , one 
should not speak of " rev o lu t io n ,"  be i t  conservative , ab o r t iv e ,  or 
whatever. What is important then is how much and how rapid  the d ra s t ic  
and in s t i tu t io n a l iz e d  changes a re ,  and to  what ex ten t a revo lu tion  
is  heading toward the l e f t  o r  otherwise.
From another viewpoint, many episodes of p o l i t i c a l  violence 
have been regarded as revo lu tions  and hence an ambiguity concerning 
what is  and what is not revolu tion  is confronted. While we are  ac­
quainted with only a small number of re v o lu t io n s ,  Blackey (1976:xi-xiv) 
provides us with a l i s t  o f  a l l  " revo lu tionary  upheavals," events which 
took place between 1517 and 1974, out of which 87 have been termed 
rev o lu tio n s . To overcome such confusion, many students o f  revo lu tion  
have developed various c r i t e r i a  fo r  d i f f e r e n t ia t in g  among d i f f e r e n t  
kinds of s o c io p o l i t ic a l  ac tion .
Johnson (1964:27-28) believes t h a t ,  based on (1) the ta rg e ts  
of revo lu tionary  a c t i v i t y  or the stake o f  rev o lu t io n ,  (2) the id e n t i ty  
o f  re v o lu t io n is ts  or p ro tagon is ts  ( i . e . ,  masses or e l i t e s  leading 
m asses), (3) the revo lu tionary  goals or ideo log ies ,  and (4) the spon­
ta n e i ty  o r c a lc u la t io n  in revo lu tion , s ix  types of revolu tion  are 
ev id en t .  They are the (1) J a c q u ir ie ,  (2) m illen ia r ism , (3) a n a rch is t  
(n o s ta lg ic )  r e b e l l io n ,  (4) Jacobin communist or nation-forming revolu­
t i o n ,  (5) co n sp ira to r ia l  coup d ' e t a t ,  and (6) m i l i t a r iz e d  mass insurrec­
t io n .  Some of Johnson's examples are communist, such as the Russian 
and Chinese rev o lu t io n s ,  and others are Jacobin but not Communist, such 
as the French and the Turkish revolu tion  o f  1908-1922.
19
Since Johnson has based his typology on somewhat ambiguous or 
overlapping c r i t e r i a  ( e .g . ,  change in government, p o l i t i c a l  regime, or 
soc ie ty  as a whole), h is  s ix  types o f  revo lu tion  are ambiguous. Changing 
the p o l i t i c a l  order includes the transform ation of the government, and 
y e t  such a change is not revo lu tion . In f a c t ,  not a l l  of the revolu­
tions  mentioned by Johnson are revolu tions per se but include re v o l ts ,  
coups and o ther s im ila r  upheavals (Hagopian, 1974:101).
Tanter  and MidlarsKy (1967:265-280) s e t  fo r th  four c r i t e r i a  
to  d iscr im ina te  among d i f f e r e n t  types o f  revolu tionary  movements. They 
are (1) the in ten s i ty  of p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  (2) the duration o f  the movement, 
(3) the level of domestic v io lence, and (4) "the in ten tions  o f  the 
in su rgen ts ."  Based on these four f a c to r s ,  "mass revo lu tion ,"  "revolu­
tionary  coup," "reform coup," or "palace revolution" can occur. For 
example, the French Revolution (1789) and the Algerian Revolution (1962) 
are c l a s s i f i e d  as mass rev o lu tio n s , and the Nazi movement of 1933 and 
the Egyptian movement o f  1952 are recognized as revolutionary  coups.
The major flaw in th i s  attempt is th a t  i t  deals with the events 
in terms of the way^  in which the old regime is overthrown, and not the 
concomitant revolutionary  outcome. As an example, the Egyptian revo­
lu t io n a ry  coup was acknowledged as rev o lu tio n ,  and on the con tra ry , 
the Persian  Revolution of 1906-1909 was c a l led  abortive revo lu tion  
or  merely a social movement, which somehow fa i l e d  to  achieve i t s  ideal 
goa ls .  In a word, i t  is  the achievement o f  a socia l movement th a t  w ill 
determine i t s  nature in the sense th a t  the movement is revolu tionary  
o r  otherw ise.
To b e t te r  c ry s ta l i z e  revolu tion  as a d i s t i n c t  phenomenon,
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Hagopian (1974:1-44) has d e l ib e ra te ly  concentrated on "what is not 
re v o lu t io n ."  The l a t t e r  category embraces th ree  sub-categories : (1)
coup d ' e t a t ,  i . e . ,  "a blow a t  the s ta te "  or "a sudden a t ta c k  on the 
government," and can take on the label o f  (a) palace rev o lu tio n ,  (b) 
executive coup, (c) m i l i t a ry  coup, and (d) pa ram ili ta ry  coup; (2) revo lts  
which are id e n t i f ie d  with f iv e  forms (a) jacq u e rie s  and peasant r e v o l ts ,  
(b) urban mobs, (c) nativ ism , (d) milleniarism-messianism, and (3) 
a r i s t o c r a t i c  re v o lts .  Revolts have a c le a r ly  "conservative" o r  even 
"re trograde" charac te r  and, unlike revo lu tion , " the short-run  impact 
of r e v o l t  on the s t ru c tu re  and function o f  so c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i ­
tu t io n s  is  . . . in d ire c t  and marginal" (Hagopian, 1974:11); (3) seces­
s ion , according to Hagopian, "involves the breaking o f f  of one p a r t  of 
the s t a t e  and the proclamation of i t s  independence" (1974:31). Such 
separa tion  can take on the label o f  a (a) reg io n a l ,  (b) c o lo n ia l ,  (c) 
e th n ic ,  or (d) re l ig io u s  movement. F in a lly ,  Hagopian concludes th a t
. . . when a movement repudiates  a s ig n i f ic a n t  po rtion  of the 
t r a d i t io n a l  values and in s t i tu t io n s  in the name of m illenary  
v is io n ,  i t  is tempting indeed to  c a l l  i t  revolu tionary . Yet, 
such movements are c h a r a c te r i s t i c a l ly  l im ited  to a s ing le  
region or sec to r of s o c ie ty ,  whereas a tru e  revolution a f fe c t s  
the global socie ty . . . . Revolution by d e f in i t io n  is e x t r a ­
o rd inary  (1974:39-40).
Hagopian's typology a lso  su ffe rs  from c e r ta in  problems. For 
example, i t  is sa fe r  to  save the term "revolution" for only those 
"extraordinary" changes th a t  are revo lu tions . As such, "palace 
revo lu tion"  should be ca lled  "palace r e v o l t . "  Secondly, w ith in  the 
category of  "what is not rev o lu tio n ,"  in which we are not so in te re s ted  
p re sen t ly ,  some overlap e x i s t s .  In th is  re sp e c t ,  i t  should be noted 
th a t  a s ec e ss io n is t  movement can be re l ig io u s ,  e thn ic  and geographic
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a t  the same time. Thirdly , Hagopian disregards the f a c t  th a t  some 
coups or rev o lts  can, by v ir tu e  o f  t h e i r  outcome, bring about revolu­
tionary  a l te r a t io n s  and hence f i t  in the category o f  revo lu tion . Fourth, 
although Hagopian d is t ingu ishes  revolu tion  from "what is not revo lu tion ,"  
he f a i l s  to  c la s s i fy  revolu tions o r  to  provide us with a s e t  o f  c r i t e r i a  
fo r  such desired  c la s s i f i c a t io n .
F in a lly ,  in closing th i s  discussion of c l a s s i f i c a t io n  i t  should 
be noted th a t  we may not typ ify  what is ca l led  revo lu tion  only on the 
grounds of such fac to rs  as mass p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  duration o f violence, 
level of v io lence, and the re su l t in g  destruction  in l iv e s  and p ro p e r t ie s .  
The more important and determining c r i t e r i a  are indeed those revolutionary 
changes th a t  are introduced to  major socia l in s t i tu t io n s  and the domi­
nant values. Accordingly, abortive  revolutions are unsuccessful in th a t  
they have f a i le d  to introduce the attempted d ra s t ic  changes to  a soc ie ty , 
though these revolu tions may have o r ig in a l ly  come about v ia  mass move­
ment and v io le n t  action  and have la s ted  fo r  a r e la t iv e ly  long period 
of time.
C. Ideology
When a p o l i t i c a l  system is challenged, what should be e s ta ­
blished  in i t s  place becomes an urgent issue . In order to  change the 
ex is t in g  order, people need a promising ideal and a v iable  program 
of ac tion . Kennan (1968) seems to  suggest th a t  rebels  w ithout a program 
should e i th e r  p u t  up or shut up. However, without a heartening program, 
people may r i s e  to  opposition , but they w ill  not be able to  make a 
revo lu tion . In the process of revolu tionary  a c t io n ,  ideology functions
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to  inflame, and to  convert the  in d iv id u a l is t ic  b e l ie f s  to  c o l le c t iv e  
ones. As Smelser suggests , "present in  a l l  c o l le c t iv e  behavior i s  some 
kind o f b e l ie f  th a t  prepares the  p a r t ic ip a n ts  fo r  action" (1962:79).
I f  an ideology 's  sources a re  understood, i t s  functional import in  the 
crea tion  o f  revolution w ill  f a i r l y  be re a l ized .  According to  Johnson 
(1968:79), ideology has i t s  roo ts  in  (1) social s t r a i n ,  (2) vested 
in te r e s t s  and prospective g a in s ,  (3) b i t te rn e s s  about socia l change th a t  
has already occurred, (4) l im ited  perspective due to  socia l p o s i t io n ,  
and (5) the p e rs is tence  o f  outmoded t r a d i t io n s  o f  thought. As such, 
ideology can be thought o f  as a c e r ta in  p r in c ip le  based on which 
social movements can e ru p t ,  fo r  the purpose o f  rad ica l change (or even 
fo r  maintaining the  e s ta b l ish e d  o rder) .
"Ideas" are  defined as "weapons" (Lerner, 1939:3) under whose 
banner c e r ta in  idea ls  can be achieved. These ideas , in f a c t ,  are 
those images th a t  people have about how the world opera tes .  In Feuer's 
words ideology i s  " . . .  a world-system based on one 's  p o l i t i c a l  and 
social fe e l in g s ,  an a ttem pt, conscious o r unconscious, to  impose one 's  
p o l i t ic a l  w ill upon the na tu re  o f  the  universe" (1968:64). However, in 
the study o f revolu tion  the  discussion  of ideology and ideas fo r  action 
revolves around the very na ture  o f t h i s  same category and i t s  operation 
in the process of revo lu tionary  change.
In the Marxist theory  o f  rev o lu tio n , the "weapons" o f ideas 
are m a te r ia l i s t  in o r ig in - - th e y  are  grounded in  the peop le 's  m a te r ia l­
i s t  needs and the ownership o f  the means o f  production. Further, in 
th i s  t r a d i t io n ,  ideology i s  a ssoc ia ted  with "c lass  consciousness," 
and i s  considered a cen tra l  element in the Marxist theory  o f  revolu tion .
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Lenin argues th a t  th e re  can be no revolu tion  without a revolu tionary  
theory . The major problem with t h i s  id e n t i f i c a t io n  o f  ideology i s  not 
the  ample weight th a t  is  given to  ideology, but the  c ru c ia l  import 
linked to  (1) social c l a s s ,  and (2) the m a te r i a l i s t  base o f  ideology.
(In th e  following chap te r ,  t h i s  c r i t ic is m  w ill be e laborated  and 
s p e c i f i e d . )
In c o n tra s t  to  the Marxist m a te r ia l i s t  p o s i t io n  o f  ideology, 
Hegel (1967) views ideology i d e a l i s t i c a l l y .  He emphasizes the d ia le c ­
t i c a l  na tu re  o f  the S p i r i t  o f  Time where the ind iv id u a ls  and nations 
become instruments o f  the  S p i r i t .  Hegel's S p i r i t  rep resen ts  the 
abso lu te  and i s  the  c en tra l  p r in c ip le  o f  a l l  ex is ten ce .  I t  is  a pro­
cess whose development proceeds by the d ia le c t ic a l  course from the " in -  
i t s e l f "  o f  the  unconscious s tage  to  the " f o r - i t s e l f "  o f  the  conscious 
s tage (Lauer, 1978:183). F in a l ly ,  S p i r i t  comes in to  being in nature and 
h is to ry  and is  ". . . ex te rn a l ized  and emptied in to  time" (Hegel, 
1967:807). However, Hegelian perception o f  ideology i s  the  o ther 
extreme from the  Marxist m a te r i a l i s t  perspec tive  in  th e  sense th a t  
Hegel gives too much weight to  the  i d e a l i s t  base o f  ideas and ideologies. 
Concerning the  ideas o f  rev o lu tio n ,  i t  could be argued th a t  what 
id e o lo g ic a l ly  motivates people to  re v o l t  i s  o f  both m aterial and 
s p i r i tu a l  na tu re .
Lauer (1978:184-5) recognizes two o th e r  ideological stand­
po in ts  assoc ia ted  with socia l change, including re v o lu tio n ;  the 
" i n t e r a c t i o n i s t , "  and th a t  o f  "concomitant v a r ia t io n ."  The in te r -  
a c t i o n i s t  p o s it ion  compromises between ideas and m ateria l fa c to rs  and 
gives more o r  le ss  equal weight to  each. In h is  study o f  changes th a t
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have taken place in "human r ig h ts"  in Jamaica, Bell (1965) p resen ts
th is  view. Defining and understanding human r ig h ts  as " so c ia l ,"
" p o l i t i c a l , "  " c i v i l , "  and "economic" r ig h t s .  Bell argues th a t
There has been a demonstrable in te rp lay  between ideas and 
in s t i tu t io n s  throughout the h is to ry  of Jamaica. I n s t i t u ­
t io n s  fo s te re d  c e r ta in  ideas about what is r ig h t  or wrong, 
what should or should not be; and ideas, o ften  exogeneous 
to  Jamaica i t s e l f  o r ig in a l ly ,  have led to organized soc ia l  
ac tion  which often  re su lted  in changing, e lim ina ting , o r  
c rea tin g  in s t i tu t io n s  (1965:165-166).
F in a l ly ,  with respec t to  the functioning of ideology in 
rev o lu tions , Brinton (1965) advocates the fourth  p o s i t io n .  He argues 
th a t  ideas and m ateria l fa c to rs  change to ge ther ,  though not necessa r ily  
s im ultaneously, and th a t  i t  is  not possib le  to iden tify  any causal 
re la t io n sh ip .  Ideas are always a p a r t  o f  the s e t  of va riab les  in­
volved in rev o lu tions . This is  so because of the f a c t  th a t  there  is  
always a number o f  people d iscontented with s o c ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and 
economic co n d itions , who more o r  le s s  are un if ied  by these common 
causes. However, i t  may be true  th a t  "no ideas, no revo lu tions ,"  but 
"This does not mean th a t  ideas cause rev o lu tio n s ,  or th a t  the b es t  way 
to  prevent revo lu tions  is  to  censor ideas . I t  merely means th a t  ideas 
form p a r t  of the mutually dependent v a r ia b le s  we are studying"
(Brinton, 1965:49).
So f a r ,  ideas and ideologies have been d e a l t  with as one of 
the provoking, f a c i l i t a t i n g ,  and, to  some e x ten t ,  generating fac to rs  
in a revo lu tionary  process. Some scho la rs  th ink  of ideology as an 
impediment o r  b a r r ie r  to change. Mannheim (1963) argues th a t  
ideologies are those systems of b e l ie f s  which r e s u l t  in behavior th a t  
maintains the "ex is tin g  order."  This is due to  the f a c t  th a t  ideology
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echoes the idea th a t  "ruling groups can in t h e i r  thinking become so 
in ten s iv e ly  in terest-bound to  a s i tu a t io n  th a t  they are simply no 
longer able to  see c e r ta in  f a c ts  which would undermine th e i r  sense of 
domination" (Mannheim, 1936:40). An example o f  th is  contention is 
Confucian thought in China, which functioned as a b a r r ie r  to  change,
"for i t  idea lized  the past"  (Lauer, 1978:187). The outlawed caste  
system in the Indian soc ie ty  can be another example.
However, i t  should be appreciated  th a t  Mannheim d i f f e r e n t ia te s  
between two kinds of ideologies: (1) the system of ideas th a t  main­
ta in s  the e x is t in g  order which he c a l l s  "ideology;" and (2) the system 
of ideas t h a t  can a lso i n i t i a t e  change which he terms "utopia" (Remmling, 
1975:52-56). According to  Mannheim, utopian th inking  is "incongruous 
with the s t a t e  o f  r e a l i ty  w ithin  which i t  occurs and tends "to b u rs t  
the bonds o f the ex is t in g  order" (1958:192-3). I t  should be noted th a t  
such d i f f e r e n t i a t io n  between revolu tionary  and conservative ideology can 
be found in the w ritings  of some o ther scho la rs .  For example, Edwards 
(1973) specu la tes  th a t  when a revolution f in a l l y  e ru p ts ,  "the r i s e  of 
the r a d ic a l s , "  and "the re ign  of te r ro r"  w ill  follow. Then, "the 
re tu rn  to  normality" w ill ensue, which, because o f  developing a con­
serva tive  p o s i t io n ,  w ill be facing "the next re v o lu tio n ."  In a word, 
the next revo lu tion  comes about under the banner of a new revolu tionary  
ideology, o r  utopian b e l ie f  system in Mannheim's terminology.
Whether an ideology is  p reex is t in g  fo r  a revolutionary  a c t i v i ty  
or develops throughout a so c io p o l i t ic a l  in su rrec t io n  is another ques­
t io n .  In th i s  context, the ca tegories  of "ad hoc ideology" ( i . e . ,  
ideology th a t  develops gradually  during the course of the revolu tionary
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s tru g g le ) ,  and "performed ideology" ( i . e . ,  ideology th a t  has been 
a r t ic u la te d  in advance o f  the eruption of revolu tion) are re levan t 
(Hagopian, 1974:263-269). However, i t  should be understood th a t  a 
revolu tionary  ad hoc ideology has a t  le a s t  some of i t s  roots in the 
p re-revo lu tionary  s i tu a t io n ,  but ge ts  developed and a r t ic u la te d  during 
the revolu tionary  process. In e i th e r  way, such ingred ien ts  as "progress,"  
" l ib e ra t io n ,"  "eq u a li ty ,"  "democracy," "socia lism ,"  and "nationalism ," 
ind iv idua lly  or j o i n t l y ,  consitu te  the content of a given ideology. 
Nevertheless, the importance of and the p r io r i ty  th a t  is given to 
each element d i f f e r  from time to time and from one soc ie ty  to  another.
Some scholars speak about "the end of ideology," o the rs  th ink  of "the 
decline o f  ideology;" another group goes "beyond ideology" emphasizing 
th a t
A man without an ideology is today as rare  as a man without 
a country, and c e r ta in ly  as unrespectable. Modern h is to ry  
is a h is to ry  of warring creeds, o f  passionate f a i t h s ,  and 
the man without an ideology is  bannerless in an age when 
thinking is e n l i s te d  in b a t ta l io n s  (Feuer, 1968:64).
But, the presence of ideology fo r  revo lu tionary  action does 
not necessa r ily  mean th a t  ideology w ill be implemented as i t  has been 
advocated nor does i t  ind ica te  th a t  revolutionary  values w ill be 
in s t i tu t io n a l iz e d  as desired . Rather, when ideology meets r e a l i ty  and 
the revo lu tionaries  begin to  f u l f i l l  t h e i r  promises, many utopian 
dreams w ill not be re a l iz e d .  In Parsons' words "no revolutionary  
movement can reconstruc t socie ty  according to  the values formulated in 
i t s  ideology without r e s t r i c t io n "  (1964:529).
D. Stages of Revolution 
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The foregoing sec tions  have demonstrated th a t  the phenomenon 
of revo lu tion  is of complex na tu re . For th a t  reason, and fo r  the 
purpose o f  a b e t te r  understanding, many students  o f  revo lu tion  have 
divided the revolutionary  process in to  d i f f e r e n t  s tages and phases.
They a lso  have concentrated on one o r  the o ther stage as t h e i r  sub jec t  
m atter of in v es t ig a t io n .  However, revo lu tion  can be thought o f  as a 
th ree -s tag e  phenomenon: the causation (or the ta k e -o f f ,  o r  the be­
ginning) s ta g e ,  the power t r a n s i t io n  (o r the take-over) s tag e ,  the 
consequence (o r the ending) s tage . (This d is s e r ta t io n  w ill  be concerned 
with only one stage of rev o lu t io n ,  namely, the causation s ta g e .)
The f i r s t  stage is id e n t i f ie d  with the issue of the causes of 
revo lu tion  and hence i t s  o th e r  l a b e l ,  the causation s tag e .  A fte r  
c e r ta in  elements are p re sen t  in a so c ie ty  and the s i tu a t io n  is r ipe  
fo r  a revo lu tionary  movement, the ta k e -o f f  stage o f  revo lu tionary  
ac tion  may emerge. I t  is  in th i s  stage th a t  the evolu tion  o f  lead e r­
sh ip , ideology, group-consciousness, and organ ization  takes p lace . 
Resource m obiliza tion  and the adoption of c e r ta in  s t r a te g i e s  and ta c ­
t i c s  ( i . e . ,  the ca r ro t  and s t i c k  p o l ic ie s )  in the process of the con­
f ro n ta t io n  with the regime are o th e r  fea tu res  o f  th i s  period .
I f  a s e t  of c e r ta in  causes gives b i r th  to  a revo lu tionary  
movement, the circumstances th a t  govern the second (take-over) stage 
w ill  determine the success o r  f a i lu r e  o f the opposition to  t e a r  down 
the old estab lishm en t.  When the old regime is  overthrown, the th i r d  
stage emerges, during which the revo lu tionary  values are i n s t i t u t i o n ­
a l iz ed .  This stage is a lso  id e n t i f ie d  with the r e la t iv e  success or 
f a i lu r e  o f  the implementation o f  the revolu tionary  ideology. In f a c t ,
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we should not speak o f "revolution" i f  the outcome of th is  stage is 
f a i l u r e ,  fo r  no more than an "abortive" revolu tion  w il l  have occurred. 
However, in order to gain comprehensive and comparative understanding 
o f p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n s ,  abortive  events should a lso  be s tud ied  and 
assessed  as well as the successful ones.
Each o f these three  s tages has been labeled  d i f f e r e n t ly  by 
d i f f e r e n t  scholars  and a lso  has been sub-divided in to  various phases.
As noted elsewhere, Edwards (1973) id e n t i f ie s  the f i r s t  s tage with 
"the slow development of revolu tionary  movements" w ithin  which both 
the "preliminary" and "advanced symptoms o f revolu tion" ge t developed.
He a lso  charac te r izes  the take-over s tage by "the outbreak of revolu­
t io n ,"  which is  followed by the th i r d  s tag e .  C h a rac te r is t ic s  of the 
t h i r d  stage are "the r i s e  o f  r a d ic a ls ,"  "the reign o f t e r r o r , "  and 
f in a l l y  "the re tu rn  to  norm ality ,"  which w ill  pave the way fo r  "the 
next revo lu tion ."
Following Edwards' d i s t i n c t  s tages and phases, Brinton (1965) 
c a l l s  the f i r s t  s tage of revolution "the e te rn a l  f ig a ro ,"  which ends 
with "the honeymoon" of revo lu tion— "the v ic to ry  o f  the revo lu tionaries  
a f t e r  what is ra th e r  dramatic than ser ious  bloodshed" (Brinton, 1965:90). 
The "b r ie f"  honeymoon, however, w il l  be over when the new leadership 
ge ts  to  work on the problems as the new government. The f in a l  stage 
in B rin ton 's  scheme is  ch arac te r ized  by the "reign o f t e r r o r  and v i r tu e ,"  
and the "thermidor," th a t  i s ,  "a convalescence from the fever of 
rev o lu tio n . . ." (Brinton, 1965:205). However, according to  Brinton 
". . .once the revo lu tion  has succeeded, once the new regime has got 
well e s ta b l ish e d ,  the emotional overtones of the word 're v o lu t io n '
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change fo r  th a t  soc ie ty . The o r ig in a l  revolution becomes p a r t  of 
h i s t o r y - o r a t o r i c a l  h is to ry  . . . —respectable  and dead" (1965:266).
Timasheff (1946:330) argues th a t  "every revo lu tion  is a s e r ie s
of d is lo c a t io n s  and reco n stru c tio n s ,  but the process of d is lo ca tio n
and reconstruc tion  may assume d i f f e r e n t  rhythms." He a lso  claims th a t
what Edwards and Brinton ca l l  "moderate" and " rad ica l"  phases (within
the consequence stage) can be pu t in to  a s ing le  phase because the
former is merely the prelude to  the l a t t e r .  In th is  same context,
Hagopian suggests th a t
. . . each revolution gives b i r th  to  forces th a t  tend to 
push i t  onward (hypertrophic fo rces)  and forces th a t  tend 
to  wind i t  down (entropie  fo rc e s ) .  The in te rp lay  between 
these  two kinds o f  forces could th e o re t ic a l ly  produce revo­
lu t io n s  th a t  run through th re e ,  fou r ,  f iv e ,  s ix ,  o r  even 
more c le a r  and d i s t i n c t  phases (1974:247).
I t  seems th a t  what is r e a l ly  important in d iv id ing  the revolu­
t iona ry  process in d i f f e r e n t  s tages is  not the periods themselves but 
why the would-be revolution succeeds o r  f a i l s  to  take over and to 
f u l f i l l  i t s  promises. According to  Laqueur (1968:504), the most 
frequent causes of f a i lu re  are (1) lack  of support, (2) lack  of active  
re s is ta n c e  ( to  the government) by the bulk of the popula tion , and (3) 
d isu n ity  o r  lack  of purpose on the p a r t  o f  the leaders .  On the o ther 
hand, (1) the support o f  a m i l i t a n t  m inority  and (2) the physical 
s e isu re  o f  some v i ta l  poin ts  d ' appui (such as the s e a t  o f  government, 
the army and police  commands, the means of mass communication—rad io ,  
p re s s ,  e t c . )  are decisive fo r  a revo lu tion  to  succeed. Laqueur a lso  
emphasizes th a t  "the timing of a revolu tionary  attempt is of crucial 
importance; so are the p e r s o n a l i t ie s  of i t s  leaders" (1968:504).
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Evidently, Laqueur dea ls  with a re v o lu tio n 's  success o r  f a i lu r e  merely 
with regard to  changing the  government, and not with reference  to  the 
app lica tion  o f  the  revo lu tionary  ideology a f t e r  the new leadersh ip  
has taken over. Like o the r students o f  revo lu tion , he f a i l s  to  address 
the  issue of the  abortion  o f  some social movements, which could have 
become f u l l - s c a le  revo lu tions .
Why a revo lu tion  is  successful in the  course o f  implementing 
a new value system, or f a i l s  to  do so, i s  the  crucial is sue . In f a c t ,  
when one speaks o f  rev o lu tio n s ,  he speaks o f  those revo lu tions  th a t  
have, to  a large degree, accomplished th e i r  id e a ls .  Other movements 
which are  s t i l l  in  p rocess ,  or have achieved but the  minimum, a re  not 
revo lu tions . However, s ig h t  should not be l o s t  of the fa c t  th a t  i t  
i s  both th e o re t ic a l ly  and em pirica lly  d i f f i c u l t  to  judge a revolu tionary  
movement as a complete revo lu tion . After almost two hundred years 
since i t s  outbreak, the g rea t  French Revolution is  charged as not having 
achieved some o f i t s  fundamental id e a ls ,  e . g . ,  pu tting  an end to  the 
a r i s to c r a t i c  t r a d i t io n  in the  French socie ty . In th i s  con tex t ,  Marx 
charges th a t  "the French rev o lu tio n a r ie s  may have thought th a t  they 
did b a t t l e  for l i b e r ty ,  e q u a l i ty ,  and f r a t e r n i ty ,  but the  rea l r e s u l t  
o f  the revo lu tion  was the f ina l  v ic to ry  of the  c a p i t a l i s t  mode of 
production" (Hagopian, 1974:70). Further, comparing two rev o lu tions , 
Arendt notes th a t  "the sad t ru th  o f  the matter i s  th a t  the French 
Revolution, which ended in d i s a s t e r ,  has made world h is to ry ,  while 
the  American Revolution, so triumphantly successfu l,  has remained an 
event of l i t t l e  more than local s ign ificance"  (1963:49).
F in a lly ,  in th e  process o f  in ves t iga ting  a rev o lu tio n ,  each
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Indeed, in one s i tu a t io n  one o r  more va riab les  may be more decis ive  
than o th e rs .  Such s i tu a t io n a l  s ig n if ic a n ce ,  one may assume, has led 
some th e o r i s t s  to define a re v o lu tio n ,  fo r  example, as economic ( i . e . ,  
Marxist) o r  p o l i t ic a l  ( i . e . ,  based on the s trugg le  for power).
The remainder o f  t h i s  sec tion  i s  devoted to  a summary s t a t e ­
ment o f  some dominant th e o r ie s  o f  th e  causes o f  revo lu tion . (A d e ta i led  
discussion and evaluation  will follow in  Chapters IV and VI.)
(1) The Marxists s t r e s s  th a t  a re v o lu t io n 's  causes are  economic 
in nature  and m an isfes ta tion . With the  development o f  th e  c a p i t a l i s t  
mode o f production, the  masses become a l ie n a te d ,  poor, and powerless.
As Vanfosson (1979:242) suggests , Marx believes th a t  " re s is ta n ce  to  
c a p i t a l i s t  in te r e s t s  w ill develop only as the workers become increasing ly  
d e s t i tu t e  and m iserable."  Therefore , i t  i s  not only economic fac to rs  
in genera l,  but misery in p a r t i c u la r ,  along with o ther f a c to r s ,  t h a t  
gives r i s e  to  revo lu tion .
(2) On the  o th e r  hand, some students o f  revo lu tion  ( e .g . ,  
Tocqueville , 1955; Davies, 1962) argue th a t  i t  i s  during a l u l l  in 
genera lly  prosperous times th a t  d iscon ten t increases and revo lu tion  
w ill be more probable. After enjoying some economic w ell-be ing , people 
w ill  be f r u s t r a te d  i f  a sudden economic stagnation comes about and 
fu r th e r  p ro sp e ri ty  i s  not enjoyed. Hence, i t  i s  economic p rosperity  
and not economic misery th a t  i s  responsib le  fo r  revo lu tion .
(3) Without regard to  a decis ive  ro le  fo r  the  economic 
v a r ia b le ,  o ther s tudents  o f  revo lu tion  seek and suggest s t r u c tu r a l - 
organizational causes fo r  rev o lu tion . According to  one sub-group 
exemplified by Dahrendorf (1957), i t  i s  the s trugg le  fo r  power, as a
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of i t s  th ree  discussed s tages  is  o f  c ruc ia l  s ig n if ic a n ce .  I f  a l l  these 
s tages are not sc ru t in iz ed  as a whole, a comprehensive understanding 
of revo lu tion  w ill  not be enjoyed. Unless a n a ly t ica l  purposes are 
involved, th i s  t o t a l i t y  should not be dismembered. Since th i s  d i s s e r ­
ta t io n  is  involved only with the genesis o f  rev o lu t io n ,  and not the 
phenomenon o f revolu tion  as a whole, only the f i r s t  s tage , id e n t i f ie d  
with the causes of rev o lu tio n ,  w il l  be emphasized in the next sec t io n .
E. Causes o f  Revolution
Whether revo lu tion  is  good or e v i l e ,  i t s  generating fa c to rs  
do always fa s c in a te  the in v e s t ig a to r s .  Understanding the causes of 
revo lu tion  is not only a prominent e n te rp r ie s  in i t s  own r ig h t ,  i t  is 
a lso  o f  s ig n i f ic a n t  importance with regard to  i t s  consequences. Such 
t i t l e s  as "Why Men Rebel," "When Men Revolt and Why," and "Revolution: 
Why, How, When," emphasize the important weight th a t  is  given to  the 
ana lys is  of the o r ig in s  o f  rev o lu tio n .  Probing a re v o lu t io n 's  causes 
is  as o ld  as A r is to t le  and, a t  the  same time, as fresh  as i f  revo lu tion  
were a newly introduced phenomenon. As a r e s u l t ,  there  is a p le th o ra  
of th e o r ie s  o f  the causes of rev o lu t io n ,  each o f  which is n e i th e r  
fu l ly  explanatory  nor t o t a l l y  inadequate.
However, there  is  a common agreement on the very nature  of 
those elements th a t  motivate men to  reb e l ,  to  make revo lu tions . These 
elements are s o c ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, c u l tu ra l  ( e .g . ,  n a t io n a l i s t ,  
r e l ig io u s ) ,  m i l i t a r y ,  and psychologica l. T h is ,  o f  course, does not 
n e ce ssa r i ly  mean th a t  in every given revo lu tion  a l l  these independent 
v a r iab le s  are in opera tion . Nor does i t  imply th a t  a l l  o f  the 
functioning  fac to rs  con tribu te  to  the c rea t io n  of revo lu tion  equally .
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scarce resource, th a t  eventuates in revo lu tion . In every so c io p o l i t ic a l  
o rgan iza tion , the powerless under c e r ta in  circumstances are in ubiqui­
tous c o n f l ic t  with the powerful fo r  the possession o f power. Thus, the 
desire  fo r  power motivates people to  rigorously  compete with and rev o lt  
aga ins t  each o ther.
Another sub-group in th i s  category argues t h a t  revolutionary  
change is an outcome o f value disensus and a d is func tion ing  d iv is ion  
o f labor. Johnson (1966) emphasizes th a t  inadequate s o c ia l iz a t io n ,  
fo r  example, w ill  cause the d isfunction ing  of the soc ia l  system and i t s  
d isequ ilib rium . This s i tu a t io n  n e ce ss i ta te s  a new balance and provokes 
people to  rebalance the d isequ il ib ra ted  system—to make revolu tion .
The th i rd  sub-group in th i s  con tex t, id e n t i f ie d  with the 
resource m obilization t r a d i t io n ,  claims th a t  even i f  c e r ta in  socio­
p o l i t i c a l  and economic inequality  does e x i s t ,  people w ill  not necessarily  
make revo lu tion . In order to  i n i t i a t e  a revo lu tion , people must have 
ce r ta in  o rgan iza tion , p a t te rn s  fo r  movement p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  and "stra tegy  
fo r  soc ia l  p ro te s t ."  Therefore, in the f in a l  a n a ly s is ,  i t  is a people 's  
resource m obilization  en te rp r ise  th a t  paves the way fo r  the crea tion  of 
a d ra s t ic  change, a revo lu tion .
(4) Another s tandpoin t, mainly id e n t i f ie d  with Gusfield 
(1976), maintains th a t  when a p eo p le 's  way of l i f e  is  changed unw illingly , 
or threatened by undesired change, they are more l ik e ly  to  rebe l. This 
view gives p r io r i ty  to  the cu ltu ra l  f a c to r  as the main cause of p o l i t i c a l  
un res t.
(5) The psychological t r a d i t io n  of revo lu tion  s t re s se s  th a t  
due to  various conditions , people become aggressive and f ru s t r a te d .
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Such aggression and f r u s t r a t io n  will put ind iv idua ls  toge the r  to  par­
t i c ip a te  in  p o l i t i c a l  v io lence. This same p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  which may 
r e s u l t  In rev o lu tion , can be understood as a people 's  psychological 
response to  c e r ta in  motives and impositions. Gurr (1974) i s  one of 
the leading exponents of th i s  t r a d i t io n .
(6) War has a lso  been regarded as a cause o f  revo lu tion . In 
a sp ec if ic  sense, a severe m i l i t a r y  defeat which a f f e c t s  a n a t io n 's  
d ign ity  and a sp ira t io n s  may motivate people to  change th e i r  unfavorable 
s i tu a t io n  through a revo lu tion .
Understandably, revo lu tion  i s  a highly complex phenomenon and 
hence i t s  e x p l i c i t  explanation and pred ic tion  is  q u ite  d i f f i c u l t .  
A dditionally , i f  i t  i s  possib le  to  comprehend which fa c to rs  have caused 
a c e r ta in  rev o lu tio n ,  i t  i s  not an easy task  to  c a te g o r ic a l ly  analyze 
how these v a riab les  function to g e th e r  to  produce a revo lu tionary  change. 
Likewise, i t  i s  a lso  d i f f i c u l t  to  s ing le  out the  individual s ign if icance  
of each co n tr ibu ting  va riab le  to  the  c rea tion  of revo lu tion . I t  should 
be emphasized, fo r  example, th a t  n e i th e r  economic elements a lone, nor 
s trugg le  fo r  power in p a r t i c u la r  i s  responsible  fo r  the  eruption  of 
revo lu tion . In f a c t ,  "as a macro-event, revolu tion  i s  produced by a 
m u l t ip l ic i ty  o f  independent causes. . ." (Gagopian, 1974:184-185).
F in a l ly ,  i t  should be emphasized th a t  such elements as ideology. 
lead e rsh ip , group consciousness, c o l le c t iv e  commitment, o rg an iza tio n , 
and communication are  o f  v i ta l  s ign if icance  in the  development and 
success of a revolu tionary  movement. Likewise, some w in d fa l ls ,  fa c to rs  
which have variously  been ca l led  acce le ra to rs  or p re c ip i ta t in g  f a c to r s , 
are necessary to  promote and inflame a revolu tionary  movement. The so-
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c a lled  th i r d  party  may a lso  c ru c ia l ly  determine the ou tburs t o f  a 
revo lu tion . The th i rd  p a r ty  is id e n t i f ie d  with an exogeneous force 
which fo r  various reasons may support the opposition to  t e a r  down the 
ru ling  c lass  or helps the l a t t e r  to  l iq u id a te  the former. However, 
there  can a lso  be th i rd  " p a r t ie s ,"  some of which back the regime and 
others of which support the revo lu tionaries  (Schumaker, 1978:168-184). 
Hence, when th is  same ex terna l party  is in opera tion , a t r i a d i c  r e l a ­
tionsh ip  in a revolu tionary  s i tu a t io n  is p re sen t .  To be su re ,  a l l  
these categories  do not cause a revolution but help to  a c tu a l iz e  the 
hidden s t r a in s  and to  t r a n s la t e  them into open v io len t  a c t io n .
Whatever i t s  causes and consequences a re ,  revolu tion  as a social 
movement is a socia l phenomenon. Further , th is  same socia l e n t i t y  is ,  
fo r  understandable reasons, o f  a socio log ical nature to  be b a s ic a l ly  
s tud ied  w ithin the area o f  sociology. The following sec tion  is developed 
to  shed some l ig h t  on th i s  contention.
P. The Study of Revolution is a Sociological Enterprise
Inspired by Leo P e trazh itsy ,  a Russo-Polish sch o la r ,  Sorokin 
once re fe rred  to sociology as the (n+1) sc ience , where (n) equals a l l  
o ther  soc ia l  sciences and the (1) equals sociology proper. In developing 
th i s  idea
Sorokin says th a t  to  each of the many c lasses  of socia l phenomena. . 
a p a r t ic u la r  socia l science must correspond. But, in add ition  to 
these sciences, a science (sociology) is necessary to  study the 
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  common to a l l  the c lasses  o f  socia l phenomena 
and the in te r r e la t io n  between these c la s s e s ,  because these two 
tasks cannot be s a t i s f a c to r i l y  achieved by the p a r t i c u la r  socia l 
sciences (Timasheff, 1955:8).
In th is  l i g h t ,  sociology is viewed as the "genera liz ing" or
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" in te r re la t in g "  science, th a t  i s ,  the science th a t  concerns in te r ­
r e la t in g  data of a l l  o th e r  socia l sciences. With th i s  in mind, and 
since sociology b a s ic a l ly  deals with the "why's" and not the "what's" 
when the explanation of soc ia l  phenomena is involved, the study of 
revo lu tion  f i t s  into the d is c ip l in e  of sociology. A dd itiona lly , 
sociology, in a sp ec if ic  sense, involves i t s e l f  with soc ia l  groups and 
in s t i tu t io n s  and the in te r re la t io n s h ip s  of each. T his , too , is  an 
ind ica t io n  o f  the f a c t  th a t  the study of revo lu tion  belongs to  the 
soc io log ica l  inquiry. Indeed, in each revolu tion  th ree  defined co l­
l e c t i v i t i e s  are involved—the government, i t s  o p p o s it ion , and the 
" th i rd  p a r ty ,"  as touched upon in the previous se c t io n .  Furthermore, 
revo lu tion  by d e f in i t io n  is one kind of socia l  change and hence i t  
is  a su b jec t  m atter of the socio log ica l p e rsp ec tiv e ,  fo r  the study of 
soc ia l  change is a socio log ica l e n te rp r is e .
This perception of sociology and the acknowledgement o f  th is
lo ca t ion  o f  the study of revo lu tion , however, do not mean th a t  the
study o f soc ia l  movements is a p r iva te  property  of s o c io lo g is ts .  Nor
does i t  ignore the f a c t  th a t  almost every o ther soc ia l  d isc ip l in e
( e .g . ,  h i s to ry ,  p o l i t i c a l  sc ience , socia l psychology) has i t s  own
concern with the study o f revo lu tion . Rather, what is meant and
emphasized is th a t  sociology incorporates d i f f e r e n t  va riab les  from
various f i e ld s  of socia l sciences into the study o f such complex
phenomena as revo lu tions . In th is  context, Timasheff ind ica tes  th a t
Neither the economist nor the s tudent o f  the h is to ry  of moral 
and re l ig io u s  ideas is competent to  solve the s c i e n t i f i c  p ro­
blem because he sees i t  from one side only; i t  f a l l s  w ithin the 
province of a science which stands above the d iv is io n  of social 
phenomena into c la s se s .  This science is  sociology (1955:8).
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But, where does the study o f revolu tion  f i t  w ith in  the sub­
d iv is ions  o f the science of sociology? The answer to  th i s  question 
was implied previously . In s p e c i f ic  terms, revo lu tion  is a social 
movement which is sub-divided under the area of socia l change, whereas 
socia l change is a socio log ical su b jec t .  As Roucek and Warren 
(1976:253-255) no te , the American Sociological Society acknowledges 
the branches of sociology as follows: social o rgan iza tion ; social 
d iso rgan iza tion ; in terpersonal r e la t io n s ;  intergroup r e la t io n s ;  
popula tion ; family; ru ra l-u rban ; soc ia l  psychology; pub lic  opinion; 
and communication; applied sociology; area s tu d ie s ;  research metho­
dology; theory; in te rd is c ip l in a ry  s p e c i a l i t i e s ;  and socia l change.
In th i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  the branch of socia l change is  id e n t i f ie d  
with so c ia l  c o n tro l ,  social p rocess , socia l m o b ili ty ,  technological 
changes, and socia l movements.
To emphasize, revo lu tion  is  a socia l movement which res ides  
in the category of social change though n e ith e r  a l l  socia l  movements 
are revo lu tions  nor a l l  socia l  changes are revo lu tionary . With th is  
in mind, i t  might be of value to  categorize  d i f f e r e n t  types of social 
changes in order to  understand f u l ly  the category of the rad ica l  change, 
th a t  i s ,  the revo lu tion . Based on the c r i t e r i a  of "duration" and 
"scope," and with reference to  Moore (1963), Smelser (1968), and 
Lauer's  (1978) id e n t i f ic a t io n  of socia l  a l t e r a t io n ,  a l l  socia l changes 
can be divided in to  four ca tego ries :  (1) revo lu tionary  change, as one
type o f  soc ia l  movement, which is id e n t i f ie d  with g re a t  scope and 
sho rt  du ra tion ; (2) evolu tionary  change, which is a change of g rea t 
scope and long duration; (3) p a t te rn  maintenance or homeostatic change,
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which is  charac te r ized  by small scope and long dura tion ; and (4) fad 
and fash ion , which are changes o f  small scope and sh o r t  duration.
The study of revolu tion  as ou tlined  in the previous passages 
is  both complicated and in te re s t in g .  As such, how to  approach revolu­
t ions  and s c ru t in iz e  theo rie s  o f  the causes of revo lu tion  is of c ruc ia l 
importance. The following chap ter w ill  address these issues as they 
c o n s t i tu te  the major methodological concern in th is  d is s e r ta t io n .
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CHAPTER I I I  
METHODOLOGY
" I t  is commonly recognized today th a t  science walks on two 
leg s—theory and observation; th a t  the lo g ica l phase of science (the 
phase o f  iso la t io n  and d e f in i t io n  of basic  ca teg o r ie s ,  and o f systematic 
build ing) is of equal importance with the a c t i v i ty  of the f a c t - f in d e r  
and v e r i f i e r "  (Morris, 1 9 6 7 :x i-x i i ) .  This d is s e r ta t io n  concerns both 
theory and the empirical observation of some cases of revo lu tion  in order 
to  obtain  a b e t te r  understanding of the causes of revo lu tion . In th is  
d i s s e r ta t io n  a four-stage  process is proposed to  develop an explanation 
and p red ic t io n  of the occurrence of  revo lu tion . A b r ie f  sketch of the 
four s tages  is presented below.
(1) Discussion of the p reva len t theo rie s  of revo lu tion  in 
terms of t h e i r  basic  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s .
(2) Application o f  the theo rie s  to  a t  l e a s t  one case of 
revo lu tion  to a id  in iden tify ing  the s im i l a r i t i e s  and d if fe ren ces  among 
the th e o r ie s .  In th is  s tag e ,  the explanatory capacity of each theory 
can be assessed , and a decision regarding a synthesizing endeavor can 
be made.
(3) Synthesis of the th e o r ie s ,  based on th e i r  ap p lic a t io n  to 
the case study. Here, two reserva tions  must be made. F i r s t ,  the in­
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tended app lica t io n  does not necessa r ily  mean th a t  each theory should 
(or would) be as applicable  to  the same e x ten t  as the o ther. Nor does 
i t  imply th a t  each revo lu tion  is a dup lica tion  o f  o th e r  revo lu tions .
We must remember th a t  whatever i t s  s im i la r i ty  to  o th e rs ,  each socia l 
pehnomenon, based on i t s  so c io -cu l tu ra l  s e t t in g  and time dimension, is 
unique and unpara lle led . The second reserva tion  is th a t  the intended 
syn thesis  does not (and should not) e s s e n t ia l ly  handle any given revolu­
tion  in exac tly  the same way as the o ther phenomenon of the kind. The 
p l a u s i b i l i t y  of th is  contention can be found in the very nature o f  the 
e a r l i e r  p o in t ,  th a t  i s ,  each soc ia l  f a c t  has i t s  own uniqueness r e la t iv e  
to  o th e rs .  To shed l ig h t  on th i s  p o in t ,  two complementary s teps w il l  be 
taken. The f i r s t  is  to  supplement the emerging syn thesis  with some sub­
s id ia ry  p ro p o s it io n s ,  based on secondary find ings  about social movements 
including revo lu tions . The next s te p ,  which is  the f in a l  stage in th i s  
synthesiz ing  process, is  the te s t in g  of the syn thes is  i t s e l f  (with 
another rev o lu t io n ) ,  as d iscussed below.
(4) Test o f  the synthesized theory with a second revo lu tion .
I f  such a t e s t  is su ccess fu l ,  to  an acceptable degree, then the u t i l i t y  
of the synthesis  as a newly developed theory o f  revolu tion  can be 
acknowledged.
As ou tlined  above, th is  four-stage  e n te rp r is e  is ,  in a sense, 
a departure  from theoriz ing  on the basis  of a case study or comparative 
in v es t ig a t io n  to build ing a theory on the grounds o f  the already developed 
th e o r ie s .  I t  i s ,  indeed, in th i s  same s h i f t  t h a t  we are p resen tly  
in te re s te d ,  and i t  is what we w ill  concentrate on throughout th is  
d i s s e r t a t io n .  However, in d iscussing  each rev o lu tio n ,  a case study
41
technique w ill  be adopted; and in applying the sy n th es is ,  derived from 
a t e s t  case rev o lu tio n ,  to another re v o lu tio n ,  a comparative analysis  
concerning the two revo lu tions  w ill  be employed. Therefore, our metho­
dological approach in th is  d i s s e r ta t io n  is id e n t i f ie d  with three  tech­
niques, th a t  i s ,  (1) comparative a n a ly s is ,  (2) case study, and (3) 
theory construction . Each of these w il l  be discussed below.
A. Comparative Analysis
The comparative study of revo lu tion  is i n i t i a l l y  id e n t i f ie d  
with some pioneer h is to r ia n s  such as Edwards (1927), Pe ttee  (1938), 
and Brinton (1965). The major a t t r i b u t e  of th is  type o f  in v es t ig a t io n ,  
sometimes c a l led  "comparative h is to ry ,"  is  to  s ingle  out the s im i la r i t i e s  
o f  the compared phenomena. Whatever the c r i te r io n  fo r  the se lec t io n  
of revo lu tions  and whatever the c u l tu ra l  con ten ts , s im i la r i t i e s  among 
the compared events are the fundamental fac to rs  in th is  comparison.
In a broad sense, t h i s  kind of procedure " is  coimnonly used ra th e r  
loosely  to  r e f e r  to  any and a l l  s tu d ie s  in which two or more h is to r ic a l  
t r a j e c to r s  of n a t io n - s ta te s ,  i n s t i tu t io n a l  complexes, or c iv i l i z a t io n s  
are juxtaposed" (Skocpol, 1979:36).
In the comparative h is to ry  technique c e r ta in  d e fic ien c ie s  
can be seen. F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  i t  is  u t i l i z e d  by h is to r ia n s  who, depending 
on th e i r  sp e c ia l ty ,  usually  do not attem pt e i th e r  to d e lin ea te  the 
causes of o r  p re d ic t  the occurrence o f  revolu tions as do so c io lo g is ts .  
"The so c io lo g is t  p icks up where the h is to r ia n  c lo se s ,"  and "he delves 
in to  assumptions with which the h is to r ia n  begins" (G usfie ld , 1976:2-3). 
Secondly, since the compared cases are usually  be based on more [ca se s] ,
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i t  ought to  cover a number of cases large enough fo r  c e r ta in  rigorous 
te s t in g  procedures 1 ike s t a t i s t i c a l  an a ly s is  to  be used" (Skocpol, 1979: 
33). Third, since the compared cases are usually  chosen a r b i t r a r i l y ,  a 
c e r ta in  amount o f  bias can always be p resen t.  For example, according 
to  Baechler (1975), B rin ton 's  (1965) s e le c t io n  of the English, American, 
French, and Russian Revolutions, fo r  the purpose of a comparative study, 
is  problematic. B rin to n 's  "en tire  work shows th a t  the American Revolu­
t io n ,  which was a national uprising ag a in s t  a foreign power, has nothing 
in common with the th ree  o th e rs ,  which are endogenous" (Baechler, 1975:6) 
So f a r ,  the comparative ana lys is  has been viewed as a un ified  
whole and as merely a h is to r ic a l  method. Skocpol (1979) d is t ingu ishes  
th ree  versions w ithin  th i s  approach, each of which d i f f e r s  from the 
c la s s ic  comparative t r a d i t io n  discussed above. The f i r s t  is  represented 
by the work of Charles, Louise, and Richard T i l ly  (1975) who attempt 
"to show th a t  a p a r t i c u la r  general socio log ica l model holds across 
d i f f e r e n t  national contexts" (Skocpol, 1979:36). The next version is 
id e n t i f ie d  with Anderson (1974), and Bendix (1964), who "use comparisons 
p r im ari ly  to bring out con tras ts  among nations or c iv i l i z a t io n s  taken 
as system atic  wholes" (Skocpol, 1979:36). The th i rd  ve rs ion , which 
Skocpol labels  "comparative h is to r ic a l  a n a ly s is ." is represented by 
such scholars  as Tocqueville (1965), Moore (1966), and Bloch (1970).
The overrid ing in te n t  in th is  procedure, as Skocpol (1979:36) argues,
" is  to  develop, t e s t ,  and re fine  causa l, explanatory hypotheses about 
events or s t ru c tu re s  in teg ra l  to  macro-units such as n a t io n -s ta te s ."
This technique, according to  Skocpol, is " d is t in c t ly  appropria te"  fo r 
h i s to r ic a l  an a ly s is ,  because i t  is "in f a c t ,  the mode of m u ltiva ria te
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analysis  to  which one re so r ts  when there  are too many va riab les  and 
not enough cases" (1979:39).
Comparative an a ly s is ,  in g e n e ra l , e i th e r  focuses on d ifferences  
o r  s im i la r i t i e s  among the compared phenomena, and whether i t  is  based 
on too many variab les  o r  too few cases, can produce genuine ins igh t 
to  the study of so c ia l  un its  including revolu tions . At the same time, 
i t  su ffe rs  from c e r ta in  problems p erta in ing  to  contextual cu l tu ra l  
d iffe rences  when socia l revolutions are analyzed. Understanding th is  
problem, Etzioni and Dubow (1970:14-15) emphasize th a t  "we need in s tru ­
ments which w ill allow us to  study d i f f e r e n t  cu ltu res  without the re s u l ts  
of measurements being a ffec ted  by the cu ltu re  in which the instruments 
are designed and te s te d ."
B. Case Study Method 
As Moore suggests , " th a t  comparative analysis  is  no s u b s t i tu te  
fo r  d e ta i led  invest iga tion  of sp ec if ic  cases is obvious" (1966:xiv).
This statement emphasizes the very nature of the case study technique.
I f  comparative s tud ies  search fo r  d iffe rences  and/or s im i la r i t i e s  fo r  an 
overa ll  exp lana tion , case s tud ies  attem pt to  analyze s p e c if ic  individual 
cases in depth. According to Labovitz and Hagedorn (1976:61) the major 
purpose o f  the "one-shot" case study method " is  to describe a u n i t ,  
ra th e r  than to t e s t  hypotheses." Therefore, the case study method is 
almost synonymous with the desc rip tive  type of research and " is  the 
method of choice when you want to  obtain  a wealth of d e ta i l  about your 
subjec t"  (Simon, 1969:276).
However, the case study procedure su ffe rs  from c e r ta in  d e fi-
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c ien c ie s .  For, " . . .  a s in g le ,  c ro ss -sec tio n a l  c o n s te l la t io n  of 
em pirical phenomena does not afford  the p o s s ib i l i t y  of e s ta b l ish in g  
causal re la t io n s  among these phenomena (Smelser, 1976:198). This pro­
posed problem needs some c l a r i f i c a t io n .  F i r s t ,  when fu r th e r  s t a t i s t i c a l  
e lab o ra t io n  or s i tu a t io n a l  manipulation is  needed, a c e r ta in  r e s t r i c t io n  
is  observed in the case study technique. Since th is  technique concen­
t r a t e s  on but one u n i t  o f  an a ly s is ,  the f ind ings  cannot v a l id ly  be 
a t t r ib u te d  to  o ther somewhat s im ila r  c a te g o r ie s .  This is so because 
each observed case is  s tud ied  ind iv idua lly  and uniquely. Secondly, 
s ince a case study "depends upon the mother w it ,  common sense , and 
imagination of the person doing the case study" (Simon, 1969:276), h is  
own p o l i t i c a l  values can a f f e c t  the f in d in g s .  In o ther words, what is 
r e a l ly  e x is t in g  in the socia l world and what is seen by the observer 
may no t match very c lo se ly .
Nevertheless, the case study method can provide a so l id  base 
fo r  fu r th e r  comparative an a ly s is .  I t  could be argued th a t  a v a rie ty  
o f  da ta  th a t  serve as a cornerstone fo r  comparisons are derived from 
case s tu d ie s .  Durkheim's (1965) The Elementary Forms of the Religious 
L i f e , Weber's (1958) The P ro tes tan t  Ethic and the S p i r i t  o f  Capitalism , 
and G u sf ie ld 's  (1976) Symbolic Crusade, which are a l l  case study e n te r ­
p r i s e s ,  are some examples out of many th a t  ind ica te  how case s tud ies  
can trav e rse  th e i r  l im i t s .
While recognizing the l im i ta t io n  in the case study procedure, 
we w il l  charac te rize  the revolutions o f Iran  (1979) and Egypt (1952), 
independently, as s p e c if ic  cases. By doing so , we do not attempt to 
develop e i th e r  a s p e c i f ic  causal explanation  o f a revolu tion  or a general
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theory of  revolution based on the two addressed revo lu tions . Rather, 
we attem pt to  use these two cases as touchstones fo r  an attempted synthe­
s i s  on the grounds o f  some already e x is t in g  theo rie s  of rev o lu tio n .
In th i s  connection, and in order to  ch arac te r ize  each rev o lu t io n ,  a 
v a r ie ty  o f  h i s to r ic a l  data  w ill  be assessed and used. These data have 
been provided by d i f f e r e n t  in v e s t ig a to r s ,  including some of the revolu­
t io n a r ie s  themselves, and can be c l a s s i f i e d  as h i s to r i c a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  
so c io lo g ic a l ,  and j o u r n a l i s t i c .  To be su re ,  whatever the performance of 
each revo lu tion  has been, we are merely in te re s ted  in those elements 
th a t  caused the erup tion  o f  the revo lu tion . In l in e  with such in te r e s t ,  
the causes and the revo lu tionary  episodes re s u l t in g  in the s h i f t  o f  power, 
which is "the basic  sign of revolution" (L enin :1917), w ill  be i l lu s t r a t e d .
C. Theory Construction Technique 
Wagner (1964) suggests th a t  a l l  soc io log ica l  th eo r ie s  demonstrate 
c e r ta in  ideological and methodological d iffe ren ces  among which th a t  of 
"scope" is c ru c ia l .  For, the scope o f theory ". . .poses ta sks  which 
are  much more complex than present-day th e o r i s t s  seem to  r e a l iz e "
(Wagner, 1964:571). Blumer (1969:143) says th a t  "theory is o f  value in 
em pirical science only to  the e x ten t  to  which i t  connects f r u i t f u l l y  
with the empirical world." In th i s  l in e  o f  argument i t  could a lso  be 
argued th a t  the way in which the theory is formulated and proposed can 
provide empirical f r u i t f u ln e s s .  In Rosenberg's words "good data  are 
im portant, but what is done with them is  equally  so. The data  must be 
viewed within  the framework of a c e r ta in  logic"  (1968:xi). Hence the 
very techn ica l substance o f  theory and theory construction  e n te rp r is e
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can be re a l iz e d .
When the procedure o f  theory building i s  d e a l t  w ith , a t  l e a s t  
two issues  must be emphasized and illum inated . The f i r s t  concerns the 
very meaning o f  "theory" in a " techn ica l"  sense, and the second p e r ta in s  
to the "form" th a t  a theory can take .
Concerning the f i r s t  question , theory i s  defined as "a statement 
th a t  i s  formulated to  provide a te s ta b le  answer to  one kind o f  problem 
in in te rp re t in g  experience. . ."  (Boskoff, 1966:8). Statements are 
id e n t i f ie d  with "new ideas" aiming a t  a p a r t ia l  o r  a wholesale explana­
t io n  o f  the  ta r g e t  phenomenon. A statem ent, according to  Reynolds 
(1975:67-82), can be an "existence" statement which re la te s  one event to 
the o ther or a re la t io n a l  s ta tem ent. A re la t io n a l  statement i s  e i th e r  
" a s s o c ia t io n a l ," which describes what concepts occur o r  e x is t  to g e th e r ,  
or "causal,"  which describes the  re la t io n sh ip  between two concepts in a 
causal fa sh io n , i . e . ,  one concept i s  the cause and the o ther is  the 
e f f e c t .  F in a l ly ,  a causal statem ent can be e i th e r  "determ in is t ic"
( i . e . ,  under c e r ta in  cond itions , i f  A occurs, B w ill  occur), or 
" p ro b a b i l is t ic "  ( i . e . ,  under c e r ta in  cond itions , i f  A occurs, B probably 
will occur). Evident as i t  i s ,  each statement contains a t  l e a s t  two 
concepts and concepts "comprise the  building blocks and provide the  
content o f  th eo r ie s"  (Chafetz, 1978:45).
The very meaning o f  p ropositions leads us to  the previously 
proposed question concerning the "form" th a t  a theory  can assume in a 
technical sense. This is  so because o f the f a c t  t h a t  a proposition 
is  a generic  name fo r  hypotheses, axioms, p o s tu la te s ,  and theorems based 
on which d i f f e r e n t  forms o f th e o r ie s  can be developed. According to
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Reynolds (1975:83-114), these forms are: (1) The se t-o f-law s form of
theory , o f  which M ichel's  "iron law o f oligarchy" is an example. However, 
th i s  form of theory does not t e l l  about what causes, say, a democratic 
organization  to be o l ig a rc h ic a l .  For, i t  is  developed in the form of 
an ex istence  statement concerned with the "whats" and not the "whys."
(2) The axiomatic form o f  theo ry , which is  based on a s e t  of re la t io n a l  
statements consis ts  o f  axioms ( i . e . ,  the basic  p ro p o s it io n s ) ,  from 
which a l l  o the r  statem ents in the theory may be derived. For th i s  
reason and because o f  th i s  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  " i t  is extremely d i f f i c u l t  to 
f ind  examples of axiomatic theory re la t in g  to  socia l or human phenomena, 
and i t  is  even harder to  f ind  those th a t  are simple enough fo r  an 
in troductory  discussion" (Reynolds, 1975:93). (3) The causal process
form of theory which c o n s is ts  of an in te r r e la te d  s e t  o f  th e o re t ic a l  
and operational d e f in i t io n s ,  and ex istence  and causal (d e te rm in is t ic  or 
p ro b a b i l i s t i c )  s ta tem ents . Reynolds suggests th a t  "almost a l l  of the 
paradigms in social science appear amiable to .  . .the  causal process 
form" of the theory (1975:97), and the proposed synthesis  in th is  
d i s s e r ta t io n  w ill not be the exception. Thus, we will develop a synthesis  
of the causes of revo lu tion  in a causal process fashion, understanding 
th a t  the search fo r  causation  in social sciences is  a never-ending 
process. For, ". . . the  analys is  can go as f a r  as the ingenuity of the 
th e o r i s t  w ill  carry  him, without ever reaching the u l t im a te ,  o r  f i r s t  
cause" (Krech and C ruchfie ld , 1948:34).
Now we may tu rn  to a crucial question of the types of r e la t io n ­
ships the variab les  can have in a causal s i tu a t io n .  However, such complex 
re la t io n sh ip s  w ill concern us only as f a r  as th is  d is s e r ta t io n  necessi-
48
t a t e s .  With th is  in mind, the possib le  re la t io n s h ip ,  according to
Baily (1978) and Rosenberg (1968), can be summarized as follows. One
may consider a s i tu a t io n  in which the re la t io n sh ip  between the variab les  
is asymmetrical and th a t  more than two va riab les  are a t  p lay . Here, we 
speak o f  p red ic tion  and not explanation o r  desc rip tive  analys is  (which 
p e r ta in s  to  symmetrical re la t io n  o r asyranetrical re la t io n  in which two 
variab les  opera te) .  Rosenberg (1968:xiv) concentrates on the introduc­
t io n  of a th ird  v a r iab le  into the ana ly s is  in terms of e labora tion  
which "enables the a n a ly s t  to  t e s t  his reasoning, and a t  the same time
serves as an instrument of discovery." On the whole, when a th ird
variab le  is involved in the a n a ly s is ,  various kinds o f  re la t io n sh ip s  
among the variab les  can be thought of.
F i r s t ,  spurious re la t io n sh ip s  can be id e n t if ie d  in which the 
independent variab le  (A) and the dependent variab le  (B) are re la ted  
to  each o ther only because both are caused by a th i r d  va riab le  (C), 
as depicted below:
A'B
Secondly, the th i rd  variab le  ( i . e . ,  C) can intervene in the re la tio n sh ip  
between A and B in the sense th a t  A causes C and C, in tu rn ,  a f fe c ts  B. 
Here, C is
rC-
‘B
the intervening v a r ia b le .  Third, C may precede the independent variab le  
A, by which B is a f fe c ted .  In th is  s i tu a t io n ,  C is considered as
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antecedent (and not independent) v a r iab le  (of A), as shown below:
C------------ -»A --------------- »B
Fourth, there is a s i tu a t io n  in which C and A in te ra c t  to  produce an 
e f f e c t  on B. Here the in te rac t ion  e f f e c t  is considered, and both A and 
C are regarded as independent va riab les  of B, and B w il l  not change 
i f  A and C do not change simultaneously:
What so f a r  has been touched upon is  merely a two-variable 
re la t io n sh ip  to  which a th i rd  var iab le  is  introduced. However, social 
phenomena a t  la rg e ,  (and the phenomena of revolution in p a r t i c u la r ) ,  
are so complex th a t  unless various v a r iab les  with d i f f e r e n t  re la t io n sh ip s  
and functions are considered and e lab o ra ted ,  appropria te  understanding 
of the causes and consequences of the events cannot be achieved. In 
Z e t te rb e rg 's  words "we have to consider i t  as normal th a t  social 
events have m ultip le  determinants and /o r m ultip le  consequences" (1965:65).
To h y po the tica lly  exemplify how the proposed syn thes is  in th is  
d is s e r ta t io n  w ill  be e labora ted , the following s i tu a t io n  is considered.
We may assume th a t  a revo lu tion , as a dependent v a r iab le  (Xg), is  caused 
by four variab les  such as c lass  s trugg le  (X-j), r e la t iv e  deprivation 
(Xg), resource m obiliza tion  (Xg), and war (X^):
(A) Revolution (XL)
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But, do a l l  these v a r iab les  a f f e c t  revo lu tion  independently? In fa c t ,  
they do not. Then, the  re la t io n sh ip s  among them, with refe rence  to  
rev o lu t io n ,  must be determined.
Based on such e labora tion  the emergence o f  a revolu tion  and 
i t s  causal sequence w ill  be approached in  th i s  d is s e r ta t io n .  We w ill 
e x t r a c t  d i f f e r e n t  elements from the applied  th eo r ie s  fo r  t h i s  purpose, 
and incorporate  those elements in to  a new body of theory—a syn thes is .
In so doing, we w ill attempt to  define so c io lo g ica l ly  the  revolu tion  
as being an outcome o f  d i f f e r e n t  (and not only one) social v a r iab le s .  
Such variab les  cause th e  revolu tion  in a complex fash ion , th a t  i s ,  
through d iverse  re la t io n sh ip s  th a t  they have with each o th e r ,  and th e i r  
indiv idual connection to  revo lu tion . In a sense, we w ill in te g ra te  
various elements t h a t  each theory o f  revo lu tion  has concentrated on as 
the ro o t  cause of rev o lu tion . Such a p ra c t ic e  seems to  be f r u i t f u l .
To mention a somewhat re lev an t  example. T urner 's  attempt i s  addressed 
below.
In h is  "a s t ra te g y  fo r  reform ulating th e  d ia le c t ic a l  and func­
t io n a l  theo rie s  o f  c o n f l i c t , "  Turner (1978) attempts to  combine Coser's 
(1956) fu n c t io n a l i s t  approach to  c o n f l ic t  and Dahrendorf's (1959) theory 
o f  d ia le c t ic a l  c o n f l i c t .  The former sees c o n f l ic t  as occasional and 
when i t  occurs i t  i s  functional fo r ,  or a function o f ,  consensus. The 
l a t t e r  understands c o n f l ic t  as ubiquitous and i s  the ru le  and not the 
excep tion ; hence soc ia l  order i s  based on c o n f l ic t  and not consensus.
In reform ulating these  two theories  and p u tting  aside "the excessive 
concern with the  func tions  of c o n f l ic t  fo r  system change o r in teg ra t io n  
and global claims about the ubiquity  o f c o n f l ic t  in social system,"
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Turner has reached the conclusion th a t :
By viewing c o n f l ic t  as only one o f  many processes in  human 
a f f a i r s ,  then i t  is  more l ik e ly  t h a t  theory w ill be d irec ted  
to  understanding the  conditions under which various types of 
c o n f l ic t s  a re  l ik e ly  to  occur. This i s  a more laudable goal 
than attempting to  rev e a l ,  ' th e  ugly face o f so c ie ty '  o r  lead 
sociology 'ou t o f  u to p ia '  (1978:197).
F in a lly ,  i t  i s  hoped th a t  the  attempted synthesis  w ill in teg ra te  
d i f f e r e n t  theo ries  o f  revo lu tion  fo r  a more reasonable understanding of 
t h i s  phenomenon. The following chap ter  in  which the ta r g e t  theo rie s  
w ill be demonstrated and d iscussed, might be regarded as the  f i r s t  s tep  
in  t h i s  endeavor.
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CHAPTER IV 
THEORIES OF REVOLUTION: A DESCRIPTION
In th i s  chap te r ,  fo r an attempted syn thes is ,  some o f the pre­
valen t theo ries  o f  revo lu tion  are  i l l u s t r a t e d  and ch arac te r ized . All 
these  theo ries  will be te s ted  with a revolu tion  in the subsequent 
chap ter. The order in which the th e o r ie s  a re  described i s  not intended 
to  imply any p r io r i ty  or a given weight to  each theory. However, the 
order i s  "temporal" and designed "to show repeatedly th a t  a given idea 
has had the power to  spawn other id eas ,  and th a t  th eo re t ic a l  systems 
evolve as they a re  thought through again and again" (Skidmore, 1979:10). 
F a in lly ,  each theory i s  described on the basis  o f  the o r ig in a l  work(s) 
of the  th e o r i s t .  The c r i t i c a l  accounts on each theory will be con­
sidered in a following chap ter, when th e o r ie s  a re  assessed.
A. The Class Struggle Explanation of Revolution
Such explanation i s  id e n t i f ie d  with Marx and Engels and will 
be addressed with re fe rence  to  Marx and Engels (1955) The Communist 
Manifesto, and (1970) The German Ideology; Marx (1959) The C ritique of 
the Gotha Program, (1961) Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, (1961) 
and The Poverty o f  Philosophy (1961). At the  very beginning o f  th is
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i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  i t  should be noted th a t  throughout Marx and Engels' works 
a theory o f revolu tion  in  sp ec if ic  " techn ica l"  sense cannot be traced  
e a s i ly .  What r e a l ly  can be p ic tured  i s  a grand (broad) thought developed 
w ithin  the  Marxist overa ll  explanation o f  socia l r e a l i t y  a t  la rg e .  In 
o th e r  words, the  Marxist theory o f  revo lu tion  should be approached with 
refe rence  to  h i s to r ic a l  m aterialism  and economic determinism, the Marxist 
fundamental p r in c ip le s .
To Marx, h is to ry  i s  charac te r ized  by c lass  s tru g g le  associated  
with m a te r ia l i s t i c  conditions  and d ia le c t ic a l  change. The cen tra l  fea tu re  
o f  " the h is to ry  o f  a l l  h i th e r to  e x is t in g  so c ie ty  is  the h is to ry  o f  c lass  
s tru g g les"  (1955:9), and the  e x p lo i ta t io n  o f  the  masses by the  few. In 
t h i s  process, the ownership of the means o f  production, as socia l power, 
and the  mode of production are  determ inant. At the very dawn o f  human 
l i f e  the  mode o f  production was communistic, though in p r im it iv e  form.
In th i s  s tag e ,  socia l d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  was not tang ib le  but a warrior 
band was d is t in g u ish ed . This long-term stage was followed by the 
s iavery  s tage whose basic  c h a r a c te r i s t i c  was the  emergence o f  two 
recognizable  c la s s e s —the  master and th e  s la v e . The t h i r d  s tage is  the 
feudal mode of production in  which the  lo rds  as the dominant, and the 
s e r f s  as the subjugated c l a s s ,  came about. The c a p i t a l i s t  mode of 
production is  the fourth s tage in the human h is to ry  which "has sprouted 
from the  ru ins  o f  feudal soc ie ty . . ."  (1955:10). Capitalism  i s  iden­
t i f i e d  with d i f f e r e n t  fea tu re s  among which the  emergence o f  two con­
f l i c t i n g  c la s se s ,  the  bourgeoisie and the p r o l e t a r i a t , th e  emphasis on 
the  ownership of the  means o f  production as p r iva te  p roperty , the
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accumulation of w ealth , and, in connection with a l l ,  the inev itab le  
e rup tion  of the soc ia l  (communist) revo lu tion  are the most dominant.
In the c a p i t a l i s t  so c ie ty ,  the ownership o f  the means of 
production , as socia l fo r c e , is exc lu s iv e ly  in the hands o f  the powerful 
c la s s ,  the c a p i t a l i s t .  In the eye of the c a p i t a l i s t ,  the labor of i t s  
coun terpar t—the workers, is a means o f  production or a commodity per 
se . However, under c e r ta in  cond itions , among which is c la s s  conscious­
ness ,  the p r o l e t a r i a t  w il l  overthrow the c a p i t a l i s t  and make revo lu tion . 
This revo lu tionary  change demonstrates a new mode of p roduction , socia l ism. 
(In the  s o c i a l i s t  so c ie ty  two c lasses  are in o rder, i . e . ,  the manager- 
b u reau c ra t ic ,  and the  c le rk - fu n c t io n a r ie s ,  whose p e r fe c t  re la t io n sh ip  
of production w ill  pave the way fo r  and give b i r th  to  the u ltim ate  mode 
of production , namely, true  commun ism,a  c la s s le s s  so c ie ty . )
To b e t te r  spec ify  how the M arxist revolution occurs , fu r th e r  
ana lys is  of such ca teg o rie s  as c la s s ,  c la s s  consciousness, a l ie n a t io n ,  
and the nature of the c a p i t a l i s t  mode of production is needed. Class 
is an aggregate of human individuals who share common p laces  in the mode 
of production. In the f i r s t  s tages o f  cap ita l ism , the p r o l e t a r i a t  
c la s s  is defined as c la s s  in i t s e l f  demonstrating fa lse  consciousness. 
Class in i t s e l f  is developed under c e r ta in  undesired common h is to r ic a l  
economic conditions . False consciousness is an a liena ted  thought from 
i t s  rea l  socia l being. A1ienation in the Marxist theory b a s ic a l ly  
means deep job d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  which climaxes in the c a p i t a l i s t  mode of 
production where the worker a t  work "does not belong to  himself but to 
another person", the c a p i t a l i s t  (1961). However, a l ie n a t io n  appears 
in d i f f e r e n t  forms.
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F i r s t ,  the worker becomes a l ie n a te d  from the product o f  h is  own 
labor. S p e c if ic a l ly ,  when he produces a p iece  o f work, the worker 
e x te rn a l iz e s  himself through th is  a c t i v i ty .  Since what he produces 
belongs, u n ju s t ly ,  to  the c a p i t a l i s t ,  he w il l  be detached from h is  own 
products . Therefore, the worker becomes a l ie n a te d  from p a r t  and pieces 
of him self. Secondly, s ince the worker becomes a lien a ted  from his 
products he a lso  becomes detached from h is  productive a c t i v i t y .  In o ther 
words, he becomes repulsed by his work a c t i v i t y .  As a r e s u l t ,  such 
repulsiveness to  work and production causes the decrease in his pro­
ductive a c t iv i ty  and h is  wage, which even tua lly  w ill d e te r io ra te  his 
l i f e  cond itions . Third , the worker ge ts  a l ien a ted  from h is  "species- 
l i f e "  which is due to  the "forced" d iv is ion  of labor in a highly segmented 
in d u s tr ia l  a c t iv i ty .  F in a l ly ,  the worker a lso  becomes a l ie n a te d  from 
o ther men which is a d i r e c t  consequence of o the r  forms of a l ie n a t io n s ,  
e sp e c ia l ly  the a l ie n a t io n  from one 's  " s p e c ie s - l i f e . "  For, " in  general, 
the statem ent th a t  man is  a liena ted  from h is  s p e c ie s - l i f e  means th a t  each 
man is a l ien a ted  from o th e rs ,  and th a t  each o f  the others is likewise 
a l ie n a te d  from human l i f e "  (1961:105). As an overall r e s u l t ,  the 
worker " . . .does not f u l f i l l  himself in h is  work but denies him self, 
has a fe e l in g  of misery ra th e r  than well being, does not develop f ree ly  
his mental and physical energies but is p h ys ica lly  exhausted and mentally 
debased" (1961:5).
However, the a l ien a ted  and oppressed workers who are recognized 
as a c la s s  in i t s e l f  w i l l ,  under c e r ta in  cond itions , recover and make 
revo lu tion . This recovery takes place through a s e r ie s  o f  revolu tionary  
a c t i v i t i e s  such as (1) the creation  of channels of communication ( e .g . ,
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clubbing to g e th e r) ,  (2) the development o f  leadersh ip , (3) the emergence 
of revolu tionary  ideology, (4) the formation of "combination" ( i . e . ,  
trade unions). As a r e s u l t ,  c lass  consciousness w ill  develop which is 
the p re re q u is i te  fo r  socia l revolu tion . In th i s  p rocess, the workers 
become able to man the barricade and to  re l ie v e  themselves from the 
c a p i t a l i s t  suppression and e x p lo i ta t io n .  They are now in a p o s i t io n  
th a t  makes them able to expose th e i r  ideas and ac tions . In th is  course 
o f  a c t io n ,  the p r o l e t a r i a t  transform themselves from c lass  in i t s e l f  
to  c lass  fo r  i t s e l f  whose members are p o l i t i c i z e d  and possess tru e  c lass  
consciousness. This c lass  i s ,  in f a c t ,  a p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  mobilized and 
armed fo r  revolu tionary  ac tion  against the c a p i t a l i s t  (whose s treng th  
a t  the time is somewhat, somehow d e c l in in g ) .
With reference to  the l a t t e r  p o in t ,  i t  must be noted th a t  a t  
the same time th a t  the worker's revolu tionary  a c t iv i ty  develops and 
matures, the ru ling  c lass  is involved in ex te rna l and in ternal "constan t 
b a t t le "  and competition. I t  is  engaged with (1) the a r is to c racy  to  which 
the e sc a la t in g  dominance of the c a p i t a l i s t  has been a destruc tive  danger;
(2) with those portions  of the bourgeoisie i t s e l f  whose in te re s ts  have 
become an tag o n is t ic  to the progress of industry ; and (3) with the bour­
geo is ie  o f  o ther coun tries  who always compete with each o the r ,  i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l ly .  In the end, the weakened elements o f  bourgeoisie w ill  seek 
refuge and side with the p r o l e t a r i a t  and drag i t  into the p o l i t i c a l  
arena. In doing so , the c a p i t a l i s t  c lass  "supplies the p r o l e t a r i a t  
with i t s  own elements of p o l i t i c a l  and general education; in o ther 
words, i t  furnishes the p r o l e t a r i a t  with weapons fo r  f igh ting  the 
bourgeoise" (1955:20).
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As the revolu tionary  actions of the p r o l e t a r i a t  reach a peak, 
and the d is in te g ra t io n  o f the c a p i t a l i s t  "nears the decis ive  hour," the 
p ro le ta r ia n  revolu tion  w ill  e ru p t ,  and consequently a new mode of 
production in a c la s s le s s  society  w ill  be e s ta b l ish e d .  In a word, the 
bourgeois socie ty  is  i t s  own "gravedigger" and " i t s  f a l l  and the v ic tory  
of the p r o le ta r i a t  are equally  inevitab le"  (1955:20). Therefore , in­
heren t in the c a p i t a l i s t  mode of production are  c e r ta in  elements th a t
cause i t s  own d is so lu t io n  and downfall.
While the Marxist theory t r e a t s  revo lu tion  in terms of c lass  
s t ru c tu re  and c lass  s trugg le  which is based on economic modes of pro­
duction and p r iv i le g e s ,  Dahrendorf emphasizes th a t  c o n f l i c t ,  including 
rev o lu t io n ,  stems from the competition over the possession o f power among 
d i f f e r e n t  social groups in d i f f e r e n t  a sso c ia t io n s .  The next sec tion
w ill  address th is  rev is io n  of Marx's theory.
B. Authority Struggle as the Root Cause o f  Revolution
In his "toward a sociological theory o f  c o n f l ic t  in indus tr ia l  
s o c ie ty ,"  Dahrendorf (1959) seems to exp la in  socia l order a t  large and 
stands ag a in s t  the "consensus" explanation o f  socia l cohesion. As a 
neo-Marxist who attem pts to  update the Marxian thought, Dahrendorf 
concerns himself with "group" struggle  based on power ra th e r  than 
economic conditions. However, his theory o f  c o n f l i c t  concerns us only 
to  the ex ten t  th a t  i t  explains the occurrence o f  revolu tion  as a "sudden 
change•"
For Dahrendorf, c o n f l ic t  among so c ia l  groups is  a stubborn and 
ubiquitous fa c t  of so c ia l  l i f e .  Such c o n f l i c t  emerges from au th o r i ty
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s t ru c tu re  in every given socia l a sso c ia t io n .  Authority in th i s  sense 
is leg it im ized  power as i t  is charac te rized  by and manifested in c e r ta in  
socia l p o s i t io n s  and ro les  in socia l o rg an iza tio n s .  I t  is t h i s  same 
scarce resource and valued reward over which groups s tru g g le .  In a 
s p e c i f ic  sense , c o n f l ic t s  a re  id e n t i f ie d  with c e r ta in  types such as war, 
re v o lu tio n ,  and socia l  movements, and can be o f  "exogeneous" and 
"endogenous" phenomena. Whereas exogenous c o n f l ic t s  are brought upon 
or in to  a given socie ty  from the o u ts id e ,  endogenous c o n f l ic ts  are genera­
ted w ith in  s o c ie t i e s .  In e i t h e r  case, c o n f l ic t s  are based on c e r ta in  
" s t ru c tu ra l  arrangements." Hence, they should not be re legated  to  psy­
chological explanation ( e . g . ,  agg ress iveness) ,  or to  mere d e sc r ip t iv e -  
h i s to r ic a l  a n a ly s is ,  or to  "chance", but to  the re la t io n sh ip  between 
two c a te g o r ie s ,  the ru le rs  and the ru led .
Dahrendorf envisions  socie ty  as a "combination" o f  " im peratively 
coordinated a ssoc ia tions"  (ICA 's), such as s t a t e ,  church, p a r ty ,  labor 
union, and so on. In every ICA, a u th o r i ty ,  i . e . ,  "imperative coord ina tion ,"  
is d is t r ib u te d  in such a way th a t  there  are p o s i t io n s  id e n t i f ie d  with 
dominance and o thers  with subjugation. As such, those who have the 
dominating p o s it io n s  cotmnand those who occupy the dominated p o s i t io n s .  
However, these two ca tego ries  are mere aggregates and not organized 
u n i ts .  They are regarded as "quasi-groups" in the sense th a t  to  them 
t h e i r  " in te r e s t s "  are " la te n t"  a t  the time. By l a t e n t  in te re s t s  i t  is 
meant t h a t  the opposition o f  outlook need not be conscious a t  th i s  le v e l ;  
i t  is  a "c lass  in i t s e l f . "  Under c e r ta in  conditions ( to  be sp ec if ie d  
l a t e r )  the l a t e n t  in te r e s t s  of these quasi-groups become "m anifest."
Now, "group consciousness" occurs and " c la ss  f o r  i t s e l f "  is e s ta b l is h e d ,
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fo r  the m anifest in te re s ts  are those formulated programs and ideologies 
under whose banner c o n f l ic t  w il l  be in i t i a t e d .
The conditions under which socia l c o n f l i c t  takes place are 
" so c ia l ,"  " p o l i t i c a l , "  and " te c h n ic a l ."  They, as a whole, are those 
v a riab les  t h a t  give r i s e  to  group consciousness and transform la t e n t  
in te r e s t s  to  m anifest id ea ls .  Channels of communication among and 
e f fe c t iv e  recruitm ent into the quasi-groups are examples o f  the social 
o rgan izational conditions. The presence of freedom fo r  a c t io n  and the 
e x ten t  to  which th is  freedom is  enjoyed represen t examples of p o l i t i c a l  
cond itions . M aterial means, a founder, a lead e r ,  and an ideology, 
are the b e s t  examples of the techn ica l conditions. However, these 
three  s e ts  of conditions do not and may not be observed to  the same 
e x te n t ,  and they may not p re sen t  themselves sim ultaneously. These 
va r iab les  in add ition  to  and in connection with the q u a li ty  of "social 
m obility" and "mechanisms fo r  c o n f l i c t  regula tion" (and not " co n f l ic t  
r e s o lu t io n " ) ,  w ill  determine the " in ten s i ty "  and "violence" in every 
c o n f l i c t  s i tu a t io n .
In te n s i ty  re fe rs  to  "the energy expenditure and degree of 
involvement o f  co n f l ic t in g  p a r t i e s . "  The violence of c o n f l i c t  " is  a 
m atter o f  the weapons th a t  are chosen by c o n f l ic t  groups to  express 
t h e i r  h o s t i l i t i e s . "  When the in te n s i ty  is of l im ited  scope and violence 
is not used, a "parliamentary debate ,"  fo r  example, may be the form of 
the c o n f l i c t .  On the o ther hand, when the challenging groups decide 
to  f ig h t  to  the end, th a t  i s ,  a t tach  themselves to  issues and substance 
to  change the au thority  s t ru c tu re ,  and use m i l i t a n t  means "such as 
s t r ik e s  and c iv i l  wars," a "sudden change"—a revo lu tion— is l ik e ly .
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c. C ollective  Behavior Explanation of  Revolution
Some s tudents  of socia l movements (including revo lu tion ) t r e a t  
revolution on a general conceptual framework o f c o l le c t iv e  behavior. In 
th i s  l i g h t ,  revo lu tion  is  seen as an important kind o f  c o l le c t iv e  behavior 
id e n t i f ie d  with values , norms, m obiliza tion  of individual motivation 
in to  organized a c t io n ,  and s i tu a t io n a l  f a c i l i t i e s .  One o f the leading 
exponents o f  t h i s  standpoint i s  Smelser, whose "theory o f  c o l le c t iv e  
behavior," as f a r  as revolu tion  i s  concerned, w ill be addressed below.
Smelser (1962) considers revo lu tion  as a p a r t i c u la r  kind of 
"co l lec t iv e  behavior" and defines the  l a t t e r  as "an u n in s t i tu t io n a l iz e d  
m obilization fo r  action in order to  modify one or more kinds o f  s t r a in s  
on the  basis  o f  a generalized reconstruction  o f  a component o f  action" 
(1962:71). C ollective  behavior takes on d i f f e r e n t  types each o f which" 
is  o rien ted  toward a d i s t i n c t  component o f  social a c t io n ."  Five types 
of these c o l le c t iv e  behaviors should be id e n t i f ie d :  (1) the  value-
orien ted  movement, (2) the norm-oriented movement, (3) the  h o s t i le  
ou tb u rs t ,  (4) the c raze , and (5) the  panic. Revolution f a l l s  in the 
category o f  va lue-o rien ted  movements, though not a l l  revo lu tions  are 
va lue-orien ted  c o l le c t iv e  behaviors. For, as an example, the re  are 
"norm-oriented revolu tions"  which are  based on grievances about sp ec if ic  
p o l ic ie s ,  laws o r  custome, which may be e i th e r  revolu tionary  coups, or 
re form ist rev o lu t io n s .  (What is  addressed in th is  d i s s e r ta t io n  is  
Smelser's rad ica l  va lue-orien ted  rev o lu t io n ,  which is  q u i te  d i s t in c t  
from the  above-mentioned two.)
There are  s ix  determinants o f  the  various forms o f  revolutions 
and a l l  o ther c o l le c t iv e  behaviors. These determinants appear in a "value
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added" process where each one is  a necessary condition fo r  the  "actuation" 
of the next one. In o the r  words, the  value-added or accounting scheme 
holds th a t  the e a r l i e r  conditions must combine according to  a c e r ta in  
p a tte rn  before the following conditions  can c o n s t i tu te  i t s  p a r t ic u la r  
value to  f in a l  outcome. However, these  variab les  can m anifest them­
selves in  any order,  and c o l le c t iv e  behavior as revo lu tion  w ill  not 
occur unless a l l  of them a re  p resen t.
These determ inants, which cause revolution and o th e r  major 
c o l le c t iv e  behaviors, a re  as fo llow s.
(1) S tructural conduciveness, which means th a t  a c e r ta in  
physical and social p o s s ib i l i ty  must be present i f  c o l le c t iv e  behavior 
is  to  take place. In o the r words, s t ru c tu ra l  conduciveness is  a s e t t in g  
which i s  e i th e r  permissive of h o s t i l i t y  or p ro h ib i t iv e  o f  o the r response 
or both. There are th ree  fa c to rs  o r  "aspects" th a t  f a c i l i t a t e  a conducive 
s i tu a t io n .  They are: (a) a f ig u r e ,  c la ss  or agency to  which respon­
s i b i l i t y  can be assigned fo r  the  d is tu rb in g  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s ;  (b)
the absence o r  f a i lu r e  o f  channels fo r  expressing grievances; (c) 
the ecological and o ther s i tu a t io n a l  fa c to rs .
(2) S tructural s t r a i n , which ind ica tes  t h a t  w ith in  the  context
of s t ru c tu ra l  condiciveness th e re  must be some socia l o r  so c ia l-p sy ­
chological d isequ ilib rium , c o n f l i c t ,  or inconsistency , necessary fo r
the occurrence o f  c o l le c t iv e  behavior. In o ther words, s t ru c tu ra l  s t ra in  
means th a t  impaired, t r a d i t io n a l  i f  not in s t i tu t io n a l iz e d  social r e l a ­
t ions  must be present in  the p re -c o n f l ic t  s i tu a t io n .
(3) Growth and spread o f  generalized b e l i e f , t h a t  i s ,  the
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the s t r a in  must be a r t i c u la te d  and i t s  sources must be id e n t i f ie d  and
labeled . Generalized b e l i e f  is an ideological j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o r loose
ideology which is  c reated  on a ground of a value-added p rocess .  This 
process embraces f ive  s tages or elements, (a) The condition o f  ambiguity
which p e r ta in s  " to  the adequacy of means fo r  a given go a l."  In a word,
"the s i tu a t io n  may f r u s t r a t e ,  harm, or destroy; but the kind and degree 
( i f  any) of the re s u l t in g  f r u s t r a t io n ,  harm, o r  d e s tru c tio n  is unknown" 
(1962:92). (b) The condition of anx ie ty , which is  the i n i t i a l  response
to  "ambiguity", and i t  "involves the creation  of or appeal to  a new 
view o f  c au sa l i ty  by converting ambiguity in to  an absolute th re a t"  
(1962:92). (c) The assignment o f  re sp o n s ib i l i ty  to  id e n t i f ie d  agents.
(d) The condition o f  h o s t i l i t y  in the sense th a t  a genera lized  and focused 
aggression must be d irec ted  toward the responsible  agent. F in a l ly ,  (e) 
the condition o f w ish -fu lf i l lm en t which endows the p a r t ic ip a n ts  in a 
c o l le c t iv e  behavior with an immense power to destroy the agent of ev il  
and thereby to  " s e t  the world r ig h t . "
However, people do not proceed to re - sp e c ify ,  s tep  by s te p ,  
to  re c o n s t i tu te  soc ia l  ac tio n .  Rather, they develop a b e l i e f  which 
"short c i r c u i t s "  from the very generalized  component d i r e c t ly  to  the 
focus of s t r a in .  Therefore, s h o r t -c i r c u i t in g  is  a process in which be­
l i e f s  move from extremely high lev e ls  of g e n e ra l i ty  to  s p e c i f ic  concrete 
s i tu a t io n .
(4) P rec ip i ta t in g  f a c to r s , which are events th a t  s e t  the 
c o l le c t iv e  behavior in motion and "may confirm or j u s t i f y  the fe a rs  or 
hatreds in a genera lized  b e l ie f"  (1962:17). For example, under conditions 
of r a c ia l  tension (as p re c ip i ta t in g  e lem ents), conduciveness, s t r a in
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and a genera lized  b e l i e f  can function to  provide the p re re q u is i te s  fo r  
c o l le c t iv e  behavior (where the  remaining two conditions are  p resen t 
to o ) .  In a word, p re c ip i ta t in g  fac to rs  "provide a concrete s e t t in g  
toward which c o l le c t iv e  ac t io n  can be d irec ted"  (1962:17).
(5) M obilization of p a r t ic ip a n ts  fo r  a c t io n , in the sense th a t  
events and/or the leaders  must develop and implement a course of action  
on the b as is  of the p rev iously  developed generalized  b e l i e f .  In th i s  
s ta g e ,  the  s t r a in  must be a l l e v ia te d ,  and the le a d e rs ,  on behalf of th e i r  
fo l lo w ers ,  must dedicate  t h e i r  energ ies  to  the desired  goal. However, 
two types o f  leadership  can be d is tingu ished : leadersh ip  in formulating 
b e l i e f s ,  and leadership  in mobilizing the p a r t ic ip a n ts  fo r  a c t io n .  "In 
th i s  process of m obiliza tion  the behaviors of leaders  is  extremely 
important" (1962:17).
(6) The opera tion  o f  socia l c o n t ro l . t h a t  i s ,  the counter 
determinants to  the f i r s t  f iv e  stages or v a r ia b le s .  The functioning of 
so c ia l  control determines the shape, form, d i re c t io n ,  and the in te n s i ty  
of the c o l le c t iv e  behavior. Social control is id e n t i f ie d  with two types. 
One type e x is t s  p r io r  to the emergence of a form o f c o l le c t iv e  behavior, 
and m it ig a te s  conduciveness and s t r a in .  The o th e r  type is  implemented 
only a f t e r  the emergence o f the c o l le c t iv e  behavior. Social control is 
id e n t i f ie d  with the operating  government whose weak or s trong respones 
a f fe c t s  the movement d i f f e r e n t ly .  In a word, soc ia l  control and espe­
c i a l l y  the second type o f  so c ia l  c o n tro l ,  can p rev en t,  in te r ru p t ,  d e f le c t ,  
o r in h ib i t  the accumulation o f  the five  determinants j u s t  reviewed.
Thus, in Sm elser's  scheme, a revo lu tion  is  l ik e ly  (1) i f  i t  
appears to  be the only way to  re l iev e  serious s t r a i n ,  and (2) i f  th i s
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same s t r a in  is t r a n s la te d  in to  and gets developed through a sp ec if ic  
o rganization  and an organized succession of soc ia l  a c t io n s ,  fo r  "co l lec t iv e  
behavior is s o c ia l ,  not psychological" (1962:12).
D. Frustration-A ggression/Cognitive Dissonance 
Explanation of Revolution 
Under the f ru s tra tion -d issonance  assumptions, d i f f e r e n t  explana­
tions  of revolu tion  with d i f f e r e n t  points  o f  emphasis can be id e n t i f ie d .
In th is  sec tio n ,  Davies "J-curve (or " r is e  and drop") p a t te rn ,"  Geschwender's 
"cognitive dissonance theory ,"  and G urr 's  " re la t iv e  deprivation" model are 
addressed.
(1) Rising and Declining S a t is fa c t io n  
Davies (1962) has i n i t i a l l y  presented  the J-curve model in his 
"toward a theory o f  re v o lu tio n ,"  and then has explored th is  theory in 
h is  (1979) "the J-curve of r i s in g  and declin ing  s a t i s f a c t io n  as a cause 
o f  revolution and re b e l l io n ."  The basic argument here is th a t  "revolu­
t io n s  are most l ik e ly  to  occur when a prolonged period  of objective  
economic and socia l development is followed by a sh o r t  period of sharp 
reversa l"  (1962:1). Therefore , "the actual s t a t e  of socioeconomic 
development is  le ss  s ig n i f i c a n t  than the expec ta tion  th a t  p a s t  p rogress ,  
now blocked, can and must continue in the fu tu re"  (1962:6).
To spec ify , Davies suggests th a t  when the r is in g  expectations 
(in  an improving s i tu a t io n )  are suddenly dropped, f r u s t r a t io n ,  d i s s a t i s ­
fac t io n  and, r e la te d ly ,  lack  of  confidence in the e x is t in g  system w ill 
follow. This w ill  eventuate in p o l i t i c a l  violence aga ins t  the responsible 
system. Where f r u s t r a t io n  is widespread, intense and focused on the
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government, revo lu tion  w ill  be the case. Rebellion is  contained in or 
overcome by the government. To b e t t e r  demonstrate the very nature of 
the ensuing f r u s t r a t i o n ,  Davies adopts Maslow's (1943) h ierarchy of needs 
including (1) physical needs (water, food, sex, e t c . ) ;  (2) safe ty  needs 
(o rder,  p r e d i c t a b i l i t y ,  dependab ility ) ; (3) need fo r  love, a ffe c t io n ,  
belongingness; (4) need fo r  se lf-es teem ; and (5) need fo r s e l f - a c tu a l i ­
za tion . Based on these se ts  o f  needs, a po ten tia l  f o r  upris ing  w ill be 
p resen t fo r ,  the a ffec ted  indiv iduals  " ind iv idua lly  sense the f ru s t r a t io n  
of one or more basic  needs and each is  able to focus h is  f r u s t r a t io n  
on the government" (1979:418).
Davies has grounded his  assumptions in and v a lida ted  them 
through some specula tions about some h is to r ic a l  cases of rebe llions  and 
revolu tions ( e .g . ,  French, Nazi, Russian, and Egyptian rev o lu tio n s , and 
the American Civil War, Dorr 's  re b e l l io n  of 1842, and the Black rebe ll ion  
of the 1960 's) .  In each case he f inds  a short  period of sharp economic 
reversal th a t  gave r is e  to  the revo lu tionary  ac t io n .  However, he 
recognizes th a t  the " in to le rab le  gap" between "actual need s a t i s fa c t io n "  
and "expected need s a t i s fa c t io n "  is rooted in a c e r ta in  " s ta te  of mind," 
or the "mood o f the people." But, in terms of p re d ic t io n ,  i t  is  "always 
d i f f i c u l t "  even by techniques of system atic  public  opinion analysis to  
assess th a t  same "mood." I t  is  so because "we. . .a re  s t i l l  not a t  the 
po in t of being able to p re d ic t  revo lu tion . . ." (1962:19).
(2) Cognitive Dissonance Explanation
Based on the Davies' proposed " r is e  and drop" hypothesis,
Marx's specu la tion  about the improvement in the worker's  m ateria l
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conditions , Durkheim's in te rp re ta t io n  of su ic ide  caused by economic 
d i s a s t e r s ,  and the l i t e r a tu r e  on the " s ta tu s  inconsistency" issue , 
Geschwender (1968) has e laborated  some hypotheses on rev o lu t io n .  They 
a re , " r is in g  ex p ec ta tio n s ,"  " re la t iv e  dep riv a tio n ,"  "downward mobility" 
as th ree  temporal hypotheses, and "s ta tu s  inconsistency" as a nontemporal 
o ther. He subsumes a l l  these hypotheses, in add ition  to  th a t  o f  Davies, 
under the "theory of cognitive dissonance." According to Geschwender, 
"This provides a general socia l psychology theory of m otivation which 
could account fo r  individual p red isp o s i t io n s  toward p a r t i c ip a t io n  in 
social movements and revolu tions" (1968:127). With the exception of 
Davies hypothesis, which is  discussed p rev ious ly , each of Geschwender's 
hypotheses is  summarized below.
(a) The r is in g  expecta tion  hypothesis ind ica tes  th a t  in a given 
s i tu a t io n ,  the p eo p le 's  perception o f an " in to le ra b le  gap" does not 
exc lus ive ly  r e s u l t  from r is in g  expecta tions followed by declin ing  
socioeconomic development. I t  a lso  can emerge "from a simple decline in 
the ra te  o f  soc ia l  and economic progress" (1968:12). For example, the 
Black Americans who have enjoyed some improvement in l i f e  conditions
and come to believe th a t  "progress is p o s s ib le ,"  now are f r u s t r a te d  and 
d i s s a t i s f i e d .  They feel th a t  the ra te  of t h e i r  progress is r a th e r  slow. 
"As they become increasing ly  impatient with the ra te  o f  improvement in 
social cond itions , they begin to r e s o r t  more and more to  d i r e c t  ac tion , 
to  s i t - i n s ,  wade-ins, e tc"  (1968:129).
(b) The re la t iv e  deprivation  hypothesis maintains th a t  people 
may re v o l t  i f  they fee l there  is an increasing gap between what they sense 
they should ge t and what they a c tu a lly  receive . In th i s  case , "the level
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o f  expected need d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  derives from percep tion  o f the level of 
need s a t i s f a c t io n  experienced by a reference group" (1968:129). An 
example of th is  can a lso  be the Black Americans who fee l th a t  they are 
r e l a t i v e ly  deprived. For, although t h e i r  ob jec t ive  p o s i t io n  in the 
American soc ie ty  is improving, ". . .they are not gaining r e la t iv e  to 
Whites" (1968:129).
(c) The downward m obility  hypothesis holds t h a t  an imbalance 
between what people d e s i r e ,  in economic o r socia l terms, and what they 
achieve can a lso  be brought about through downward soc ia l  m o b ili ty ,  in 
e i t h e r  an absolute or a r e l a t iv e  sense. R elative  downward m obility  
re fe rs  to  "the f e l t  loss  of s ta tu s  experienced by a group which observes 
a p rev ious ly  in fe r io r  group c losing  the gap between them" (1968:130).
In such a s i tu a t io n ,  people experience "the in to le ra b le  gap" which is 
" l ik e ly  to  produce a soc ia l  movement o r  revo lu tion . . ." (1968:130).
(d) The s ta tu s  inconsistency hypothesis, which is  unlike the 
above discussed hypotheses, deals  with and is based on nontemporal 
elements as the cause o f soc ia l  movements. S ta tus  inconsistency is a 
s i tu a t io n  in which the in d iv id u a l 's  upward m obility  in some s ta tu s  
h ie ra rc h ie s  lags behind o the rs  ind ica ting  the ex is tence  o f  impediments 
to  f r e e  m obility . "These impediments tend to c rea te  tensions  which 
could produce p ro te s t  a c t iv i ty "  (1968:131). Hence, s ta tu s  inco n sis ten t  
in d iv idua ls  may comprise the membership of a soc ia l  movement. In a 
s p e c i f ic  sense, people who have a low degree of "stratum consis tency ,"  
i . e . ,  having s im ila r  p a t te rn s  o f inconsistency , may p a r t i c u la r ly  develop 
"ethnic"  consciousness and i n i t i a t e  an e thn ic  movement. In f a c t ,  in the 
s ta tu s  inconsistency exp lanation  of socia l movements, the propensity
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toward revo lu tionary  o r  p ro te s t  a c t i v i t y  does not res ide  in the develop­
ment o f  the individual d i s a t i s f a c t io n .  Rather, s ta tu s  inconsistency  
i s  envisioned with reference to  a c e r ta in  social stratum such as e thnic  
or re l ig io u s  m in o r i t ie s .
F in a lly ,  Geschwender in te g ra te s  a l l  these hypotheses, including 
th a t  o f  Davies, in to  a theory o f  cogn itive  dissonance which, he b e lieves , 
i s  capable o f  explaining the " s ta te  o f  mind" th a t  causes revolu tions 
and p ro te s ts .  He s t re s se s  and concludes th a t  "the p a r t i c u la r  sequence 
o f  temporal changes described by Davies i s  only one o f  several sequences 
which produces in ind iv idua ls  the s t a t e  o f  mind th a t  tends to  be expressed 
in revolu tionary  or o ther  p ro te s t  a c t iv i ty "  (1968:135).
(3) Relative Deprivation Theory
Gurr (1974) has concentrated on r e la t iv e  depriva tion  as the  very 
root cause o f  p o l i t i c a l  v iolence, includ ing  revo lu tions . He argues th a t  
" . . .  men are not l ik e ly  to  be mobilized by new, revo lu tionary  hopes 
unless they feel sharply deprived by the  circumstances in which they 
live"  (1974:121). As such, r e la t iv e  depriva tion  (RD) is  to  be considered 
as the o r ig ina l element th a t  causes rev o lu tio n s .  R elative  depriva tion  
" is  defined as the a c to r 's  perception o f  discrepancy between th e i r  
value expecta tions  and t h e i r  value c a p a b i l i t i e s "  (1974:24). Value 
expectations are  those valued rewards to  which people believe  they are 
r ig h t f u l ly  e n t i t l e d ,  and value c a p a b i l i t i e s  are  thoes valued rewards 
th a t  ind iv idua ls  perceive themselves capable o f  obtaining and maintaining. 
The type o f  these  two kinds o f  values must be analyzed with reference to  
two v a r ia b le s—in te n s i ty  and scope. In te n s i ty  ( i . e . ,  the  opportun it ies )
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is of a psychological nature and i t s  u n i t  of ana ly s is  is the individual 
member. On the o ther hand, the scope of RD is a so c ie ta l  variab le  whose 
u n i t  of ana ly s is  is  the involved c o l le c t iv i ty  in a given violence. On 
the basis  o f  i t s  so c ie ta l  o r ig in s ,  RD is derived from three ch arac te r­
i s t i c s .  They are exposure to  new modes of l i f e ,  new ideologies, and 
value d i s e q u i l ib r ia .
The quantity  of goods, t h a t  i s ,  t h e i r  s c a rc i ty  or p le n t i tu d e ,  
as well as the conditions of ind iv idua ls  in terms o f having e f fe c t iv e  
opportun ities  fo r  sharing the b e n e f i t s ,  is  a decisive  fa c to r  based on 
which a c e r ta in  type o f  RD can emerge. F i r s t ,  décrémentai RD occurs 
when people experience RD "by reference  to  th e i r  own p a s t  condition ."
In such a case , and aside from f u t u r i s t i c  hopes, "people lose what they 
have abso lu te ly  and th i s  w ill eventuate  in th e i r  anger whose end r e s u l t  
would be d isco n ten t ,  and more so , open revo lt"  (1974:48). This kind of 
RD can be summarized in the p ro pos it ion  th a t  "men are l ik e ly  to be more 
in tensely  angered when they lose what they have than when they lose hope 
o f a t ta in in g  what they do not y e t  have" (1974:50). Décrémentai RD 
and the concomitant violence usually  takes place in t r a d i t io n a l  s o c ie t ie s  
and t r a d i t io n a l  un its  of t r a n s i t io n a l  o thers .
Second, a sp ira t io n a l  RD which comes about when people 's  value 
expectation is  increased but no ensuing change in value p o s it ion  (or 
p o te n t ia l )  is  brought about. This type of RD r e f le c t s  the increase in 
e i t h e r  desire  fo r  g re a te r  demands of values already he ld , or demand fo r  
new values never held before, o r  an in ten s if ied  commitment to  values 
th a t  p reviously  were " fa in t ly "  examined. Aspirational RD can be found 
in those s o c ie t ie s  in which the socioeconomic horizons are expanding.
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Third, progressive RD. which is a t t r ib u ta b le  to  those so c ie t ie s  
th a t  have a lready enjoyed some modernization and examined some asp ira ­
t iona l RD where " th e i r  value c a p a b i l i t i e s  s ta b i l i z e  o r  decline  a f t e r  
such a period o f  improvement. . (1974:52-53). In f a c t ,  th i s  kind of
RD is a common theme in many old and some new th eo rie s  th a t  a t t r ib u te  
revolutionary  p o te n t ia l  to  general social change. F in a l ly ,  "such a 
p a tte rn  is  most common in so c ie t ie s  undergoing simultaneous ideological 
and systematic change" (1974:53).
In sum, under c e r ta in  conditions people become deprived and then 
f ru s t r a te d  and aggress ive . Such aggression is very l ik e ly  to  be t ra n s ­
la ted  into p o l i t i c a l  un res t .  The root of psychological j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
of violence can be found in both human cu ltu re  and human nature and the 
d isp o s it io n  of the l a t t e r  to e i th e r  peace or aggression. I f  peace does 
not p re v a i l ,  then "the primary source o f  the human capacity  fo r  v io le n c e . . .  
w ill be the f ru s tra t io n -ag g re s s io n  mechanism" (1974:36). In a word,
"on e a r th ,  g rav ity  can be assumed as co n tra s t ;  among men, leve ls  of 
f r u s t r a t io n  vary g rea tly "  (1974:37).
E. The F u nc tiona lis t  Explanation of Revolution 
Some s tuden ts  o f  revolu tion  view rad ical soc ia l  changes as 
functional fo r  soc ie ty  in the sense th a t  they are caused by a temporal 
d isco n t in u ity  o f  socia l consensus on the ex is t in g  o rder. This view is 
contrad ictory  to  the Marxists and the c o n f l ic t  th e o r i s t s  who see c o n f l ic t  
and change as d ia le c t ic a l  and ubiquitous. In th is  s e c t io n ,  Johnson's 
(1966) explanation of  "revolutionary  change" which demonstrates a 
s t ru c tu ra l - fu n c t io n a l  s tandpoin t is examined.
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In his approach to revo lu tion , Johnson envisions the socia l 
system in the l ig h t  o f  the Parsonian t r a d i t io n .  In th is  t r a d i t i o n ,  the 
socia l system is conceptualized as a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t ,  s e I f - r e g u la to ry ,  
and homeostatic equilibrium  whose v i ta l  functions c o n s is t  of (1) p a t te rn  
maintenance ( e .g . ,  s o c ia l iz a t io n ) ,  (2) adapta tion  to  the environment,
(3) goal a tta inm ent, and (4) in teg ra tio n  ( e . g . ,  socia l c o n t ro l ) .  In 
such a system, "equilibrium" corresponds to  "the healthy s t a t e  of the 
socia l system" and "homeostasis" re fe rs  to  the reg u la t iv e  and adaptive 
processes th a t  "control and counteract v a r ia t io n  which would destroy the 
system i f  they exceed more than a lim ited  range" (p. 54). The presence 
of value and ro le  consensus endows the socia l  system with homeostatic 
capacity  of adjustment, fo r  socie ty  is seen as a "moral community" whose 
members share c e r ta in  "d e f in i t io n s  o f  a s i tu a t io n "  c a l led  "values ."
Values " leg itim ize  the in e q u a l i t ie s  o f  soc ia l  o rganization  and cause 
people to  accept them as morally ju s t i f i e d "  (p. 19). However, "so long 
as the value s t ru c tu re  remains synchronized with the demands of environ­
mental adaptation" (p. 38), "socie ty  is  immune from revo lu tion"  (p. 60); 
otherw ise, revolu tion  is l ik e ly .
To be su re ,  Johnson d is tingu ishes  between changes undertaken 
rou tine ly  to  maintain an equilibrium  and changes undertaken to  rec rea te  
an equilibrium . The l a t t e r  changes are revolu tionary  and the former do 
not n ece ss i ta te  revo lu tion . One form of the nonrevolutionary change, 
th a t  i s ,  the evo lu tionary  one, is "compatible" with homeostatic e q u i l i ­
brium. Some evolu tionary  changes can take on a revo lu tionary  charac te r  
though they are not intended to  produce rad ica l impacts. When the routine 
homeostatic processes of s o c ia l iz a t io n ,  adap ta tion , goal a tta inm en t,
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and in teg ra t io n  f a i l  to maintain system atic  equilibrium  (by making 
necessary evo lu tionary  changes in the system), a revo lu tionary  change 
is probable.
In s p e c i f ic  terms, such a breakdown comes about because o f  the 
f a c t  th a t  the value s tru c tu re  ( i . e . ,  the symbolic in te rp re ta t io n  of socia l 
ac tion ) and the s t ru c tu re  of the d iv is ion  of labor ( i . e . ,  the p a tte rn  of 
adapta tion  to  the environment) have become incongruent. Such incon­
gruency is caused by some exogenous and endogenous fo rce s .  The endo­
genous fo rces  are id e n t if ie d  with such elements as "imperfect s o c ia l iz a ­
t io n ,"  which occurs when the values of the system have been imperfectly 
imparted to  new members; "role  s t r a i n , "  which r e s u l t s  from in teg ra ting  
the "human being" system with i t s  own needs into another system, the 
so c ie ty ;  and "normative d issensus ,"  which develops ou t o f  co n f l ic t in g  
norms or am biguities w ithin  the value system i t s e l f  (p . 36).
On the o ther  hand, the exogenous forces are environmental and 
revolve around "scarce goods," which are sources o f  c o n f l ic t  between 
people occupying the same stratum and are involved in the processes o f 
exchange (p. 37); " in eq u a li ty ,"  which is re su l t in g  from the possession 
of power and the subjection  to i t ;  and f in a l ly ,  " in te rs tra tu m  disputes" 
which o ften  stem from "both the d is t r ib u t io n  of scarce goods and the 
a lleg ed ly  excessive powers of the ru ling  stratum. . ."  (p. 37-38).
However, " i f  the a u th o r i t ie s  f a i l  to  recognize these  s i tu a t io n s  or 
f a i l  by t h e i r  ac tions  to c o r re c t  them, o ther things being equal, a 
revolu tion  w il l  ensue" (p. 38).
F in a l ly ,  Johnson s t r e s s e s  th ree  " c lu s te rs  of necessary causes" 
fo r  re v o lu t io n .  The f i r s t  is found in "a socie ty  which is changing
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and which is in need o f fu tu re  change i f  i t  is  to  continue to  ex is t"
(p. 91). The second s e t  o f  a re v o lu t io n 's  causes "revolves around the 
qua li ty  of the purposeful change being undertaken while a system is 
d iseq u i l ib ra ted "  (p. 91). The th i rd  s e t  serves as "w ind-fa lls"  which 
come about and e i t h e r  deprive the e l i t e  of i t s  a b i l i t y  to  maintain order 
o r encourage the rev o lu t io n a r ie s  to  make revo lu tion . These fac to rs  are 
c a l led  "acce le ra to rs"  and, when an insu rrec tion  takes p lace ,  w ill determine 
"whether or not the rev o lu tio n a rie s  w ill  succeed in e s ta b l ish in g  and 
occupying new s ta tu se s  of au thority"  (pp. 91-92).
With re sp ec t  to  the time dimension, the above mentioned causes 
function on the basis  of a f iv e -s tag e  process. In the f i r s t  s tage , the 
so c ia l  system is in teg ra ted  and has a "steady s ta te "  though some "deviant 
behaviors" do occur ro u tin e ly .  In the  second s tag e ,  a source of change 
w ill  d is e q u i l ib ra te  the healthy system and consequently "anomie and 
d is illus ionm ent"  become widespread. In the th i rd  s tag e ,  "cu ltu ra l  
d is to r t io n "  is  in o rder and the tensions induced by d isequ ilib rium  become 
f u l ly  m anifest. From th i s  stage the period of " r e v i t a l i z a t io n ,"  or 
rev o lu tion , w ill  emerge whose f in a l  ta sk  is the " ro u t in iza t io n "  of the 
revo lu tion . In sum, Johnson roots h is  causal explanation o f revolution 
in the s t ru c tu re s  o f  the social system and the system of the social 
values o f  a given so c ie ty .  When, in a socia l system, s t ru c tu ra l  d is in ­
te g ra t io n  occurs and dissensus on the s o c ia l ly  held values e x i s t s ,  a 
revo lu tionary  change is l ik e ly .
F. S ta tus  P o l i t ic s  Explanation of Revolution
Weber (1947) d is t ingu ished  three  d i s t i n c t  "orders" in social
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communities. The economic o rd e r , which is  based on economic in te re s ts  
and represented by c lasses ;  socia l o rd e r , which is  based on social 
p re s t ig e  and y ie ld s  s ta tu s  groups; p o l i t i c a l  order which revolves around 
p o l i t i c a l  power and is symbolized by p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  Such d i f f e re n ­
t i a t io n  is  based on Weber's view th a t  n e i th e r  economic power nor p o l i t i c a l  
power par excellence is the so le  base of social honor. "Indeed, socia l 
honor, or p re s t ig e ,  may even be the basis of p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
power, and very frequently  has been" (Weber, 1947:1).
Following Weber, some students of socia l movements have traced  
and s t re sse d  the noneconomic motives and ingredients  in the c rea tion  of 
social ac t io n s .  A leading example in th is  area is  Gusfield (1976) whose 
theory is o f  in te r e s t  a t  the p resen t .  However, as he acknowledges, 
G usf ie ld 's  "theory of s ta tu s  p o l i t i c s , "  which is  based on the American 
Temperance Movement (n ineteenth  century) as a case study, is not a 
wholesale explanation of p o l i t i c a l  unres t. I t  is only "a useful addition  
the the economic and the psychological modes o f  analys is  cu rren t in the 
study of p o l i t i c a l  and socia l movements" (p. 167). With respect to  the 
underlying assumptions o f  th i s  d is s e r ta t io n ,  the inclusion of s ta tu s  
p o l i t i c s  as a p a r t i a l  explanation of revolution is  considered to be 
f r u i t f u l  fo r  i t  deals with "the s t ru c tu ra l  and c u l tu ra l  roots" of socia l 
movements, the roots th a t  can be id en tif ied  in any given co lle c t iv e  
action .
Social s ta tu s  re fe rs  to  the d is t r ib u t io n  of p re s t ig e  in a given 
socie ty ; and p res tige  is the approval, re spec t,  adm iration, or deference 
a person or a group is able to  command by v ir tu e  of his or i t s  imputed 
q u a l i t ie s  o r  performance. Among p res tige  groups, a s ta tu s  h ierarchy tends
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to develop w ithin which some groups can claim g re a te r  p re s t ig e  than 
o thers .  E ffo rts  to  r e d is t r ib u te  p re s t ig e  w ill  depend on the a b i l i t y  to  
control the giving o f p re s t ig e  aga ins t  the re luctance o f p re s t ig e -g iv e rs  
to g ran t  i t .  Hence soc ia l  s ta tu s  c o n f l i c t  over the a l lo c a t io n  of p res­
tige  and the genesis  o f  s ta tu s  movements can be understood. A s ta tu s  
movement then is a c o l le c t iv e  action which seeks to  m ain ta in , re s to re ,  
or r a is e  the p re s t ig e  o f  a group whose values and ideals  are advocated 
by the movement. Such a movement is "symbolic in n a tu re ,"  and i t s  goals 
are usually  defined in i d e a l i s t i c  terms. However, one must recognize 
th a t  t h i s  does not mean th a t  a "symbolic crusade" is le s s  s ig n i f ic a n t  
than o th e rs .  In f a c t ,  almost any socia l movement is a blend of 
instrum ental, symbolic, and expressive ( i . e . ,  a mere psychological 
c a th a rs is )  ac tions .
A s ta tu s  movement is to  be understood as an "e th ica l  p o s i t io n ,"  
and consequently "a sign of l i f e  s ty le  commitment and s ta tu s  group 
membership" (p. 30). Thus, "the p o s i t io n  of a s ty le  o f  l i f e  in the 
s ta tu s  s t ru c tu re  is  an important clue to the s ign if icance  o f  attempts 
to persuade, in fluence, or force o thers  to  emulate i t "  (p. 35). The 
ta rg e t  of a l i f e  s ty le  and moral crusade is  usually  d irec ted  toward the 
government,for "government is the only agency which claims to  ac t  fo r  
the e n t i r e  society" (p. 168). The government, e sp e c ia l ly  when socie ty  
undergoes profound a l t e r a t io n s ,  ac ts  in such a way th a t  one s ta tu s  
group becomes degraded and the o ther is given deference. Consequently, 
" in  seeking to  a f f e c t  t h e i r  honor and p re s t ig e  in the so c ie ty ,  a group 
makes demands upon governing agents to  a c t  in ways which serve to 
symbolize deference or to  degrade the opposition whose s ta tu s  they
76
challenge or who challenge th e ir s "  (p. 167).
S ta tus  p o l i t i c s  revolves around e th n ic ,  re l ig io u s ,  and o ther
"cu l tu ra l  groups" who see t h e i r  p re s t ig e  and the t r a d i t io n a l  way o f l i f e
as changed or threatened by change by o th e rs .  Hence, "cu l tu ra l  issues"
w ill  p o la r iz e  socie ty  along l in e s  o f s ta tu s  d ifferences  and pose c o n f l ic t
between d ivergent l i f e  s ty le s .  S ta tus  movements in th is  sense attempt
to  bu ild  and su s ta in  moral orders which provide basic meaning to  human
l i f e  in the eyes of movers. In sum,
p re c ise ly  because p re s t ig e  is  f a r  from s tab le  in a changing 
so c ie ty ,  sp e c i f ic  issues can become s tru c tu red  as t e s t s  of 
s ta tu s  when they are construed as symbols o f  group m o ra l i t ie s  
and l i f e  s ty le s .  A c iv i l  l i b e r t i e s  issue . . .takes much o f 
i t s  a f f e c t  and meaning from the c lashes  between t r a d i t io n a l iz e d  
and modernist groups. . . Elements of educational s o p h i s t i ­
c a t io n ,  re l ig io u s  secularism , or p o l i t i c a l  l ibe ra lism  may 
appear as a l ie n ,  fo re ig n , and in d ir e c t  con trad ic t ion  to  the 
l o c a l i s t  ways of l i f e  of the t r a d i t io n a l  orien ted  cu l tu re .
Thus , Issues of c iv i l  l i b e r t i e s  become f ie ld s  on which 
such cu l tu ra l  and educational groups f i g h t  to e s ta b l is h  
t h e i r  claims to  pub lic  recognition  and p re s t ig e  (p. 175).
G. Resource M obilization Explanation of Revolution 
H is to r ic a l ly  speaking, resource m ob iliza tion , as a determining 
f a c to r  in the f in a l  end of socia l movements, has been emphasized by 
d i f f e r e n t  analys ts  of p o l i t i c a l  u n res t .  However, as an explanatory  
model o f  socia l movements th i s  viewpoint was not s tre ssed  u n t i l  recen tly .  
Such s tuden ts  of socia l movements as Coleman (1969), Oberschall (1973), 
T i l ly  (1973, 1975), Gamson (1975), McCarthy and Zald (1977), and others 
have i n i t i a t e d  and developed th is  p e rsp ec tiv e .  As Oberschall notes 
"m obilization  re fe rs  to  the processes by which discontented group assem­
bles and invests  resources fo r  the p u rs u i t  o f  the group goals" (1973:28). 
Resources to  be managed include both m ateria l ( e .g . ,  jo b s ,  income, savings.
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and the r i g h t  to  m aterial goods and se rv ices )  and nonmaterial th ings 
( e .g . ,  a u th o r i ty ,  moral commitment, time, t r u s t ,  f r ien d sh ip ,  s k i l l s ,  mass 
media). However, a l l  mobilizable resources have co n stra in ts  which r e s t r i c t  
th e i r  a b i l i t y  to  be assembled. Such fa c to rs  as the governing va lues , 
p a s t  experiences, reference groups, and re la t io n s  with the ta r g e t  groups 
constra in  the management o f  the availab le  resources and the access to 
o thers  (Freeman, 1979).
As such, resource m obilization should not be understood as a mere 
c re a t io n ,  discovery, p rep a ra t io n ,  organ ization  of and devotion and com­
mitment to  the requirements of c o n f l ic t  s i tu a t io n s .  I t  a lso  should be 
viewed in the sense th a t  "groups locked in c o n f l ic t  are in competition 
fo r  some o f  the same resources as each seeks to  squeeze more resources 
from i n i t i a l l y  uncommitted p a r t i e s .  When one p ar ty  to the c o n f l ic t  suc­
ceeds in obtaining some h i th e r to  unallocated resources, these resources 
are no longer availab le  to  the opposition" (Obershall, 1973:28). Hence 
th is  pe rspec tive  deals with socia l s t ru c tu re s  from the p o in t  of view of 
how resources are c rea ted , exchanged, re a l lo c a te d ,  consumed, converted 
and even lo s t ,  constantly .
Whereas other explanations of soc ia l  movements emphasize " s t ru c ­
tu ra l  s t r a i n , "  "generalized b e l ie f , "  and "deprivation ,"  the resource 
m obiliza tion  model focuses on the "ongoing problems" and " s t r a te g ic  
dilemmas" of social movements. In th is  con tex t,
The resource management model views revolu tionary  violence as 
an extension or con tinua tion , in a p a r t i c u la r  form, of everyday 
non-vio len t p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv i ty .  An event o f  p o l i t i c a l  violence 
is conceptualized, not as a sudden and unpredictable ou tbu rs t  
or e rup tion  of heretofore  l a te n t  tensions o r  f ru s t r a t io n s  
which take th e i r  m anifest form in an organizational vacuum, 
but r a th e r  as the outcome of a continuous process or organiza­
t io n a l  a c t iv i ty  (Aminzade, 1973:5).
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T i l ly  (1973:6) adds th a t  whether violence takes place is la rg e ly  contingent 
upon "whether members of one group decide to r e s i s t  the claims being made 
by members of another group" (emphasis added).
The resource m obilization approach . .depends more upon 
p o l i t i c a l ,  socio logica l and economic theo rie s  than upon the socia l psy­
chology o f  co lle c t iv e  behavior" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1213). In th is  
re sp ec t ,  socia l action  in p ro te s t  s i tu a t io n s  is considered as reasonable 
and ca lcu la ted . I t  is  not i r ra t io n a l  as the psychological view of co l­
le c t iv e  behavior suggests. This r a t io n a l i ty  can be j u s t i f i e d  by the 
f a c t  th a t  group ac t io n ,  as noted e a r l i e r ,  is viewed as being attached 
to the experience of everyday l i f e .  "Collective  violence is one of the 
commonest forms of p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ic ip a t io n "  (T i l ly ,  1973:6). More 
s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  " re b e l l io n ,  in th is  view, is simply p o l i t i c s  by other 
means. I t  is  not some kind of i r r a t io n a l  expression but i s .  . . i n s t r u ­
mental in i t s  nature. . ." (Gamson, 1975:139).
To b e t te r  grasp the resource m obilization assumptions in a 
system atic  fash ion , McCarthy and Zald 's  (1977) hypotheses, as "a p a r t ia l  
theory" o f  "resource m obiliza tion  and socia l movements", can be outlined 
as follows:
Hypothesis 1 : As the amount o f  d iscre tionary  resources of mass 
and e l i t e  publics increases, the absolute and re la t iv e  amount of resources 
av a ilab le  to  the socia l movement sec to r  increases. ("Social movement 
s e c to r ,"  SMS, re fe rs  to  a l l  "social movement in d u s tr ie s" ,  SMIs, in a 
socie ty  no m atter to  which social movement, SM, they are a ttached . SMI 
is "the o rganizational analogue of a socia l movement.")
Hypothesis 2: The g rea te r  the absolute amount of resources
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a v a ilab le  to  the SMS, the g re a te r  the l ik e l ih o o d  th a t  new SMIs and 
"soc ia l movement o rgan iza tion ,"  SMOs, w ill  develop to  compete fo r  these 
resources . (A SMO is a complex, or formal, organization  which id e n t i f ie s  
i t s  goals with the preferences of a soc ia l  movement or a counter movement 
and attem pts to  implement these g o a ls .)
Hypothesis 3: Regardless of the resources ava ilab le  to  the
p o te n t ia l  benefic ia ry  adherents , the la rg e r  the amount of resources 
a v a ilab le  to  "conscience adherents" the more l ik e ly  is the development 
of SMOs and SMIs th a t  respond to  preferences fo r  change. ("P o ten tia l  
b e n e f ic ia r ie s "  are those groups or ind iv idua ls  who would b e n e f i t  d i re c t ly  
from SMO goal accomplishment. "Adherents" are those indiv iduals  or 
o rgan iza tions  th a t  believe in the goals o f  the movement. "Conscience 
adherents" are individuals and groups who are p a r t  of the appropria te  
SM but do not stand to  b e n e f i t  d i r e c t ly  from SMO goal accomplishment.)
Hypothesis 4: The more a SMO is  dependent upon iso la ted  
c o n s t i tu en ts  , the le ss  s tab le  w ill  be the flow of resources to  the SMO. 
(" I s o la te d  co n s ti tuen ts"  are those groups or ind iv iduals  who do not 
normally meet in face - to -face  in te rac t io n  with o the r  co n s ti tu en ts  and 
hence cannot be bound to  the SMO through so l id a ry  se le c t iv e  in cen tives .)
Hypothesis 5 : A SMO which attempts to l in k  both conscience 
and b en e f ic ia ry  con s ti tu en ts  to the o rgan iza tion  through federa ted  chapter 
s t ru c tu re s ,  and hence so lid a ry  incen tives , is  l ik e ly  to have high levels  
of tension  and c o n f l ic t .  (Federated chapters  are those small but organized 
u n its  t h a t  serve to  pu t co n s ti tu en ts  to g e th e r .)
Hypothesis 6: Older e s tab lish ed  SMOs are more l ik e ly  than newer 
SMOs to  p e r s i s t  throughout the cycle of SMI growth and d ec line .
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Hypothesis 7 : The more competitive a SMI (a function  of the 
number and s ize  of the e x is t in g  SMOs)» the more l ik e ly  i t  is th a t  new 
SMOs w ill  o f f e r  narrow goals and s t r a t e g i e s .
Hypothesis 8 : The la rg e r  the income flow to  a SMO, the more 
l ik e ly  th a t  cadre and s t a f f  are p ro fessional and the la rg e r  are these 
groups.
Hypothesis 9 : The la rg e r  the SMS and the la rg e r  the sp ec if ic  
SMIs, the more l ik e ly  i t  is th a t  SM careers  w ill  develop. (A "social 
movement career" is a sequence of p ro fess ional s t a f f  and cadre pos it ions  
held by adherents in a number of SMO and/or supportive i n s t i tu t io n s . )
Hypothesis 10; The more a socia l movement is funded by iso la ted  
c o n s t i tu e n ts ,  the more l ik e ly  th a t  ben ef ic ia ry  co n s t i tu en t  workers are 
re c ru i te d  fo r  s t r a te g ic  purposes r a th e r  than fo r  o rgan izational work.
Hypothesis 11: The more a SMO is made up o f workers with d is ­
c re t io n ary  time a t  t h e i r  d isp o sa l ,  the more read ily  i t  can develop 
t r a n s i to ry  teams. ("T ransito ry  teams" are composed of workers assembled 
fo r  a s p e c if ic  ta sk , sh o r t  in du ra tion , and are ty p ic a l ly  led  by cadre 
members.)
F in a lly ,  as i t  is  ou tl ined  in th is  s ec t io n ,  resource m obilization 
analys ts  anchor th e i r  explanation of so c ia l  movements, revolu tionary  or 
o therw ise, in the very nature of the a v a ilab le  and p re d ic tab le  resources 
as both ends to  be achieved and means whereby such achievement becomes 
p o ss ib le .  The resource m obilization  idea can be traced  to  the f a c t  th a t  
i f ,  in a given s i tu a t io n ,  the oppressed people are not p ro te s t in g ,  they 
should not be viewed as s a t i s f i e d  with the system. Rather, t h e i r  s i tu a ­
t io n  demonstrates th a t  to  date they have not been able to a c t iv a te  th e i r
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p o te n t ia l s  and s e t  themselves in motion, th a t  i s ,  t h e i r  overa ll  resources 
are not mobilized.
* * *
In closing th is  d iscussion  about the theo ries  of re v o lu tio n ,  
the following po in ts  should be emphasized in conclusion. F i r s t ,  a l l  
these th e o r ie s  hold th a t  under ce r ta in  circumstances some s t r a in  and 
tension are produced in a soc ie ty  which, given o ther co n d itions , w ill  
revo lu tion ize  the masses o r  some segment o f  them. Second, concerning 
the o r ig in s  of s t r a in ,  some th e o r is t s  ( e . g . ,  Marx, Dahrendorf, Smelser, 
Johnson, G usfie ld ) ,  hold t h a t  s t r a in  is rooted in so c ie ty 's  soc ia l  s t ru c ­
tu re  and the system of c u l tu ra l  values. Other th e o r is t s  ( e . g . ,  Davies,
Gurr, Geschwender), maintain th a t  s t r a in  r e s u l t s  from an in to le ra b le  
gap between what people want (or had in the pa s t)  and what they are 
receiving a t  the p resen t.  Third, whereas a group of th e o r i s t s  focus on 
the roo t o f  s t r a in  as so c io lo g ica l ,  economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  o r  c u l tu r a l ,  
the o th e r  group id e n t i f ie s  i t  as predominately psychological. However, 
the psychological view can be p ic tu red  as e i t h e r  in d iv id u a l i s t ic  where 
the individual a c to r 's  aggressiveness is responsible  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  violence, 
or c o l le c t iv e  where s t r a in  is  accumulated in c o l le c t iv i ty  and manifested 
c o l le c t iv e ly .  The l a t t e r  s tandpoin t id e n t i f ie s  social ac tion  in social 
movements as ca lcu la ted  and ra t io n a l  while the former sees i t  as deviant 
and i r r a t i o n a l .
However, our p o s i t io n  is socio log ica l in the sense t h a t  s t r a in  
and d i s a t i s f a c t io n  are caused by a web of in te r re la te d  socia l fa c to rs  and 
not an individual v a r ia b le ,  be i t  socia l o r  psychological. Such a pos­
i t io n  w i l l  be explored in the l a t e r  app lica t io n  and evalua tion  chapter 
as i t  e n t a i l s  a c h ra c te r iz a t io n  of the t e s t  case revo lu tion .
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CHAPTER V 
THE REVOLUTION OF IRAN (1979)
A. A Prelude
In discussing the Iranian Revolution, an attempt w ill not be 
made to  produce a theory of  revolu tions based on a s ing le  case o r  to 
v igorously explain th i s  revo lu tion . In f a c t ,  in th is  d i s s e r ta t io n  the 
ta rg e t  revolu tion  is  o f  i n t e r e s t  only as a t e s t  case fo r th eo r ie s  of 
revo lu tion  based on which a synthesis  w ill be concluded. However, in 
th i s  p rocess , the s c i e n t i f i c  commitment i s  twofold. On the  one hand, 
j u s t i c e  must be given to  the  revolu tion  under study, regard less  of 
whether t h i s  revolution supports a p a r t i c u la r  theory or no t.  On the 
o th e r ,  each addressed theory must be applied  to  the t e s t  case revolu­
t io n  regard less  of the  nature  and ch arac te r  o f  th is  revo lu tion . I t  
should a lso  be emphasized th a t  since the  underlying theme o f th i s  
d i s s e r ta t io n  is  why^  revo lu tions  take p lace ,  our treatment o f  the 
Iranian Revolution revolves around only i t s  causes proper without 
considera tion  of what the  rev o lu tiona rie s  achieved a f t e r  they took 
over.
As a complex soc ia l  phenomenon, revolu tion  has i t s  roots  in a 
s o c ie ty 's  socia l h is to ry ;  i t  is  not an overnight c re a t io n .  However,
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the  remoteness of the  past events responsible  fo r  the  c rea t io n  of 
revolutions d i f f e r s  from one s e t t in g  to  the o ther .  For in s tance , in his 
analysis  of the Russian Revolution, Davies (1962:10) argues th a t  "one 
can t ru ly  say th a t  the  real beginning [o f  th is  rev o lu t io n ]  was the  slow 
modernization process begun by Peter The Great over two hundred vears 
before the revo lu tion" (emphasis added). The very beginning of the 
Iranian Revolution has been variously  a t t r ib u te d  to  (1) The Iranian 
n a t io n a l i s t  movement of the ea r ly  195G's, (2) the r e l ig io - p o l i t i c a l  
upris ing  of the  ea r ly  1960's, and (3) The "oil boom" which began in 
the  ear ly  1970's.
For reasons to  be addressed l a t e r ,  we believe  th a t  the  Iranian 
revolution must be traced  to  the  r e l ig io - p o l i t i c a l  episodes which 
occurred around the tu rn  o f  the tw en tie th  century. These events re ­
su l te d  in the Iranian C onstitu tional Revolution (1906), which from the 
very beginning was suppressed. With th i s  in mind, the  major events and 
t h e i r  impacts t h a t ,  in one way o r ano ther, gradually  accumulated and 
u lt im a te ly  surfaced to  jo in t ly  co n tr ib u te  to the c rea t io n  of the 1979 
revolution will be addressed. This i s  approached in two interconnected 
sec tions . Taken to g e th e r , the  two accounts will produce a s u f f ic ie n t  
understanding o f  the t e s t  case revo lu tion  based on which a synthesis 
w ill  be concluded.
B. H is to rica l  Background
Understanding th a t  the Revolution of Iran i s  rooted in a f a i r l y  
long p as t ,  the occurrence and cumulation of the  events th a t  are  both 
responsible  fo r  and symptomatic of th i s  revolution can be addressed in 
the  following form.
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(1) The Early Roots. Beginning in  the  l a te  n ine teen th  century, 
the  I ran ia n s ,  led by the  re l ig io u s  le ad e rs ,  ra ised  th e i r  guns agains t 
the  imprudent Qajar dynasty (1796-1925), and the  in te rfe ren ce  of  Russia 
and Great B rita in  in t h e i r  country (Shuster, 1912; Browne, 1966; Keddie, 
1979:16; Johnson, 1980:36). Among the in su rrec t io n s  of th e  l a t e  n ine­
teen th  century , th a t  o f  the  Tobacco, o r  Regie (1981-2), had a crucial 
impact on the  events to  come (Paine, 1975:4; Keddie, 1980:66). In th i s  
movement, the  opposition forced the government to  revoke th e  concession 
i t  had a lready given to  the  B r i t ish  (1890) allowing England to  monopolize 
the  domestic tobacco production and industry . On the  whole, a l l  of
the  1890s and ear ly  1900s' upris ings re su lted  in  a desired  change - The 
C onstitu tiona l Revolution o f  1906. As i t s  fundamental id e a l ,  the 
opposition  succeeded in transforming the  Q ajars ' a u to c ra t ic  ru le  to 
co n s t i tu t io n a l  monarchy id e n t i f ie d  with the  " ru le  o f  law" and symbolized 
by th e  parliament ( e . g . ,  Browne :1966).
But, a t  the very dawn o f th i s  achievement, two events  took 
p lace . In 1907, Iran was divided in to  two spheres o f in f lu en ce ,  the 
Russian in the North and the  B ri t ish  in the South (Pahlavi, 1980:47). 
Second, Mohammad Ali Shah, the new king, with the  overt support o f  
Russia, stormed the  Parliament and challenged the "freedom -fighters" 
(1908). Thus fo r  a th irteen-m onth period , he reimposed absolu tism , or 
as b e t t e r  known in I ran ,  The "Istebdad-e Sagheer: ( i . e . ,  sh o r t  depotism). 
U ltim ate ly , the despo tic  Shah was expelled and the ru le  o f  th e  represen­
t a t i v e  came agains , to  be continued c h a o t ic a l ly  un til  1921.
(2) The Reza Shah Penonmenon. While Iran was su ffe r in g  from 
serious  in te rna l problems as well as Russian - B r i t ish  im positions,
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Colonel Reza Khan implemented a B ritish -designed  coup d ' é t a t  and took 
the saddle  o f power (1921). Four years l a t e r ,  he put an end to  the 
Qajar dynasty to  e s ta b l i s h  his own, the Pahlavi dynasty (1925). Sig­
n i f i c a n t ly ,  following the  e n te rp r ise  o f  Kamal Atotork of Turkey, Reza 
Khan i n i t i a l l y  had the in c l in a t io n  to  form a republic  in I ran ,  but he 
somehow dropped the idea and perpetuated the  imperial system.
Under d i c t a to r i a l  p o lic ie s  and p rac tices  and the  deemphasis on 
the C on sti tu t io n ,  Reza Shah attempted to  c re a te  a modern u n if ied  Iran.
Such an attempt continued u n ti l  his g rip  o f  power was sh a t te re d  by the 
A l l i e s '  occupation o f the  country (1941). Reza Shah's expanding mul­
tidim ensional r e la t io n s h ip  with Germany under H i t le r ,  as well as the 
" s t r a te g ic  sp o t l ig h t  lo ca t io n  of Iran as the  only route through which 
len d - lease  m ateria l"could  be delivered  to  Russia, led the A ll ie s  to  
rep lace  Reza Shah with h is  twenty-two-year old son, the  Crown Prince 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and to  occupy the Iranian t e r r i t o r i e s .  This, 
however, took place in th e  guise o f  the so -ca lled  Tehran Treaty which 
p a r t i a l l y  reads th a t  "The governments o f  the  United S ta tes  o f  American, 
the  U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom recognize the a ss is tan c e  which 
Iran has given in  the prosecution of the war agains t the  common enemy, 
p a r t i c u la r ly  by f a c i l i t a t i n g  the t ran sp o r ta t io n  of supplies  from over­
seas to  the  Soviet Union" (Thomas and Frye, 1971:276).
(3) Iran Under the  Shah. Up to  the la te  1940s, the  new young 
king, h e re a f te r  the Shah, was not a real th r e a t  to  the growing t ra d i t io n a l  
opposition  as he l a t e r  became.
(a) The 1940s. During th is  period , the Iran ians thought more 
o f  the  f a t e  o f  t h e i r  occupied and embattled country than the nature of
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the  regime and i t s  func tion ing . In noncompliance with the  Tehran Treaty, 
the  Russians continued t h e i r  occupation o f the  North of Iran u n t i l  they 
withdrew re lu c ta n t ly  in 1946, under the p ressure  of the United Nations 
Organization. In t h i s  y e a r ,  the Turk and the  Kurd m in o r i t ie s  of Iran , 
who had Russian support, declared th e i r  independent repub lics .  The 
Arabs, who had lo s t  t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  independence to  Reza Khan in  1925, 
a lso  re b e lled  agains t the  regime (1946). However, no group achieved any 
ob jec t iv e  in  these re b e l l io n s .  The Shah survived the f i r s t  a ssass in a tio n  
attempt in  1947, but h is  M in ister o f  Court, A. Hazhier, l o s t  h is  l i f e  in 
another attem pt in 1949. The attempt on the  Shah's l i f e  was managed by 
the communist Tudeh P arty , a r e s u l t  o f  which was the outlawing o f  the 
organ ization  (Pahlavi, 1980:82); the attempt on the l i f e  o f  the M inister 
was planned by the F eda 'ian -e  Islam ( i . e . ,  the  devotee to  Islam). This 
o rgan iza tion  was formed in 1945 and was roughly modeled on the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood. According to  Keddie (1981:200),
. . . th e  Feda 'ian-e  Islam, [was] a group of young 
men o f  popular o r ig in  who published a fundam entalist program 
c a l l in g  fo r  a re tu rn  to  popular Islamic ways and laws and 
an end to  Western in f lu en ce ,  and who a lso  a ssass in a ted  th e i r  
c h ie f  enemies.
(b) The Early 1950s. Even a f t e r  t h e i r  withdrawal from Iran ,  the 
B ri t ish  up to  the e a r ly  1950s remained the p r in c ip a l ta rg e t  ag a in s t  which 
the  p o l i t i c s  o f  the country was d irec ted . They had always been i n t e r ­
vening in the  in te rn a l a f f a i r s  and e n t i r e ly  co n tro lled  the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company. Such a control began a t  the  turn  o f  the p resen t century 
when they obtained the  concession fo r  the exp lora tion  of  o i l  from the 
Qajars. Up to  the 1950s, Iran was receiving only 25 percent of i t s  o il 
revenue while the o th e r  75 percent belonged to  the  B r i t i s h .  This f a c t ,
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among many o th e rs ,  motivated the opposing and p a t r i o t  Iranians to  
challenge the  B ri t ish  and the Shah who a l l i e d  him self with them. Such 
a challenge developed under and was p o l i t i c a l ly  j u s t i f i e d  through the 
banner o f  nationalism and n a t io n a liza t io n  o f  o i l .
In response, the  Shah sought more support from Great B rita in  
and a lso  took refuge in the United States as he made his  f i r s t  s t a t e  
v i s i t  to  Washington (1949). Later, The Americans began to  take an active  
ro le  in the p o l i t i c s  o f  Iran and to  replace the  B r i t i s h .  Since the  
Iranian Parliament was opera ting  with only the  House of Representatives 
un til  1949, the Shah, as he put i t ,  "created" the  Senate. He subse­
quently amended the C onsti tu tion  to  provide him with power to  d issolve 
the Parliament and to  o rder new e lec tions  (Pahlavi, 1980:83). At the 
time, the opposition consis ted  b a s ica l ly  of right-wing Islamics repre­
sented by Ayatollah Kashani (the Speaker o f  the House), Fadaiyn-e Islam, 
n a t io n a l i s t  p a r t ie s  led by Mossadegh (or Mossadeq) and the c o a l i t io n  of 
the National Front, and the  pro-Russian Tudeh (mass) Party. All o f  these 
fac tions  i n i t i a l l y  worked to g e th e r  and fo r  a common cause - the nation­
a l iz a t io n  of o i l  and the termination of the B r i t i s h  p o l i t ic a l  and economic 
dominance in Iran . With Mossadegh's leading ro le  as the leader o f  the 
Front and a popular member o f  the  Parliament, the  opposition f in a l ly  
reached i t s  goal. On April 19, 1951, the Parliament approved the 
n a tio n a l iz a t io n  and expropria tion  law which was endorsed by the  Shah 
immediately.
On the o ther hand, before the n a t io n a l iz a t io n  of o i l ,  the 
Premier General Razmara was assass ina ted  by a re l ig io u s  devotee (March, 
1951). He was succeeded by A la 's  short-term  Premiership (March - A pril,
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1951). A fter A la 's  re s ig n a tio n ,  "Mossadegh accepted and became Prime 
M inister on the day th a t  n a t io n a liza t io n  was approved" by the Parliament 
(Roosevelt, 1979:85). As a new popular Prime M inister , Mossadegh, from 
the very beginning, attempted to  minimize th e  Shah's ro le  as an ac tive  
ru le r  and obtained some concessions in t h i s  process. Yet, Mossadegh 
saw the Shah, the supreme power and commander-in-chief with foreign  
support, as the major roadblock in the course o f  managing the country.
However, (1) the  consequent p ressure  on the  Shah from the 
triumphant Premier, (2) the  following, and even preceding, recession  
caused by the n a t io n a l iz a t io n  negotia tions  and measures, (3) the  B rit ish  
co u n te rp o lic ie s ,  (4) the  lack of a workable program to  manage the 
country, and (5) in connection to  the  preceding p o in ts ,  the emerging 
r iv a l ry  and d ifference  in p o l i t i c a l  po s i t io n s  among the  coalesced 
p a r t i e s ,  produced an economically s tagnant and p o l i t i c a l l y  m i l i t a n t  
s i tu a t io n  in Iran . As a r e s u l t ,  the opposition s p l i t  (Cottam, 1979; 
Lenczowski, 1980:179; Abrahamian, 1978a:7) and the Shah denied more 
concessions to Mossadegh. Provoked by the B r i t i s h ,  the Americans 
understood th a t  "events were moving ra p id ly ,  inexorably toward c o n f l ic t  
between Mossadegh and the  Shah and, by asso c ia tio n  between th e  U.S.S.R. 
behind Mossadegh, the  major Western powers sympathetic to  the Shah" 
(Roosevelt, 1979:91).
As a r e s u l t ,  the  Americans (and the  B r i t ish )  counteracted with 
a "Countercoup" (Roosevelt:1979), aimed a t  two in tertw ined  o b jec t iv es :  
(1) p u tt ing  an end to  Mossadegh's movement, and (2) paving th e  way fo r  
the Shah to  ru le  a t  w i l l .  Both ends were achieved su ccess fu l ly  (August, 
1953), though as a f a c i l i t a t i o n  fa c to r  the Shah abdicated fo r  a short
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while. Consequently, a new e ra  in the p o l i t i c s  o f  Iran emerged which 
took shape through various so c io p o l i t ic a l  episodes.
(c) A fter Mossadegh. In m atters o f  foreign  r e la t io n s ,  the 
new era  (1953-1979), became id e n t i f ie d  with the  increasing presence o f  
the United S ta te s  in ,  and i t s  overa ll dominance over, the Iran ian  scene. 
"Iran  became p a r t  o f  what is  c a l led  'The Northern T i e r ' ,  the  l in e  of 
pro-Western s ta t e s  along the southern borders o f  the Soviet Union, 
from Turkey through to  Pakistan" (H alliday, 1979a:252). The Shah 
re s to re d  and accumulated power abruptly and denied the valued o f f ic e s  
to  the  remaining opposition . His major c h a llen g e rs ,  including Mossadegh, 
were executed, j a i l e d ,  detained  o r e x i le d ,  and the opposing p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t ie s  were outlawed or denied p rac t ica l  r iv a l r y  with the exception of 
the extreme right-wing Pan I r a n i s t  Party which was co-opted. In order 
to  remain in c o n tro l ,  the Shah, under the  CIA supervision and I s ra e l i  
co lab o ra tio n ,  created  h is  s e c re t  police - The SAVAK (1957), which 
harassed the  Iran ians , and functioned as an e f fe c t iv e  agent o f  socia l  
contro l u n t i l  the very co llap se  of the regime.
However, as e a r ly  as November 1953, in sp ired  by now sporadic 
and subterranean opposition , the students  o f  the  University o f  Tehran 
deomonstrated aga ins t  the  one-man regime. The demonstration was quelled 
by the  Shah's troops and, among o ther c a s u a l t i e s ,  th ree  s tuden ts  l o s t  
t h e i r  l iv e s  on campus. Until the  downfall o f  th e  Shah, the  in c id en t  
served as a "generational event" to  keep "generational consciousness 
most in tense  in the sense o f  generation martydom" (Feuer, 1969:27).
Also i t  was invoked and exp lo ited  by d i f f e r e n t  challenging p a r t i e s .
In October 1955, the  Shah signed the  Baghdad Pact, which linked
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Turkey, Pak is tan , and Iraq to  Great B r i ta in ,  in the guise of "defensive 
a l l ian ce"  aga ins t  Russian "expansionism" ( e . g . ,  Richards, 1975a: 9, 12). 
In the  wake o f  th e i r  1958 revo lu tion , the I r a q is  withdrew from the 
"im perialist-im posed" pac t.  However, the Shah remained an a c t iv e  a l ly  
of the t r e a ty ,  now changed to  the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 
to which the  United S ta tes  a ttached  i t s e l f  as a "Partner".
In 1957-8 the Shah ordered the formation of two p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s ,  th e  Mellion (the n a t io n a l i s t s ) ,  as the  m ajority  p a r ty ,  and 
the Mardom (the people), as the opposition party . Both were continu­
ously led  by his devotees and functioned in  one way or another u n t i l  
1975. In January 1958, General Qarani attempted a coup a g a in s t  the 
regime but with the lack o f  foreign support he fa i le d  to  achieve an 
end, though was courtmarshalled and j a i l e d  (Cottam, 1979:314-315, 362; 
Richards, 1975a:16). When the revolutionary  regime took over, Qarani 
assumed the position  of  the Commander-in-Chief, to  be a ssass in a ted  by 
a counterrevolu tionary  c l iq u e .  Also in 1958 the Shah created  the  
Pahlavi Foundation o s ten s ib ly  fo r  ch a r i tab le  purposes, financed by 
Pahlavi Esta tes  and the Crown Land. These p roperties  had been con­
f i s c a te d  by Reza Shah to  become Pah lav i 's  p r iv a te  property (Zonis, 
1972:48-49; Richards, 1 9 7 5 a :l l ,  14, 15; Hoveyda, 1980:92).
(d) The Early 1960s. In July 1960, the Shah, in a press 
meeting, confirmed th a t  h is  regime had recognized the S ta te  o f  Israel 
de fa c to .  This acknowledgement inflamed Jamal Abdul Nasser, the  la te  
Presiden t o f  Egypt, to  a t ta ck  the  Shah and to  cu t o f f  Egyptian r e la t io n ­
ships with Iran (Lenczowski, 1980:203-4). In consequence, Nasser became 
the major, i f  not the only , head o f s ta t e  to  c r i t i c i z e  the Shah as
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being the puppet of the C o lo n ia l is ts  and Is rae l  as t h e i r  s a t e l l i t e .  
Morally speaking, Nasser 's  standpoint against the  Shah had an encouraging 
e f f e c t  on the  l e t t e r ' s  opposition throughout the 1960s. This i s  why 
the Shah "detes ted  Nasser, who had made speeches a t tack ing  him, and he 
tensed whenever the name o f  the  Egyptian President was spoken in his 
presence" (Hoveyda, 1980:138).
Referring to  the "black reac t io n a r ie s"  and the "des truc tive  
red e lem ents", the  Shah, in  January 24, 1963, announced th a t  " . . .  they 
have chosen the Egyptian government as th e i r  leader and want Iran 
patterned  on Egypt. . . .we sha ll  p i ty  these people i f  they do not 
mend t h e i r  ways and do not make use o f  our generosity" (Pahlavi, 1963:1).
In f a c t ,  the  e a r ly  1960s were a c ruc ia l po in t in the  course 
o f  the Shah 's  adm in is tra tion . In l a t e  1960 and e a r ly  1961, the Iranian 
teachers  backed by the u n iv e rs i ty  s tuden ts ,  went on s t r ik e  and held 
frequent demonstrations. Their demands were sa la ry  increases and 
favorable employment re g u la t io n s .  However, the  " in v is ib le  hand" of the 
t r a d i t io n a l  opposition was involved in the event. In a confrontation  
with the  p o l ic e ,  one of th e  Tehranian teachers .  Dr. Khan-Ali, was shot 
to  death. Hence, the  s i tu a t io n  tensed and consequently a new government 
in which th e  teach e rs ' lead e r  assumed the M inistry o f  Education came to 
power ( B i l l ,  1972:139; Zonis, 1971:47-50; F ischer, 1980:187).
Throughout 1961-2, General Tiemur Bakhtiar, the tough d i re c to r  
of the  SAVAK, began to  exerc ise  power somewhat independently and to 
play p o l i t i c s  with both the  opposition and the incumbent Prime M in is ter ,  
Ami n i . F urther ,  the rumors c i rc u la te d  th a t  he was about to  engineer 
a coup a g a in s t  the  regime. The Shah f in a l ly  confronted Bakhtiar, and
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the ambitious general went abroad to  work l a t e r  aga ins t  the  Shah from 
his s e l f - e x i l e  in neighboring Iraq (Zonis, 1975:47-52; Richards, 1975: 
16-17). Bakhtiar worked out and advocated a p o l i t ic a l  program based on 
which he would su b s t i tu te  the  Shah's regime with a " fed e ra t iv e  system." 
The proposed federa tion  somewhat a t t r a c te d  the Iranian e thn ic  m in o r i t ie s ,  
though th i s  did not imply a confirmation of B akh tia r 's  p o l i t i c a l  career . 
However, Bakhtiar lo s t  h is  l i f e  in  Iraq a t  the hand of the  SAVAK 
agents (1970).
In 1962, in sp ired  and supported by the Kennedy and Johnson 
Administrations to  do something about I r a n 's  backwardness and hence to  
prevent the Russians' ideo log ical provocation in the Iran ian  lower 
c la s s e s ,  the  Shah declared a " s ix  point" program - The White Revolution 
(Leeden and Lewis, 1980:4). Up to  his dethronement, the  Shah had 
ra ised  the  program to  nineteen p o in ts .  Some observers note th a t  the 
in troduction  o f  th i s  program was a lso  influenced by N asser 's  el-Mawad 
e l - S i t  ( i . e . ,  the s ix  p o in ts )  program (Bayne, 1965:267). The major 
poin t o f  t h i s  program was the  land reform; the l i t e r a c y  co rps , p r o f i t  
sharing fo r  workers, and voting and p o l i t ic a l  r ig h ts  fo r  women also 
a t t r a c te d  some a t te n t io n .  The land reform was opposed by some o f  the 
t r a d i t io n a l  landlords, many of whom were members o f the Parliament or 
highly-ranked o f f i c i a l s .  Furthermore, i t  was re jec ted  by the m ajority 
o f  the re l ig io u s  leaders  who a lso  disagreed with the p o l i t i c a l  r ig h ts  
fo r  women as proposed by th e  White Revolution (Zonis:1972; Cottam:1979). 
However, in 1963 another c o n s t i tu t io n a l  change took p lace ,  based on which 
the Iran ian  women achieved th e  franch ise  (Saikal, 1980:87).
Meanwhile, the  r e l i g io - p o l i t i c a l  opposition came to  be more
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id e n t i f i e d  with the e n th u s ia s t ic  Ayatollah Khomeini, who began to  wage 
a b a t t l e  aga ins t  the regime. Ayatollah Khomeini f i r s t  came to  public  
a t te n t io n  a f t e r  the death o f  Ayatollah Bouroajerdi (1961) who had over­
shadowed the  whole re l ig io u s  sphere. On the  eve o f  the  e lec t io n  o f  the  
new Parliam ent, in October o f  1962, Ayatollah Khomeini was detained 
fo r  ordering h is  followers to  boycott the vote. Shortly  a f t e r ,  he was 
re leased . Later in t h i s  y ea r ,  th e  Shah "in accord with the Vienna 
Convention", granted the so -ca l led  " e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l  r ig h t s , "  b e t t e r  
known in Iran as the " c a p i tu la t io n s " ,  to  the American servicemen. These 
r ig h ts  ind ica ted  th a t  i f  the  Americans commit crime in  Iran , they w ill 
be d e a l t  with in t h e i r  own country and according to  the United S t a t e ' s  
laws. This concession motivated Ayatollah Khomeini to  a ttack  d ec is iv e ly  
the  Shah, the  pro-Western Prime M inister Masour, the  " im p e r ia l is t"  
Americans, and the  "Z ionist"  I s r a e l i s  as well (B i l l :1 971; Zonis:1972; 
Richards:1975a; Mottahedeh, 1980:25).
In the wake o f these  in c id e n ts ,  o ther events ensued and f i n a l ly  
th a t  o f  Panezdeh Khordad, o r  fo u r th  o f  June, 1963, occurred. Inflamed by 
Ayatollah Khomeini's speeches and preachings, h is  followers demonstrated 
in Tehran and the holy c i ty  o f  Qam. In t h i s  even t,  "the blood of 
thousands o f  Iran ians had been s p l i t "  by the Shah's troops (Zonis, 1971: 
63). F urther ,  Ayatollah Khomeini was ex iled  to  Turkey (November 1964), 
and then to  Iraq where he took abode un ti l  October 1978. The Shah's 
behavior toward "the men of re l ig io n "  was condemned by the Egyptian 
re l ig io u s  community. P residen t Nasser a lso  c i te d  the  dis turbances 
(Richards, 1975a:18) and reproached the "puppet o f  Colonialism" who a t  
the  time persecuted the Iranian Arab a c t i v i s t s .  In connection, two
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events must be mentioned. F i r s t ,  following the  p o l i t i c a l  unres t o f  
Summer 1963,
. . .  the Ayatollah [Khomeini] sen t l e t t e r s  to  leaders  
o f  Moslem and Arab c o u n tr ie s ,  asking fo r  help fo r  the victims 
o f  what he described as the a t r o c i t i e s  o f  the  Shah. Of a l l  
th e  leade rs  the  Ayatollah con tac ted , only one responded: Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, the  Egyptian army colonel who, the years  before , 
had overthrown King Farouk. The Egyptian leader  sen t $150,000 
by co u r ie r  to  the  committee t h a t  was responsib le  fo r  the 
r e l i e f  o f  the v ic tim s. But the  Savak a rre s ted  the cou rie r  
a t  Mehrabad A irport as he was bringing in the  money. The 
Shah seized  upon the inc iden t to  rebuke the  Ayatollah p u b lic ly ,  
who even then was id e n t i f ie d  as a leader o f  the opposition.
In a widely public ized speech, the  Iran ian  monarch questioned 
both the  source o f  the money and the  use to  which i t  was to  
be put. The next day, the Ayatollah rep l ie d :  "Everybody 
knows I did  not ask fo r  the money fo r  myself. I asked fo r  
i t  fo r  the  committee fo r  the r e l i e f  o f  the victims o f  what 
you have done—the ch ild ren  you have orphaned, the wives you 
have widowed." (S alinger,  1981:75-76).
Next, in 1963-4, the Shah was confronted by a s e p a r a t i s t  attempt 
by some Arab m inority  in Iran belonging to  the "Arabestan (Khuzistan) 
L ibera tion  Front". Although the  a ttem pt was aborted in December 1963, 
and th e  s e p a r a t i s t s  were e i th e r  executed o r  sentenced to  imprisonment 
by the  regime (June, 1964), the  event outraged the Shah - i t  was designed, 
nurtu red , and backed by the neighboring Arab I ra q is .  A dd itiona lly ,
By 1966 i t  would not be an exaggeration to  say th a t  
in  Iran ian  eyes Cairo had replaced Moscow as the  major cen te r  
o f  immediate danger. Radio Cairo broadcast increasing pro­
paganda on behalf o f  the Kuzistan [Abarbestan] Liberation 
Committee (B u rre l l ,  1972:23).
(e) The Late 1960s. In January 1965, the Prime M inister 
Mansour, a lso  the  leader o f  the  Iran Navin Party - the s u b s t i tu te  fo r  
the Mellion Party  - was a ssass ina ted  by a re l ig io u s  r i g h t i s t  from the 
Feda 'ian-e  Islam. On the o ther hand, in  April o f  the same year ,  the 
Shah survived another attempt on h is  l i f e  by an Imperial Guardsman.
This event was d irec ted  by a l e f t i s t  group whose leader ,  Parviz Nikkhuh,
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was sentenced to  imprisonment but l a t e r  was pardoned by the  Shah to  
c o l lab o ra te  with the regime and f i n a l l y  to  be executed by the revolu­
t io n a r ie s  (Pahlavi, 1980:60). In October 1966, the Shah ce lebra ted  
h is  S i lv e r  Ju b ilee .  In September 1967, he, through su p e r if ic a l  legal 
measures, a l te re d  the  C onstitu tion  so th a t  the Queen would be able to  
assume C onsti tu tiona l Regency (Lenczowski, 1980:210). Such a r ig h t  was 
not given to  the female. This was followed by his and th e  Queen's 
coronation in October 1967. This occasion as the imperial values 
suggested, gave a lso  the impression th a t  the regime was in  a steady s t a t e  
and th a t  th e  Shah enjoyed to ta l  contro l over the  country. As an ind ica ­
tion  o f  th e se  a t t i t u d e s ,  and as the foreign  re la t io n s  were concerned, 
the Shah a lso  enjoyed a de tente  with th e  Soviet Union "an impressive 
m anifesta tion  o f  which was the construc tion  o f  the Isfahan s tee l  m ill"  
begun in  1965 (Cottam, 1979:334).
P r io r  to  the Shah's coronation , the  A rab-Israeli  war o f June 
1967 had occurred, and he took advantage o f  i t s  afterm ath . For in s tance , 
h is  ce leb ra ted  enemy. P resident Nasser o f  Egypt, l o s t  the  b a t t l e  to  
Is rae l  and had already begun to  adopt and execute new p o l ic ie s ,  among 
which were the l a t e r  resumption of diplom atic  re la t io n sh ip s  with Iran . 
More im portan tly , N asser 's  ideological p r in c ip le s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  Arabism 
and Arab Socialism, were a serious th r e a t  to  the Emperor (B u rre l l ,  
1972:22-23, 4; Burrell and C o t tu l l ,  1972:12; Bayne, 1965:267). To be 
sure , pan-Arabism co n f l ic ted  with th e  Iranian  nationalism and in te r e s t s  
in the  Gulf area and th i s  was aggravated by the Shah's a t t i tu d e s  toward 
I s r a e l .  With reference to  the s o c i a l i s t  p r in c ip le ,  the  Shah was an 
advocator and executor o f  the  c a p i t a l i s t  system. Hence, the resumption 
of the p o l i t i c a l  re la t io n sh ip  with Egypt would r e d u c e  the  ex is t in g  te n ­
sion in  the  Gulf area.
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In 1967, the Shah's regime put in to  e f f e c t  a Family Protection 
Law based on which " . . .  men could no longer u n i la te r a l ly  divorce 
t h e i r  wives but a l l  divorce cases had to  go to  court and grounds fo r  
divorce by husband o r  wife were sim ilar"  (Keddie, 1980:180). This law, 
which was repealed and passed in s tronger form in 1975, was c r i t i c i z e d  
in the t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  re l ig io u s  c i rc le s  as being based on Western mores 
and not being in agreement with re lig ious  values.
As another event, in ear ly  1968, the regime to r tu red  and 
poisoned to  death the fa v o r i te  Iranian world w restling  champion, Takhti, 
a member o f  the National Front. Apparently, he had refused to  co llaborate  
with the regime by becoming a member o f  the Parliament. However, the 
s ec re t  was d isclosed  immediately, and the claim o f  the regime th a t  the 
champion committed su ic ide  was proved fa ls e .  Hence, tens o f  thousands 
o f  Tehranians demonstrated in the South o f  the C ap ita l ,  where the 
champion was born and buried , to  public ize  the b r u ta l i ty  o f  the  regime.
The event provoked the teachers  as well as s tudents to  go on s t r ik e s  and 
to  demonstrate.
( f )  The Early 1970s. "In March, 1970, u n iv e rs i ty  students  
[ in  Tehran] p ro tes ted  bus fa re  increases as a hardship on the  poor; 
they attacked a hundred buses; f iv e  students were k i l l e d ,  f iv e  hundred 
in ju red , and a thousand a r re s te d ,  of whom th i r ty  to  e ighty  were j a i le d  
fo r  an extended period" (F ischer, 1980:188). On the  o ther hand, beginning 
from the la te  1960s a t  l e a s t  two events occurred which, in tu rn ,  served 
as a prelude to  the episodes of th is  decade and which had a d i r e c t  impact 
on the approaching revo lu tion
(1) After accomplishing his academic study in soc ia l  sciences
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in France, Dr. All S h a r ia t i ,  an Iranian r e l i g io - p o l i t i c a l  scho la r ,  
in i t i a t e d  a symbolic awakening movement in the country. Through 
numerous le c tu re s ,  papers, and books, he advocated and i n s t i l l e d  
enthusiasm, e sp ec ia l ly  among the youth, and ideological revo lu tion  and 
l ib e ra t io n  based on updated Islamic t r a d i t io n  (Farhang, 1979; Halliday, 
1979a; Richard, 1980). His in te l le c tu a l  a c t i v i t y ,  which was mostly 
id e n t i f ie d  with Hussieniah Irshad, a mosque-like p lace , th rea tened  the 
regime and re su lted  in h is  repeated imprisonment, detention  and e x i le ,  
the e f f e c t  o f  which was to  public ize  fu r th e r  his teachings. S h a r i a t i ' s  
l i f e  f in a l ly ,  and m ysteriously , came to an end in h is  e x ile  in  London 
(1977), but Sullivan (1981:112) r e i t e r a t e s ,  and does not v e r i fy ,  th a t  
he died o f  a h ear t  a t ta ck .  However, S h a r ia t i  was not able to  enjoy 
the  revolu tionary  fe rvor to  which he had already  con tribu ted .
In l in e  with such an awakening movement, the W rite r 's  Associa­
t io n  o f  Iran with some f i f t y  core members, came, however u n o f f ic ia l ly ,  
in to  being. The Association ca lled  fo r  the  removal o f  censorship o f  the 
p ress ,  produced some anti-regim e m a te r ia l ,  and held some poetry readings 
known as Shah-e Shear, i . e . ,  poetry n ight ( e .g . ,  Baraheni:1976;
Halliday:1979a). This occasional ac tiv ism , though i t  was r e s t r i c t e d  
by th e  regime, a t t r a c te d  the youth and e sp e c ia l ly  the u n iv e rs i ty  
students in the C apita l.
(2) The more important event, in instrumental te rm s, was the 
emergence o f g u e r r i l l a  activ ism . In 1971, two separa te  underground 
p a r t isan  groups, the Fadayeen-e Khalgh ( i . e . ,  the  devotees to  the 
people), and the  Mojahideen-e Khalgh ( i . e . ,  the  peoples' f ig h te r s  of 
holy war) came in to  ex istence . The f i r s t  was M arxist-Lenin is t and the
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second was, so to  speak, Islam ic-M arxist. Members o f  each group got 
some o f  t h e i r  g u e r r i l l a  t r a in in g  in the  P a le s t in ian  L iberation Organi­
z a t io n  camps. The Fadayeen had the  f i r s t  armed confronta tion  with the 
regime in  Siahkal in  the  North o f  Iran in 1969 . The two attempted 
many a ssa ss in a t io n s  o f  army generals and o th e r  o f f i c i a l s ,  including 
the American a d v ise rs ,  a ttacked  many po lice  po s ts ,  attempted to  kidnap 
one o f  the Shah's nephews, Shahram, and th e  American Ambassador,
Douglas McArthur, and were responsible  for many explosions and bank 
ra id s  ( e .g . ,  Fischer:1980; Abrahamian:1980a).
In 1970, the  Shah, a f t e r  "conf iden tia l  diplomatic a c t i v i t y  
between Tehran and London" (B u rre l l ,  1972:41-42), agreed th a t  the  issue 
o f  Bahrain should be s e t t l e d  by the w ill o f  i t s  people. Bahrain was 
claimed by the Iran ians  as a pa rt  o f  t h e i r  t e r r i t o r i e s .  F in a lly ,  the 
Bahraini people, who were under the  B r i t i sh  p ro tec t io n ,  voted fo r  
independence (March 1970). However,
. . .when the  extreme right-w ing Pan-Iranian Party 
attempted to  censure the  government fo r  y ie ld ing  Iranian 
s o i l ,  the party  was quickly  ordered to  suspend i t s  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t i e s  and i t s  le ad e r  was tem proarily  [ s ic ]  banned from 
speaking in parliam ent (B u rre l l ,  1972:42).
As a r e la te d  i s s u e ,  on December 1, 1971, the B r i t i sh  p ro tec tion  
o f  th e  Gulf was formally term inated; and on November 30, (1971) the 
Shah's troops occupied the  Islands of Abu Musa and the big and small 
Tumb on the Gulf. These th re e  is lands  are considered by the Arabs as 
Arabian t e r r i t o r i e s ,  belonging to  the  s t a t e  o f  the United Arab Emirates. 
This ac tion  e sca la ted  tensions  between the Shah and the  rad ica l Arabs, 
a r e s u l t  of which was th e  Arab's re-emphasis th a t  the "Persian" Gulf
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was "Arabian" Gulf proper.
In October 1971, the Shah ce leb ra ted  worldwide the controversial 
2500th anniversary  o f  the Persian Empire. P r io r  to  and during the  very 
occasion, the  regime j a i l e d  or detained some o f  the p o l i t ic a l  a c t i v i s t s  
so as to  prevent any opposition th a t  might be voiced. In April 1972, 
impressed by th i s  ambitious ce le b ra t io n ,  the Shah ordered the change 
of the  Iran i an-Islam ic calendar, the  Solar Heigra, to  the  Empire ca len­
dar which s t a r t s  from the very dawn of the Persian Empire, 500 B.C.
In 1972, the  Shah paradoxically  obtained President Nixon's 
agreement th a t  Iran and the United S ta te s  in s t ig a te  another rebe ll ion  
o f  the Iraqi Kurds ag a in s t  the Iraq i government (Graham, 1980:64; Leeden 
and Lewis, 1980:8). The goal was the weakening of the Iraq is  who (1) 
began to  defend more than before Arab nationalism  in the Gulf a rea , 
a f t e r  the death o f  President Nasser, (2) did not (and have not) com­
promise on the P a le s t ian  question , and (3) were about to  s e t t l e  the 
Iraqi Kurdish issue  peacefu lly . At the same tim e, i t  was a lso  attempted 
not to  s tim ula te  the  Iranian Kurds who too had (and have) e thnic  claims. 
The re b e l l io n ,  f i n a l l y ,  was t r ig g e red  although ". . .by w inter of 
1974-75 Iraq was c lose  to  m i l i ta ry  v ic to ry ,  and Iranian forces were 
compelled to  give m il i ta ry  support to  the Kurds, advancing as much 
as nine miles in to  Iraq (Cottam, 1979:340). However, the Iraq is  
counteracted by a s s i s t in g  the Iran ian  d is s id e n ts  and Arab and Baluchi 
m ino r it ie s  in  Iran . Later, in March 1975, the two governments signed 
an agreement based on which, among o th e r  terms, they agreed to  cease 
a s s i s t in g  the  o ther p a r ty 's  opposition (Khadduri, 1978:245-260).
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However, the Shah's involvement in the problem as the  Kurds were con­
cerned served as a "defeat" and "setback" fo r  the king who, according 
to  Cottam, "had the decisional l a t i tu d e  to  accept defeats  and setbacks. . 
but seemed to  avoid pub lic iz ing  even minor episodes in which casu a l t ie s  
could re su l t"  (1979:362).
In October 1973, the  fourth  A rab-Israe li  war occurred and, 
as a r e s u l t ,  the  Arabs p a r t i a l l y  embargoed th e i r  o i l  to  the  West, the 
supporter of I s r a e l ,  thus making o i l  a weapon in the  c o n f l i c t .  For 
th is  reason, and fo r  reasons connected with the marketplace, the  p rice  
o f  o i l  increased tremendously and Iran , as a major exporte r  o f  o i l ,  
became rich  overnight. Thanks to  the  o i l  boom, a remarkable economic 
a c t iv i ty  in the  u rb an -in d u s tr ia l  sec to rs  developed. The army and i t s  
a s so c ia te s ,  however, in connection with the Shah's p o l ic ie s  and ambi­
t io n s ,  benefited  tremendously. I t  became ". . . the  w orld 's  f i f t h  
la rg e s t  m i l i ta ry  fo rce ,  equipped with the  most ultra-modern weapons 
p e tro d o lla rs  could buy" (Abrahamian, 1980:21).
At th i s  time, the Shah fu r th e r  a t t r a c te d  the  Nixon adm in is tra­
tion  in the United S ta te s .  Based on his d o c tr in e ,  Nixon believed th a t  
the  United S ta te s  in te r e s t s  in  the  so -ca l led  "troubled areas" should 
be secured from local opposition and Russian expansionism by her 
a l l i e s  to  whom the Americans' moral and instrumental support was 
offered . Such a policy  was a lso  to  f u l f i l l  the Shah's regional am­
b i t io n s .  As a r e s u l t ,  the  U.S. m il i ta ry  presence in the form of 
technical t r a in in g ,  advising , and surveilance  o f  Russia increased , 
and as o ther  economic sec to rs  were concerned, a wide-range o f the 
American investment ensued. However, in l in e  with Nixon's d o c tr in e ,
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the Shah's a sp ira t io n s  traversed  the  Iranian t e r r i t o r i e s .  This doc tr ine  
was id e n t i f ie d  with "regional power", which in  th e  case o f  I ran ,
. . considered the Iranian surrogates fo r  Western m il i ta ry  power in 
the Persian Gulf and Southwestern Asia" (S u llivan , 1981:149).
The Shah now came to  dominate v is ib ly  the  Gulf, to  send h is  
troops to  Oman to  oppress the  Dofar n a t io n a l i s t  movement, to  provide 
support to  Somalia in the Horn o f A frica , to  fu r th e r  a ttach  h is  regime 
to  Is rae l  and South Africa, to  somewhat in s trum en ta l!y back the United 
S ta tes  in  Viet Nam, and to  manage some dominance over the Indian Ocean 
(Richards, 1975a; Halliday, 1979a:249-384; Lenczowski, 1980:225; Pahlavi, 
1980:131-143). This ambition and the  guardianship o f  the Gulf was, 
however, simultaneous with the  B r i t ish  withdrawal from the East o f  
Suez in l a t e  1969.
(g) The Mid-1970s. From the mid-1970s, the Shah came up 
with a new prophecy, the "Great C iv i l iz a t io n " ,  which o s tens ib ly  was 
synonymous with President Johnson's "great s o c ie ty ."  Based on such a 
prophecy, the  Shah, with o i l - d o l l a r s  in hand, promised the Iranians 
th a t  they  would a lleged ly  enjoy t h i s  utopia l a t e r  th i s  century. At 
th a t  tim e, Iran would become the Asian Germany, a highly in d u s t r ia l iz e d  
and prosperous homeland (Pahlavi, 1980:175-179). However, in March 
1975, and to  the  su rp rise  o f  even h is  in t im a tes ,  the  Shah dissolved 
the e x is t in g  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  the  twp governmental and the one 
government-directed, to  impose an "all-emcompassing" one pa rty ,  the 
Rastakhiz ( i . e . ,  resurgence). Membership in the  new phenomenon was 
ob lig a to ry ,  and the p a r ty 's  ideological p r in c ip le s ,  as determined by 
the Shah, were lo ya lty  to  the Imperial system, to the 1906 C o nsti tu tion ,
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and to  the  White Revolution ( e . g . ,  Johnson, 1980:37; Hoveyda, 1980:
102-5). However, in th is  year  (1975) Amnesty In te rna tiona l declared 
th a t  "no country in the world has a worse record in human r ig h ts  than 
Iran ."
In 1975, the Shah reached an agreement with the Iraq is  based 
on which border d isputes were s e t t l e d  and the re b e l l io n  o f  the Iraq i 
Kurds, fue led  by the  Shah, came to  an end (Khaddouri, 1978:245-260). 
According to  Helm,
. . .The agreements reached between Iraq and Iran 
in 1975 eventually  opened the border between the two co u n tr ie s ,  
perm itting  ten thousand Iran ian  pilgrim s per year to  cross 
over th e  S h i 'a  shrines in  Iraq . This gave Komeini, then 
in e x i le  in Iraq , con tac t with the  p ilg rim s. What had been 
a t r i c k l e  o f  Khomeini propaganda in to  Iran became a flood 
(1981:200, 202).
In 1976-77, the Shah ce leb ra ted  his dynasty 's  Jub ilee  fo r  a 
whole y e a r  and h is  mass media were ordered to  emphasize the Pah lav is ' 
achievements throughout t h e i r  re ig n . In 1976, when the Democrats under 
P res iden t C a r te r 's  "human r ig h ts "  slogan took over in the United S ta te s ,  
the Shah was r e la t iv e ly  pushed to  democratize h is  p o l i t i c a l  system 
(F isch e r ,  1980:192). However, in  th i s  year Iran was declared one o f  
those coun tr ies  in  which human r ig h ts  v io la t io n s  were p rev a len t ,  and 
t o r t u r e s ,  executions, and imprisonments were common p rac tices  ( e . g . ,  
Baraheni, 1976; Cottam, 1979; Johnson, 1980:37). In 1977, the in te rn a ­
t io n a l  y ea r  of human r ig h t s ,  the  w e ll-respec ted  and open-minded Ayatollah 
Taleghani, a r e l i g io - p o l i t i c a l  le ad e r  from the 1950s' movement, was 
sentenced to  ten  years in  prison (Cottam, 1979:331). During th i s  
time a number o f  the g u e rr i la  a c t i v i s t s  had been shot on the s t r e e t s ,  
to r tu re d  to  death or executed, in  some cases even without su p e r f ic ia l
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t r i a l s .  However, about the  same time, and due to  a showcase l ib e ra l iz in g  
measure, some o f  the opposing s p e c ia l i s t s  and graduates were able to  
re tu rn  to  the country (Ledeen & Lewis, 1980:18) and to  play a ro le  in the 
fu tu re  challenges.
"In August 1977, Tehran slum dwellers p ro tes ted  in la rge  numbers 
aga in s t  ev ic t io n  no tices  and the leveling  o f  t h e i r  accomodations; a 
number o f  people were k i l le d "  (F ischer, 1980:189). A dd itiona lly , a 
s e r ie s  of arsons swept Tehran f a c to r i e s ,  and an a ssass in a tio n  was a t ­
tempted by some unknowns on the l i f e  o f  Ashraf, the Shah's twin s i s t e r .
The attem pt was made under the guise of a drug smuggling p lo t .  At th i s  
same time, a W ri te r 's  Committee fo r  the Defense o f  Prisoners  was formed.
In 1977, the  regime declared th a t  i t  would l e t  the West European countries  
dump t h e i r  atomic wastes in  the Iranian d ese r ts  i f  they were in te re s ted  
in doing so. Although th i s  dumping would be done in exchange fo r  some 
m illion  d o l la r s ,  i t  aroused domestic c r i t ic i s m  which proh ib ited  th is  pro- 
Western policy  from being ca r r ied  out.
From the  l a t e  Spring of 1977 and throughout the Summer of th is  
yea r ,  a nationwide e l e c t r i c  power f a i lu r e  occurred which caused much 
economic lo ss  and produced a g rea t  deal o f  tension and un res t .  At the 
time, the M inistry  o f  Power was under one o f  the Shah's r e la t iv e s .
Further , t h i s  public  inconvenience was added to  the already ex is t in g  
s t r a in  and d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  caused by dé fic iences  in c iv i l  se rv ice s ,  
t r a n s p o r ta t io n ,  educational development (in  terms of q u a l i ty  and quan­
t i t y ) ,  s k i l l e d  manpower, housing, in f l a t i o n ,  skyrocketing p r ic e s ,  
a g r ic u l tu ra l  d e te r io ra t io n ,  urban exodus, in te rn a t io n a l  m igration , 
multidimensional corruption (including i r r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  and bad adminis­
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t r a t io n  in the  bureaucra tic  o rg an iza tio n s) ,  and p o l i t i c a l  s trangu la t ion  
( e .g . ,  Richards, 1975a:3-18; Hurewitz, 1978:40; Burn and Dumont, 1978: 
15-20; Halliday, 1978b:2-3; Cottam, 1979; 320-363; N ickle, 1979:95-106; 
Lenczowski, 1980:222-229; Hoveyda, 1980:31; Hooglund, 1980:3-6; Ledeen 
and Lewis, 198:9-11; Pahlavi, 1980:101-129; Armstrong, 1980:18A).
As face-saving measures, the  Shah had already (1) ordered court 
in v e s t ig a t io n ,  (2) formed a group fo r  in v es t ig a t in g  the problems of 
Iran to  work a l leged ly  under h is  ausp ices, and (3) declared a f ig h t  
agains t corruption and p ro f i te e r s ,  as the  14th and 19th po in ts  o f  the 
White Revolution (Pahlavi, 1980:126). However, as the l a t e r  events would 
confirm, none re su l ted  in anything o th e r  than fu r th e r  disappointing 
the people. F in a lly ,  in August 1977, he replaced his  devoted Prime 
M in ister , the th i r te e n  year incumbent Amir Abbass Hoveyda, with Amouzgar 
who a lso  was the leade r  of the Rastakhiz Party . On November 13 o f th is  
y ear ,  the  Shah l e f t  fo r  his  "twelfth  v i s i t "  to  the United S ta te s .  He 
was faced by some four thousand Iranian s tudent demonstrators gathered 
around the White House chanting "death to  the  Shah." "Tear gas wafted 
across the  White House lawn, causing Shah and President to  wipe away 
te a rs  during th e i r  speeches" (F ischer, 1980:193).
Amouzgar was not able to  remedy the in ten s ify in g  so c io p o l i t ic a l  
unrest. Moreover, the  s i tu a t io n  worsened, and the Shah l a t e r  wrote,
"By the Summer of 1979 I had a sense o f  the new troubles  ahead" (Pahlavi, 
1980:149). In an angry reaction  to  Ayatollah Khomeini's increasing 
a g i ta t io n  and activism  the regime published a hum ilia ting  a r t i c l e ,  
under a fake name, in the sem i-o ff ic ia l  paper E t t e l l a a t ,  January 7,
1978, (F ischer, 1980:194; Hoveyda, 1980:23). Later, i t  was disclosed
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th a t  the main theme of th is  a r t i c l e  was d ic ta ted  by the  Shah himself 
(Ahrar, 1359/1979:4). However, the a r t i c l e ,  which labeled Khomeini 
as a "medieval reac tionary" , caused h is  followers to  demonstrate a n g r i ly  
in the p rovincia l c i ty  o f  Tabriz and o ther p laces. The demonstrators 
were confronted by the regime and in Qom, in add ition  to  o ther casua l­
t i e s ,  two re l ig io u s  students were shot to  death by the  police  in the  
house o f the  w ell-respec ted  but moderate Ayatollah Shariat-Madari who 
a lso  was p resen t a t  the  shooting in January 1978 ( e .g . ,  F ischer, 1980: 
196). In the wake of th is  even t, "Shariat-Madari declared the Shah's 
government non-Islamic, c a l led  fo r  a moratorium on communal p rayers ,  
and th rea tened  a funeral march to  carry  the corpses to  the  Shah Nia- 
varan Palace" in Tehran (F ischer, 1980:194).
However, on the eve o f  the  new year (1978), P resident C ar te r ,  
in r e tu rn ,  made his s t a t e  v i s i t  to  Tehran and in h is  ceremonial speech 
in the Niavaran Palace acknowledged fo r  the Shah th a t :
Iran because o f  the  gread leadership  o f  the  Shah 
is  an is land  o f s t a b i l i t y  in  one o f  the most troubled areas 
of the world. This i s  a g re a t  t r i b u te  to  you. Your Majesty, 
and to  your leadersh ip , and to  the respec t,  admiration and 
love which your people give to  you (C arter, 1977:1975).
(h) The Escalation o f  the Tension. In the summer of 1978, 
rumors c i rc u la te d  th a t  the Shah was in ju red  by one o f  his re la t iv e s  and 
th a t  he su ffe red  from i l l  health  (he had not appeared in public  fo r  some 
weeks). On August 19th, 1978, a "stunning tragedy" was perpe tra ted  in 
the  Rex Theater, during the show tim e, in the in d u s t r ia l  c i ty  o f  Abadan. 
As a r e s u l t ,  over 400 people were burned a l iv e ,  including one o f  the 
a r s o n is ts .  According to  the Shah, the death t o l l  was 477 people 
(Pahlavi, 1980:159). The regime reproached the ex trem is t  Muslims fo r  
the  in c id e n t ,  but the  people charged the SAVAK immediately (F ischer,
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1980:197; Cottam, 1979:356). The c i ty  a u th o r i t ie s  f a i l e d  and caused the 
firemen to  f a i l  to  put out the f i r e .  The regime a lso  f a i le d  to  confirm 
i t s  accusation aga ins t  the  opposition  or to  s in g le  out any o ther. This 
"Fajeah" ( i . e . ,  d i s a s t e r ) ,  served both as a turn ing  po in t and as a 
p re c ip i ta t in g  fa c to r  in the course o f  the coming rev o lu t io n .  However, 
the h i th e r to  unthinkable "down with the  Shah" chanting began as the 
mournful Abadanians s ta r te d  t h e i r  demonstrations and r i o t s  against the  
regime asking fo r  punishment and revenge (F ischer,  1980:197).
Because o f  his now m u lt ip l ied  and concentrated declara tions  
and prerecorded speeches, Khomeini was asked to  d e se r t  neighboring Iraq . 
A fter he was denied refuge in Kuwait, he a rr iv ed  in  Paris  (October 5, 
1978) where, fo r  the  f i r s t  time, he got access to  and was favored by a 
worldwide mass media and press which never was a v a i la b le  before. This 
helped much to  shed l ig h t  on the  na ture  o f  the Shah's opposition , t h e i r  
determ ination , and t h e i r  id e a l s ,  as well as the ongoing chaotic  s i tu a t io n  
in the  country. The regime's so c ia l  c o n tro l ,  and e sp e c ia l ly  the censor­
ship measures, had obscured the  f a c ts  to  the ou ts ide  world. Later, i t  
was observed th a t  "The g re a te s t  e r r o r  o f  judgment was th a t  of the Shah 
h im self, who to ld  the French government i t  was a l l  r ig h t  to  permit the 
Ayatollah Khomeini to  take  up res idence  in the Paris  suburbs" (Ledeen 
and Lewis, 1980:12).
In te re s t in g ly ,  Khomeini's presence and symbolic activism 
in Paris  were analogus to  th a t  o f  both Sayad Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, 
and h is  Egyptian d isc ip le  Shikh Mohammad Abduh, the  re l ig io u s  enthu­
s i a s t i c  scho la rs .  They both, in the  la te  n ineteenth  cen tu ry , located 
in the  c i ty  to  make issue  o f the  c o l o n i a l i s t ' s  aggression in the Muslim
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coun tr ies  as well as the  reac tionary  leaders  o f  the Muslim nations 
(G abrie li:1961; A1gar:1966; Keddie:1980).
In the  wake o f  and inflamed by the Abadan d i s a s te r  as well 
as by Khomeini's imposed departure from Iraq , the opposition began to 
m ultip ly  i t s  voices . Various opposing groups with r e l ig io u s ,  n a t io n a l i s t ,  
communist o r  socia l democratic ideo log ical p o s it io n s  and in te l le c tu a l  
p r in c ip le s  poured in to  the s t r e e t s  and demanded independence, p o l i t i c a l  
freedom, f ig h t  ag a in s t  co rrup tion , s a la ry  in c rease s ,  the  re le a se  of the 
p o l i t i c a l  p risoners  and the re tu rn  o f  Khomeini as w ell.  Members o f  the 
Shah's handpicked Parliam ent a lso  were ab le  to  d i r e c t  some charges 
ag a in s t  some o f f i c i a l s  and demanded a " r e a l " in v es t ig a t io n  o f  the 
Abadan tragedy. Members o f  the royal family began to  f l e e  the  country 
and to  t r a n s fe r  t h e i r  money and valuables . Many of the high-ranking 
a u th o r i t i e s  a lso  took ac tion  to  sen t t h e i r  money abroad.
In response to  the challenging vo ices , the Shah named a new 
government (August 27, 1978) led by Sharif-Imami, the speaker o f  the 
Senate, the d i re c to r  o f  the Pahlavi Foundation, and once premier with 
i l l  rep u ta t io n .  He was given a mandate to  make concessions to  the 
oppos it ion , e sp e c ia l ly  the  re l ig io u s  community. The c losing  o f  gambling 
cas in o s ,  the a b o l i t io n  o f  the  M inistry o f  Women's A ffa irs ,  the creation 
o f  a M inistry  of Religious A ffa irs ,  the  approval of forming p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s  w ithin the l im i ts  o f  the  C on sti tu t io n ,  the  l i f t i n g  o f  the 
censorship  on the p r in ted  media, the resumption of the Islamic calendar, 
s a la ry  in c reases ,  and th e  dismissal o f  some corrup t o f f i c i a l s ,  including 
some Bahais ( e .g . ,  the  Shah's personal physician) were the major 
concessions th a t  the  new government o ffered  to  the opposition throughout
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i t s  opera tion  (Abrahamian:1978a; Cottam:1979; F isc h e r :1980). (Bahaism, 
as a r e l ig io u s  b e l ie f ,  was born in Iran in  the mid-nineteenth century 
and has always been considered by the p rac tic in g  Muslims as a dangerous 
heresy to  the  re l ig io n  of Islam. Some o f the  Bahais had dominated the 
p o l i t i c a l  arena in the  Shah's regime).
On September 4, 1978, the opposition ce leb ra ted  a re l ig io u s  
h o lid ay ," Id -e  Fitr',' with a well-organized demonstration. This, fo r  the 
f i r s t  tim e, took place in the northern area o f  Tehran. By doing so , 
the opposition had in te n t io n a l ly  sh if ted  the  geographical c en te r  o f  th e i r  
activ ism  from the t r a d i t io n a l  south, the Bazaar, which is  id e n t i f ie d  
with the  lower s t r a t a ,  to  the middle-and-upper c lass  d i s t r i c t s .  During 
th is  f e a s t ,  the  demonstrators handed flowers to  the  so ld ie rs  and chanted: 
" i s t e g h la l ,  azad i,  hokoomat-e' Islami" (independence, freedom, Islamic 
government), and "marg bar Shah" (death to  the Shah) ( e .g . ,  F ischer , 
1980:198).
With reference to  an Islamic government, i t  must be noted th a t  
u n t i l  1969 Khomeini had no open p o l i t ic a l  program except the  re tu rn  to  
the 1906 C onsti tu tion  as i t  had been abused by the  Pahlavis. T herea fte r ,  
he began to  advocate the Islamic sacred o rder which appeared in h is  
book. The Islamic Government. "A composite Islamic order. . . provides 
fo r  a s t a t e  in teg ra ted  with re l ig io n ,  a s t a t e  self-avowedly Muslim, led  
by th e  Muslims in which the law of Islam enjoys a p r iv i leged  position" 
(Kramer, 1979:13). The n a t io n a l i s t  groups had always defended c e r ta in  
re fo rm is t  p r in c ip le s  which could be t r a n s la te d  in to  "social democracy" 
(H alliday , 1978b:7), or the  au then tic  implementation of the 1906 Con­
s t i t u t i o n .  The program of d i f f e r e n t  communist groups had been c le a r e r —
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a communist o rder, with various approaches however. To be su re ,  a t  the 
time, the  voice o f  Islam was overwhelmingly dominant (F ischer, 1980:190).
Sharif-Imami, from the very beginning, was not able to  cool 
down the  esca la t in g  o p p o s i t io n is t  waves, hence he resorted  to  m artial 
law, which was declared a t  6:00 a.m. and included twelve major c i t i e s ,  
among which was the  c a p i t a l .  Under the guise o f  the martial law, but 
before i t  was adequately communicated, many Tehranian demonstrators, 
unaware of or uncerta in  about the new r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  were masacred by the 
Shah's troops , among which, according to  rumors, were I s ra e l i  so ld ie rs  
(Friday, September 8, 1978). The death t o l l  o f  86 was reported by the 
government (Pahlavi, 1980:160), but according to  the opposition spokesman 
"a t l e a s t  fo r ty - f iv e  hundred were k i l le d  and reports  o f  seventeen 
thousand deaths were c ircu la ted "  (Cottam, 1979:358). This "Black Friday" 
fu r th e r  h ighlighted  the Abadan tragedy and ig n i te d  the masses; i t  helped 
the imminent revolu tion  to  erupt speedily . However, in the wake o f the 
Black Friday, the Shah received a telephone c a l l  from President Carter 
confirming his support fo r  the monarchy (F ischer,  1980:199). But the 
Shah l a t e r  wrote th a t  "President Carter has never ca lled  me—except once 
a t  Lackland Air Force Base in December 1979" (Pahlavi, 1980:161).
In sp i te  o f  the  m artia l law and the  concommitant curfew, s t r i k e s ,  
demonstrations, and r i o t s  continued. On October 18, o il  workers began 
th e i r  s t r ik e ;  amnesties were announced; the ce leb ra t io n  of the Shah 's , 
the Grown P r in c e 's ,  and the  Queen's birthdays were cancelled; the  SAVAK, 
as countermeasures to  in tim ida te  d is s id e n ts ,  a ttacked a mosque in Kerman 
and a g i r l s '  school in Hamadan, raping th ree  g i r l s  (F ischer, 1980:201). 
Meanwhile, the previously  dismissed head of SAVAK, General Nasseeri who
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was appointed as the  Iranian Ambassador to  Pakistan , was re c a l le d  to  
face  a m il i ta ry  tr ib u n a l  on charges o f  ordering to r tu re s  and i l l e g a l  
imprisonments.
F in a l ly ,  the regime in i t i a t e d  p o l i t i c a l  nego tia tions  with the 
opposition in connection to  which Karim Sanjab i, the leade r  o f  the 
National Front, flew to  Paris  to  consu lt with Khomeini, as l a t e r  did 
Mahdi Bazargan, the leade r  of the Iran ian  L iberation Movement (Cottam: 
1979; Pahlavi: 1980). On his re turn  to  Tehran, Sanjabi announced th a t  
no compromise with the  Shah was possib le . Khomeini had previously  re ­
fused to  re tu rn  to  I ran ,  but he would do so only when the Shah was gone.
On November 4 , 1978, the s tuden ts  pulled  down the  s ta tu e  o f the 
Shah a t  the U niversity  o f Tehran, and on the following day the Bazaar, 
the  t r a d i t io n a l  t rade  cen te r ,  closed. The r io t e r s  now began to  se le c ­
t iv e ly  a t ta ck  banks, t o u r i s t  h o te ls ,  l iq u o r  s to re s ,  cinemas, American 
and B r i t i sh  A ir l ines  and the Embassay o f  B rita in  as well (Abrahamian: 
1978a; Fischer:1980). The removal o f  censorship helped the  Iranians 
to  communicate f r e e ly  in co l le c t iv e  terms and to  exchange information.
I t  was the  f i r s t  time since the ear ly  1950s and a b r ie f  time during the 
e a r ly  1960s, th a t  they had enjoyed a f r e e  p ress .  However, such an 
opportunity  came soon to  an end: Sharif-Imani resigned and the new 
m i l i t a r y  government reimposed the ban.
The new government, nominated by the Shah on November 4, 1978, 
was led by General Azhari, the Commander-in-Chief. To pave the way fo r  
h is  "m il i ta ry  card ,"  the  Shah, with a c o n c i l ia to ry  tone, encouraged the 
Iran ians  to  keep q u ie t  and to await reforms to  come. In t h i s  te lev ized  
speech, which happened to  be his l a s t ,  the  Shah acknowledged the  tw il ig h t
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of the I ra n ia n s '  developing revo lu tion  as he s a id :  . .your revo lu­
tio n a ry  message has been understood. . (Hoveyda, 1980:169). That was 
the f i r s t  time th a t  the movement was o f f i c i a l l y  acknowledged as "révolu 
t ion"  by the  regime ( Iran Times, 1979:9). Under the  m il i ta ry  government, 
many jo u r n a l i s t s  and p r in te rs  boycotted the papers (Cottam, 1979:358) 
and, as a r e s u l t ,  mass communication became r e s t r i c t e d  to  the TV-radio 
networks which were in the hands o f  the government. At the time, the  o i l  
s t r ik e  had reduced production from six  m illion  to  1.1 m illion  b a r re ls  
a day, and hence gasoline and kerosene were in sh o r t  supply. Garbage 
c o l le c t io n  and bus serv ices in Tehran were suspended and public unrest 
was more widespread than ever before ( e .g . ,  Cottam, 1979; F ischer, 1980; 
S a ika l,  1980).
In Tehran, on December 26, a p ro fesso r p a r t ic ip a t in g  in  a s i t -  
in a t  th e  M inistry  of Sciences and Higher Education was shot to  death 
by the  p o lice .  The following day, a t  h is  bu ria l  ceremony, the p a r t i c i ­
pants were confronted by the troops which re su l ted  in  the k i l l in g  of 
some people, including a colonel on duty. On November 11, Sanjabi was 
a r re s ted  on th e  charge o f  having arranged a p ro h ib i ted  press conference.
On the  following day, the  rad ical re l ig io u s  le ad e r ,  Taleghani, was 
re leased  a f t e r  four years o f  imprisonment, to  play a very ac t iv e  and 
unifying ro le  in  the days to  come. Ayatollah Montazeri was a lso  re leased  
a t  the same tim e.
About th i s  time, the  Bazaar closed again and serious d is turbances 
in th e  o i l  and commercial c i t i e s  o f  Ahwaz, Abadan, and Khorramshahr 
occurred. The opposition demanded th a t  fo re ign  techn ic ians  leave the 
country, which they had already begun to  do. On November 19, the Queen
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flew to  the  holy c i t y  o f  Najaf in Iraq to  seek support from the qu ie t 
Ayatollah Khoi, but she was denied support and was d is c red i ted  (F ischer, 
1980:203). On the same day as well as on November 23 and 26, o ther 
groups o f p o l i t i c a l  p risoners  were re leased . On November 21 and 26, 
demonstrations and r i o t s  swept the holy c i t y  o f  Mashhad, as well as o ther 
c i t i e s  including Tehran, Isfahan, T abriz , and Gorgan in the  following days.
On December 2, 1978, the holy mourning month o f  Mohrram began.
For the Shi a Muslims, th i s  month has the  special meaning o f  martyrdom. 
Shiism was o f f i c i a l i z e d  in Iran in 1501 and has become th e  coun try 's  
o f f i c i a l  denomination ever s ince. On the ten th  of Mohrram, known as 
Ashora, Imam Hussien, the  th i r d  successor, according to  Shiism, and 
the  nephew of the Prophet Mohammad, was martyred with some seventy of 
h is  r e la t iv e s  and fo llow ers , in a defensive holy war, by th e  ty ra n t  
Yazid in Karbala, I raq ,  A.D. 680 ( e .g . ,  Ayoob: 1979; C lin ton , 1979;
Deming, 1979:40). Hence, the  im plication of  "Red Shism" in  the Shia 
(o r  S h i i te )  doc tr ine  as the  anniversary o f  t h i s  martyrdom has always been 
held by the  Shia Muslims with dramatic and t r a g ic  t r a d i t io n s  and symbols 
as a function  to  produce r e l ig io u s - p o l i t i c a l  zeal and consciousness.
Based on the "karbala paradigm," and the  value of martyrdom, the h i s t o r i ­
cal slogan, th a t  i s ,  "everywhere is  Karbala and every day i s  Ashora," 
became p reva il ing  in the  month o f Mohrram in revo lu tionary  Iran (F ischer, 
1980:204).
Throughout the f i r s t  ten days o f  Mohrram and under m il i ta ry  
government and curfew measures many d istu rbances  took place nationwide.
Men in  white shrouds, s ign ify ing  th e i r  p reparation  and w illingness  to  
be martyred by the regime appeared here and the re  "in defiance of the
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curfew" (F ischer ,  1980:203). At n ig h ts ,  when gathering was p roh ib ited , 
people went on rooftops to  chant "Allaho Akbar" (God is  g re a te r ) ,  and, 
in te r e s t in g ly ,  to  exchange messages and information which could not be 
communicated otherwise. Such a slogan as "although i t  is  time to  s leep ,  
i t  is  time to  re v o l t , "  became the  theme o f the rooftop p o l i t i c s .
More im portantly , during the 9th and 10th o f  Mohrram (December 
11 and 12), in response to  Khomeini and Sharia t-M adari 's  statements 
and in l in e  with the re l ig io u s  t r a d i t io n  as well as the w illingness of 
a l l  the  opposing groups, m ill io n s  of Iranians poured in to  the  s t r e e t s  
to  mourn Emam Husien and to  curse  the Shah. Among these re l ig io u s -  
based but p o l i t i c a l ly  motivated demonstrations, the  one held in Tehran 
had c e r ta in  determining revolu tionary  im plica tions . This demonstration 
was led  by the rad ical w ell-respec ted  Ayatollah Taleghani, Ayatollah 
Montazeri, Sanjabi, who had been re leased re c en t ly ,  Bazergan, the 
leader o f  Iran Liberation Movement, and a l l  o the r  p a r t ie s  such as the 
Mojahideen Khalegh, Fedayee Khalegh, and the Tuden Party. Considering 
th is  even t,  Halliday in d ica tes  th a t  ". . . in  December, 1978, an estimated 
two m ill io n  people poured in to  the  s t r e e t s  o f  Tehran in one of the 
l a rg e s t  u n o ff ic ia l  demonstrations in human h is to ry"  (1978b:l). Further, 
th is  w ell-organized , w ell-a ttended , and m i l i t a n t  but nonviolent demon­
s t r a t i o n ,  id e n t i f ie d  with Ashora, was acknowledged as a s e l f -h e ld  
referendum s ign ify ing  the r e je c t io n  of the  Shah's regime and the approval 
of an Islamic order as the  s u b s t i tu te .
In t h i s  month, c lashes between some s o ld ie r s ,  who were inc lined  
to  jo in  the  people, and t h e i r  commanders were reported . Serious a ttacks  
on the  people occurred in a t  l e a s t  two c i t i e s ,  Najaf-Abad and Esfahan.
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S tr ik e s ,  r i o t s ,  s i t - i n s ,  boycotts in bu reaucra tic  o rg an iza t io n s ,  f a c to r ie s ,  
and o i l  f ie ld s  became the  ru le  and paralyzed the system. As an example, 
the o i l  s t r ik e  caused severe energy shortage and, as a general outcome, 
food supply problems emerged. Now, the  opposition took some p a r t ia l  
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  d i s t r ib u t in g  the scarce commodities, e sp e c ia l ly  in 
the c i ty  of Tehran. F in a l ly ,  the m il i ta ry  government f a i le d  and 
co llapsed , to  be replaced by a c iv i l i a n  cab ine t led by Shapour Bakhtiar 
(January 1, 1979).
( i )  The Take-over. Bakhtiar, the  leader of the Iran Party , 
an organ o f the National Front, took some actions in l in e  with the 
demands o f  the people. The imprisonment o f  some highly-ranked au tho ri­
t i e s ,  the  d isso lu t io n  o f  the SAVAK, the  free ing  of the m ajority  of 
the remaining p o l i t i c a l  p r iso n e rs ,  the embargo of o i l  o t  " z io n is t"
Is rae l  and " ra c is t"  South A frica , the easing of the curfew hours, and 
the cance lla t ion  o f the  bans on the papers were the best examples.
However, from the very beginning, the Bakhtiar government was re jec ted  
and lab e l led  as " i l le g a l"  by Ayatollah Khomeini, the National Front, 
and a l l  o ther challenging p a r t i e s ,  and he was a lso expelled  from his 
party  (Halliday, 1978b; F ischer , 1980). His acceptance o f  the  pre­
miership was considered by the opposition as a " s p l i t "  from and "treason" 
a g a in s t  the  united  masses. Ayatollah Khomeini decreed t h a t  government 
employees should not co llab o ra te  with and must r e j e c t  the new m in is te rs .
On the o ther hand, the United S ta te s ,  which saw th a t  the Shah's 
ru le  under the premiership of a challenging figure  was on the  verge of 
co l la p se ,  sent Air Force General Huyser to  Tehran to  back B akh tiar 's  
e f f o r t s .  Huyser's mission has been d i f f e r e n t ly  understood as e i th e r
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to  persuade the army to  foment a coup aga ins t  the opposition or to 
prevent such an event (Ledeen and Lewis, 1980:35-36; Pah lav i, 1980:127). 
However, e i th e r  way, s taging a m il i ta ry  coup was too l a t e  to  serve any 
v i t a l  ob jec t ive .
On January 13, a Regency Council was formed so th a t  the Shah 
chould "go on vaca tion ."  This, however, was immediately confronted 
with Ayatollah Khomeini's announcement th a t  he had a lready  formed an 
"Islam ic  Revolutionary Council" with ten  anonymous members to  assume 
power and to  manage the  country a f t e r  the  Shah is  gone. The Shah, 
who t o t a l l y  f a i l e d  to  work out any s e l f - s u s ta in in g  device , f le d  the 
country with te a r s  in h is  eyes on January 16, 1979. Soon a f t e r  the 
Shah's forced abd ica tio n ,  " there was ju b l ia t io n  in the  s t r e e t s .  Sold iers  
and c iv i l i a n s  embraced. Anti-American slogans were in evidence— 'A fte r  
the  Shah, now the Americans', and 'Yankees go home, the  Shah is  dead— 
but Americans on the  s t r e e t s  were t r e a te d  with f r ie n d l in e s s"  (F ischer, 
1980:210).
After the  Shah f le d  the country, Ayatollah Khomeini managed to  
re tu rn  to  Iran , but Bakhtiar closed the  a i rp o r ts .  This was reacted to  
by various demonstrations and slogans such as "Death to  B akhtiar ."
As a counter measure, B akh tiar 's  troops clashed with the  demonstrators. 
Among o ther c a s u a l t i e s ,  twenty people were shot to  death by the  troops 
near the University  o f  Tehran (F ischer,  1980:211). This took place on 
January 27, 1979. However, Ayatollah Khomeini, a f t e r  more than f i f te e n  
years  in  e x i le ,  re turned  to  Iran triumphantly to  be welcomed by a 
"crowd of some two m ill ion  people" (February 1, 1979). Soon a f t e r  his  
a r r i v a l ,  he nominated Mahdi Bazargan, the Leader of the  Iran Liberation
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Movement, as the provisional Prime M inister.
Now, Iran had two governments. However, e a r ly  in  February 
1979, the  army s p l i t  (Ledeen and Lewis, 1980:30, 35; H alliday , 1979b: 
83) and the Shah's Prime M inister, B akhtiar, vanished in the shadows. 
Consequently, the  revolu tionary  masses in Tehran, backed by some 
m i l i t a ry  men, e sp e c ia l ly  the Air Force Technicians, captured the 
National TV-radio Network, stormed the Zendan-e Qaser, the  B a s t i l le  o f  
I ran ,  occupied p o lice  s ta t io n s  and SAVAK o f f ic e s ,  and f in a l l y  took 
over on February 11, 1979. In the same fash ion , a l l  o th e r  c i t i e s  and 
towns f e l l  in the hands o f  the rev o lu tio n a r ie s .
Thus, th e  Iranian people who l a t e r  (on April 1979) voted fo r  
th e  "Islamic Republic o f  Iran ,"  p u tt ing  an end to  the  2500-year-old 
Persian Empire and th e  l a s t  Emperor as w e ll ,  came up with a revolu tion . 
The Shah (Pahlavi, 1974:14) was c o rre c t  when he once sa id  "nothing 
but th e  to ta l  d e s tru c tio n  o f  human c iv i l i z a t io n  could stop the Iranian 
people on th e i r  way," which happened to  be toward h is  regim e's  e x te r ­
m ination. The next sec tion  w ill deal with the roo t causes of th is  
rev o lu tio n .
C. Analysis o f  the Root Causes o f  the Revolution
The antecedents o f  the  Iranian Revolution suggest and manifest 
understandable fa c ts  in whose l i g h t  both the genesis and the  eruption 
o f  t h i s  revolu tion  can be grasped. The f i r s t  ev ident f a c t  is  th a t ,  
concerning i t s  causes, the ta rg e t  revo lu tion  was not an overnight 
c re a t io n .  I t  was rooted in a remote past and was nurtured  by the 
ensuing and cumulating episodes. This, however, i s  endemic to  a l l
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so c ia l  revo lu tions . As Wendell P h i l l ip s  emphasizes, "Revolutions are 
not made. They come. A revolu tion  i s  as natural a growth as an oak.
I t  comes out o f  the p a s t .  I t s  foundations are  la id  back in h is tory"  
(F ischer,  1980:181). In a word, the  roo t causes of socia l revolutions 
are h is to r ic a l  in substance. They are  not causal o r  contemporary. 
Concerning the Iranian Revolution, the  responsible  va riab les  and th e i r  
accumulative impact can be seen and analyzed as a h i s to r ic a l  process 
th a t  was in f u l l  development. In th is  attempt i t  w ill  be shown how, 
throughout a long period , the I r a n ia n 's  old soc io cu ltu ra l  and p o l i t ic a l  
wishes remained u n f u l f i l l e d ,  to  bu rs t  f in a l ly  in to  a revo lu tion .
1. In Search o f  P o l i t ic a l  Freedom
To shed l ig h t  on the roots o f  the  Iranian Revolution, the 
d es ired  changes th a t  somehow brought undesired consequences and in the 
long run caused a new revolu tionary  change must be in v es t ig a ted .  Be­
ginning from the  la te  nineteenth  century and due to  acquaintance with 
in d u s t r ia l  Europe, the  American, French, and Russian (1905) Revolutions, 
co lon ia l hegemony, and governmental despotism and negligence, the 
Iran ians  were exposed to  and developed a desire  fo r  d i s t r ib u t iv e  ju s ­
t i c e ,  t e r r i t o r i a l  independence, and "progress."  These idea ls  were 
r a ised  and promoted under the banners of re l ig io u s  d ig n ity  and national 
in te g r i ty  (Browne, 1966; Shuster, 1912).
In Islamic Iran , e sp e c ia l ly  from the Safavid Reign (1501-1732), 
when Shiism was o f f i c i a l i z e d ,  the  p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e s  and the  re l ig io u s  
leaders  developed an known rec iprocal t i e  (Algar, 1966). In such 
an in te ra c t io n ,  the p o l i t i c a l  func tiona rie s  sought leg it im iz in g  support 
from the re l ig io u s  d ig n i ta r ie s  and in re tu rn ,  the l a t t e r  acquired more
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influence and valued s ta tu s .  These mutual in te re s t s  and functional 
re la t io n sh ip s  were, with some f lu c tu a t io n s ,  operational u n t i l  the l a te  
n ineteenth century when a number o f  fac to rs  d isturbed the re la t io n sh ip .
Later in the  Q ajar 's  ru le  (1796-1925), the t r a d i t io n a l  Iran 
developed a d isp o s i t io n  fo r  new horizons. At the same time the  Russian 
and the B ri t ish  competition over Iran began se r ious ly . These countries 
had two in te r re la te d  ob jec tives : p o l i t i c a l  in te rven tion  and economic 
ex p lo i ta t io n .  This devasta ting s i tu a t io n  caused a gradual c o n f l ic t  
between the  ru ling  c la ss  and the t r a d i t io n a l ly  powerful re l ig io u s  
leaders . The government was subjected to  the overall hegemony of the 
foreign forces which i t  f a i le d  to  oppose. On the o ther hand, the 
"Iranian traders  [ i . e . ,  the Bazaaris] were hurt by foreigh competition 
and Muslims in general were offended by the arrogance and manners of 
Western in f id e ls .  As a r e s u l t ,  many people turned to  'm ullahs' to  voice 
th e i r  grievances" (Paine, 1975:3).
Backed by the  people, the re l ig io u s  leaders were mobilized 
to curb the government. In reac tion , the regime yielded  towards the 
foreigners  who could provide i t  with f inanc ia l  a id  such as loans neces­
sary  fo r  the maintenance of order. The major purpose of th i s  support 
was an attempted dominance over and ju s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  in te rven tion  in 
domestic a f f a i r s .  As a r e s u l t ,  the t r a d i t io n a l  a l l ia n ce  between the 
re l ig io u s  leaders and the  ru ling  c lass  weakened and took a d i f f e re n t  
d ire c t io n .  The regime understood th a t  a compromise with the  foreigners 
was more fea s ib le  and benefic ia l than one with the challenging re lig ious  
leaders  who were now backed by the newly emerging and a c t iv e  phenomenon, 
the n a t io n a l i s t s .  As Cottam (1976:6) observes, ". . . th e  wholesale
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d is t r ib u t io n  o f  Iranian resources to  foreigners  were objectives c lose ly  
re la ted  to  the values of nationalism ." I t  was fo r  r e l i g io - p a t r io t i s t  
values and objectives th a t  the re l ig io u s  a c t iv i s t s  were p o l i t ic iz ed
In co lon ia lized  s o c ie t ie s ,  as well as in so c ie t ie s  subjected 
to  neo-colonialism, nationalism evolved as both a reaction  to  and an 
ideological ju s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r a war o f  independence. However, in l in e  
with the underlying assumption of th i s  an a ly s is ,  and as the  Iranian 
case i s  concerned, i t  i s  sa fe r  to  speak o f  pa trio tism  ra th e r  than 
nationalism fo r  a number of reasons. F i r s t ,  in recent cen turies  Iran 
has never been a colony, in conventional terms, to  nurse n a t io n a l i s t ic  
values very f r u i t f u l l y .  However, she had been a sphere o f  neo-colonialism 
and imperialism un til  the dawn of the 1979 revolu tion . Second, ideo­
lo g ic a l ly ,  in the Islamic t r a d i t io n ,  which is  dominant in Iran , 
the Umna ( i . e . ,  the confluence of followers from whatever regions 
and o rig in s)  is  more emphasized than the  na tio n . In o ther words, in 
the  Islamic ideology, "Taking the place o f  a l l  s im ila r  concepts which 
in d i f f e r e n t  languages and cu ltu res  designate a human agglomeration or 
so c ie ty ,  such as ' s o c ie ty , '  'n a t io n , '  ' r a c e '  ' people , ' ' t r i b e , '
' c l a n , '  e t c . ,  i s  the  s ing le  word umma, a word involved with progressive 
s p i r i t  and implying a dynamic, committed and ideological social vision" 
( S h a r ia t i ,  1979:119).
Third, Iran has been id e n t i f ie d  with d i f f e r e n t  e thnic  m inorities 
( e .g . ,  Arabs, Baluchis, Kurds, Turkomans, Turks), t r i b e s ,  and regional 
autonomists who, u n t i l  "the prenational e ra .  . .were able to  enjoy a 
good deal o f  autonomy (Cottam, 1979:8). Such o rig inal and regional 
d iv e rs i ty  cannot provide a so lid  base fo r  pure and comprehensive
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national values and id e a ls .  The very meaning of the t i t l e  "shahenshah" 
( i . e . ,  king o f  kings) can be traced  to  th is  same f a c t  (Graham, 1979:73f). 
In s p e c if ic  words, the  Shahenshah ru led  d i f f e r e n t  t e r r i t o r i e s  with a 
v a r ie ty  of cu ltu re s  and subcultures  which often  had nothing in common 
more s ig n i f ic a n t  than an over dominant sovereign. Therefore, as 
Hooglund no tes , any app lica t io n  o f  the  value o f  "national consciousness. . 
to  e th n ic  m in o r i t ie s  would have to  examine the  e f f e c t s  o f  the  in te rp lay  
between e thn ic  consciousness and Persian  chauvinism upon th e i r  concept 
and lo ya lty  to  Iran" (1980:5f).
Fourth, th e re  have been d i f f e r e n t  re l ig io u s  m ino r it ie s  ( e .g . ,  
Assyrian, C h r is t ia n ,  Jewish, Z oroastrian) in the country , who, by 
d e f in i t io n ,  a re  n e i th e r  included in the  Islamic Umma nor, with exception 
o f  th e  Z orostr ians , have Persian o r ig in .  F i f th ,  in terms o f p o l i t ic a l  
ideology, the  Communist Iran ian  a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y  advocate in te rn a t io n a l  
communism in which nationalism  i s  e i t h e r  s a c r i f ic e d  o r  a t  best i s  a t  
the p e r i l  o f  a slow-motion death. F in a lly ,  with a l l  these  considerations 
in  mind, with t h e i r  sharp t r a d i t io n a l  feu d a l ,  c a p i t a l i s t ,  and a r i s t o ­
c r a t i c  d if fe re n c e s ,  the  Iran ians a lso  cannot demonstrate a commonly 
agreed-upon national sentiment. Since both t h e i r  economic values 
and t h e i r  social s ta tu se s  are d i f f e r e n t  and c o n f l ic t in g ,  t h e i r  na tion ­
a l i s t  id ea ls  may not be channeled toward one d i re c t io n .  Therefore, 
i t  can be argued th a t  i t  was t e r r i t o r i a l  id e n t i ty  in  the  sense o f  home­
land and not a n ces tra l  a f f i l i a t i o n  c ry s ta l iz e d  in  in c lu s iv e  national 
values th a t  has cemented the  overa ll  Iranians to g e th e r .  In te re s t in g ly ,  
the  sem i-o ff ic ia l  slogan, Khuda, Shah, Meehan ( i . e . ,  God, king, homeland), 
o f  I r a n 's  old regime, can be considered as an in d ic a t io n  o f  th is  same
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fa c t  though some may seen more nationalism  in the  slogan than in  the  
shared t e r r i t o r i e s .
Nevertheless, Islamic and n a t io n a l i s t  ideologies can be r e ­
garded as the  more p rev a il in g  cu rren t ideo log ical  thoughts in  contem­
porary Iran . "They both r e f l e c t  the  same e x is t e n t ia l  and national 
anx ie ty  th a t  grips Iran ian  socie ty  a t  a l l  le v e ls"  (B oya t-P h ill ip ,  
1978:220). As Shiism i s  concerned, i t  i s  understood th a t  "the  h is to ry  
o f  Iran  and the S h i i te  t r a d i t io n  a re  c lo se ly  in tertw ined  and have 
never ceased to develop in  the  course o f  th e  centures" (Hoveyda, 1980: 
44). Such a web, as Scarcia  observes, i s  "a confluence between Shiism 
and th e  popular s p i r i t ,  tak ing  on the  form o f national consciousness" 
(1957:90). F in a lly ,  t h i s  confluence and th e  incurring  consciousness, as 
noted e a r l i e r ,  came up with the C onstitu tiona l Revolution ea r ly  in the 
tw en tie th  century.
However, I r a n 's  f i r s t  " co n s t i tu t io n "  was more a valuational 
gain than a s t ru c tu ra l  rad ica l  change. I t  did  not propose a sp e c if ic  
socioeconomic order c a te g o r ic a l ly  d is t in g u ish ed  from the old one. The 
c o n s t i tu t io n  more p ro jec ted  p o l i t ic a l  freedom and re l ig io u s  d ig n ity  
than d i s t r ib u t iv e  economic ju s t i c e .  The Iran ian  social s t ru c tu re  
would have remained i n t a c t  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  even i f  the  c o n s t i tu t io n  had 
been implemented. Yet, due to  external p ressures  and in te rna l aggression 
and c o n f l i c t ,  the  C onsti tu tiona l Revolution was suffocated a t  b i r t h ,  
and the  c o n s t i tu t io n  was c a r r ie d  out a t  the  w ill o f  the  succeeding 
governments. Hence, from the very dawn of t h i s  rev o lu tion , a m u l t i ­
dimensional depriva tion  and despair occurred from which d i f f e r e n t  
s t r a t a  su ffe red . This s i tu a t io n  was described  by the contemporaries
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Browne (1966) and Shuster (1912), and was b e s t  symbolized by S huste r 's  
The S trang ling  of P e rs ia . Such a s i tu a t io n  heralded Reza Shah's coup 
d e 'e t a t  in 1921.
2. The In to le rab le  Burden
Reza Shah's accession to  power was possib le  through th e  support 
of the  B r i t i s h  who understood th a t  a u n if ied  and s tab le  Iran under a 
powerful cen tra l  government would b e t te r  secure th e i r  o il-based  in te re s ts  
than o th e r  arrangements ( e .g . ,  Bayne, 1965:251-310; Graham, 1979:22-30; 
Forbis, 1980:41-62). In 1925, Reza Shah "forced" the Parliament to 
d isso lve  the  "decadent" Qajar dynasty and to  proclaim him the new Shah 
of Iran . However, ". . .reported ly  he was anxious to  e s ta b l is h  a 
Kamalist s ty le  republic  in Iran  but the opposition to  the abandonment 
o f  the  t r a d i t io n a l  forms o f legitimacy was so strong th a t  he dropped 
the idea" (Huntington, 1980:270). In f a c t ,  Kamal Ataturk o f  Turkey was 
so disposed to  modernization and the a l t e r a t io n  of the Islamic t r a d i t io n  
th a t  the  t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  Iran ians refused the  idea o f  the  republican 
form of government, l e s t  undesired changes would ensue. F in a l ly ,  Reza 
Shah "es tab lish ed  the Pahlavi dynasty and single-handed absolu te  rule" 
(S aika l, 1980:20).
In th i s  process, Reza Shah came up with a new modern Iran , 
d i f f e r e n t  su b s ta n t ia l ly  from the Q ajar 's  period. As Keddie notes 
"Under Reza Shah, roads, te lephones, automobiles, a ra i l ro a d ,  and 
state-owned fa c to r ie s  were introduced, as well as modern schools , a 
u n iv e rs i ty ,  some education f o r  g i r l s ,  unveiling and new legal codes. 
Foreigner 's  power was reduced through the  ending o f c a p i tu a la t io n s ,  the 
gaining o f  t a r i f f ,  autonomy and the use o f  p ro tec tiv e  t a r i f f s "  (1979:17).
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However, such an achievement became possible  through Reza 
Shah's a t t i tu d e s  d isregard ing  the natu re  o f  the t r a d i t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
and re l ig io u s  values fo r  which the  pioneer Iranians s a c r i f i c e d .  Forbis 
n o te s ,  "Reza Shah believed  th a t  a king needed some harsh and unsavory 
q u a l i t i e s —suspicion o f  everyone, d i s t r u s t  of clemency, w illingness  
to  h i t  f i r s t "  (1980:46). The Shah h im self acknowledges f o r  h is  fa th e r  
t h a t  "P roverb ia lly , to  ge t things done in  Persia  one must both reward 
and punish. My fa th e r  r e l ie d  more on punishment than he did  on reward 
o r encouragement. . .My f a th e r ' s  method fo r  g e tt in g  th ings done showed 
no l i t t l e  realism in the l ig h t  o f  our a u th o r i ta r ia n  t r a d i t io n "  (Pahlavi, 
1961:49).
Focusing on Reza Shah's ou tp u t ,  Hobson (1974:174) concludes 
t h a t  his  " . . . r u le  brought about s t a b i l i t y  and p rosperity  fo r  some, 
h is  increasing  a u th o r i ta r ia n  approach c rea ted  an oppressive burden 
f o r  la rge  sections o f  soc ie ty . Many died in the p rocess ."  Millspaogh, 
the  economic adviser to  the Secretary of S ta te  who served fo r  some 
years  as D irector General of Iranian Finances under Reza Shah, had 
reached the  same conclusion:"A ltogether he thoroughly milked the country, 
grinding down the peasan ts , tribesmen and lab o re rs ,  and tak ing  heavy 
to l l  from the land lo rds . While h is  a c t i v i t i e s  enriched a new c lass  
of ' c a p i t a l i s t s '—merchants, monopolists, c o n trac to rs ,  and p o li t ic an  
f a v o r i te s —in f l a t io n ,  heavy ta x a t io n ,  and o ther measures, lowered the 
s tandard  o f  l iv ing  o f  the  masses" (1946:34).
In a sh o r t  word, the cos t  o f  Reza Shah's c rea ted  s t a b i l i t y ,  
s e c u r i ty ,  modernity, and centralism  was despotism, a c u l t  o f  p e rso n a li ty ,  
the  growth of the bourgeoise s t r a t a  on the  ruin o f  the p r o l e t a r i a t  and
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peasan try , and a p o l i t i c a l  burden ag a in s t  which the opposition had 
a lready  fought. In Lambton's words, " i f  the  movement o f  the  c o n s t i tu ­
t io n a l  reform and i t s  antecedents a re  c lo se ly  examined, i t  w ill  be 
seen th a t  what lay behind the movement was e s s e n t ia l ly  a p r o te s t  aga ins t  
tyranny. . .The c o n s t i tu t io n a l  revo lu tion  took place because i t  was 
f e l t  th a t  the weight o f  tyranny had become in to le rab le "  (1972:176).
As such, the  legacy of the  Q a ja r 's  absolutism continued to  
i n t e r a c t  with and be in te n s i f ie d  by Reza Shah's forced reforms and to  
deprive the  Iran ians more than ever before . Such was the  s i tu a t io n  when 
the  second Pahlavi came to  power. Iran "was then weak and improverished, 
i t s  commerce dependent upon foreign money, i t s  resources owned by foreign 
in v e s to rs ,  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  system p enetra ted  by foreign ag en ts ,  and i t s  
t e r r i t o r y  a t  the very moment occupied by thousands o f  un inv ited  B ri t ish  
and Russian troops" (Paarberg e t  a l . ,  1978:17).
3. The Shah's Modernization
With the above antecedents in mind, the Shah's o rder and i t s  
d is in te g ra t io n  under the  revo lu tionary  fo rces  of 1978-9, w il l  be approached 
immediately. In th i s  approach, the Shah 's modernization e n te r p r i s e ,  
represented  by h is  White Revolution, as the  mechanisms f o r  proposed social 
change is  o f  in t e r e s t .  To be su re ,  th i s  approach does not attem pt to  
o f f e r  a "balance sheet"  o f  the  Shah's regime. As f a r  as th e  causes of 
the  Iran ian  Revolution a re  concerned, only the  f a i lu re s  o f  the  old 
regime which, in tu rn ,  caused and j u s t i f i e d  i t s  d is in te g ra t io n  w ill be 
in v e s t ig a te d .  Put d i f f e r e n t ly ,  when a soc ia l  revolu tion  i s  a t  hand, 
the  f a i l u r e  of the  old regime in  producing the  desired  changes can be 
taken a p r i o r i . Hence, what the Shah did not do ra th e r  than what he
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d i ^ w i l l  be our an a ly t ica l  concern.
Such an an a ly t ica l  approach i s  appropria te  in the  l i g h t  of 
the f a c t  th a t  "a modernizing revo lu tion , a marked hastening o f  evo lu tion , 
n e c e ssa r i ly  involves a c o n f l ic t  th a t  has not y e t  been fu l ly  resolved in 
any so c ie ty .  . . . Yet, the  ideological goal o f  Iran ians , l ik e  th a t  of 
o th e r  awkward [ s ic ]  people, must be assumed to  be freedom within a 
modernized s ta te "  (Bayne, 1965:25203) (emphasis added).
Revolution From Above
The period o f the 1950s may be considered as a span of time in 
which the  Shah consolidated h is  power to  introduce socia l change to  the 
Iran ian  so c ie ty  through a program c a lled  the "White Revolution" (WR) 
o r ,  as i t  was l a t e r  c a l le d ,  th e  "Shah-and-People Revolution." According 
to  the Shah, "the p r in c ip le s  o f  th is  revo lu tion  form our p o l i t i c a l ,  
s o c ia l ,  and economic p o lic ie s"  (Pahlavi, 1967:1). Students of Iranian 
p o l i t i c s  emphasize th a t  the  WR was i n i t i a t e d  as a preventive device 
a g a in s t  the  growing s treng th  o f the d isenfranchised middle c lasses"
( B i l l ,  1972:18) "who re je c te d  the t r a d i t io n a l  socioeconomic arrangements" 
(Lauer, 1978:234). In a s p e c i f ic  sense, the i n i t i a t i o n  o f  the  WR was 
a lso  a precautionary  measure agains t the fu tu re  spread o f  the  Communist 
ideology among the poor and the  peasantry in  p a r t ic u la r  (Cottam, 1979: 
139).
At the time o f  the  downfall o f  the Shah, the o r ig in a l ,  s ix -  
p o in t WR amounted to  nineteen po in ts . The Shah s t re s se s  th a t  "everyone 
o f  the White Revolution 's po in ts  is  a small revolution in i t s e l f "
(F orb is , 1980:74). But h is  c r i t i c s  commonly agree th a t  the "essence"
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of th i s  revolution was the  "land reform." They a lso  seem to  emphasize 
th a t  " the o ther programs have done l i t t l e  more than ex is t"  (B i l l ,  1972: 
141). As Johnson in d ic a te s ,  "in p ra c t ic e ,  however, many o f the  reforms 
were in e p t ly  administered; o thers were deeply resented" (1980:36). With 
emphasis on land reform, the  rural aspect o f  the Shah's modernization 
can be p ic tu red  as follows.
The Land Reform 
In the beginning i t  should be noted th a t  feudalism in Iran 
"does not correspond to  any o f the various types of feudalism found in 
Western Europe. The element of mutual o b liga tion  inherent in the nexus 
of feudal tenure in Western Europe i s  notably absent" (Lambton, 1963:24). 
This f a c t  is  a lso  emphasized by Richards (1975a;18) who says th a t  ". . . 
socia l re la t io n s  in the  countryside of Iran were t r a d i t io n a l  but not 
feudal in  any technical sense ."
The program o f  the  Land Reform was implemented in a three-phase 
period (1963-71), and a t  some 65,000 v i l la g e s  with about 16 m illion  
population which comprised about 70 percent o f  the to ta l  population a t  
the time. The program's basic  fa i lu re s  can be assessed in th is  form.
(a) About 40-50 percent o f  the  v i l la g e  fam ilies were excluded 
from th e  land reform because the adu lt  male heads did not have formal 
sharecropping agreements with the landlords . The r e s u l t  was "extreme 
poverty and indebtedness" o f  the landless  laborers  (Hooglund, 1980:
3; Keddie, 1979:23). This s tratum , being u n sk il led ,  became farm 
laborers  and "v il lage  p r o le ta r ia t "  who in f a c t  "accounted fo r  the 
m ajority  o f  the ru ra l population" ( B i l l ,  1972:146).
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(b) The program l e f t  many loopholes from which the landholders 
b en e f i t ted  and secured th e i r  p ro p e r t ie s .  As Hooglund (1980:3) in d ic a te s ,  
"roughly h a lf  of the land—and the best qua lity  so i l  a t  hand—was never 
subjected to  land d is t r ib u t io n  but remained under control of absentee 
land lo rds ."  Many of the major landlords were able to  t r a n s fe r  t h e i r  lands 
to  t h e i r  r e la t iv e s  before-hand. Others, c a p i ta l iz in g  on "mechanization," 
"orchards," "P lantations o f  te a"  or o ther crops as d i f f e r e n t  but vague 
c r i t e r i a  fo r  exclusion from Land Reform, escaped the device , and t h e i r  
p roperties  remained in ta c t  (Richards, 1975:7; Keddie, 1979:22-3).
(c) For about 84 percent o f  the peasantry, the  land gained 
was le ss  than 10 hectars  (Keddie, 1979:23). As a r e s u l t ,  "the over­
whelming majority of peasant owners farmed subsis tence  and not p r o f i t ,  
were heavily  indebted, and t h e i r  poverty was only s l ig h t ly  le ss  extreme 
than o f the landless workers" (Hooglund 1980:3).
(d) Based on i t s  subsid iz ing  p o l ic ie s ,  the  government imported 
such a s tap le  commodity as wheat a t  twice the local cos t  to  be sold a t
a subsidized p rice . On the o th e r  hand, i t  s ta b i l iz e d  the p rice  o f  local 
a g r ic u l tu ra l  products, including wheat, r ic e ,  and ba rley ,  the major 
t r a d i t io n a l  crops. As a r e s u l t ,  the livelihood o f  the  subjected 
peasantry became a burden fo r  they had to  s e l l  a t  cheap prices  and to 
purchase a t  expensive prices (Halliday, 1979a:125-137; Keddie, 1979:25). 
This, however, was more troublesome in the 1970s when in f la t io n  reached 
a doub le -d ig it  ra te  and the cos t  of services and non-subsidized goods 
esca la ted .  The peasantry then sold th e i r  products cheaply and brought 
what they needed and could very expensively. As a r e la te d  is su e ,
" . . .  su b s id ia r ie s  concealed the wastage in local production: up to
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$2,000,000 worth o f  a g r ic u l tu ra l  production was being l o s t  each year 
through poor cropping, bad warehousing and inadequate d is t r ib u t io n "  
(Graham, 1979:117).
(e) To improve a g r ic u l tu ra l  production, to  modernize peasant 
l i f e ,  and to sew to g e th e r  b i t s  and pieces o f  land th a t  i t  had already 
d i s t r ib u te d ,  the government took some i n i t i a t i v e s ,  including the a g r i ­
b u s in ess . These new devices were "farm corporations p ro fess io n a lly  
managed and c o l le c t iv e ly  owned." Until 1978 the re  were about 100 such 
corpora tions in the country. This, however, meant the submission of 
land to  the government fo r  c o l le c t iv e  c u l t iv a t io n  and production, 
rece iv ing  "shares" in re tu rn .  The device was confronted by a "wide­
spread r e s is ta n c e ,"  fo r  the peasants would have to  give back the land 
th a t  they had hoped fo r  throughout the c en tu r ie s .  In f a c t ,  " fo r  people 
who had barely emerged from the medieval might o f  feudalism , land was 
a parable  good, and shares were j u s t  paper. They were f r u s t r a te d  by the 
Shah ordered 'a g r ib u s in e s s 'e n te rp r is e s "  (Hoveyda, 1980:89).
In addition  to  t h i s  psychological burden, a t  l e a s t  two problems 
emerged (Hooglund, 1980:3). F i r s t ,  the d i f f e r e n t ia l  shareholdings 
widened the gap among the sh a re h o ld e rs - - th e i r  number o f  shares was the 
major determinant of t h e i r  earnings. Second, the land less  agribusiness 
workers, due to  wage increase  and the p r o f i t  sharing device , p ro f i ted  
more than the shareholders p ropo r tiona te ly . This became another source 
of f r u s t r a t io n  and even c o n f l i c t  between the two s t r a t a .
Another i n i t i a t i v e  was the te ch no-ag r icu ltu re  where four 
j o i n t  devices were formed in  the Dez Dam area in the  provinc of 
Khuzfstan, the would-be bread basket o f  Iran . This included 58 v i l lag es
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and was done with "p restig ious"  foreign  p a rtn e rs .  In order to  prepose 
the land fo r  la rg e -sca le  farms, the government fo rc e fu l ly  moved 6,530 
fam ilies  and re loca ted  them in 13 p laces. As Graham observes, "This had 
been done in a clumsy way, and many were re lu c ta n t  to  work fo r  others 
on land which they h i s to r i c a l ly  regard as t h e i r s —esp e c ia l ly  as most of 
the work was casual"  (1979:118). In th is  program, Khuzistan Water 
and Power A uthority  "took advantage o f  ra c ia l  p re jud ices  among the local 
peasantry and removed the Arab population f i r s t "  (R ichards, 1975a:14).
However, the program "was a f inanc ia l  and organizational 
d is a s te r"  (Graham, 1979:118). The peasantry were forced to  abandon th e i r  
t r a d i t i o n a l ,  p r iv a te ly  owned places and co ttag es ,  to  res ide  a t  a newly 
b u i l t  small town ca lled  Shahrak, and to  pay re n t  fo r  the  undesired 
q u a r te rs .  They a lso  worked as farm laborers  and not as land owners; 
a ga ins t  t h e i r  d e s ire  t h e i r  lands were bought by the government. F in a lly ,  
in add ition  to  the  j o i n t  a u th o r i t i e s  and fo re ig n e rs '  co rrup tion , "The 
presence of  the  farm corporation and the agribusiness  have done nothing 
to  ra i s e  the welfare  of the m ajority  s ec to r  o f  Khuzistan 's rural 
population" (Richards 1975a:15). Based on her 36 months p a r t ic ip a n t  
observation in  t h i s  same a rea ,  the  an thropolog is t Goodell concludes 
th a t  the  Shah's ru ra l  development program was but a program fo r  de­
s ta b i l i z in g  th e  Iran ian  so c ie ty ,  fo r  "To the Pahlavi regime t ra d i t io n  
was I r a n 's  f i r s t  enemy; ad m in is tra tive  decree, i t ' s  sav io r .  In hind­
s ig h t  i t  i s  i ro n ic  th a t  the dynasty sensed the dangers of t r a d i t io n  
to  be s tro n g e r  in the countryside than in the c i t i e s "  (1981:66).
( f )  In l in e  with i t s  in d u s t r ia l iz a t io n  and modernization 
p o l ic ie s ,  the  government held to  the s tra teg y  o f a id ing  large  owners
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in various economic se c to rs .  As a r e s u l t ,  many t r a d i t io n a l  but productive 
devices were neglected and even destroyed. The point in mind includes 
Boneh ( i . e . ,  the t r a d i t io n a l  peasant corpora tion  o f plowland owners formed 
around a d ra f t  animal team), and Qanat ( i . e . ,  the  t r a d i t io n a l  su b te r ra ­
nean i r r e g a t io n  channels). As a consequence of such s t r a te g y ,  the 
Qanats were l e f t  undredged and the re fo re  d ried  out. The Bonneh which 
were replaced with new corporative  measures lacked t h e i r  s ign if icance  
and even were d is fu n c t io n a l . All o f  these  fac to rs  contributed  to  the 
d e te r io ra t io n  o f ru ral economic conditions and t r a d i t io n a l  social 
r e la t io n s  as well (Bayne, 1965:278-9; Drun & Dumont, 1978:16-17; Halliday, 
1979a:128). In ad d i t io n ,  "in the ru ra l  a reas  t r a d i t io n a l  in d u s tr ie s  l ik e  
carpet-weaving, which employed some 30,000 people, suffered" (Graham, 
1979:122).
(g) Given the  c lim a tic  s i tu a t io n  o f  Iran , the p easan t 's  parcels 
of land, i f  desirab ly  p lan ted ,  were very o ften  destroyed by droughts or 
excessive water or p e s ts .  Before the Land Reform, the landlords were 
quick to  respond to  problems. Under the  WR, the measures taken were
not so adequate, and the a ffec ted  peasantry e i th e r  were l e f t  a t  the 
mercy o f  nature or were entangled by the  bureaucra tic  monster.
(h) The absence of s u f f ic ie n t  and adequate mechanization 
devices, technical t r a in in g ,  and f in an c ia l  support caused extreme 
a g r ic u l tu ra l  d e te r io ra t io n  and peasant poverty. In th is  re sp ec t ,
Cottam observes th a t  the peasants were "not prepared fo r  th e i r  good 
fo r tune ;"  th a t  they lacked an understanding o f marketing, seed s e le c t io n ,  
animal husbandry, a c c e s s ib i l i ty  to  c a p i t a l ;  and th a t  the re  was "nothing 
approaching an adequate s t a f f  technician  to  advise them" (1979:317).
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Further, "as the peasants f a l l  in to  f in an c ia l  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  the regime 
w i l l ,  almost in ev itab ly ,  cease appearing to  be the g ran ter  o f  land 
ownership and instead w ill  seem to be aiding those who th rea ten  th a t  
ownership" (Cottam, 1979:317).
As a re la ted  is su e ,  since a g r ic u l tu ra l  loans were based on the 
s ize  o f  land and i t s  p roductiv ity  and types of product, the m ajority  of 
loan re c ip ie n ts  were able to  get only small loans. Because o f  th e i r  
impoverishment, they did not invest such small sums of money in c u l t iv a ­
tion  but consumed i t  fo r  basic  n e c e s s i t ie s .  Moreover, in many cases, 
in order to  meet the requirements, the peasants paid a g rea t  portion 
of  t h e i r  loans to  the professional guarantors without whom loans would 
not be obtained. F in a lly ,  when i t  was due, the  loan was re a l iz e d  more 
as a l i a b i l i t y  than an a s se t .
( i )  Because o f  a g r icu ltu ra l  d e te r io ra t io n  as a major pushing 
fa c to r ,  and urban p l ig h t  as a pulling  fa c to r ,  urban in flux  a t  an o f f ic ia l  
ra te  of 250,000 per year occurred in the 1970s. Such migratory waves 
included d i f f e r e n t  ages and the youth in p a r t i c u la r .  This m igration, 
aimed a t  th e  cap ita l  and a host of provincial c i t i e s ,  l e f t  the v i l lag e s  
without the  minimum manpower needed and a lso  in te n s i f ie d  urban problems. 
In Hoveyda's words, the  peasantry, "unable to  express t h e i r  grievances 
f r e e ly ,  . . . voted with t h e i r  fe e t  aga ins t  the  in truder 'modernization' 
by leaving v il lag es  to  look fo r  work in the towns" (1980:89-90).
( j )  There was evidence th a t  some of the peasants from the very 
beginning, due to  l i fe t im e  a f f i l i a t i o n  with the landlords and separation  
from the  government, p referred  to  remain a ttached to  the former and 
refused to  be supervised by the l a t t e r  ( B i l l ,  1972:147). I t  was a lso
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tru e  th a t  in c e r ta in  cases a number o f  peasants made s e c re t  dea ls ,  
however i l l e g a l l y ,  with the  past landlords fo r  a g r ic u l tu ra l  guardianship, 
technological and f in an c ia l  provisions based on common o r proportional 
ownership and u t i l i z a t i o n  of the gained land.
(k) As a by-product o f  the Land Reform, the big landlords 
received , as compensation, shares in state-owned fa c to r ie s  and extended 
tax  holdings fo r  those founding new fa c to r ie s  and in d u s t r ie s .  This 
policy  was included in the th i r d  poin t o f  the WR, th a t  i s ,  "sa le  o f  
state-owned e n te rp r is e s  to  the  p ub lic ."  However, th is  increased the 
influence o f  the former landlords in the urban sphere and encouraged 
a l l ia n c e  with the c a p i t a l i s t  and powerful s t r a t a .  Hence, the  very 
im plication o f  "Feudaliteh Shahri" ( i . e . ,  urban feudalism) as the 
Iranians labeled  the  new phenomenon. Relatedly , the Shah, fo r  two 
reasons, did not attempt to destroy the landlord c lass  completely 
(Paine, 1974:4). F i r s t ,  the upper c la s se s ,  including the feu d a ls ,  were 
the t r a d i t io n a l  and actual a l l i e s  o f  the regime. Second, the m ajority  
of the Iran ian  feudals  had t r a d i t io n a l  and/or t r i b a l  influence and 
urban as well as foreign connections whose transform ation in to  o th e r  
s ta tu se s  was s a f e r  fo r  the regime than th e i r  l iq u id a t io n .
(1) Based on references here in , some s t a t i s t i c a l  summaries 
perta in ing  to  the 1970's can shed more l ig h t  on the ru ra l s i tu a t io n .  
While in 1976 about 55 percent of I r a n 's  population was comprised o f  
the peasan try , only 1,500 out o f  10,000 doctors operated in the country­
s ide; more than 60 percent o f  the v i l la g e rs  were i l l i t e r a t e  and only 39 
percent o f  the  ch ild ren  were enro lled  in primary education; about 95 
percent of the  houses were mud and/or mud b rick ; a g r ic u l tu r e 's  share
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of GDP f e l l  back from 30 percen t in 1959 to  13.6 percent in 1972 and 
i t  received only 8 percent from investment in comparison to  in d u s try 's  
22 percen t; the  percentage employed in a g r ic u l tu re  decreased from 56 
percent in 1956 to  33 percen t in 1976. F in a lly ,  fo r  ages, Iran had been 
la rg e ly  a l l  but s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  in foodstuffs  up to  the e a r ly  1960s, 
but in  the 1970s she suddenly had to  import more than 60 percent o f  her 
food products a t  a p r ic e  o f  over $1.8 b i l l io n  (Time, 1978:39; Graham, 
1979:40, 85; F ischer, 1980:190-1). In te re s t in g ly ,  while the  northern 
region o f  Iran had been the producer and exporter o f  c i t r u s  throughout 
the c e n tu r ie s ,  during the  1970s the  C alifo rn ia  orange became the most 
av a i lab le  f r u i t  to  find  in the  country , including i t s  north .
As sketched above, the  Land Reform (and the  ru ra l  s ide  o f  the WR 
in general)  was not a major s t ru c tu ra l  change but r a th e r  a re fo rm is t  
measure with undesired consequences. In l ig h t  of such outcomes, the 
Land Reform came to be considered as a "d isas te r"  (H alliday, 1978:10), 
which "has begun to a l i e n a te  many o f  the  v i l la g e rs  who are to ld  th a t  
they are  to  begin new l iv e s  but who in  f a c t  see themselves the  victims 
o f  the government agents" ( B i l l ,  1972:155). In l in e  with such a conclu­
s io n , the  peasant l i f e  under the  o ld  regime was seen as "a miserable 
l i f e  of sweat and t o i l ,  s ta rv a t io n  and anxiety with an uncerta in  future" 
(Baraheni, 1976:36). Viewed from d i f f e r e n t  angles , while the land 
reform was judged as a to ta l  f a i l u r e  in economic terms, ". . . i t  did 
produce su b s tan tia l  changes in the  socia l and p o l i t i c a l  s t ru c tu re  in 
the  countryside--changes running p a ra l le l  to  the population s h i f t  from 
country to  town" (Halliday, 1978a:10).
In f a c t ,  th e  Land Reform program was not more than a p a r t ia l
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land d iv is io n . I t s  economic gain in terms o f  a g r ic u l tu ra l  r a te  o f  growth 
f a i le d  to  p a ra l le l  the r a te  o f  the increase  in  population. While the 
population growth was about 3.0 or 3.4 percent a yea r ,  a more reasonable 
ra te  o f  a g r ic u l tu ra l  production was 2-2.5 or 3 .0  percent per year  
(Keddie, 1979:25; Drun and Dumond, 1978:16), The program was tre a ted  
by the  government more as land give-away than as an economic program 
o f production and s t ru c tu ra l  social a l t e r a t io n .  I t  lacked a revolu tionary  
sense and even a planned re fo rm ist device. All these findings in d ica te  
th a t  the  countryside under the  WR was "not some quaint reminder o f  the 
p a s t ,  but a continuing and v iv id  example of the  backwardness th a t  e x is t s  
behind the  modernization o f  Iran" (Graham, 1979:29). Such was the  rural 
s ide  o f  the WR. The urban s id e ,  represented by the  in d u s t r ia l iz a t io n  
e n te r p r i s e ,  w ill  a lso  be examined immediately.
The I l lu s io n  of In d u s t r ia l iz a t io n
Based on h is  WR, the  Shah attempted to  in d u s t r ia l i z e  the 
country so th a t  Iran  would be on a par with the Western European coun­
t r i e s  and Japan by the end o f  th is  century. In th is  attempt in d u s t r i a l ­
iz a t io n ,  as was t ru e  with Land Reform, became an end proper regard less  
o f  the measures necessary to  a t t a in  i t .  Democratic devices, socia l 
e q u a l i ty ,  and economic p rosperity  fo r  the many were undermined. Growth, 
represented by f igu res  and percentages, overrode the au then tic  socio­
economic development id e n t i f ie d  with re d is t r ib u t io n  o f  wealth and 
p o l i t i c a l  power.
Influenced by such an i l lu s o ry  v is ion  and provided with the 
increasing  p e tro d o l la r ,  the  Shah's economic s tra teg y  favored the  rich
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over the poor, big over sm all, urban over r u r a l ,  m i l i ta ry  and luxury 
expenditures over basic n e c e s s i t i e s ,  and assembly over production of 
expensive durables " th a t  have a la rge  foreign p a r ts  and/or investment 
component. . (Keddie, 1979:13, 20). I t  a lso  was t ru e  th a t  under 
the Shah's regime, Iranian industry  grew an average o f  15.2 percent per 
annum in the  period of 1965-1975 (Halliday, 1978c:13). However, the 
in d u s t r ia l iz a t io n  e f f o r t s ,  which were paradoxically  based on "super­
rap id  growth" but poor in f r a s t ru c tu re ,  gave b i r th  to  a va rie ty  of 
devasta ting  shortcomings, which are  addressed below.
(1) The economic en te rp r ise  was b a s ica l ly  financed by the 
o i l  d o lla rs  which esca la ted  from the ear ly  1970s. As an example, about 
80 percent o f  the  country 's  income was o i l -g en e ra ted ,  and 90 percent o f  
I r a n 's  nearly  $70 b i l l io n  F if th  Development Plan (1973-78) was financed 
by o i l  (Lenczowski, 1980:213; Keddie, 1979:18). As a r e s u l t ,  on the one 
hand the quickly depleted o i l  stock suffe red  from exhaustion, and on 
the o the r  Iran became more dependent on the  in te rn a t io n a l  forces which 
were the u ltim ate  determinant o f  the o i l  market. This is  e spec ia lly  
t ru e  when one remembers th a t  Iran i s  a developing country which cannot 
compete with those same fo rces . Hence, i t  was the  m ulti-na tional 
corporations t h a t ,  in p r in c ip le ,  determined the coun try 's  socioeconomic 
development, i t s  r a t e ,  d i r e c t io n ,  and major p references . As an example, 
even under the  Shah's ru le ,  the West did not supply Iran with a s tee l  
m i l l ,  as a heavy industry ; th i s  end was achieved by Russia in exchange 
f o r  the  coun try 's  natural gas ( e .g . ,  Graham, 1979:44).
(2) Although the  regime, based on i t s  c a p i t a l i s t  na ture , 
encouraged and supported p r iv a te  investments and e n te r p r i s e s ,  th is  was
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confined to  a few fam ilies  who in 1974 numbered 45, and con tro lled  85 
percent o f  the industry  (H alliday, 1978c:13). Such a monopoly demonstrated 
a t  l e a s t  two problems. F i r s t ,  i t  was enjoyed a t  the cost  of the  small 
and newly growing e n te rp r i s e s ,  in both t r a d i t io n a l  and modern realms, 
which needed more support fo r  a secure opera tion . Second, i n d u s t r i a l i ­
za t io n ,  which in the developing nations is  expected to  ac t  as e q u i l iz e r ,  
caused the widening of socia l gaps and d i f f e r e n t i a l s .
(3) In l in e  with i t s  in d u s t r ia l iz a t io n  s t r a te g y ,  the  regime 
encouraged foreign  investments. By 1974, th e re  were 183 in te rn a tio n a l  
firms operating in Iran (H alliday, 1978c:13) whose d i r e c t  investment 
in 1975 was valued a t  $1 b i l l io n  " . . .  making [ th e ]  U.S. the la rg e s t  
foreign investo r  in the country" (Paarlberg , e t  a l . ,  1980:22). Since 
foreign in v es to rs ,  with few exceptions, were more concerned about th e i r  
c ap ita l  and p r o f i t  in the sh o r t  run, the  well-being o f the country in 
the long term did not m atter. They produced more consumer than durable 
commodities, helped to  exhaust the already poor in f r a s t ru c tu re ,  and 
increased national dependence on foreign ventures.
(4) With few exceptions ( e .g . ,  o i l  and petrochemical in d u s try ) ,  
I r a n 's  major in d u s tr ie s  were confined to  assembly and l ig h t  en te rp r ise s  
( e .g . ,  Hoveyda, 1980:73). Concerning such an indus try , there  b as ica lly  
e x is ted  a consumer and dependent r a th e r  than producer and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  
economy. Further, the  e ff ic ien cy  o f such an economy was a lso  in question. 
According to  Halliday (1978c:14)and Graham (1979:121), i t  took 45 hours
in Iran to  assemble a GM Chevrolet, a process needing only 25 hours in 
Western Germany. In 1972 i t  was estimated th a t  Iran ian  manufactured 
goods were about 30 percent more expensive than the average p r ice  in the
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world and the gap was widening (Looney, 1973:88). Consequently, I r a n 's  
industry  could not compete world wide, and i t s  dependence on foreign 
technology and e x p e r t ise  continued.
(5) With a l l  i t s  dependence and wastage, the  in d u s t r ia l  output 
f e l l  sh o r t  of the increasing  demands caused by population increase  and 
income growth. This shortage helped both the  e sc a la t io n  o f  p rices and 
the importation o f  the foreign commodities. Bazaar-e Siah ( i . e . ,  black 
market) became the  ru le  and not the exception to  which the a f f lu e n t  
re fe r re d  and from which the poor suffe red .
(6) With reference  to in f r a s t r u c tu r e , in d u s t r ia l  growth was 
not based on a so l id  foundation. Some examples can shed l ig h t  on th is  
s i tu a t io n .  The Shah admits th a t  in the mid-1970s " . . .  ships often  
waited s ix  months or more to  unload th e i r  cargoes" (Pah lav i, 1980:123). 
Further ,  due to  lack of  a highway system and adequate tran sp o r ta t io n  
devices ( e .g . ,  t ru c k s ,  t r a i l e r s ,  t r a i n s ) ,  i t  took weeks to  t r a n s fe r  the 
offloaded m ateria ls  to  the  consumer market. According to  Graham, "a t  
Khorramshahr 12,000 tons were being unloaded per day but only 9,000 tons 
were being removed per day. At the  most congested p o in t ,  in September/ 
October 1975, the re  were over 1 m illion  tons o f  goods p i led  upon the 
j e t t i e s  and around the port"  (1979:87). As a r e s u l t ,  many goods decayed 
or corroded on the docks. Moreover, in 1975 alone Iran paid $1.5 
b i l l io n  equaling almost 5 percent o f  i t s  to ta l  fo re ign  exchange earnings 
and more than 7 percent o f  i t s  o i l  income, as demurrage (H alliday,
1978c:15; Graham, 1979:88).
The next example pe rta in s  to  the s k i l l e d  labor force which the  
government was unable to  supply out of local manpower. Hence, in the
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1970s "over one m ill ion  fo re ig n e rs ,"  including truck d r iv e r s ,  were 
h ired  (Pahlavi, 1980:123). The regime's media acknowledged th is  as a 
sign of a f lo u r ish in g  economy. In f a c t ,  i t  was an in d ica tio n  of basic 
problems. F i r s t  and foremost, such an imported labor fo rce ,  b as ica lly  
a t  an in term ediate  l e v e l ,  could be supplied in the country through 
planned tra in in g  devices. For example, in s tead  of t ra in in g  the Iranian 
t ru c k e rs ,  truck d r iv e rs  were imported from Korea. This cos t  the govern­
ment a " s izab le  commission on the deal owing to  the labor r e c r u i te r  and 
royal patron" (F ischer,  1980:191).
Second, the  foreign presence in  the labor market provoked the 
na tiona l sentim ent, e sp e c ia l ly  among the  a ffec ted  Iran ians  who saw 
th a t  t h e i r  country was being "ripped off"  by some in tru d e rs .  Such a 
fe e l in g  was more in te n s i f ie d  by the f a c t  th a t  the fo re ig n e rs ,  with 
few exceptions , earned much more than comparable local workers. Third, 
because o f  a housing shortage, th is  "imported" population led to  the 
r i s e  o f  r e n t ,  which t r i p l e d  in 1975-6 (H alliday , 1978c:16). In te re s t in g ly ,  
the foreign  tenants  were more welcomed than the Iran ian s ,  fo r  the  former 
o ffe red  and could a ffo rd  higher re n ts ,  and the l a t t e r  lagged behind 
and had a penchant fo r  bargaining. In a d d it io n ,  many Iran ian  landlords 
would fe e l  a sense o f  p ride  i f  they had a foreign tenan t .  F in a lly ,  in 
g enera l ,  th i s  imported labor was a lso  an imported in f la t io n a ry  fac to r  
which con tribu ted  to  the devastating s i tu a t io n .
Concerning the  issue  of manpower, i t  should be noted th a t  
according to  I r a n 's  Plan and Budget organ ization  e s tim ation , under the 
F if th  Development Plan (1973-78), 2.1 m illion  s k i l le d  workers were 
needed, 40 percent o f  which in the in d u s t r ia l  and mining s e c to r .  But,
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only 1 .4 -1 .3  m illion  o f  them would be supplied in the  process re su lt ing  
in a shortage of about 800,000, 80 percent of whom were s k i l l e d  and 
sem i-sk i l led  workers in in d u s tr ia l  and construction  se c to rs .  Yet, a l l  
the  o ld  regime's c r i t i c s  agree th a t  in the  governmental organizations 
the level o f  s k i l l  was extremely d e f ic ie n t ,  and management was a b o t t l e ­
neck.
However, the Shah admits th a t  "these weaknesses in our in f r a ­
s t ru c tu re  played a ro le  in the d e te r io ra t io n  o f our socia l and p o l i t ic a l  
c lim ate . They con tribu ted  to  our in f la t io n  problem, which we constantly  
sought to  con tro l"  (Pahlavi, 1980:123). On the o the r hand, i t  seems 
th a t  the  Shah's c r i t i c s  agree with Cottam in the  sense th a t  "the 
government's e f fo r t s  to  co n s tru c t a strong heavy industry  in f ra s t ru c tu re  
were hampered by the Shah's fa sc in a tio n  with the  most advanced and most 
expensive technology" (1979:345).
(7) Along with such operating industry , a supplementary 
in d u s try ,  namely housing con stru c tio n , grew rap id ly  and without a pro­
gram. This rap id  growth of housing p ro jec ts  was n ece ss i ta te d  by urban 
growth and foreign immigration. However, i t  lacked appropria te  devices 
and demand-supply measures. Hence, i t  turned out to  be gross land 
specu la tions  which absorbed many resources , including government 
c r e d i t s  (Cottam, 1979:345). Such speculations became so widespread and 
p ro f i ta b le  th a t  even big businesses and members o f  the " inner c irc le "  
took the  i n i t i a t i v e  in  the process. Many got r ich  overn igh t, and too 
many o thers  were hurt badly.
Housing comprised 60 percent o f  the l iv in g  c o s t ,  and 40 percent 
of housing expenditures were absorbed in land cost  (Graham, 1979:89).
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However, regard less  o f  the outcome, the Shah l a t e r  wrote th a t  "contro ls  
were placed on the rap id ly  r is in g  land p r ic e s ,  and various forms of 
land specu la tion  were penalized. This was P r in c ip le  18 of our White 
Revolution, adopted in 1977" (Pahlavi, 1980:122). However, in 1972 
the urban areas were a t  l e a s t  1.1 m illion re s id e n t ia l  un its  sh o r t ,  and 
"throughout the Fourth Plan (1968/9-1972/3) a t o t a l  o f  290,000 un its  
were b u i l t .  . ."  (Graham, 1979:104). In ad d it io n ,  construction  m a te r ia ls ,  
e sp e c ia l ly  cement, were in short supply and hence were ra tioned .
(8) To so lve , however p a r t i a l l y ,  the workers' economic and not 
p o l i t i c a l  problems, the  Shah devoted two poin ts  o f  the WR to the p ro le ­
t a r i a t .  The f i r s t  ( i . e . ,  worker's p ro f i t - s h a r in g )  was adopted in 1963, 
and the  second ( i . e . ,  employee and public  ownership extension scheme) 
was adopted in 1975. The f i r s t  point was, from the very beginning, 
"misunderstood and mismanaged" (B i l l ,  1972:141f). As a r e s u l t ,  i t  came 
to  be understood as a showcase ra th e r  than a fundamental device. Con­
cerning th e  second i n i t i a t i v e ,  the Shah argued th a t  "a t f i r s t ,  o f  course, 
we beared c r ie s  o f  ' s a c r i l g e '  from some fac to ry  owners" (Pahlavi, 1980: 
108). Eventually, o the r  problems surfaced. F i r s t ,  the purpose o f  t h i s  
"law" was not fundamentally a d i re c t  support o f  the employees but a 
stopage to  the undesired labor mobility in the country. This was caused 
by economic d ifferences  and f lu c tu a t io n s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  
Such a problem stemmed b as ic a l ly  from the s c a rc i ty  o f  the s k i l le d  man­
power which led the management to  o f fe r  higher wages and o ther p r iv i leg es  
to  the s k i l l f u l  and hence to  d e s ta b i l iz e  the labor force.
Second, the  addressed law discouraged foreign investors  and some 
local ventures who n a tu ra l ly  were not inc lined  to  share t h e i r  en te rp r ise s
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with the  employees. Hence, "p riva te  investment f e l l  o f f ,  and up to  $2 
b i l l i o n  of Iran p r iv a te  money. . . l e f t  th e  country in  a few weeks" 
(H alliday , 1978c:13). To make up fo r  such a lo s s ,  th a t  i s ,  to  encourage 
the  continuation  o f  th e  foreign investment, th e  regime took c e r ta in  
s teps  in favor o f  the  fo re igners  (Graham, 1979:95). Third , the "employee 
and public  ownership" law intertw ined with the a n t i - in f la t io n a r y  devices 
in 1977-78 and "led to  widespread unemployment, e sp e c ia l ly  in the 
construction  industry" (F ischer, 1980:191). Fourth, s ince  "an e laborate  
mechanism fo r  implementation to  avoid a rb i t r a r in e s s "  was lack ing , the  
groups th a t  were to  b e n e f i t  from the program did not rece ive  ju s t i c e  
(Lenczowski, 1980:212). As an overa ll  r e s u l t ,  "the government tim etable  
was impossibly am bitious,"  and "by Ju ly  1977, 72, 235 in d u s t r ia l  workers 
and 125,745 farmers had ben ef i t ted  from the  scheme—a much smaller number 
than an t ic ip a te d  in  1975" (Graham, 1979:95).
(9) As expected, in d u s t r ia l iz a t io n  in such a developing socie ty  
as t h a t  of Iran should lead to  a new "c la s s  map." However, in the newly 
developed p ic tu re ,  gaps and social d iffe rences  widened and were more 
sensed than ever before . As Lenczowski sees i t  "the s tim ula ted  economic 
a c t i v i t y ,  most o f  i t  government-sponsored, produced a c la s s  of 'nouveau 
r ic h e '  co n tra c to rs ,  o f ten  men o f  e l a s t i c  s tandards , whose m ultim illion- 
d o l la r  deals involved corruption in the h ighest echelons o f  the govern­
ment" (1980:224). Looked a t  d i f f e r e n t ly ,  "the ex traord inary  speed of 
soc ia l  change," produced "a new ro o t l e s s ,  urban p r o l e t a r i a t  [and] a 
suddenly rich  in d u s t r ia l  e l i t e  with i t s  brash Western hab its  and morals. 
(Borderwich, 1980:65). To emphasize, " th is  bourgeoise as a whole r e l i e s  
fo r  i t s  survival on the  s t a t e ' s  provision of economic resources and
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economic d i re c t io n ,  and i s  not an independent agent" in the  i n d u s t r i a l i ­
z a t io n  process (H alliday , 19 7 8 ç :l l) .
F in a lly ,  I r a n 's  industry  and in d u s t r i a l i z a t io n  under the  Shah's 
adm in is tra tion  have been defined as "d es tru c t iv e  but lu c ra t iv e ,"  
"dependent" but growing a t  " fu l l  speed in  the  wrong d i r e c t io n ."  In 
th i s  co n tex t ,  a 1974 Hudson I n s t i tu t e  re p o r t  s tre ssed  th a t  " I ra n ,  in 
the f in a l  decade of th is  century , could prove to  be no more than a 
half-completed in d u s t r ia l  e d i f i c e ,  with the  trappings o f  power and 
in te rn a t io n a l  in fluence  and none o f substance ."  In add ition  to  the 
Land Reform discussed e a r l i e r ,  th i s  was I r a n 's  in d u s t r ia l i z a t io n  and 
the proposed modernization under the Shah's WR.
In 1967, the  Shah, quoting Leon Walras, the n ine teen th  century 
Swiss economist, had emphasized th a t  "as long as wealth i s  no t ju s t ly  
d i s t r ib u te d  amongst the  people, i t s  abundance is  meaningless." In 
1977-8, given the tremendous and increasing  wealth o f  the  country , i t  
became eviden t th a t  h is  emphasis bore no substance. According to  
o f f i c i a l  f ig u re s ,  I r a n 's  per cap ita  income rose from $174 in 1963 to  
$2,540 in  1978 (Pah lav i, 1980:176). However, "the e f fe c t s  o f  the  new 
wealth were a t  f i r s t  uneven and even tua lly  d is ru p t iv e .  Hundreds became 
m il l io n a i re s  overnight as the  web o f corrup tion  permeated Iran ever 
deeper, but the m a jo ri ty ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  in th e  v i l la g e s ,  saw l i t t l e  
improvement in t h e i r  l i f e  s ty le s .  . . . In  1976 only th ree  percent of 
Iran ians  shared 90 percen t o f  the national wealth (Thurgood, 1980:7). 
About th i s  time, the Shah acknowledged an in f l a t io n  ra te  a t  20 percent 
(P ah lav i,  1980:126). However, o thers  argue th a t  such a r a te  was 30 
percen t ( e . g . .  Brun and Dumont, 1978:15), o r  30-50 percent (Lenczowski, 
1980:224).
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From Expected P o l i t ic a l  P a r t ic ip a t io n  to  P o l i t ic a l  S trangulation
For a socie ty  to  be democratic, a tendency towards both economic 
eq u a li ty  and p o l i t ic a l  l ib e r ty  must e x i s t .  In th is  re sp ec t ,  some 
researchers  ( e .g . ,  Lenski, 1966; Outright, 1967; Stack, 1978) argue th a t  
democracy has an independent negative e f f e c t  on sec to ra l  income ineq u a l i ty .  
In o ther words, economic growth causes more p o l i t i c a l  democracy in the 
process o f  in d u s t r ia l iz a t io n  and modernization. On the o th e r  hand, 
o th e r  researchers  "view p o l i t i c a l  democracy as a luxury t h a t  can be 
i l l - a f f o r d e d  by Less Developed Countries. . . facing the more pressing 
problems o f socioeconomic development, income in e q u a l i ty ,  and rapid 
population growth" (Bollen, 1980:370), Although under the  Shah's ru le  
Iran was undergoing a remarkable economic growth and increase  in 
income, economic in eq u a l i ty ,  as addressed before , did not decrease 
and p o l i t i c a l  democracy, as w ill  be sketched immediately, did not 
emerge.
Boll en understands t h a t  s ince the  p o l i t i c a l  power o f  the e l i t e ,  
in comparison to  the n o n e l i te ,  varies  from one so c ie ty  to  the o th e r ,  
p o l i t i c a l  democracy can be defined "as the ex ten t to  which the  p o l i t i c a l  
power of the e l i t e  i s  minimized and th a t  of the n o ne li te  i s  maximized" 
(1980:372). Based on such a d e f in i t io n  as well as the  above mentioned 
considera tions  about the re la t io n sh ip  between economic eq u a l i ty  and 
p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r ty ,  the  case o f  Iran under the Shah's regime can be 
assessed in the following way. In the f i r s t  p lace , i t  should be noted 
th a t  the Iranians have always fought fo r  the p r in c ip le  o f  "Azadi"
( i . e . ,  freedom, p o l i t i c a l  freedom). As s ta ted  e a r l i e r ,  the  C onstitu tional 
Revolution of 1906, the  n a t io n a l i s t  movement of the ea r ly  1950s, and the
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re l ig io u s ly  motivated upris ing  of the ear ly  1960s can best rep resen t 
such a d e s i r e .  Although the  Revolution of 1978-9 advocated a new 
socioeconomic o rder, " p o l i t ic a l  freedom" was a t  the  very fundamental 
ferment o f  the revolutionary  voices.
However, the  value o f  l ib e r ty  in the Iran ian  social movements 
has always been in te r l in k ed  with the ideal of " i s te q la l "  ( i . e . ,  indepen­
dence). As Ross suggests, " Iran ian s ,  even in normal times, have a 
strong tendency toward xenophobia a f t e r  almost a century of what they 
feel has been foreign domination, f i r s t  by the Soviet Union, then the 
B r i t ish ,  and f in a l ly  the Americans" (1980:A16). Indeed, what the 
Iranians had fought fo r  f i r s t  and foremost was most denied to  them.
Some o f  the Shah's c r i t i c s  argue th a t  he adhered to  the theory 
th a t  economic growth and socia l development would, or should, lead to  
p o l i t ic a l  democratization. Even i f  th is  a l le g a t io n ,  as well as the 
theory i t s e l f ,  were t ru e ,  the  nature  o f  the Shah's a b so lu t i s t  ru le  was 
decisive ly  preventive in th is  process. "Few of the  Shah's in te rna l 
po lic ies  worked because the imperial vision was always made subserv ien t 
to  p o l i t i c a l  expedience" (Thurgood, 1980:7). In h is  d ic ta to r ia l  exerc ise  
o f  power, socioeconomic growth and development could no t, and did no t,  
democratize th e  socie ty . "Even with the United S ta tes  behind him, the 
Shah lacked the  confidence and charisma to  carry  out his  reforms in a 
democratic s e t t in g .  . .he was never qu ite  able to  t r u s t  his own people 
to  run his new society" (Shah, Diana K., 1980:4). Consequently, he 
"ruled with progressively  rep ress ive  absolutism" and suppressed a l l  the 
possible o u t le t s  of freedom such as "the p ress, p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  
s tudent o rgan iza tions , and any forum fo r  free  speech. . ." (Zabih,
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1979:2, 20). Such an oppressive ru le  can be described very s p e c i f ic a l ly .
The Peasantry . Due to t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  conservatism, remote­
ness from urban and cu ltu ra l  cen te rs ,  d ispersion  in the  ru ra l  a reas ,  the  
regim e's co n tro l ,  and widespread i l l i t e r a c y ,  the peasantry were n e i th e r  
p o l i t i c a l l y  aware nor had the motivation fo r  p o l i t i c i z a t io n .  However, 
through the WR p o lic ie s  and p rac tices  ( e .g . .  Land Reform, Corps of 
I l l i t e r a c y ,  Houses o f  Equity) the government penetrated  in to  the ru ra l 
l i f e  more than before . This penetra tion  held a governmental control 
over the  countryside and, as a l a t e n t  func tion , helped the  v i l la g e rs  
to  in te r a c t  with the government agents d i r e c t ly .  When a g r ic u l tu ra l  
d e te r io ra t io n  occurred and the ensuing d i f f i c u l t i e s  were sensed, the 
peasan ts , d isun ited  and disorganized, were not able to  channel and 
voice t h e i r  grievances. Even i f  on some occasions th i s  was p oss ib le ,  
a s a t i s fa c to ry  reac tion  from the regime was improbable. The regime had 
already  sh if te d  i t s  a t te n t io n  to  the urban areas and in d u s t r ia l iz a t io n  
e n te rp r is e s .
In th is  process, the regime exp lo ited  the "natural purity"  
and "po liteness"  o f  the farmers who came to  re a l iz e  th a t  they lacked 
the minimum p o l i t i c a l  freedom necessary fo r  the promulgation o f  th e i r  
problems. In f a c t ,  the Shah not only deprived the peasantry  o f  some 
kind o f  p o l i t i c a l  freedom and p a r t ic ip a t io n  in the p o l i t i c a l  processes, 
he a lso  fa i le d  to  promote, and even to  maintain, t h e i r  e n th u s ia s t ic  
support which was e l i c i t e d  in the f i r s t  s tage of the Land Reform. 
Consequently, in the la te  1970's, the so -ca lled  "unbroken a l l ia n c e  be­
tween the Shah and peasants" became nothing but a hollow o f f i c i a l  slogan.
Hobson (1980:178) observes t h a t  although th e re  were no demon­
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s t r a t io n s  and r i o t s ,  . . th e re  was d i s i l lu s io n  a t  th e  f a i lu r e  of the 
government to  help the  rural areas" (1980:178). R e a l i s t i c a l ly ,  the  slum 
dwellers who p a r t ic ip a te d  in the  revolu tionary  processes were mostly 
the  peasantry who, a f t e r  a g r ic u l tu ra l  f a i lu r e s ,  had a lready  taken refuge 
in  the  urban o u ts k i r t s  in p u rsu it  of a minimum level o f  subsis tence .
With regard to  a c e r ta in  group of these  immigrants, Hooglund observes 
th a t  the young peasantry who l e f t  t h e i r  v i l lag es  fo r  the  c i t i e s  " . . .  
succeeded in organizing p o l i t i c a l  support fo r  the anti-Shah demonstra­
t io n s  which occurred d a ily  throughout the  country. . ."  (1980:6).
The P r o l e t a r i a t . In the in d u s t r ia l  process, unionization 
epitomizes the  r ig h ts  o f  the working c la s se s .  Beginning from the ea r ly  
tw en tie th  century , t rad e  unions came in to  being in Iran . This, however, 
took place under (1) the influence  o f  a g rea t number o f  Iranians who had 
a lready  worked in T s a r i s t  Russia, across  the border, and (2) the  Iran ian  
Communist Party which was formed in the ear ly  1920's .  Under Reza Shah's 
ru le  such an experience was suppressed and unions were dissolved in 1936 
(Ramazani, 1966) to  be resumed in the 1940's and e a r ly  1950's . From 
1953 on, labor unions were discouraged o r  th e i r  formation and operation 
were supervised and con tro lled  by the regime. The Labor Law of 1959 
allowed unionization  only a f t e r  the approval o f  the M inistry o f  Labor, 
and supposedly any such approval was conditioned on continued compliance 
w ith  the government.
By 1978, th e re  were some 1,023 labor unions, a l l  of which were 
prevented ". . .from playing an independent p o l i t i c a l  ro le"  (Halliday, 
1979a:197-210; 1978c:7). This kind o f  unionization can be understood 
as "paternalism  but not p a r t ic ip a t io n "  in  the p o l i t i c a l  process and
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laobr r ig h t  arrangements (F ischer, 1980:191). Zonis understands th a t  
these  . . o f f i c i a l l y  syndicated unions [were] created  as a challenge 
to  communist dominance o f organized labor or even a non-communist but 
independent body of organized labor" (1971:293).
So as to  minimize the working c la ss  unres t,  the Shah adopted 
two programs as two points  o f  the WR: p ro f i t - s h a r in g ,  and share p a r t i ­
c ip a t io n  in firms and fa c to r ie s .  Each o f  these two devices had some 
economic b enef its  fo r  the workers. The sh a re -p a r t ic ip a t io n  device was 
intended to  " in te g ra te  the c lasses  and head o f f  the c la s h e s ."  "But 
r e a l i t y  was q u ite  d i f f e r e n t  from th i s  kind o f  euphoria. With Iranian 
cynicism, workers thought the plan was some kind of t r a p .  I f  the Shah 
had wanted to  appeal to  them, he could have freed th e i r  unions and 
c a l le d  o f f  his  s e c re t  p o lic e ,  who swarmed through f a c to r ie s  in search 
of  "communists'" (F orb is , 1980:247). In f a c t ,  government-directed 
labor unions served two governmental o b jec t iv es .  On the one hand they 
were s t re sse d  as labo r  rep resen ta tion  in the  p o l i t i c a l  process. On the 
o th e r ,  they were used whenever o f f i c i a l l y  o rches tra ted  parades and 
r a l l i e s  were necessary , to  show the  workers' prosupposed a l l ia n c e  with 
the regime. Hence, the p r o le ta r i a t  were not only prevented from 
exerc is ing  th e i r  genuine labor r ig h ts  but were a lso  forced to  r a l ly  
fo r  the  regime ag a in s t  t h e i r  own w ill  and b e l ie f .
Yet, the workers were required  to  make more s a c r i f i c e s  to 
s a t i s f y  the regime. In 1976, the M in ister o f  Labor and Social A ffa irs ,  
a t  the  Third Iran ian  Labor Congress, emphasized th a t  the Iran ian  
"workers should s t r iv e  to  work harder, improve th e i r  s k i l l s ,  and 
r a i s e  p ro duc tiv ity  in an e f f o r t  to  repay t h e i r  debts to  the  Shah"
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(H alliday , 1979a:206). While the workers seek any po ss ib le  route to  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ic ip a t io n  and free  expression, "the SAVAK has the task 
o f  ensuring th a t  labor does not become p o l i t ic iz e d  or does not ex p lo it  
in d u s t r ia l  action fo r  p o l i t i c a l  ends" (Graham, 1979:148). F ina lly , 
among such deprived s t r a t a  two groups could be found who, although 
having d i f f e r e n t  economic s i tu a t io n s ,  were both p o l i t i c a l ly  f ru s t r a te d .
The f i r s t  was the group th a t  succeeded economically and now needed 
some valued p o l i t i c a l  rewards or a t  l e a s t  a sense of f r e e  expression.
The o th e r ,  which lagged behind the f i r s t  group in  economic terms, sought 
p o l i t i c a l  means fo r  economic ends. N either achieved any p o l i t i c a l  
freedom.
While the regime concentrated on in d u s t r i a l i z a t io n ,  i t  fa i le d  
to  accompany th is  s t ra te g y  with some democratization measures necessary 
f o r  fu r th e r in g  industry  and p ro d u c tiv i ty ,  save the labor r i g h t  proper.
This a l ie n a t in g  s i tu a t io n  led to  s t r i k e s ,  r i o t s ,  and demonstrations, 
even before the episodes o f the 1978-9 Revolution ( e .g . ,  F ischer , 
1980:181-244). With the  middle c la s s e s ,  the  p r o le ta r i a t  promoted 
the  Revolution.
The Middle Classes: From Evolution to  Revolution. As noted 
elsewhere, the WR was b a s ic a l ly  introduced to  d iffuse  the  growing 
unrest o f  the expanding middle c lasses .  In 1978-9 i t  became evident 
t h a t  the middle socia l s t r a t a ,  whose p o l i t i c a l  s trength  and desire  fo r 
power were underestimated by the  Shah, in s t ig a te d  the  Revolution. To 
emphasize, "the Iranian Revolution was urban in composition. I ts  
cadres came from the urban-based middle and working-classes—the bazaaris ,  
Muslim c l e r i c s ,  workers, i n te l l e c tu a l s  and s tuden ts . I t  was swelled
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by ru ra l  migrants driven to  the c i t i e s  by the  Shah's modernization of 
a g r icu ltu re "  (Ahmad, 1979:6).
As an in d ica t io n  o f  the  Shah's ignorance o f  these  s t r a t a ,  he 
"blocked movements w ithin  the  government toward any rad ica l  land reform 
and even inh ib ited  any appeal to  the  educated middle c la s s  fo r  support 
o f  land reform" (Paine, 1975:18). The h o s t i le  and p o l i t i c a l l y  deprived 
middle c lasses  grew very rap id ly  in terms o f number, educational a t t a i n ­
ment, and expec ta tions . They then sought new horizons commensurate 
with t h e i r  new s i tu a t io n .  However, such a growth and d e s ire  was not met 
with an appropria te  response from the regime. ". . . th e  Shah imposed 
s t r in g e n t  l im ita t io n s  on independent p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n ,  [and] th i s  was 
a severe provocation to  those s tu d en ts ,  i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  and members of 
the middle c lasses  who had e n th u s ia s t ic a l ly  p a r t ic ip a ted  in party  
a c t i v i t i e s "  (Ledeen and Lewis, 1980:10).
To r e i t e r a t e ,  the  Iranian middle c lasses  consis ted  o f  three  
ca teg o rie s :  (1) the  t r a d i t io n a l  bourgeo is ie , best known as the
Bazaaris ( i . e . ,  the  t r a d i t io n a l  merchants, t r a d e r s ,  c o n tra c to r s ,  and 
p ro fes s io n a ls ) ,  (2) the  c l e r i c s ,  and (3) the  i n te l l e c t u a l s  including 
the white c o l la r  workers, b a s ica l ly  the  government employees, and 
u n iv e rs ity  s tuden ts .  However, a l l  these  c la s s e s ,  as w ill be seen 
s h o r t ly ,  shared somewhat common p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n s ,  caused more by 
the  old regime's p o l ic ie s  and p rac tice s  than th e i r  own u n if ied  ideals  
and in te r e s t s .  The p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n  o f  each c la ss  may be assessed 
as follows:
The T rad it ional Bourgeoisie. H is to r ic a l ly ,  t h i s  tratum has
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always been involved in p o l i t i c s .  This condition , however, was not caused 
by th i s  s tra tum 's  d e s ire  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  power but by the way in which the 
regime in te r fe re d  in  the  t r a d i t io n a l  commercial arrangements as well 
as the  re l ig io u s  t r a d i t i o n .  In f a c t ,  the Bazaaris ' acquaintance with 
p o l i t i c s  and t h e i r  deprivation  of  p o l i t i c a l  freedom stemmed from c e r ta in  
fa c to r s .  F i r s t ,  they are t r a d i t io n a l ly  re l ig io u s  and conservative. 
Regardless o f  i t s  na ture  and d i re c t io n ,  forced modernization can a f fe c t  
o r  th rea ten  th e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  p rofessional p ra c t ic e s .
Second, the  development of th e  new c a p i t a l i s t  s tratum  in the 
country , which was by a l l  means supported by the  regime, jeopardized 
t h e i r  own economic s i tu a t io n .  However, a number o f  I r a n 's  dominant 
c a p i t a l i s t s  grew out o f  the  corner o f  the Bazaar (Graham, 1979:47-8). 
I n te re s t in g ly ,  such ind iv idua ls  became a th re a t  to  the lagging Bazaaris 
and a t  the same time served as a refe rence  poin t fo r  the  ambitious 
t r a d e r s .  Third, h i s t o r i c a l l y ,  as was mentioned before , the  Bazaaris 
had the  desire  to  be united  with the re l ig io u s  d ig n i ta r ie s  as they 
had always been. In time of c r i s i s ,  the re l ig io u s  leaders  s e t  the 
Bazaar in motion, and the Bazaaris financed and/or staged violence with 
t h e i r  own money, tim e, and energy. This is  the major reason fo r  the 
Shah's constant and d i r e c t  control over the Bazaar.
Zabih (1979:27) observes th a t  ". . . th e  group which more 
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  broadened the basis  of anti-regim e opposition  was the 
b aza a r i ."  Concerning the " su s c e p t ib i l i ty "  of the  Bazaaris to  mobiliza­
t io n  e f fo r t s  of the  c le rg y , Zabih (1979:27-32) emphasizes cer ta in  
reasons. F i r s t ,  th e re  has been a mutual dependence between the two in 
th a t  the  economically powerful Bazaaris finance the  re l ig io u s  leaders
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and the re l ig io u s  in s t i t u t i o n s .  In exchange, in  add ition  to  moral 
support, th e  clergy  educate the  ch ild ren  o f  th e  Bazaaris. This was, 
however, more tru e  in the past when the  educational agencies were almost 
r e s t r i c t e d  to  the c lergy  and th e i r  c i r c l e s .  At th a t  tim e, the  clergy 
were agents of education and, with the  high-ranking a u th o r i t i e s ,  were 
a lso  the  educated stratum.
Second, t r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  the B azaaris , by means o f  the  purchase o f  
the  a g r ic u l tu ra l  surplus and the sa le  o f  consumer goods, had main­
ta ined  c lo se  t i e s  with th e  peasantry and a t  times were able to  mobilize 
them fo r  demonstrations. Third, due to  the  regime's s t r a te g ie s  and 
p ra c t ic e s ,  the  Bazaaris themselves were a l ie n a te d  and hence had a b u i l t -  
in p o te n t ia l  fo r  v io lence. "In the l a s t  20 years th e i r  economic power 
has plummeted, with the  s t a t e  taking over more than 80 percent o f  the 
6NP. Their nouveau r iche  bureaucra tic  successors were w esternized and 
newcomers to  the p o l t ic a l  scene. Even though the  bazaari ben ef i t ted  
from the  o i l  boom a f t e r  1973, once t h e i r  s ta tu s  declined , t h e i r  h o s t i ­
l i t y  toward the regime was revived" (Zabih, 1979:28).
B ill  (1972:13) notes th a t  "The t r a d i t io n a l  middle c la sses  fled  
the scene once they saw t h e i r  goals s a t i s f i e d  and t h e i r  upper c lass  
d e t ra c to r s  shackled." However, the actual p o l i t i c a l  depriva tion  o f  these 
s t r a t a  can be traced  to  the regime's f a i l u r e  in  re a l iz in g  the a t t i tu d e  
o f  the  Bazaaris. I t  seems th a t  these a t t i tu d e s  were harmonious with 
gradual modernization but d iscordant with forced social change from 
whatever d i re c t io n .  This i s  because o f  th e  f a c t  th a t  the t r a d i t io n a l  
merchants and businessmen have both money to  enjoy th e i r  l i f e  and the 
d e s ire  to  improve t h e i r  ways and means in th e  economic processes. In-
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s tead  o f  a r t i c u la t in g  and ex p lo it ing  these  tendencies and d isp o s i t io n s ,  
the Shah's regime functioned as an uprooting force o r  as an ev il  agent 
o f  so c ia l  change.
To b e t te r  understand the  preceding claim , two examples w ill 
be d iscussed. F i r s t ,  in his course o f  modernization, the Shah recommended 
". . . t h a t  a t  l e a s t  p a r t  o f  the  old bazaar area  [ in  Tehran] . . .be torn 
down, and a new commercial and shopping area be constructed. . ."
(Ledeen and Lewis, 1980:11). This was intended under the guise of c i ty  
planning and t r a f f i c  measures, but i t  was confronted with g rea t despair 
and strong  symbolic re s is ta n c e  by the Bazaaris. The Bazaari Tehranians 
were quick to  understand th a t  th is  intended reconstruction  had two> 
in te r l in k e d  o b jec t iv es ,  n e i th e r  o f  which was d es irab le  fo r  them. 
Physica l ly , i t  would p a r t i t io n  the t r a d i t io n a l  businesses centered 
around a h is to r ic a l  Mosque in a multi-purpose area: the Bazaar.
S o c ia l ly ,  i t  a lso  would a f f e c t  the t i e s  th a t  had become more possib le ,  
durable , and p o l i t i c a l l y  functional by means o f  togetherness a t  jammed 
shops and benches. However, because o f  the  growing grievances, the 
regime dropped the idea , but the h o s t i l i t y  o f  the Bazaaris did not 
decrease.
The next example, o f  almost the same na tu re , p e r ta in s  to  the 
prov incia l holy c i ty  of Mashhad. The p rec in c t  o f  the  Shraine of 
Imam Reza, the S h i i t e ' s  Eight Iman, was so jammed with t in y  and over­
loaded shops located in narrow a lley s  t h a t ,  a t  l e a s t  fo r  s a fe ty ,  secu rity  
and public  hygiene reasons, some s o r t  of reconstruc tion  was e s s e n t ia l .
The Shah's regime f in a l l y  succeeded in re lo c a t in g  the Bazaaris, cen­
te red  around the Shrine and the  annexed Mosque, a t  a newly b u i l t
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marketplace located some blocks from the  Shrine. The regime came up 
with a splendid p rec in c t  in an open area planted with t r e e s ,  lawns, 
and flowers very appropria te  to  the s ta tu s  o f  Imam.
However, t h i s  plan was resented by the Bazaaris and the 
re l ig io u s  community for several reasons. F i r s t ,  i t  took the "heart" 
o f  the Bazaar f a r  from the everyday pi 1 grams, based on whose purchases 
the  Bazaar had come in to  being. Secondly, there  were a lleged losses 
by the  shop owners in terms of compensation fo r  the old places and the 
ren ting  o f  new shops in the new Bazaar from the government. Third, 
t h i s  re location  separated the Bazaari community from the  Shrine, as 
well as from the major re l ig io u s  d ig n i ta r ie s  centered a t  the Shrine 
and a t  the annexed Mosque fo r teach ing , preaching, and p rac tica l  
r e l ig io u s  purposes. On behalf o f  the  Shah's regime, t h i s  a l t e r a t io n ,  
as was intended in  th e  case of Tehran, achieved an underlying ob jec tive  
too. I t  helped to  d if fu se  the mixed r e l ig io u s -p o l i t ic a l  unrest which 
usually  took place around the Shrine. In f a c t ,  t h i s  a l te ra t io n  would 
reduce the  j o in t  clergymen-Bazaaris' ac tion  and mobilization cap a b i l i ty  
in time of c r i s i s .
F ina lly , Hobson observes th a t  "In the 60s and 70s many of the 
middle c lass  merchants moved out of the bazaar [ s ic ]  in to  a new pros­
p e r i ty ;  and when imports dominated trade  in o ther p a r ts  of the c i t i e s ,  
i t  seemed the bazaar was losing i t s  ro le  as a nerve-center" (1979:177). 
However, during the  revolu tionary  upheaval economic in te r e s t s  and 
re l ig io u s  values motivated the Bazaaris to  play th e i r  t ra d i t io n a l  
p o l i t i c a l  ro le  in Iranian p o l i t i c s .  They a t  le a s t  regained both t h e i r  
t r a d i t io n a l  s ta tu s  in the r e l ig io - p o l i t i c a l  arrangements and the
154
symbolic c e n t r a l i ty  o f  the Bazaar.
The Religious Stratum. In the  Iranian social h ierarchy  the 
c l e r i c s  with t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  theological ranks, can be considered as 
a socia l stratum whose re l ig io - so c ia l  s ta tu s  was more d ef inab le  than 
t h e i r  occupational ro le s .  They were involved in the processes o f  
teach ing , preaching, and the  regu la ting  o f  re l ig io u s  a f f a i r s .  These 
a c t i v i t i e s  were b a s ic a l ly  financed by the  Islamic t i t h e  and o ther 
r e l ig io u s  donations as well as such revenues as endownments. All th i s  
money was given to  the re l ig io u s  leaders  and t h e i r  re p re sen ta t iv e s  
d i r e c t l y  and was out of governmental control and ta x a t io n .  In th i s  
sense , th e  re l ig io u s  d ig n i ta r ie s  operated as n e ith e r  government employees 
nor as p r iv a te  in ves to rs  handling f r e e  e n te rp r is e s .  Hence, they mostly 
functioned out o f  the  mainstream of th e  economic arrangements of the 
country.
For t h i s  reason, as well as t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  p o s i t io n s ,  the  
r e l ig io u s  d ig n i ta r ie s  can be defined as a " s ta tu s  group" ra th e r  than a 
"socia l c la ss"  in the  Marxist sense. By th i s  d e f in i t io n ,  they may be 
seen as being independent from, and deprived o f ,  both th e  governmental 
arrangements and the  o f f i c i a l i z a t io n  o f  t h e i r  re l ig ious-educa tiona l 
a tta inm en t.  To w i t ,  n e i th e r  re l ig io u s  ranks nor educational c e r t i f i c a t e s  
were recognized by the  old  regime. The only exception was the  top 
re l ig io u s  f ig u re s ,  the  Ayatollahs, who were t r a d i t i o n a l ly  and symboli­
c a l ly  recognized by the government.
This s i tu a t io n  can be explained on the basis  o f  a c e r ta in  
h i s to r ic a l  background discussed e a r l i e r .  In s h o r t , th e  re l ig io u s  
stra tum  which once was represented in  th e  ru ling  c lass  through the
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ju r i s d ic t io n a l  branch began, from the  l a t e  n ineteenth  cen tury , to  lose  
i t s  t r a d i t io n a l  s treng th  and in f lu en ce . Such a pos it iona l lo s s ,  among 
o th e r  fa c to rs  d iscussed before , pushed the  re l ig io u s  leaders  to  stand 
ag a in s t  the government and the in trud ing  fo re igners  and hence to  be 
f u r th e r  immersed in p o l i t i c s .  A c lo se  examination o f  I r a n 's  1906-7 
C onstitu tion  would confirm the va lnational achievement th a t  the 
r e l ig io u s  leaders  accomplished c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly .  As a concrete example, 
a r t i c l e  2 o f  " the supplementary fundamental laws o f  October 7, 1907" 
reads :
At no time must any legal enactment o f  th e  Sacred 
National C onsultative  Assembly, e s tab lish ed  by the  favor 
and a ss is tan ce  o f  His Holiness Imam of the Age (may God hasten 
h is  glad Advent:), the  favor o f  h is  Majesty the  Shahinshah 
o f  Islam (may God immortalize h is  r e ig n : ) ,  the care of the  
Proofs o f  Islam (may God m ultip ly  the  l ik e  o f  them :), and the 
whole people o f  the  Persian n a tio n ,  be a t  variance with the 
sacred p r in c ip le s  o f  Islam o r  th e  laws e s tab lish ed  by His 
Holiness the  Best o f  Mankind (on whom and on whose household 
be the Blessings o f  God and His Peace:).
I t  is  hereby declared th a t  i t  i s  fo r  th e  learned 
doctors o f  theology (the ulama)—may God prolong the  blessing 
o f  th e i r  e x is te n c e : - to  determine whether such laws as may be 
proposed a re  o r a re  not conformable to  the p r in c ip le s  o f  Islam; 
and i t  i s  th e re fo re  o f f i c i a l l y  enacted th a t  th e re  sha ll  a t  a l l  
times e x is t  a Committee composed o f not le ss  than f iv e  muj- 
tah id s  or o ther devout theo lo g ian s ,  cognizant a lso  o f  the  
requirements of the  age, [which committee shall  be e lec ted ]  
in th i s  manner. The ulama and Proofs of Islam shall present 
to  the National C onsultative  Assembly the names o f  twenty of 
the  ulama possessing the  a t t r i b u t e s  mentioned above; and the 
Members of the  National C onsu lta tive  Assembly s h a l l ,  e i th e r  
by unanimous acclamation, o r  by vo te , designate f iv e  o r  more 
o f  th ese ,  according to  the ex igencies  o f  the tim e, and recog­
nize these as Members, so t h a t  they may c a re fu l ly  d iscuss 
and consider a l l  m atters proposed in the Assembly, and r e je c t  
and repud ia te , wholly or in p a r t ,  any such proposal which is  
a t  variance with the  Sacred Laws o f  Islam, so t h a t  i t  shall 
not obtain the  t i t l e  o f  l e g a l i t y .  In such m atters  the decision 
o f  th is  E cc le s ia s t ica l  Committee shall  be followed and obeyed, 
and th i s  a r t i c l e  shall  continue unchanged u n t i l  th e  appearance 
o f  His Holiness the  Proof o f  th e  Age (may God hasten h is  glad 
Advent:) (Browne, 1966:372-3).
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However, in p ra c t ic e ,  such a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r ig h t  was denied 
to  the "Ulama and Proofs o f  Islam," the  highly ranked re l ig io u s  lead e rs ,  
from the  very beginning. Further, so as to  j u s t i f y  such a d e n ia l ,  the 
Pahlavis took steps to  s ep a ra te ,  in one way o r  another, the  re l ig io u s  
community from p o l i t i c s .  Hence, whenever a re l ig io u s  le ad e r  was able 
to  play a ro le  in the p o l i t i c a l  process, he was e i th e r  moderate or 
subordinate. Otherwise, such a figure  was l iq u id a te d .  Sayyad Hassan 
Modarress, a radical congressman in Reza Shah's re ig n , was th e  best 
example (Cottam, 1979:146; Ramazani, 1966), and Ayatollah Khomeini in 
the  Shah's ru le  is  the  o th e r .  In f a c t ,  "under the  two Pahlavi shahs, 
the balance of  tension  has t i l t e d  sharply ag a in s t  the Mojtahids. . . .
An imbalance of th i s  degree has not ex is ted  s ince  the l a s t  years of 
the Safavid dynasty ( B i l l ,  1972:24).
In recent t im es, namely the s ix t i e s  and sev en tie s ,  the re l ig io u s  
leaders  were in danger more than ever before . Such a s i tu a t io n  became 
more th rea ten ing  under the Shah's i n i t i a t i o n  o f  the  WR. With fu l l  
in te n t io n ,  th i s  i n i t i a t i v e  headed toward secularism  and the  ab o li t io n  
of  t ra d i t io n a l ism .  Such a planned change and emphasized s h i f t  hu rt the 
re l ig io u s  community who, in  a secular soc ie ty  as proposed by the  Shah 
and h is  Western connections, would lose  even t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  and 
symbolic influence. Secondly, in r e a l i t y ,  the  Shah's Land Reform took 
out of the hands o f  the  re l ig io u s  leaders  the "Awghaf" ( i . e . ,  endowment) 
based on which these d ig n i ta r ie s  had been able to  f inance , a t  l e a s t  
p a r t i a l l y ,  t h e i r  r e l ig io u s  in s t i tu t io n s  throughout h is to ry  (Zabih, 
1979:21; Halliday, 1978b:3). This p ra c t ic e ,  the  supervision o f  Awqaf, 
can a lso  be understood as a source of t r a d i t io n a l  power on behalf of
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the  c l e r i c s .  In ad d i t io n ,  the  Land Reform Law was observed as con tra ­
d ic to ry  to  some re l ig io u s  p r in c ip le s .
Third, in the  process o f modernizing family re la t io n s h ip s ,  the 
regime sanctioned the  o f f i c i a l i z a t i o n  o f  marriage and divorce very 
s t r i c t l y .  This e n te rp r is e  minimized the c le rg y 's  t r a d i t io n a l  re lig ious  
ro le  in t h i s  a rea , which they considered as one of the cornerstones of 
the Islamic arrangements. They saw such a transform ation as another 
example o f  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  v io la t io n  by the government. As A rtic le  
2 mentioned before in d ic a te s ,  they had the r ig h t  to  supervise the 
l e g i s l a t i o n s ,  and to  veto whatever was con trad ic to ry  to  the Islamic 
te n en ts .  Fourth, the regime even speculated about a "Religious Corps," 
as another "point" o f  th e  WR. This, however, meant the governmentaliza- 
t io n  o f  the Islamic t r a d i t i o n  and the expropria tion  of the t ra d i t io n a l  
re l ig io u s  d ig n i ta r ie s  and th e i r  h i s to r ic a l  functioning.
In connection with these o f f i c i a l  speculations and o the r 
governmental programs ( e .g . ,  reducing the  re l ig io u s  holidays) the  regime 
a lso  took d i f f e r e n t  s teps  to  achieve the  co llabo ra t ion  o f  some re lig ious  
leaders  who e i th e r  were a l lu red  by the regime or were co-opted fo r  
personal in te r e s t s .  As Cottam observes ". . . th e re  were a g reat many 
S h i i te  re lig ious  leaders  who were not only w illing  but anxious to  sanc­
t i f y  the  regime. This included, o f  course, a l l  those with o f f ic ia l  
appointments. . . . But the prominence o f  those in opposition was so 
su b s tan tia l  th a t  the  Shah was e f fe c t iv e ly  denied the a b i l i t y  to  use, in 
h is  own and his  dynasty 's  behalf , the sanction  of S h i i te  Islam" (1979: 
331-2). F ina lly , the  American's presence in  Iran which amounted to 
"more than 40,000 m il i t a ry  and c iv i l i a n  personnel" (Time, 1978:39),
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as well as the opera tion  o f  the I s r a e l i s  in d i f f e r e n t  p ro je c ts ,  under­
mined and antagonized the  re l ig io u s  community. Advocating both national 
independence and the  r ig h t s  o f  the "Muslim P a le s t in ian s ,"  the  clergy saw 
such a presence as contemptuous and hum ilia ting . As a r e s u l t ,  "serious 
pressures began to  be applied  agains t the  Shah and his regime, and also  
aga ins t  h is  reforms, which had hurt the  s ta tu s  o f  the re l ig io n "  
(Shmuelevitz, 1979:36).
In order to  f u l f i l l  t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  re l ig io u s  commitments 
and to  regain some o f  t h e i r  p r iv i leg es  and s ta tu se s ,  the re l ig io u s  
leaders  had to  r e s i s t  the  regime's uprooting measures. Otherwise, 
not only would t h e i r  advocacy o f Islam be meaningless, they a lso  would 
be seen as dysfunctional in the  eyes o f  t h e i r  followers. In such a 
f ru s t r a t in g  s i tu a t io n ,  t h e i r  nothingness and powerlessness, even in a 
t r a d i t io n a l  sense, would cause t h e i r  increasing  decay. In order to  
avoid such a " k i l l in g  edge," the re l ig io u s  d ig n i ta r ie s  began to  make 
s e n s i t iv e  p o l i t ic a l  issues  in  th e i r  year-round re l ig io u s  preachings 
and sermons. Whenever t h i s  was p o ss ib le ,  i t  a t t r a c te d  a v a r ie ty  of 
social s t r a t a ,  in add ition  to  the  t r a d i t io n a l  audience, who were not 
able to  hear of m i l i t a n t  and open p o l i t i c a l  c r i t ic is m  a g a in s t  the 
regime elsewhere.
Consequently, mosques, which were considered as p laces fo r  
re l ig io u s  p rac tice s  fo r  the  p rac tica l  fo llow ers , were frequented by a 
new audience from d i f f e r e n t  social backgrounds and p o l i t i c a l  stands.
This new audience, although Muslim by cu l tu re  and/or ideology, was more 
in te re s ted  in the p o l i t i c a l  tone o f  the  mosque than in Heaven and Hell. 
Thus, " re l ig io n  provided a common reference  point and a fulcrum of
159
p ro te s t"  (Graham, 1979:24). In t h i s  re sp ec t ,  Bazargan, the leader o f  
I r a n 's  L ibera tion  Movement, acknowledges th a t  " in  s p i t e  o f  the  power of 
the sec u r i ty  fo rce s ,  the  mosques and re l ig io u s  cen te rs  were sanc tuaries  
where we met, ta lk ed ,  prepared, organized, and grew" (1979:20).
Instead  o f opening some o u t le ts  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  expression 
favorable to  h is  regime, the  Shah continued to  "keep the l i d  on"—to  
l iq u id a te  the  preachers and speakers and to  shut down the ac tive  r e l i -  
g lious  c e n te rs .  The e x i le  o r  imprisonment o f  such a c t i v i s t s  as Khomeini, 
Talequani, Montezeri, Zanjani, and Dr. Ali S h a r ia t i  as well as the  shut 
down o f Hussienieh Irshad , a re  among the best examples. To be su re ,  
the  regime would to le r a te  the  re l ig io u s  le ad e rs '  preaching i f  they 
would not make mention of th ree  is sues :  the denouncing o f the  Shah, 
the a t tack s  on I s r a e l ,  and the  cry  th a t  Islam was in danger (Hakeimi, 
135/1979:111). In c id e n ta l ly ,  th e se  th ree  "taboos" were the  very backbone 
around which the preachers could r a l l y  i f  they were to  take a m i l i t a n t  
p o l i t i c a l  tone. These issues  were, in f a c t ,  what the  re l ig io u s  leaders  
had to  o f f e r  fo r  the  newly emerging audience. Based on these  and re la te d  
to p ic s ,  they were able to  p o l i t i c i z e  the  fo llowers and to  give meaning 
to  t h e i r  own re l ig io u s  opera tion . This was a s tru g g le  o f  survival in 
the sense o f  s ta tu s  maintenance and meaningfulness on behalf o f  the 
c l e r i c s .  I t  was in t h i s  re sp ec t  th a t  they could make sense o f  them­
selves as r e l ig io u s  d ig n i ta r ie s  and the  re l ig io n  of Islam as w ell.
The regime fa i le d  to  understand the  " la te n t  function" o f  i t s  
own counter measures. I t  a lso  f a i le d  to  understand th a t  the new groups 
re c ru i te d  to  the  re l ig io u s  cen te rs  and p a r t ic ip a t in g  in c e r ta in  r e l i ­
gious r i t u a l s  had more p o l i t i c a l  values in t h e i r  heads than s t r i c t
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re l ig io u s  a t t i tu d e s .  Hence, by suppressing the re l ig io u s  community and 
sh u ttin g  down some re l ig io u s  p laces ,  the regime both angered and un ified  
d i f f e r e n t  socia l  s t r a t a  with d i f f e r e n t  age s t ru c tu re s  and even opposing 
ideo log ies .  In add ition , through i t s  suppressive measures, the regime 
staged the marriage between those who were in te re s te d  in and exposed 
to  modernity based on p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r ty ,  and those who were t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  
with a d e s ire  fo r  a f ree  p o l i t i c a l  expression and not necessarily  
p ra c t ic a l  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  the  p o l i t ic a l  process. However, as Leeden 
and Lewis no te , the regime ". . . f a i le d  to  comprehend the o rganizational 
c a p a b i l i t i e s  and crisis-management s k i l l s  o f  the leaders  o f  the S h i i te  
re l ig io u s  community, and did not recognize th a t  the  mullahs were 
capable o f  d is t r ib u t in g  p o l i t i c a l  t r a c t s  and organizing s treen  ac tions"  
(1980:12). This c ap a b i l i ty  would be b e t te r  recognized i f  one understood 
th a t  the re l ig io u s  leaders  were favored by a network of some 180,000 
c l e r i c s  opera ting  in about 80,000 mosques a l l  around the country (Hovey­
da, 1979:44; Zabih, 1979:20). In add ition , the  functioning o f "Hayats" 
( i . e . ,  r e l ig io u s  r i t u a l i s t  groups mostly id e n t i f ie d  with t h e i r  place of 
b i r th  and /or a member of the  House o f  the Prophet) , must a lso  be con­
sidered  in  th i s  process.
Thus, in many cases the  re l ig io u s  leaders  and preachers came 
not only to  rep resen t t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  followers but also to  symbolize 
c e r ta in  groupings of the p o l i t i c a l  d is s id e n ts .  On the  o ther hand, in 
such a s i tu a t io n ,  the re l ig io u s  community saw i t s e l f  as a c tu a lly  power­
ful but le g i t im a te ly  powerless. Such f r u s t r a t in g  circumstances did 
not cause the  ambitious to  d e sp a ir .  On the co n tra ry ,  f ru s t r a t io n  s e t  
the  r e l ig io u s  stratum in motion and helped i t  to  develop some leg it im iz in g
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measures fo r  confronting the regime. F ischer observes th a t
All o f  these  issues provided th e  c lergy  with a recep­
t i v e  audience and f e r t i l e  moral pla tform s. Their own material 
i n t e r e s t s —the  system atic  removal from t h e i r  control o f  educa­
t i o n ,  adm in is tra tion  o f  j u s t i c e ,  notary  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty ,  adminis­
t r a t io n  of re l ig io u s  endowment—were le s s  important than th e i r  
ro le  as spokesmen fo r  the in te r e s t s  of more important sec to rs  
o f  so c ie ty ,  and than th e i r  a r t i c u la t io n  o f  the  general p ro te s t  
ag a in s t  the s e c re t  police  tyranny and massive corruption (1980:
191-2).
In ad d i t io n ,  id eo lo g ica lly  speaking, the  S h ii te  Muslims have 
the  b e l i e f  th a t  "Al-Molk wa Addin Twoamam" ( i . e . ,  s ta te  and re l ig io n  
are  tw ins) .  Hence, in the process o f  opposing the  regime, such a 
b e l i e f  both inflamed and ju s t i f i e d  the co n fron ta tion . To sp ec ify ,  such 
an ideological value i s  rooted in the  S h i i te  d e f in i t io n  and recognition 
o f  "Imamat" ( i . e . ,  the  succession o f the  Prophet; the s p i r i tu a l  leade r­
ship o f  the Muslim community). Shiism holds th a t  the Prophet Mohammad, 
as he had openly announced, was succeeded by his immediate k in , the 
Twelve Imams, the  f i r s t  o f  which was Imam A li ,  Mohammad's cousin and 
son-in-law . The l a s t  Imam, the Hidden Imam who went in to  occu lta tion  
in 940 A.D., i s  the  Muslims' Messiah who w ill  reappear before the 
Resurrection Day to  e s ta b l i s h  the  leg it im a te  ru le  (Keddie:1980).
In t h i s  theo log ical scheme, the i n s t i t u t i o n  o f Imamat functions 
in terms of socia l in te g ra t io n  and socia l contro l on the basis  o f  the 
Quranic ru les  and the  " t ra d i t io n "  of the  Prophet as i t  has been "reported ."  
Therefore, Imamat w ill spread ju s t i c e  and sweep o f f  the seed o f corrup­
t io n  from the e a r th .  However, un ti l  the  Advent o f  the Hidden Imam, 
the most q u a li f ie d  re l ig io u s  leaders ( i . e . ,  the  Mojtahids, the  Aya­
to l la h s )  should ru le  or supervise the  Islam ic community, the Umma, as 
su rroga tes .
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In te re s t in g ly ,  in connection with such a b e l ie f  system, a l l  
the S h i i t e ' s  Imams, except the Hidden Imam, were m artyrized, e i th e r  
a ssass in a ted  or poisoned to  death , by th e i r  non-Shiite  r iv a l s :  the  
Sunni Muslims (Pooya, 1972:179-181). Hence, the  concept o f  "Red Shiism," 
o f  which the S h ii te s  are  proud. More in te r e s t in g ly ,  the S h i i te  clergy 
consis ted  o f two groups: the group th a t  claims i t s  decendancy from the
Prophet and his House, the Sayyids with black tu rbans , and the o th e r ,  with 
white tu rbans , who do no t.  H is to r ic a l ly ,  the Sayyids' re l ig io u s  commit­
ment and th e i r  claimed ances tra l  attachment to  th e  Prophet toge ther have 
in te n s i f ie d  and j u s t i f i e d  t h e i r  involvement in p o l i t i c s .  B ill (1972:28) 
observes th a t  "The members o f th is  family have often  had a charism atic  
power and thus almost a l l  o f  the v io len t p o l i t i c a l  movements th a t  have 
a risen  in Islamic areas have occurred in the name and under the le ad e r­
ship o f  a person claiming d i r e c t  descent from the  Prophet."
I t  may be il lum ina ting  to  note th a t  u n t i l  re cen tly .  Shiism, 
as a school of thought, was not recognized by the Sunni Theology. This 
theology i s  id e n t i f ie d  with the  Hanafi, Hanbali, Maleki, and Shafiay 
schools o f  thought and holds th a t  the succession o f  the Prophet was 
(and should be) s e t t l e d  by the  "Ijmaa" ( i . e . ,  consensus) of the fo llow ers. 
According to  Shiism, the founders of the Sunni schools were students 
under Imam Jaa fa r  Al-Sadigh, the Shia 's  s ix  Imam, and hence th e i r  doctrines 
are  secondary or p a r t ia l  to  h is  thought. "In 1929 the head o f Egypt's 
A1 Azhar University , the main [Shafiay] Sunni re l ig io u s  estab lishm ent, 
pronounced a Sunni-Shia concordat, declaring th a t  Shiism was a leg it im a te  
version o f  Islam" (The Economist, 1982:47). This recognition was a lso 
endorsed in the ea r ly  1960's by Shiekh Mahmoud S h a l to o t , th e  Chief o f
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Al-Azhar a t  the time. However, the issue  o f  the succession o f  the  Pro­
phet remains as the fundamental theological d iffe rence  between the  two 
Islamic t r a d i t io n s .
The rad ical r e l ig io u s  leaders led by Ayatollah Khomeini and 
Ayatollah Taleqani saw p o lo tica l  power as the  log ica l and e s s e n t ia l  
extension o f  the Islamic t r a d i t io n .  Moderates led by Ayatollah S h a r ia t-  
Madari j u s t  wanted " c le a r  and honest p o l i t i c a l  leaders" (1978:136). 
N either achieved anything under the Shah's regime. Worse, the  Shah 
assigned to  some o f the Bahais, members o f  a h e re t ic a l  s e c t ,  highly 
ranked positions  which added in s u l t  to  the  in ju ry .  Further, ignoring 
the re l ig io u s  grievances, moderate or o therw ise , he r id ic u le d  the 
r e l ig io u s  community and labeled  the c lergy  as "black re a c t io n a r ie s "  
who "made unholy a l l ia n c e "  with the "red fo rces"  (Pahlavi, 1980:145-174). 
Among o the r  th in g s ,  he disregarded the  f a c t  t h a t ,  as the o f f i c i a l  
Iran ian  textbooks read, the  1906 C onstitu tiona l Revolution was b a s ic a l ly  
managed under the leadersh ip  of two in f lu e n t ia l  re l ig io u s  lead e rs :
Sayyad Mohammad Tabatabai and Sayyid Abdollah Behbahani (Browne, 1966).
F in a lly ,  although the  exigencies o f  time e n ta i led  c e r ta in  
a l t e r a t io n s  in the t r a d i t io n a l  social l i f e  in favor of s ec u la r  arrange­
ments, the regime was not able (or did not p re fe r)  to  coordinate 
i t s  p o l ic ie s  in the process. Hence, even on c e r ta in  occasions some 
f r u i t f u l  measures were resented because the  re l ig io u s  leaders  were not 
"consu lted ."  The a u th o r i t ie s  did not pave a t  l e a s t  a psychological 
way fo r  the  accomodation to  and the acceptance of  so c ia l ly  desired  
changes. The Shah, in  f a c t ,  was engulfed in  a c e r ta in  " ro le  c o n f l i c t . "  
On the  one hand, as a le ad e r  of a leading Islamic country, he had the
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d e s i re  to  assume a sense o f  Islamic leadersh ip  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  dominance.
As an in d ica t io n ,  he assumed the guardianship o f  the major holy places 
in  th e  country though t h i s  meant the govermentalization o f  the  re l ig io n  
by h is  c r i t i c s .  Within the  Islamic world, in 1966 with King Faysal o f  
Saudi Arabia, he took the i n i t i a t i v e  in  founding an Islamic Conference. 
However, th i s  was s t e r i l i z e d  by th e i r  r i v a l .  President Nasser, who 
charged th a t  the " in v is ib le  hand" o f the  im p e r ia l is ts  was behind the 
i n i t i a t i v e .
On the o ther hand, as a p ra c t ic a l  secu la r  r u le r ,  the Shah pushed 
h is  country toward secularism  regard less  o f  the  consequences. Once he 
informed h is  m in is te rs :  "I am going to  go f a s t e r  than the l e f t "
(Johnson, 1980:36). In a l l ,  i t  can be argued th a t  p a r t  o f  the Shah's 
f a i l u r e  in dealing with the  re l ig io u s  s tratum  was a t t r ib u te d  to  h is  
s u p e r f ic ia l  guardianship o f  Islam and a t  the  same time his  d ra s t ic  
s e c u la r  conduct and Western a t t i tu d e s  aimed a t  the d es truc tion  of  the 
t r a d i t io n a l  establishm ent in  favor o f  a modern order. Unable to  abandon 
t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  va lues , and dismayed by a sweeping Western l i f e - s t y l e ,  
the  c lergy  found themselves powerless and a l ien a ted  from the regime.
Such an a l ien a tin g  s i tu a t io n  antagonized and mobilized them f o r  ac tion . 
This s i tu a t io n  a lso helped to  a l ly  them with the  educated and i n t e l l e c ­
tu a l  groups, the supposed "forerunners" in the process of modernization.
The I n t e l l e c tu a l s . To b e t te r  understand the id e n t i ty  o f  the 
Iran ian  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  i t  i s  necessary to  s in g le  out t h e i r  occupational 
s ta tu s e s .  The occupations o f  these s t r a t a  in the developing nations 
ty p ic a l ly  are  teaching, journalism , law, medicine, and c iv i l  s e rv ice s .  
S h ils  (1960:331) emphasizes th a t  ". . . th e se  are  the professions in which
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i n t e l l e c tu a l s  are to  be found and which requ ire  e i th e r  in te l le c tu a l  
c e r t i f i c a t io n  or in te l le c tu a l  s k i l l s .  . . Therefore, the i n t e l l e c ­
tu a ls  can be considered as . . a l l  persons with an advanced modern 
education and the in te l le c tu a l  concerns and s k i l l s  o rd in a r i ly  assoc ia ­
ted  with i t "  (S h ils ,  1960:332). In l in e  with th is  d e f in i t io n ,  in th is  
study the Iranian in te l le c tu a l s  are  id e n t i f ie d  as those s t r a t a  o f  socie ty  
which were (1) government employees, in s tru c to rs  and bureaucra ts , (2) 
u n iv e rs i ty  s tuden ts ,  and (3) the free - lan ce  ind iv idua ls  involved in 
p r iv a te  or f ree  en te rp r ise s .  However, in th is  c a teg o r iz a t io n ,  which 
includes both secular and re l ig io u s  persons, some overlapping ex is ted .
For ins tance , many of the Iranian u n iv e rs i ty  s tudents were w h ite -co lla r  
workers, e sp ec ia lly  school te ac h e rs ,  and in c e r ta in  cases, the  i n t e l ­
le c tu a ls  occupied d i f f e r e n t  occupational s ta tu se s  simultaneously—an 
ind ica t io n  of the " d r i f t in g  in t e l l e c t u a l s . "
On the whole, "the g re a te s t  concentration o f  the p ro fess io n a l- 
bureaucra tic  in te l l ig e n ts ia  i s  found in the governmental aparatus. . . . "  
(B i l l ,  1972:62). I t  i s  a lso  in d ica ted  th a t  "Numerically the  Iranian 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  is  one of  the l a r g e s t  in the Middle East" (Zabih, 1979:17). 
At the  p resen t,  those in te l l e c tu a l  indiv iduals  are considered who, because 
of u n sa t is fac to ry  government se rv ices  and/or p o l i t i c a l  id e a l s ,  were in 
c o n f l ic t  with the old regime and the regime constan tly  co n tro lled  and 
c u r ta i le d  t h e i r  activism in the process. They may be labeled as e i th e r  
the "nonelite"  or the " c o u n te re l i te ."  They saw the Shah's e l i t e ,  even 
with comparable q u a l i f ic a t io n s ,  as more p r iv i leg ed , and th is  was under­
stood as a syndrome o f socioeconomic inequali ty .
In te re s t in g ly ,  these  s t r a t a  were, in f a c t ,  involved in a two-
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fo ld  c o n f l ic t  with d i f f e r e n t  d ire c t io n s .  They re jec ted  the ex is t ing  
power s t ru c tu re  but adhered to  modernity and modernization compatible 
with the essence of the  national and cu ltu ra l  values. Hence, they 
shared with the o ther  p o l i t i c a l l y  deprived s t r a t a  common values con­
cerned with the a l ie n a t in g  nature o f  the regime. Simultaneously, they 
had, however in  p r in c ip le ,  one th ing in common with the regime i t s e l f ,  
th a t  i s ,  socioeconomic reforms with the reserva tion  about the magnitude 
and the ensuing foreign dominance.
The Shah's regime f a i le d  to  understand and ex p lo it  these some­
what supportive a t t i tu d e s .  As a r e s u l t ,  the main body o f  the i n t e l l e c ­
tu a ls  were kept out o f  the  p o l i t i c a l  process in terms of both decision 
making and socia l p o l ic ie s .  Moreover, c e r ta in  groups of the i n t e l l i ­
gentsia  a lso  shared some n a t io n a l i s t  values with the  regime, although 
they viewed the regime as e i t h e r  c h au v in is t ic ,  im peria l,  or Westernized. 
The regime again f a i le d  to  explore and o r ie n t  these  favorable n a t io n a l i s t  
a t t i tu d e s .  Such a f a i l u r e ,  in tu rn ,  f a c i l i t a t e d  and ac t iv a ted  the 
the growing a l l ia n c e  among (1) c e r ta in  re lig ious  in te l l e c tu a l s  who 
emphasized Islamic universal ism, (2) l e f t i s t s  who advocated in te rna tiona l 
communism, and (3) the n a t io n a l i s t  in te l l e c tu a l s  who argued th a t  "Iran" 
and the "Iran ians"  were "out there"  even before the dawn of Islam and 
the r is e  of Marxism-Leninism.
To be su re , u n t i l  the l a t e  1950s the label " in te l le c tu a l"  was 
not prevalent in Iranian c i r c l e s .  Instead , the "Tahseel-kardeh" ( i . e . ,  
the educated) was most popular. (This f a c t  can a lso  j u s t i f y  the inc lu ­
sion of a l l  the w h i te -c o l la r  employees under the category o f  the i n t e l ­
l ig e n t s i a . )  From the l a te  1950's ,  the concept "Roushan-fekr" ( i . e . ,
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c lear-or-bright-m inded: the i n t e l l e c tu a l )  came more to  public  a t te n t io n .  
This seemed to  be caused by the  charge from some leading in te l le c tu a l s  
th a t  groups o f  the "educated" were e i th e r  a p o l i t ic a l  o r  had been co­
opted. Thus, only the "motaahid" ( i . e . ,  the committed) i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  
who cared about people and dared to  voice somewhat h is  grievances , came 
to  be appraised as an in te l l e c tu a l  proper. Other i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  who 
chose a lav ish  Western l i f e - s t y l e  and became "Gharb-zedegi" ( i . e . .  
W esternized), were re je c te d  and denied by the s e lf -d e f in e d  "responsible" 
in te l l e c tu a l s .
The well-known Iran ian  w r i te r ,  J a la l  Al-Ahmad (1343/1963) 
most public ized  the phenomenon Gharb-zedegi ( i . e . ,  Westomania) by his 
book of the  same t i t l e .  However, the m ajority of the Iran ian  i n t e l ­
l e c tu a ls ,  who were not co-opted o r  were p o l i t i c a l ,  shared a common 
p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n .  They were a l ien a ted  from the mainstream of the 
p o l i t i c a l  process and p ro h ib i ted  from scholarly  production as they 
desired . B ill  (1972:57-61) recognizes f iv e  c h a r a c te r i s t ic s  o f  th is  
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  which one may th ink  o f as an in d ica tion  of  the noted 
a l ie n a t io n :  (1) re je c t io n  o f  the t r a d i t io n a l  power s t ru c tu re  th a t
dominated so c ie ty ;  (2) the  possession of modern education or a cce ss i­
b i l i t y  to  i t ;  (3) the possession o f t a l e n t  and s k i l l  t h a t  made them 
able to  achieve or seek th a t  kind of education; (4) the exposure 
"outside" ph ilosophies, thoughts , and ideas; (5) the  nonexistence of 
r ig id  re l ig io u s  dogmatism and b lind  worship of h is to ry .  However, 
i t  seems t h a t ,  in c e r ta in  case s ,  the Iranian in t e l l e c t u a l s '  in c l in a ­
t io n  to  modern education was not only encouraged by t h e i r  " ta len t"  and 
" s k i l l , "  but i t  was a lso  f a c i l i t a t e d  by th e i r  f in an c ia l  background.
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Members o f the  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  had both "wealth" and "property" which 
enabled t h e i r  t a le n t s  and s k i l l s  to  f lo u r ish .  Elsewhere i t  w ill  be 
argued th a t  layers  o f  the  Shah's opposition , a t  the leadersh ip  le v e l ,  
did not r a is e  t h e i r  heads fo r  economic rewards but fo r  p o l i t i c a l  power.
From Zonis' (1971) The P o l i t i c a l  E l i te  o f  I r a n , one can a lso  
r e a l iz e  the a l ie n a t io n  o f  the c o u n te r -e l i te .  He observes th a t
Inasmuch as the  s t ru c tu re  of the e l i t e  i s  predicated  
on the  notion o f  in c lu s iv i ty ,  opposition to  the e l i t e  is  equated, 
by the  regime, with opposition to  the regime i t s e l f .  And the  
regime, to  the  p re sen t ,  has refused  to  to le r a te  persons who, 
by i t s  own d e f in i t io n ,  a re  in opposition to  i t .  The r e s u l t  
is  th a t  the a c t iv e  unassim ila ted  o r  unassim ilable are  subjected 
to  continued p ressure  from the  regime (1971:39).
Such a "continued p ressu re ,"  which f in a l ly  exploded, can be 
b e t te r  p ic tu red  i f  i t  i s  approached by examining the  individual layers 
of the continuum o f  the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a .
Government Employees. This stra tum , t r a d i t i o n a l ly ,  had been 
one of  the most p re s t ig io u s  layers  in the Iran ian  so c ie ty .  Generally, 
i t  was id e n t i f ie d  as the  governing c la s s ,  regard less  o f  the  in te rn a l  
d is t r ib u t io n  o f  a u th o r i ty  and the  possession o f power and wealth . The 
Iranian parents more than hoped to  ge t th e i r  ch ild ren  employed in the 
government apparatus . There, they would achieve some s o r t  o f  s ta t e  
power, socia l p r e s t ig e ,  and economic rewards m a te r ia l ized  in the 
p resent sa la ry  and the fu tu re  pension. Roughly, u n t i l  the 195G's, the 
major occupational s ec to r  was the public  sec to r .  Up to  th i s  time, 
I r a n 's  development took place b a s ic a l ly  in the  areas o f education and 
adm in is tra tion  (Banani, 1961). Education was a t  the  serv ice  o f  govern­
ment through which i t  was able to  n u rtu re , m ain tain , and develop i t s  
adm in is tra tive  arrangements.
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In f e u d a l i s t - c a p i t a l i s t  Iran , the government was not only the 
unique source of power but a lso  the major in v es to r ,  employer, and 
entrepreneur. The governmental ro le  in the economy was a c tu a l ly  based 
on a to ta l  c o n tro l ,  not la is se z  f a i r e .  This, however, has been a pecu­
l i a r i t y  of many underdeveloped and developing nations wherein the p riva te  
sec to r  has been in  th e  process of development and has r e l ie d  more on 
government c re d i ts  than on i t s  own i n i t i a t i v e s .  From the  l a te  1950's, 
due to  (1) population in c rease ,  (2) the gradual dissemination o f college 
education, (3) the general urbanization tren d s ,  and (4) the tw il ig h t  o f  
in d u s t r ia l i z a t io n ,  many c e r t i f i e d  youths sought jobs b a s ic a l ly  in the 
governmental agencies. Since the  p r iv a te  s ec to r  was in  the  primary 
stage of i t s  development, the government was pushed to  employ the 
maximum of the ap p lic an ts ,  including the untra ined and the i l l i t e r a t e .  
According to  the Iranian  o f f i c i a l  s t a t i s t i c s ,  from 1969 on the popula­
t ion  of  the governmental employees increased rap id ly .  In 1977 th is  
increase was 102 percent r e la t iv e  to  the year 1975.
This, o f  course, caused under-employment and mal-employment. 
Because of th is  f a c t  and many o thers  discussed e a r l i e r ,  government 
s a la r ie s  and wages, though increasing  co n stan tly ,  f a i l e d  to  meet the 
r is in g  costs  o f  l iv in g .  The consumer p rice  index, according to  the 
s ta t e  bank. Bank Mardezi (Central) of Iran , rose from 0.2 percent in 
1965 ( r e la t iv e  to  year 1964) to  25.2 percent in  1977. The c r i t e r i a  
based on which one could get promoted were educational a tta inm ent, 
occupational c a re e r ,  and " r e la t io n s ."  However, the overemphasis on 
college c e r t i f i c a t e s  in  the  employment process a ffec ted  the qua lity  
of education d ec is iv e ly  fo r  what mattered was simply college  "sheep
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skin" and not the  academic values. Hence, the Iranian im plication of 
"madrek-Garai" ( i . e . ,  the lav ish  tendency toward d ip lom atic iza tion ) 
p revailed . In d ica t iv e  o f  th is  was a lso  widespread favorit ism  and the 
marketing o f  grades and diplomas, a t  l e a s t  in the p r iv a te  co lleges .
Rumors even c irc u la ted  and p r in ted  in the  press about some 
Iranians who obtained college degrees from some European schools i l l e ­
g a lly . Hence, the  metaphor "Doctor-hya Qaleechei va P i s ta i "  ( i . e . ,  
doctors who were given doctorates by means o f Persian ca rpe t and 
p is tach io  as b r ib e s ) .  However, with the  passage of  time, the  govern­
ment employees came to  re a l iz e  th a t  even with t h e i r  co llege  diplomas 
in hand, they were not able to  keep up with the e sca la t in g  expenditures 
and the booming in f l a t io n .  These s a la r ie d  groups suffe red  in th is  
s i tu a t io n  (F ischer,  1980:190).
In a d d it io n ,  because o f  declin ing  s ign if icance  o f  college 
diplomas as the major determinant o f  economic ga ins, the  t r a d i t io n a l  
c e r t i f ic a te -b a s e d  socia l  p res tige  and self-esteem  began to  decline.
This decline was su re ly  caused by "diploma in f l a t io n ,"  e sp ec ia l ly  in 
the less  demanded academic f ie ld s .  I t  was a lso caused by the  i n e f f i ­
ciency of occupational performance as well as job p roduc tiv ity  r e la t iv e  
to  educational a tta inm ent. To be su re ,  the  root cause of th i s  problem 
must be traced  to  the government's inadequate educational planning in 
re la t io n  to  the  labor market. I r a n 's  educational system was operating 
i r r e sp e c t iv e  o f  the demand of the  occupational s e c to rs ,  both p riva te  
and public . Further , many college graduates worked in f i e ld s  th a t  
were unre la ted  to  t h e i r  major su b jec ts .  The fu l l - t im e  operation of 
some physicians and v e te r in a r ian s  in such occupations as accounting and
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business are examples.
Nevertheless, in terms of educational achievement, only 
"doctors,"  and "engineers ,"  p referab ly  educated abroad, were in demand 
and hence ranked highly. In te re s t in g ly ,  the  bureaucra tic  d is t in c t io n  
and the  public  a t t r a c t io n  o f  the highly educated ind iv idua ls  was such 
th a t  the government in the ea r ly  1970's p roh ib ited  the formal use of 
such t i t l e s  as "Doctor" and "Engineer" in s t a t e  correspondence. This 
s tep  was taken to  somewhat normalize the e sc a la t in g  in c l in a t io n  toward 
diplom atization. However, the m ajority  o f  the  Iranian government 
employees found themselves caught in a s i tu a t io n  in which t h e i r  s a la r ie s  
were inadequate and t h e i r  corresponding soc ia l  s ta tu se s  were not r e ­
warding. Such a dilemma was fu r th e r  complicated by the regime's counter­
measures and the constan t pressure on the a lready  a ffec ted  s t r a t a .
In th i s  p rocess ,  the Karmandan ( i . e . ,  the w h ite -c o l la r  workers), 
became able to  r e la te  t h e i r  occupational claims to  p o l i t i c a l  id e a ls .
They developed a consciousness o f  kind based on a common and worsening 
s i tu a t io n .  Beginning from the ea r ly  1970 's, the regime c reated  the 
so -ca lled  "Security Division" in each bureaucra tic  organization  to  carry 
out "confiden tia l a f f a i r s "  and to  check on the  Karmandan d i r e c t ly .
Such a task was ca r r ie d  out by the  SAVAK from outside government o ff ices  
and eventually  the " ins ide"  presence of the SAVAK agents was sensed.
By doing so , the regime in f a c t  antagonized and a lien a ted  d i f f e r e n t  
layers o f  i t s  own appara tus , who i f  s a t i s f i e d ,  a t  l e a s t  economically, 
could have helped the ongoing of the system. Worse, the regime, in one 
way or another, required  the  sa la r ie d  s t r a t a  to  c e le b ra te ,  advocate, 
and demonstrate the P ah lav i 's  self-procla im ed achievements, year round.
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This, in f a c t ,  was the  " r i t e  o f  passage" in the Shah's bureaucra tic  
o rgan izations .
Alfred Sauvey, the contemporary French soc ia l  s c i e n t i s t ,  once 
sa id  the w h ile -c o l la r  government employees have the  upper-c lasses ' 
d e s i r e s ,  wishes, and t a s t e s ,  and the  low er-c lasses ' bread and b u t te r  
problems. The Iranian government employees found themselves in such a 
f r u s t r a t in g  s i tu a t io n .  Due to  t h e i r  educational a tta inm ent, occupational 
c a ree r ,  and world view, they developed new values concerning modernity, 
l i f e - s t y l e s ,  economic p ro sp e r i ty ,  and p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r ty .  At the same 
tim e, because o f  the regime's p o l i t i c a l  suppression and inadequate 
occupational rewards, they were unable to  r e a l iz e  those id ea ls .  Al­
though the  government, during the very episodes o f  the revolu tionary  
upheaval, made some concessions, such a sa la ry  inc rease  ( e .g . ,  F ischer ,
1980; H alliday , 1978d), th is  was too l i t t l e  too l a t e  to  d iffu se  the  
accumulating s t r a in  th a t  i t  had already created .
S tuden ts . "No considera tion  o f  the in te l le c tu a l  c lass  in 
underdeveloped countries  can d is regard  the u n iv e rs i ty  students" (S h i ls ,  
1960:337), and the  Iranian  u n iv e rs i ty  s tudents a re  no exception. However, 
a higher education system in i t s  modern sense is  not a very h is to r ic a l  
and widespread phenomenon in Iran . The f i r s t  Iran ian  co llege . Par Al- 
Funoon ( i . e . ,  po ly technic) , was e s tab lish ed  in 1849. I t  operated a s , roughly 
the  only higher educational i n s t i t u t i o n  un ti l  the  c rea tion  o f the 
U niversity  o f  Tehran, the coun try 's  f i r s t ,  in 1934. The f i r s t  group 
o f Iranian high school graduates were sent by the  government to  Europe 
(1928) to  pursue a higher education and to  function f in a l ly  as the  core 
facu lty  o f  I r a n 's  f i r s t  u n iv e rs i ty .
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Following the afterm ath o f  WWII, the Iranian students became 
more involved in  p o l i t i c s  than ever before . At the time, the  p o l i t i c a l  
s i tu a t io n  o f  I ran ,  as discussed p rev ious ly , motivated them to  p a r t i c i ­
pate  in the issues o f  the day. Although i t  is  argued th a t  "Student 
movements a re  born o f vague, undefined emotions which seek fo r  some 
is su e ,  some cause, to  which to  a t ta ch  themselves" (Feuer, 1969 :5 3 ) ,  
the Iran ian  s tu d en ts ' activism  ag a in s t  the  regime stemmed from id e n t i ­
f i a b le  o b jec t iv e s .  Until the e a r ly  1960 's , they had p rim arily  p o l i t i c a l  
values concerned with p o l i t i c a l  freedom and national independence.
Later more m ateria l causes emerged. Because o f  (1) population in c rease ,  
(2) gradual migration to  the  c i t i e s  and u rban iza tion , (3) the  expansion 
of high school education, and (4) the c ru c ia l  s ign ificance  o f  a college 
education in  the  process of employment, an increasing desire  fo r  higher 
education followed. This in te n s i f i e d  d e s ire  was not s a t i s f i e d  s u f f i ­
c ie n t ly  and adequately, fo r  the enrollment capacity  o f  the higher 
educational system was l im ited . Along with the l a t e r  expansion o f 
t h i s  c ap ac ity ,  the  regime a lso  app lied  the  "entrance examination," 
b e t t e r  known in Iran by i t s  French eq u iv a len t ,  th a t  i s  "Concours."
Based on t h i s  s e le c t iv e  examination, the  most academically q u a l i f ie d  
in d iv id u a ls  were admitted to  co lleges  and u n iv e r s i t ie s .
Since the q u a li ty  o f  the p re -co llege  education was not comparable 
in d i f f e r e n t  high schools and s ince  the  actual length of the academic 
y ea r  fo r  c l im a tic  reasons was not c o n s is te n t  nationwide, the p a r t i c i ­
pants did not enjoy an equal opportun ity  fo r  competition. This handicap 
as well as the l im ited  enrollment f r u s t r a te d  the prospective s tudents  
and led to  the development o f  an ti-reg im e a t t i tu d e s .  (Such a t t i t u d e s ,
174
however, in te ra c ted  with the  a lready  ex is t ing  p o l i t i c a l  d iffe rences  and 
l a t e r  were shaped id e o lo g ic a l ly ) .  According to  the M inistry o f  Sciences 
and Higher Education (MSHE) o f Iran (1335/1976:10-15), in 1963, out of 
13,600 candidates only 2,000 (14.7 percent) were accepted to  higher 
education in s t i tu t io n s .  In the following years the number of app lican ts  
rose constan tly  to  reach about 295,952 in 1976. However, in t h i s  year 
only 25 percent of the  s tudents  were admitted in a l l  the coun try 's  
colleges and u n iv e r s i t ie s .
The m ajority  o f  the  admitted students had to  pursue t h e i r  
s tud ies  even in t h e i r  l a s t ,  namely te n th ,  choice o f  preference . Other­
wise, they would f a i l  to  e n te r  the  higher educational system. In 1976,
81 percent o f  the app lican ts  were eager to  pursue t h e i r  s tud ie s  even 
to  the po in t o f  t h e i r  ten th  and l a s t  choice of majors. However, even 
in such a choice the demand was 7.4  times higher than the demand (MSHE, 
1335/1976:8). In ad d it io n ,  in t h i s  same year ,  there  were 21 u n iv e rs i t ie s  
and 209 two-year and four-year colleges with 400 majors and some 150,000 
students in the country. In 1946 the higher educational in s t i tu t io n s  
numbered but f iv e .  But such a tremendous increase had two major flaws. 
F i r s t ,  i t  f a i le d  to  embrace a l l  o r  the m ajority  of those who somehow 
desired a higher education. The process l e f t  a yearly  increasing 
"reserve army " of almost 4/5 o f  the  to ta l  candidates. The MSHE (1335/ 
1976:10-15) a lso  predic ted  t h a t ,  given both the cu rren t trends o f  supply 
and demand, such a reserve army would amount to  1,327,952 persons in 
1981-2. For such a huge group, mostly under 25, occupational t ra in in g  
was not a v a ilab le  to  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e i r  employment and s ig n i f ic a n t  jobs 
were not provided.
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Second, th is  expansion in the higher educational system, though 
i t  was not all-encompassing, took place a t  th e  co s t  of the q u a l i ty  of 
education (H alliday, 1979a:218). As an in d ica tion  of t h i s ,  in 1976, 
according to  MSHE (1355/1976:86-91), the 73 s tuden ts  who took the 
entrance examination fo r  the master degree in the Faculty o f  Cartogra­
phy f a i l e d  to  obtain  a minimum average of 50 percent o f  the grade in  each 
su b jec t—mathematics, physics, and foreign language. In te re s t in g ly ,  
according to  the same rep o r t ,  the  p a r t ic ip a t in g  students represented , 
in  t h e i r  undergraduate career I r a n 's  seven leading u n iv e rs i t ie s  and th ree  
c o lleges . The t e s t s  were evaluated by an im partia l group o f experts 
and judged to  be f a i r  and standardized. Such a f a i lu r e  in i t s e l f  can 
be considered as a symptom of the on-going nepotism and embezzelment 
in a t  l e a s t  p r iva te  schools as mentioned previously . The overall 
inadequacy and in e ff ic ien cy  of the  Iranian higher education system, 
among o ther fa c ts  perta in ing  to  economic growth, led many, even those 
o f  lower-middle c la ss  fa m ilie s ,  to  send th e i r  ch ild ren  abroad. In 
1978, the re  were 100,000 Iranians studying in o ther coun tr ie s ,  about 
40,000 of whom were in the United S ta te s ,  "because there  is  no room 
fo r  them a t  th e i r  own u n iv e r s i t ie s .  . ." (Time, 1978:36).
This s i tu a t io n - - th a t  i s ,  the imbalance between supply and 
demand as well as the low q u a li ty  o f  the h igher education—antagonized 
the s tuden ts  and encouraged them to  jo in  t h e i r  a lready antagonized 
and p o l i t i c iz e d  comrades. These tendencies and exposure to  p o l i t i c s  
can be b e t t e r  seen in a processual framework. In S c o t t 's  words, " th is  
p ro c l iv i ty  fo r  p o l i t i c s  is  passed from one s tuden t generation to  another 
by a sp ec ia l iz ed  student sub-culture"  (1969:410). The lack o f p o l i t i c a l
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as well as academic freedom on campuses fu r th e r  encouraged the s tudents  
to  communicate with the subterranean t r a d i t io n a l  opposition and to  be 
o r ien ted  by i t .
Throughout the 1970s, there  had always been d is rup tion  in the 
h igher educational system caused by both s tu d en ts '  unres t and a r r e s t .  
Such t a c t i c s  as s i t - i n s ,  s t r i k e s ,  boycotts o f  examinations, and campus 
demonstrations ". . .were the only means o f  expression since s tuden t 
magazines were censored, normal p o l i t i c a l  meetings were government 
i n f i l t r a t e d ,  and there  was no forum outside the  u n ivers ity "  (Graham, 
1979:214). S urp ris ing ly , the regime even planted pine t re e s  along the 
south s ide  of the main campus of the U niversity  o f  Tehran, dominating 
a main s t r e e t .  This was done to  obscure the  s tuden t d is tu rbances , and 
to  block any in te ra c t io n  between the demonstrators and passers-by . In 
f a c t ,  as Graham observes, "Education was a t  the  se rv ice  of the regime. 
This meant th a t  s tudents  were constan tly  spied upon by SAVAK, courses 
doctored, and con trovers ia l le c tu re s  dismissed" (1979:214).
As an example of such a co n tro l ,  the regime even attempted 
to  invade s tuden ts ' privacy and v io la te  t h e i r  ind iv idual r ig h ts  and 
personal l i f e - s t y l e s .  Very o f te n ,  SAVAK agents sneaked in to  the 
dorm itories in search o f  rad ica l  l i t e r a t u r e .  Moreover, the regime 
managed to  prevent the co-eds from wearing "veil"  and "chador."
The two toge ther may be congruent with the Islamic "hijab" ( i . e . ,  
modesty) though chador i s  a t r a d i t io n a l  Iranian c lo th ing  and not 
n ece ssa r i ly  r e l ig io u s ,  even in the Islamic Iran . The usage of  both 
was paradoxica lly  increased in the 1970's. This can be explained as 
both a reaction  to the regime which has already o f f i c i a l l y  imposed the
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unveiling in 1935 and the increas ing  rep resen ta tion  o f  the  lower and 
t r a d i t io n a l  s t r a t a  in u n iv e r s i t ie s  and co lleges . Such s t r a t a ,  roughly 
speaking, u n t i l  the mid-1960s were f a r  from the mainstream o f  higher 
educational a tta inm ent. I d e n t i f i c a t io n  with u n iv e rs i ty  education was 
b a s ic a l ly  confined to and c h a r a c te r i s t i c  of the middle and upper c la s s e s .
According to  the MSHE (1335/1976:81-82), the  tendency toward 
modesty was not caused simply by r e l i g io - p o l i t i c a l  f a c to r s  but a lso by 
economic fa c to r s .  S p e c i f ic a l ly ,  s ince  the lower c la s s  females were not 
able to  compete with t h e i r  s t y l i s h  and " in-fashion" c o u n te rp a r ts ,  they 
re so r te d  to  the t r a d i t i o n a l ,  inexpensive and humble c lo th in g .  I n te r e s t ­
ing ly , a study conducted in  Egypt in 1981 concerning a s im i la r  case 
a rr iv ed  a t  the  same conclusions (Abdullah and Mostafa, 1981:13).
However, the  MSHE suggested, though c o n f id e n t ia l ly ,  several 
p rac t ice s  to  the a u th o r i t ie s  so th a t  the use of "h ijah"  was e i th e r  
discouraged or pass ive ly  r e s i s t e d  by the  regime. The appearances of 
females with "modern" modesty on campuses, TV networks, in  newspapers 
and magazines as well as a t  work were examples of the  passive re s is ta n c e .  
Among the  ten advocated "so lu tions"  to  discouraging the t r a d i t io n a l  
dress were the compulsory unveiling  a t  the u n iv e rs i ty  ga tes  and the 
unacceptance of the outmoded v e iled  females in c la s s e s ,  a t  examination 
ses s io n s ,  and in employment in terv iew s. In th is  re sp e c t ,  Fischer 
rep o r ts  th a t :
In 1977, women who attempted to  r e g i s t e r  fo r  c lasses
a t  the  University  o f  Tehran wearing a chador were refused ; the
issue  o f  the r ig h t  o f  h ijah  (modesty) became rek ind led , with 
many women who otherwise would not wear chadors, tu rn ing  
up in them. The r ig h t  to  choose was a t  is su e ,  so during 
1978 the chador a t  u n iv e r s i t i e s  became a symbol o f  p ro te s t  
ag a in s t  d ic ta to rsh ip  in genera l.  Women a t  the U nivers ity  of 
Isfahan were even reported  to  put the chador on to  demonstrate
a t  the U niversity  but to  take  i t  o f f  when going out onto the
s t r e e t s  to  champion women's l ib e ra t io n  (1980:186).
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However, the  t r a d i t io n a l  low er-class  s tu d en ts ,  fo r  re l ig io u s  
or t r a d i t io n a l  motives, were eager to  maintain th e i r  own way o f l i f e .
To many o f  them Tehran campuses appeared s trange  and a l ie n a t in g .  
According to  the MSHE (13355/1976:1-9), in 1976, 45 percent o f  a l l  
the coun try 's  230 higher educational i n s t i tu t io n s  were operating in 
Tehran, but the cap i ta l  comprised only 12.4 percent of I r a n 's  to ta l  
population. In l i g h t  o f  the  overall geographic d is t r ib u t io n  o f  colleges 
and u n iv e r s i t i e s ,  two fa c ts  might be emphasized. F i r s t  was the  accumu­
la t io n  o f  youths fo r  educational (and occupational) purpose in lim ited  
urban cen te rs  and the c a p i ta l  in p a r t i c u la r .  This concen tra tion , a t  
l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y ,  caused some housing, t ra n sp o r ta t io n ,  and s ex - re la ted  
d i f f i c u l t i e s .  Next, in t h i s  s i tu a t io n ,  many youths were a lso  confronted 
by a new way of l i f e  fo r  which they were not prepared f in a n c ia l ly  
and psychologically . Such a mode of l iv in g  was based on u rban iza tion - 
modernization measures which were d i f f e r e n t  from, i f  not con trad ic to ry  
to ,  the  t r a d i t io n a l  s tandards of the a ffec ted  youths. Thus, fo r  
groups of s tuden ts ,  the  problem was f i r s t  adapta tion  to  the environment 
and not nece ssa r i ly  involvement in p o l i t i c s .
The textbooks in Iran were censored, and the in s t ru c to r s  were 
e i th e r  a p o l i t i c a l ,  in d o c tr in a ted ,  or harrassed by the SAVAK. P o l i t ic a l  
m a te r ia ls ,  even in the p o l i t i c a l  science courses , did not touch upon 
domestic issues but only the  conservative foreign examples. Further, 
soc ia l m atters d iscussed  in  social science courses revolved generally  
around h is to r ic a l  cases and antecedents. These p o lic ie s  a l l  were 
implemented to  keep s tuden ts  iso la ted  from cu rren t rad ica l socia l 
thoughts , ph ilosophies, and ideo log ies . In h is  "informal" bu t govern-
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ment supervised "Observations About Higher Education in I ran ,"  M il le t t  
(1976:7) reported to  the then Minister o f  Sciences and Higher Education 
o f  Iran th a t
One common c i r t ic i s m  of u n iv e rs i ty  performance was 
voiced in p r iv a te  conversation. I t  was sa id  th a t  the re  were 
a good many d i s s a t i s f i e d  students w ithin  the u n iv e r s i t ie s .
This d i s s a t i s fa c t io n  a r i s e s ,  so i t  was s a id ,  from the  f a i lu re  
o f  fa cu lty  members to  give adequate a t te n t io n  to  t h e i r  sub­
j e c t  m atte r , and to  provide poor in s t ru c t io n  to  s tuden ts .
For students  in such a developing country as Iran who, l ik e  
a l l  o ther  students in  comparable nations consider themsleves "as p a r t  
o f  the in te l le c tu a l  c la ss"  (S h ils ,  1969:337), th is  s i tu a t io n  was surely 
a l ie n a t in g .  Such an a l ien a tio n  can be traced  to  the Shah's 13-years 
incumbent Prime M inister Amir Abbas Hoveyda, who once sa id  "The Iranian 
s tuden t must be courageous and w ill ing  to  s a c r i f i c e .  He should and can 
form s tudent unions and organ izations. He should no t, however, build 
these  in to  anything p o l i t i c a l .  This i s  not h is  business" ( B i l l ,  1972:88) 
(emphasis added).
In f a c t ,  what the  Iranian students  were able to  "form" were 
Student L ibraries  on campuses. These l i b r a r i e s ,  id e n t i f ie d  with Islamic 
and Communist s tu d en ts ,  contained some a lleged  " ideological"  m ateria ls  
none o f which was "hot" even by the regim e's  standards. On the part 
of the regime, these l i b r a r i e s  had a twofold function. They were 
ex p lo i ted ,  e labora ted , and emphasized by the  a u th o r i t ie s  as a mani­
fe s ta t io n  o f  the regime's academic freedom and p o l i t i c a l  to le rance .
They a lso  functioned as a granted means through which the  opposition 
network could be checked and detected, and through which the  most 
a c t i v i s t  students could be id e n t i f ie d  and trapped. On the  p a r t  of the
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s tu d en ts ,  the  l i b r a r i e s  symbolized a sense o f  s tuden t id e n t i ty  and a 
desired  independence from the  government-controlled educational process.
Ideo lo g ica l ly ,  i t  i s  observed th a t  "Within th is  young b loc , the 
ro le  o f  the  l e f t  fac tion  i s  very prominent, both in actions and in 
slogans" (Shmuelevitz, 1979:35). I f  what i s  meant by "the l e f t "  i s  com­
munist ideo log ies ,  Atkins' (1981-54) contention should a lso  be taken in to  
the considera tion : "The Tudeh. . . lamented the  weakness of Marxism-
Leninism among the s tu d en ts ,  many o f whom were h o s t i le  to  the regime 
but remained bogged down in the  'p e t t y - bourgeoise' ideo lo g ies ."  Real­
i s t i c a l l y ,  i t  was from the  t o t a l i t y  of the Iran ian  students abroad 
and a t  home th a t  a t  l e a s t  two major g u e r r i l l a  groups, the Majahedeen 
and the Fedayeen, emerged to  play a s ig n i f ic a n t  ro le ,  both in symbolic 
and in instrumental terms, in the confron ta tion  with the old regime.
I t  should a lso  be noted th a t  the Iranian s tuden ts  in Europe and in the 
United S ta tes  were f i r s t  id e n t i f ie d  with the  Confederation of Iranian 
Students and l a t e r  a lso  with the Muslim Students A ssociation, and Muslim 
Students Society.
As a r e s u l t  of the regime's e sc a la t in g  pressure  on the s tudent 
community and the  continuing s tudent v io lence, many students were 
dismissed, imprisoned, to r tu re d  or shot to  d ea th , and executed through­
out the  1970's. Nevertheless, "we can observe th a t  in the end of 
1978 and the  beginning o f  1979, the most a c t iv e  fac tion  is  the young 
people, who are very f r u s t r a t e d ,  because they have not b en ef i t ted  from 
the q u a l i ty  of education which they had a n t ic ip a te d .  The Shah did not 
succeed in carrying out a l l  o f  his  educational reforms" (Shmuelevitz, 
1979:35). The Iranian studen ts  abroad were a lso  harrassed. An ind ica t io n
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of t h i s  in tim idation  occurred in the United S ta te s ,  Anderson and Witten 
(1967:7) in d ica te  th a t
The Savak [ s i c ]  agents devote most o f  t h e i r  time, 
apparen tly , to  spying on the s tudents  who oppose the Shah's 
imperial ru le .  Savak informants have i n f i l t r a t e d  s tudents  
groups so completely t h a t  no one knows whom to  t r u s t .  When 
the s tuden ts  demonstrate, Savak agen ts ,  posing as newsmen, 
snap t h e i r  photographs. This is  why most Iranian demonstra­
to rs  wear masks. And th a t  Savak agents hound and harrass  
Iran ians  in the United S ta te s ,  with fu l l  knowledge and some­
times th e  a ss is tan c e  o f  CIA.
According to  Paarlberg (1978:25), "The Shah has admitted th a t  
Iranian in te l l ig e n c e  agents do keep c lose  watch on Iranian students  
activ ism  w ith in  the U.S." Troubled by the  Iran ian  s tu d en ts ' a n t i ­
regime activ ism  abroad, one o f  the Shah's highly-ranked a u th o r i t ie s  once 
sa id  "we have to  accompany each Iranian s tu d en t heading fo r  America 
and Europe with a SAVAK ag en t."  Although the  Shah continued h is  i n t i ­
midation and in a t te n t io n  to  h is  s tu d en ts .  P res iden t Nixon advised him 
th a t  "I envy the  way you deal with your s tu d en ts .  . . Pay no a t te n t io n  
to  our l ib e r a l  g rip ings"  (Hoveyda, 1980:77).
On the  o the r  hand, the Iranian s tuden ts  abroad continued to  
p ub lic ize  th e  regime's suppression, to  s o c ia l i z e  p o l i t i c a l ly  the new­
comers, and to  function as a reference po in t fo r  th e i r  fellow students 
a t  home. In te re s t in g ly ,  owing to the a v a i la b le  academic and p o l i t i c a l  
freedom in the  host c o u n tr ie s ,  the Iranian s tuden ts  abroad were more 
able to  d iscuss p o l i t i c a l  issues  and to  demonstrate the nature  o f  the 
Shah's oppressive ru le  than t h e i r  comrades in s id e  the country.
Instead  o f working out c e r ta in  devices fo r  s tu d en ts '  academic 
d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  and ideo log ical claims, the regime in te n s i f ie d  i t s  
uprooting measures. In re a c t io n ,  the Iranian u n iv e rs i ty  campuses
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became a barricade  from which the  whole estab lishm ent came under a t ta ck .  
The U nivers ity  o f Tehran mostly fueled o ther  campuses nationwide and 
symbolized the  in tens ify ing  p o l i t i c a l  violence ag a in s t  the  regime. In 
1969, Feuer p red ic ted  th a t  "the students o f  the  Tehran U niversity ,
'a  beehive o f  p o l i t i c a l  fe rm en t, '  could, according to  q u a l i f ie d  observers , 
bring down the government a t  any time. . ."  (1969:179). Later i t  became 
eviden t th a t  "in the period of repressed s t a b i l i t y  from 1963 onwards, 
the ra p id ly  expanding s tuden t population was the most ac tive  p o l i t i c a l  
group in Iran" (Graham, 1979:213). Further, i t  was a lso  emphasized 
th a t  "By and large the opposition to  the Shah was believed to  be led 
by s tuden ts  and in t e l l e c t u a l s ,  with add itiona l technocra tic  and re l ig io u s  
components, along with bazaaris  and the usual f r in g e  groups" (Leeden 
and Lewis, 1980:19).
The Professional I n t e l l e c tu a l s . In a sp ec ia lized  sense, one 
may s in g le  out a group from a l l  the Iranian in te l l e c tu a l s  which was more 
involved in scho la r ly  production and symbolic in te l le c tu a l  opposition 
to  the  regime than o ther i n t e l l e c tu a l s .  These indiv iduals  can be seen 
as i n t e l l e c t u a l s  by "p ro fess ion ,"  i r r e sp e c t iv e  o f the scope and the  
e f fe c t iv en e ss  o f  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .  In t h i s  re sp e c t ,  Feuer's  d e f in i t io n  
of  the  in te l le c tu a l  is  suggestive: "The in te l le c tu a l  is  what he reads, 
and in a l l  so c ie t ie s  his world o f  books, with i t s  moral im peratives, has 
seemed more rea l to  him than the  world o f  men" (1969:66). So, he is  "a 
person whose consciousness determines his ex istence"  (Feuer, 1963 :ix ) ,  
and the "crea to r"  o f  "cu ltu re"  in L ip se t 's  (1963:333) terms.
These in te l l e c tu a l s  were a c lu s te r  o f  w r i te r s ,  poe ts ,  a r t i s t s ,  
and in s t ru c to r s .  They were id e n t i f ie d  with t h e i r  poems, a r t i c l e s ,
183
s c r i p t s ,  scen a r io s ,  t r a n s la t io n s ,  poetry n ig h ts ,  open l e t t e r s  and 
"Shah-Namehs" ( i . e . ,  s e c re t  l e t t e r s ) ,  and the publica tion  of some 
pe rio d ica ls  though i r r e g u la r ly ,  a l l  with some anti-regim e f la v o r  which 
often was im p l ic i t .  In f a c t ,  they were more men of th e i r  "pens," "words," 
and " th e a t r ic a l  ro les"  than men of b u l le ts  and guns. Hence, they might 
be defined as the  c rea to rs  of co u n ter-cu ltu re  though in p o l i t i c a l  terms. 
The m ajo rity  o f  these ind iv idua ls  were id e n t i f ie d  with the W rite r 's  
Association of Iran which opera ted , i r r e g u la r ly  and u n o f f ic ia l ly ,  from 
the 1960's.
In terms of t h e i r  in te l le c tu a l  s tandpoin ts  and not n ecessa r i ly  
p o l i t i c a l  id eo lo g ies ,  they might be considered in the fo re f ro n t  within 
the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a .  Their p o l i t i c a l  id eo lo g ies ,  in general,  ranged from 
the sacred to  the  profane, the New Left to  the  c la s s ic  Marxism-Leninism, 
and from soc ia l  democratic to l ib e ra l  and na tiona l tendencies. However, 
in c e r ta in  cases ,  e th n ic i ty  opposed nationalism  and r e l i g io s i t y  stood 
aga ins t  communism in the advocated p o l i t i c a l  id e a ls .  Hence, the  pro­
fessiona l i n t e l l e c tu a l s  were o f  d i f f e r e n t  ca tegories  with various shades 
of opinions. As a r e s u l t ,  they could not in troduce a sp ec if ic  program 
fo r a c tion  a g a in s t  the regime, nor did they produce a concrete "ideal 
type" so c ie ty  t h a t  would rep lace ,  fo r  example, the  Shah's professed 
"Great C iv i l iz a t io n ."  They were more c r i t i c s  o f  the ex is t in g  arrange­
ments than i n i t i a t o r s  o f  a promising estab lishm ent. However, in general 
terms, such id e o lo g is ts ,  n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  le ad e rs ,  and revo lu tionaries  
as Imam A li ,  Imam Hossien, Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky,
Mao Tse-tung, Bertrand R usse ll ,  Jean-Paul S a r t r e ,  Joseph T i t to ,  Jamal 
Abdul Nasser, P a t r i s  Lumumba, Herbert Marcuse, Frantz Fanon, Che
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Guevara, Regis Debray, Fidel Castro, and the l ik e  were t h e i r  reference  
po in ts .
In the meantime, l ik e  the Shah's e l i t e ,  these c o u n te r - e l i te s ,  
in a sense, were r e la t iv e ly  detached from the  masses though fo r  d i f ­
f e re n t  reasons. F i r s t ,  the  regime's constant check and censorship 
a ffec ted  the magnitude o f th e i r  in te l le c tu a l  maneuvering, prevented 
them from addressing issues e x p l i c i t ly ,  and weakened t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to 
lead in f lu e n t ia l ly .  Second, the p o ten tia l  b en e f ic ia r ie s  o f  t h e i r  
i n te l l e c tu a l  products—th a t  i s ,  the masses—were generally  i l l i t e r a t e  
o r  not s u f f ic ie n t ly  educated to  d ig e s t  and comprehend. This caused 
poor in te l le c tu a l  communication between the  men of pens and the rank 
and f i l e .  Consequently, the i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  who by th e i r  own d e f in i t io n  
and in te n t io n ,  were expected to  be a t  the se rv ice  of the many, became 
able to  communicate with but the few—groups o f  un ivers ity  s tu d en ts .
Third, in connection with the l a s t  p o in t ,  in the Iran ian  socie ty  
the  "educated" t r a d i t io n a l ly  were assumed to  be a category of th e  "Az 
Ma Behtiran" ( i . e . ,  the b e t t e r - o f f ) .  This s tereo type  image p e rs is te d .
As a r e s u l t ,  the i n t e l l e c t u a l s '  p o l i t i c a l  s tandpoin t was not p rec ise ly  
comprehended as i t  might have been. Such an image of the in te l le c tu a l s  
was a lso  aggravated by some a l leg a tio n s  th a t  members o f  them had th e i r  
own covert SAVAK connections; th a t  t h e i r  o s ten s ib le  anti-regim e challenge 
was managed and used by the regime. To f u r th e r  obscure the i n t e l l e c t u a l s '  
image, the SAVAK i t s e l f  in one way or another advanced and exp lo ited  
these a l le g a t io n s .  I t  i s  to  such a s i tu a t io n  th a t  the a l ie n a t io n  of  
the in te l le c tu a l s  can be ascribed and blamed.
In f a c t ,  the  regime did not to l e r a te  any appeal o f  these
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in t e l l e c t u a l s .  They were denied even the  basic r ig h t  to  form th e i r  
au thorized  professional a sso c ia t io n s .  Further, some o f  them were de­
ta in e d ,  imprisoned, to r tu re d ,  beaten, ex i le d ,  dismissed from or denied 
governmental jo b s ,  and in tim idated , and others were executed o r  l i q u i ­
dated by the  regime (Zonis, 1971; 39-79; B i l l ,  1972:73-101; Graham,
1979; Halliday, 1979a:325f; F ischer, 1980:192-194). The p o l i t i c a l  
s t ran g u la t io n  th a t  engulfed th is  s tratum  also did a f f e c t  the very 
con ten t ,  d ire c t io n ,  and magnitude o f  t h e i r  scho la rly  p ro d u c tiv ity .
Their poems, w r i t in g s ,  and le c tu re s  took on a d i f f e r e n t  s ty le  and 
were shaped and colored by the reg im e 's  in tim idation  and imposition 
( B i l l ,  1972:73-79; Doctorow:1976; H alliday , 1979a:217-221). Hence,
" i t  i s  no wonder th a t  the  whole o f  contemporary Iran ian  f i c t i o n ,  poe try , 
and c r i t ic i s m  revolves around a c en tra l  theme: repress ion"  (Baraheni, 
1976:116). In d ica tive  o f  th is  i s  the following verse by the  Iranian 
poet, Medhi Akhavan-Saless (1978:90) from his poem, " In s c r ip t io n :"
The stone lay th e re  l ik e  a mountain 
and we s a t  here a weary bunch 
Women, men, young, old 
a l l  linked to g e th e r  
a t  the ankles , by a chain.
F in a lly ,  re fe r r in g  to  the  Shah's a u to c ra t ic  ru le ,  Hurewitz 
notes th a t  "He's given no freedom to  the Iranian i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  The 
r e s u l t  is  th a t  Iran su ffe rs  from a p o l i t i c a l  vacuum: the people feel 
out o f  things" (1978:40).
*  *  *
In c losing th i s  argument about the Shah's u n r e a l i s t i c  approach 
to  the  necess ity  of p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r t y ,  i t  must be emphasized th a t  such 
a fe e l in g  of nothingness as discussed above engulfed d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t a
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of the  Iranian so c ie ty .  In the Shah's regime, in f a c t ,  the  whole 
nation  was playing a passive ro le  in the p o l i t i c a l  process. By a l ien a tin g  
a nation  a t  la rg e ,  th e  Shah, unconsciously and u n in te n t io n a l ly ,  coor­
dinated  and un ified  a people from d i f f e r e n t  regions and roo ts  with 
c o n f l ic t in g  id e o lo g ic a l ,  r e l ig io u s ,  and c u ltu ra l  in t e r e s t s .  Many 
s tuden ts  of Iranian p o l i t i c s  seem to  adhere to  the conclusion th a t  
" . . .  repression was the  major reason fo r  the f a l l  o f  the  Shah" (U.S.
News and World Reports, 1980:31).
What was worse, while some s o r t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  
was v i ta l  to  accompany th e  ongoing economic growth, population t r a n s ­
formation, educational development, and bureaucra tic  p r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  
the  Shah, in 1975, term inated a l l  the peop le 's  hopes fo r  p o l i t i c a l  
" t r a n q u i l i ty ."  He d isso lved  a l l  the ex is t in g  governmental and govern­
ment-supervised p a r t ie s  and imposed the Rastakhiz ( i . e . .  Resurgence)
Party  to  which alj_ the  Iran ians should be re c ru ited .  The non-conformists 
were allowed to "leave" the country o r  e ls e  they would be denied the 
regim e's  mercy. Although from the very in i t i a t i o n  o f  t h i s  p a r ty ,  
b u i l t - i n  ideological and p rac t ica l  problems were revea led , the Shah 
only in h is  e x i le  came to  re a l iz e  th a t  ". . . experience was to  show 
th a t  the crea tion  o f  t h i s  party  was an e r ro r .  . . . The Resurgence 
Party  did not succeed in  achieving i t s  o b jec t iv es—i t  did not become the 
conduit o f  ideas , needs, and wishes between the nation and the  govern­
ment" (Pahlavi, 1980:124). In te re s t in g ly ,  by acknowledging th i s ,  
he ". . . admits to  only one f a i lu r e  during h is  37-year re ig n — . . . The 
one-party  p o l i t i c a l  system—and apportions blame l ik e  summer rain" 
(Thurgood, 1980:7).
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Thus, in add ition  to  h is  socioeconomic f a i lu re s  concerning 
the appropria te  r e d is t r ib u t io n  of wealth and income, which was pouring 
a f f lu e n t ly  in to  the  country , and the  e lim ination  o f  the widening gaps 
among socia l c la s s e s ,  the  Shah f a i l e d  to  c rea te  independent p o l i t ic a l  
i n s t i tu t io n s  or a t  l e a s t  to  l i b e r a l i z e  the already e x is t in g  ones. I t  
is  emphasized th a t  "one o f  the prime causes o f his  d i s a s t e r ,  in f a c t ,  
was th a t  he. . .d id  not adapt h is  p o l i t i c a l  in s t i tu t io n s  s u f f ic ie n t ly  
to  the economic and so c ia l  changes he had brought about" (K issinger, 
1979:1259). To be s u re ,  p o l i t i c a l  freedom was in sho rt  supply even 
w ithin the Shah's inner c i r c l e  where members e i th e r  developed some 
kind o f  po p u la r i ty ,  attempted some s ig n i f ic a n t  changes, o r  c i r t i c i z e d  
lo y a l ly .  In add ition  to  the re sh u ff l in g  o f the e l i t e ,  such members of 
them as Ali Ami n i , Hassan A rsanjani, Tiemur Bakhtiar, Ahmad Aramesh,
Abol-Hassan Ib tah a j ,  Ali Kani, Nasser Ameri, and Ferydoon Mahdavi 
represented  the best  examples of those who were dism issed, j a i l e d ,  
e x i le d ,  o r  even l iq u id a te d  (Zonis, 1971:80-117; B i l l ,  1972; Cottam, 
1979:312-363; Graham, 1979). "Thus," as Hoveyda put i t ,  "he destroyed 
a l l  v a l id  rep resen ta t io n  of o ther viewpoints. He removed a l l  possible  
r iv a ls  a t  every le v e l ,  and muzzled i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  the 
p re ss .  Parliam ent--the  whole people, in  fac t"  (1980:132).
So f a r  the  major emphasis has been put on the Shah's economic 
and p o l i t i c a l  f a i lu r e s  as two s t ru c tu ra l  causes fo r  h is  downfall. A 
c lo se r  analysis  o f  such a co llapse  would a lso  reveal o th e r  s t ru c tu ra l  
problems which in tu rn  con tribu ted  to  The Fall of the Shah. They are
(1) th e  Shah's lack o f  a unifying ideology, (2) the phenomenon of 
e thn ic  s t r a i n , and (3) the problem o f  the  legitimacy o f  h is  regime, each
188
of which w in  be sketched below.
5. Ideological I l lu s io n
In the  review o f  l i t e r a t u r e  we have already observed the crucial 
s ign if icance  o f  the weapons of ideas . In th is  sec tion  ideology is  
t r e a te d  in the Manheimian t r a d i t io n ,  th a t  i s ,  in the sense th a t  i t  
functions e i th e r  to  preserve an ongoing system or to  challenge, id e a l i s ­
t i c a l l y ,  i t s  opera tion . While the Shah was confronted by d i f fe re n t  
challenging "utopian" id e a ls ,  he f a i l e d  to  f a l s i f y  them in theory or 
in p ra c t ice .  This contention is  based on ce r ta in  f a c ts .
F i r s t ,  as the  t r a d i t io n a l  controversy between socialism  and 
and cap ita lism  is  concerned, the Shah adhered to  and la id  the founda­
tion  fo r  the c a p i t a l i s t  mode of production. Although the  s t a t e ,  in 
one way or another, co n tro lled  the e n t i r e ty  of the economic processes, 
the  r e s u l t  was a swelling bourgeoisie stratum and a widening o f the 
socioeconomic gaps. However, i t  might be argued th a t  in the developing 
nations what r e a l ly  m atters  in the f i r s t  place is  not the simple adop­
t io n  of  s o c i a l i s t  or c a p i t a l i s t  p o l ic ie s  but the nature  o f  the  achieved 
s t ru c tu ra l  changes. Such a pragmatic position  was not advocated in the 
Shah's Iran. Equal l i f e  chances were not enjoyed, fo r  the  r ich  got 
r ic h e r  and the poor continued to  lag behind. The regime's proposed 
q u a s i - s o c ia l i s t  p o l ic ie s  such as "p ro f i t -sh a r in g  in f a c to r i e s , "  "employee 
and public  ownership," and some subsid iz ing  devices were in r e a l i ty  
showcases y e t  based on the Shah's imperial ambivalence and not genuine 
s o c i a l i s t  p rac t ice s .  In f a c t ,  ". . . s t r u t t in g  in an ach ro n is tic ,  
imperial splendour, he declined to  follow the example o f o ther th i rd -
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world leaders in paying even l ip - s e rv ic e  to  the misty socia lism  th a t  
helps to  keep m iddle-class i n t e l l e c tu a l s  happy" (The Economist, 1980:12). 
The absence of s o c i a l i s t  measures during the  Shah's regime was more 
sensed by the opposition groups who were already acquainted with the 
s o c i a l i s t  ideologies o f  Nasser 's  Arab S o c ia l i s t  Union, the  s o c i a l i s t  
t r a d i t io n  in  Algeria and the Arab Bath S o c ia l i s t  Party .
Second, although nationalism  in i t s e l f  is  not considered a 
workable ideology in a socioeconomic sense (Lauer, 1978:200), but an 
in g red ien t of some p o l i t i c a l  id eo lo g ie s ,  the Shah's na tionalism  and 
p a tr io t ism  were in  question . (1) As s ta te d  before, with the imposition 
o f  the Rastakhiz P a rty ,  the Shah emphasized his p o l i t i c a l  s tandpoint in  
the  sense of lo y a lty  to  " three  p r in c ip le s " —the in s t i tu t io n  o f  kingdom, 
the Constitu tion  o f  1906, and the White Revolution. Some might argue 
th a t  given the nature  o f  the combination o f  the Iranian people, the 
geographic c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  of the country , and the 2500-year monarchical 
t r a d i t io n  in I ran ,  the  imperial regime may b e t t e r  function than o ther 
systems to  unify the  people. Even i f  t h i s  a l le g a t io n  i s  taken a 
p r i o r i , in p ra c t ic e ,  the a lleged  royal patronage turned out to  be a c u l t  
o f  p e rso n a l i ty ,  dynastic  hegemony, and hum ilia tion o f a people whom 
the i n s t i tu t io n  o f  monarchy was expected to  cherish  and to  patron ize .
Instead o f  emphasizing I r a n 's  n a t io n a l i s t  va lues , the values 
o f  the  Persian kings, and the Pahlavis in p a r t i c u la r ,  were s tre ssed  and 
apprecia ted . This po licy  was c o n s is te n t  with Marx and Engles' observa­
tio n  t h a t ,  in a po la rized  so c ie ty ,  "The ideas o f  the ru ling  c lass  are 
in every epoch the ru l in g  ideas , i . e . ,  the c la ss  which i s  the ru ling  
m ateria l force o f  so c ie ty ,  is  a t  the  same time i t s  ru l in g  in te l le c tu a l
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force"  (1970:64). To revive the  ancien t imperial t r a d i t i o n ,  and, in 
f a c t ,  to  s t r e s s  and j u s t i f y  h is  proposed dynastic  exce llen ce ,  the Shah 
ce leb ra ted  the 2 ,500-year anniversary o f  the  Persian Empire fo r  which, 
according to  the  o f f i c i a l  claim s, "only" $100 m ill ion  was spent ( e .g . ,  
Shah, 1980:42; H a rp e r 's , 1980:10). He a lso  replaced the t r a d i t io n a l  
Iran ian  calendar, adopted by h is  f a th e r  in  the 1925, with a monarchical 
one, which, according to  some Iran ian  h i s to r ia n s ,  does not match 
ex ac tly  the founding o f  the Empire. In f a c t ,  i t  was formulated in such 
a way th a t  the  beginning of the tw enty-s ix th  century o f  the  imperial 
ru le  in Iran corresponds to  the Shah's accession to  power in  1941.
Further examples of these  kinds o f  a sp ira t io n s  can a lso  be 
observed e a s i ly .  The Shah was e n t i t l e d  to  a v a r ie ty  o f  imperial t i t l e s  
some o f which have d iv ine  co lo ra t io n .  "Aala Hadhrat Homayounee" ( i . e . .
His Imperial M ajesty ,) "Shahinshah" ( i . e . .  King o f Kings),"Dhel-Allah 
Pel Ardh ( i . e . ,  the  shadow o f God on E arth ) ,  and "Arya-Mehr" ( i . e . ,  the  
l i g h t  o f  Aryans). In te re s t in g ly ,  the  l a s t  t i t l e ,  i t  i s  s a id ,  was a 
l a s t  name of an Iranian  army o f f i c e r  which was "confisca ted" by the 
Royal Court to  be used and monopolized by the  King. In addition  to  h is  
e a r th ly  hegemony, the  Shah, in one way o r ano ther, a t tached  himself to  
Almighty and Divine ru le .  The Persian concept o f  "Farr-e  Ezadee"
( i . e . ,  the Awe o f  Providence), with which the  Iran ian  Great Shahs had 
been id e n t i f i e d ,  in d ic a te s  the  same f a c t .  The Shah argued th a t  "I 
be lieve  in God, and th a t  I have been chosen by God to  perform a task .
My v is ions  were m irac les  th a t  saved the country. My re ign  has saved the 
country , and i t  has done so because God was on my s ide"  (Pahlavi, 1973:7). 
I t  i s  based on such claims th a t  he once to ld  the ABC te le v is io n  network
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th a t  the re  is  a "ru le"  th a t  the King should not be in su l te d  o r "even 
c r i t i c i z e d . "  Such a se lf -d es ig n a ted  supremacy was su re ly  presented and 
overemphasized by the Shah's media. As Hoveyda (1980:55) observes,
" . . .  the radio news b u l le t in s  always angered the l i s t e r n e r s .  They 
invariab ly  s ta r te d  with a d e ta i led  account o f  doings o f  the  royal family, 
even when important news was pouring out of the te le ty p e  machines." In 
accordance with th i s  observation, Leeden and Lewis a lso  note th a t" ( a l l  
the resources o f  the  mass media have been explo ited  to  s t r e s s  the idea 
th a t  lo ya lty  to  the  monarchy and na tiona l pa tr io tism  are  id e n tic a l"  
(1980:5).
The Iranian national anthem was in name and con ten t id e n t i f ie d  
with the Pahlavi Shahs and not the nation  and the country. I t  was 
labeled  "The Imperial Anthem" and s t a r t e d ,  a f t e r  the B r i t i sh  t r a d i t io n ,  
with "long l iv e  the  Shah." Further, even I r a n 's  ambassadors to  foreign 
countries  were o f f i c i a l l y  designated and id e n t i f ie d  as ambassadors of 
Shahinshah Aryamehr. The Shah once defined himself as "super modern," 
and one must wonder how re a l ly  such a royal modernity and overemphasized 
d iv in i ty  can be lodged on the Shah's c o l le c t io n  o f  t i t l e s ,  h is  c u l t  of 
p e rso n a l i ty ,  dynastic  hegemony and shallow base of soc ia l  support. This 
example, in f a c t ,  i s  s o c ia l iz a t io n  in to  the family values and not 
id e n t i f ic a t io n  with nationalism  whatsoever.
(2) While the n a t io n a l i s t  leaders  in the Third-World countries 
had e i th e r  waged a b a t t l e  o f  independence aga in s t  the foreign  forces 
and/or chosen a non-aligned p o s it io n ,  the  Shah re s to red  power through 
the CIA and " a f t e r  th i s  re s to ra t io n  o f  1953, . . . [h e ]  never re a l ly  
freed  himself from h is  dependence on the U.S." (Godsell, 1980:12). In
192
add ition  to  the Shah's membership in the Central Treaty Organization, 
he a lso  signed m il i t a ry  pacts and agreements with the United S ta tes  in 
1947 and 1963. In the  l a s t  one he even gave the so -ca l led  e x t r a t e r r i ­
t o r i a l  r ig h ts  to  the Americans. However, s im ila r  r ig h ts  which had been 
given to  the  B r i t ish  and the Russians were abolished by his fa th e r  in 
1928 (Mottahedeh, 1980:19-34). Based on d i f f e r e n t  p o lic ie s  and prac­
t i c e s ,  he id e n t i f ie d  him self as "the American's Shah" (Richards, 1975: 
3-22), "the American Middel Eastern su rro g a te ,"  and the  "Gerdarme of 
the  Region," In Cottam's words, "the e p i th e ts  ' t r a i t o r , '  'American 
a g e n t , '  and 'puppet' are used by every opposition group regard less  of 
ideo log ica l complexion. But so are ' c o r r u p t , '  ' t y r a n n ic a l , '  'murderer'" 
(1979:361). I t  is  no wonder then th a t  Presiden t C arter , as l a te  as 
November 30, 1978, s ix teen  days before the Shah's abd ica tion , in a press 
conference, emphasized th a t  "we t r u s t  the Shah to  maintain s t a b i l i t y  in 
Iran . . . .We have confidence in the Shah. We support him. . . " 
(1978:2101).
(3) In foreign  re la t io n s  the Shah adopted and s tre sse d  what 
he c a l led  a "national independent po licy ,"  o r  "positive  nationalism ."
In his words, "our po licy  is  based on the maintenance and the preserva­
tio n  of  peace. We in  Iran have adopted a policy  which we c a l l  a policy 
o f  independent nationalism . I ts  e s se n t ia l  p r inc ip les  are  non-in terference  
in  the  in te rna l a f f a i r s  o f  o ther countries  and peaceful co-existence" 
(Pah lav i, 1967:173). In th is  connection, Lenczowski (1980:201) ind ica tes  
th a t  t h i s  phrase "p o s i t iv e  nationalism" was coined in rep ly  to  two con­
cepts which the Shah's government was try in g  to  combat: one was the 
'n eg a t iv e '  nationalism  [in  f a c t ,  the "negative balance"] of the Mossdegh
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era which brought Iran to  the verge o f  ru in ; the o the r  was N asser 's  
'p o s i t iv e  n eu tra lism ,' which the  Iranians thought tended to  f a c i l i t a t e  
Soviet i n f i l t r a t i o n  in the a re a ."  However, while in the course o f  time 
Nasser and Mosadegh rose to  prominent n a t io n a l i s t  leadersh ip , the  Shah 
was dethroned by his nation to  wander u lt im ate ly  as a "man-without-a- 
country."
Contrary to  his proposed policy of "non-in terference in the 
in te rn a l  a f f a i r s  of o ther c o u n tr ie s ,"  the Shah, as noted before, involved 
his regime in the Iraq is  and Omanis' in te rna l a f f a i r s ,  backed the 
I s r a e l i s  in the A rab-Israe li  c o n f l ic t ,  and allowed the Americans to  
su rve il  on the Russians from the Iranian s o i l .  Thus, in the eyes of 
the n a t io n a l i s t ,  re l ig io u s ,  and communist I ran ian s ,  the Shah's foreign  
p o l ic ie s  were "d ic ta ted ,"  "imported," and "imposed" by the Americans.
They a lso  saw the Shah's e s ta b l ish in g  of the  diplomatic re la t io n sh ip  
with Mao's China in 1974, as a U.S. d ire c t iv e  s ince America's recogni­
t ion  o f  the  Republic of China was in the process. Therefore, such 
foreign-enhanced and fo re ign -o rien ted  p o lic ie s  could not be rooted in 
I r a n 's  national in te r e s t .
(4) While the n a t io n a l i s t  leaders ,  in  one way or another, 
backed the  n a t io n a l i s t - r a d ic a l  movements, the  Shah played an ac t iv e  
ro le  to  o f f s e t  such in su rrec tio n s  or to d e s ta b i l iz e  c e r ta in  arrangements. 
For in s tan ce ,  he deprived the Pa les t ine  L iberation Organization o f  any 
s o r t  o f  support; in add ition , he helped the fragmentation of Lebanon 
by supplying the s e p a ra t i s t  right-wing m i l i t i a  with arms and by pro­
voking the  " t ra d i t io n a l  and u ltra -co n se rv a tiv e  elements of the S h i i te  
community of Lebanon" (Cottam, 1979:341 )—H arakit A1-Mahroumeen, i . e . ,
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the  Deprivds' Movement; fu r th e r ,  as in d ica ted  before , the Shah sen t
h is  troops to  Oman to  crack down on what he c a l led  the "savage" people 's
ra d ic a l  movement o f  Dhofar (New York Times. 1975:47); and f in a l ly  
a f t e r  the  1967 war between Is rae l  and the Arabs, he cheered and backed 
the  I s r a e l i s  m i l i t a r i l y .  To c i t e  one example re la te d  to  the  l a s t  case, 
in . . the 1968-79 'war of a t t r i t i o n , '  during which the  I s r a e l i s  ran 
sh o r t  o f  bombs fo r  t h e i r  a i r  force . . . the  Shah. . . provided Is rae l  
with 23,000 tons o f  bombs, a l l  o f  which were dropped on Egyptian t a r ­
ge ts"  (Newsweek. 1980:17). According to  Helms (1981:188) the  Shah 
" . . .  had been heard to  say th a t  n e i th e r  I s ra e l  nor Iran wanted to 
be surrounded and alone in  a sea o f  Arabs."
(5) Where the committed n a t io n a l i s t  leaders  s a c r i f ic e d  fo r  the
cause o f  t h e i r  people and took pains to  preserve  th e i r  r iches  and 
re so u rces ,  the Shah, h is  fam ily, and h is  e l i t e s  milked the  wealth of 
the  Iran ian  nation . As e a r ly  as the r i s e  o f  Reza Shah, the  Pahlavi 
fam ily , through a v a r ie ty  of devices and excuses ( e .g . ,  pretended 
c h a r i ty  o rg an iza tio n s ,  c o n f isca t io n s ,  commissions, ro y a l t i e s ,  tax 
loopholds, c o u r t-sh e l te red  investments) ex p lo ited  the country. To 
mention but one example, Newsweek (1979:44) repo rts  th a t
After the  Shah's successful campaign to  quadruple 
OPEC's o i l  p r ice  in  1974, I r a n 's  petroleum revenues ran 
between $20 b i l l io n  and $30 b i l l io n  a year .  About $1 b i l l io n  
o f  the  gusher went in to  the royal co ffe rs  annually. For 
y e a r s ,  anyone wanting to  do business in Iran rou tine ly  sought 
to  include one or another royal r e l a t i v e  in  the p r o f i t s ,  and 
the  numerous family foundations had p a r t  o r  fu l l  in te r e s t s  
in  scores o f banks, h o te ls ,  shipping companies and o ther 
e n te rp r is e s .  I t  was nearly  impossible to  say where I r a n 's  
wealth ended and the  Pahlavi fam ily 's  began (emphasis added).
Such an " im p eria l" in te rven tion  and o r ie n ta t io n  brought about
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a new c u l tu re  whose values were those o f  co rrup tion , b r ib e ry ,  usury, 
embezzlement, scandal, fav o rit ism , and nepotism a l l  of which were b e t te r  
represented  in the I ran ian s '  habitual phrases—P arti  Bazi ( i . e . ,  re ­
l a t i o n s ) ,  Pool ( i . e . ,  money which implied b irb e ry ) ,  and "Chapeedin"
( i . e . ,  " r ip p in g -o f f" ) .  Hence, the Court was "a r a t  race" and a "hive 
of c o rru p tio n ."  In Hoveyda's words, " . . .  the  people were concerned 
th a t  the  roots  o f  corruption  grew out o f  co u r t  i t s e l f "  (1980:60). 
In te r e s t in g ly ,  the Iranian  proverb, "Ab Az Sar Cheshmeh Gel-Aloud 
Ast" ( i . e . ,  the spring muddy a t  i t s  o r ig in s ) ,  can best  ch arac te r ize  
the  co rrup t cou rt .
More in te r e s t in g ly ,  the Shah's c rea t io n  of a v a r ie ty  o f m il i ta ry  
and c iv i l  "inspection" o rg an iza tions , committees, and groups as well 
as t h e i r  in e ffec t iv en ess  was in i t s e l f  the  most ringing ind ica tion  of 
the co rrup t o rder.  However, in th a t  kind o f "inspection" i t  was the 
powerless and the impoverished who were scapegoated so th a t  the masses' 
tension  would be d iffused  and challenged elsewhere. Thus, " the 'two- 
c u l tu re s '  phenomenon in Iran ( th a t  i s ,  d i f f e r e n t  cu ltu res  fo r  the e l i t e  
and the masses) i s  la rg e ly  a phenomenon o f  the  Pahlavi pe riod , before 
which th e re  was a gradation but no sharp break between e l i t e  and popu­
l a r  c u l tu re s"  (Richard, 1981:183). The non-popular but dominant cu ltu re  
was gen era l ly  id e n t i f ie d  with "Hizar Family" ( i . e . ,  one thousand 
fam il ie s )  who c o n s t i tu ted  the inner c i r c l e  and explo ited  the  wealth of 
the na tion . From the l a t e  1950s, these  fam ilie s  were t a r g e t  to  a 
proposed law known as "Az Koja Avardai" ( i . e . ,  how you have obtained 
" i t " ,  the w ealth) . This recommended law, symbolizing the regime's 
o s ten s ib le  d es ire  fo r  ac tion  aga ins t  co rru p tio n ,  was never taken
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se r io u s ly ,  because i t s  actual t a rg e t  was the  regime i t s e l f .
(6) S h if ting  propaganda emphasis from the White Revolution, 
to  the  National Independent Policy , and then to  the Rastakhiz Party , 
the  Shah f i n a l l y ,  from 1976 on, s tre ssed  h is  utopian society--Tamaddon-e 
Bozorg ( i . e . .  Great C iv i l iz a t io n ) .  But, "what then is  th i s  Great 
C iv i l iz a t io n  th a t  I wanted fo r  Iran?" The Shah's answer to  th i s  s e l f -  
addressed question is  th i s ;  "To me, i t  i s  an e f f o r t  toward understanding 
and peace which c rea tes  the  p e r fec t  environment in which everyone can 
work" (1980:176). According to  the Shah, the  Iranians would reap the 
f r u i t  o f  such an ideal c iv i l i z a t io n  by the mid 1980's, or as he l a t e r  
emphasized, by the turn  o f  t h i s  century. Given the s t ru c tu ra l  sh o r t­
comings t h a t  were discussed before , the  Iran ians  were quick to  r e a l iz e  
the emptiness of the Shah's dream. They understood th a t  h is  Great 
C iv i l iz a t io n  "was time wasted" and "his hobby-horse, his very own l i t t l e  
inven tion , an imaginary world which was more rea l to  him than r e a l i ty "  
(Hoveyda, 1980:29). B ela ted ly , a f t e r  his  downfall, the Shah too came
to  re a l iz e  th a t  "Today, our Great C iv i l iz a t io n  may appear to  have died 
fo r  a l l  time" (Pahlavi, 1980:190).
(7) While "the opposition ideology grew from the na tive  values 
o f  Iran" (Dorman, 1979:65), the  Shah's ideo log ical values were lodged
on imperial and dynastic  a sp ira t io n s  which were generally  shaped by 
and in c l in ed  toward the West and W esternization ( e .g . ,  Richards, 1975; 
Paarberg, 1978; Rouleau, 1980). Thus, while "middle Eastern ideology 
is  . . . h ighly n a t io n a l i s t i c "  (B ill and Leiden, 1979:285), the  Shah's 
ideological tendencies were orien ted  toward dynastic  values and Western 
t r a d i t io n s .  In f a c t ,  the Shah f a i le d  to  c re a te  a v iable  ideological
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base in his so c ie ty .  "His only defense i s  the loya lty  o f  the  armed 
forces  and the e ff ic acy  of the secu r i ty  serv ices"  (Graham, 1979:211).
He re l ie d  on a c lique  o f  the p o l i t ic a l  and m il i ta ry  e l i t e  o f  h is  own 
a t t i tu d in a l  nature who f a i le d  to  c i r c u la te  but were quick to  disappear 
and s p l i t  even before the  Shah's forced abdica tion . Both the  Shah's 
m i l i t a ry  t r a d i t io n  and powerful army, fo r  whose build-up much resources 
were exhausted and national development plans were d is to r te d  ( e .g . .
Time, 1978:40; Nickel, 1979:95-106; Cottam, 1979:333; Newsweek, 1980: 
41-42), f a i le d  to  operate  properly and to  secure the monarchy. In f a c t ,  
the Shah and h is  m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l  men were involved in a process of 
" s e l f  in te re s t "  but not in the i n t e r e s t  o f  the people. Such a group 
of ind iv iduals  is  most l ik e ly  to  lose the game (Coser, 1956), and they 
did .
F ina lly , although "Nationalism per se demands no p a r t i c u la r  
p o l i t i c a l  o r ie n ta t io n  o ther than the u n if ic a t io n  of a people" (Lauer, 
1978:200), the Shah's proposed n a t io n a l i s t  values as well as his o ther 
ideological stands antagonized the people but unified  them aga ins t  the 
regime. "Indeed, the su rp ris ing  fea tu re  i s  th a t .  . . [the Shah's] 
po licy  has generated so l i t t l e  n a t io n a l i s t i c  excitement with Iran" 
(Cottam, 1979:337). S ta ted  d i f f e r e n t ly ,  " . . .  the former Shah was 
remembered more generously by fo reigners  than by his own people" 
(Johnson, 1980:36).
In f a c t ,  the Shah's n a t io n a l i s t i c  f a i lu r e  was twofold. He 
f a i l e d  (1) to  t ru ly  id e n t i fy  himself with and (2) to  accommodate I ran 's  
non-Persian n a t io n a l i t i e s  to  Persian nationalism . This l a s t  f a i lu re
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must be envisioned in the l i g h t  of the e thn ic  s t r a in  th a t  had been in 
the process o f  accumulation and eruption throughout the Pahlavi regime.
6.. Ethnic S tra in
H is to r ic a l ly . Iran  has been id e n t i f ie d  as a potpouri o f  t r i b e s ,  
e thn ic  and rac ia l  m in o r i t ie s  who, in one way o r another, had enjoyed 
"autonomous ru le ,"  "semi-dependent a u th o r i ty ,"  "regional autonomy," 
o r ,  in some cases and tim es, fu l l  independence. Such a c ircum stan tia l 
a u th o r i ty  was a lso  c h ry s ta l iz e d  in two Iran ian  o f f i c i a l  emblems: (a)
the t i t l e  Shahinshah," i . e . ,  the King of ( the  o the r Iranian) Kings, as 
touched upon before , and (b) "Mimalik-e Mahrouseh Iran ,"  i . e . ,  the  f o r t i ­
f ie d  s t a t e s  of Iran. The peoples o f  these s t a t e s  are e i th e r  from 
d i f f e r e n t  races ( e .g . ,  the  Arabs, the  Turkomans, the  Turks) o r  are  
branches from the dominant Arayan race ( e .g . ,  the Kurds). They a lso  
have t h e i r  defined languages or d ia le c ts  ( e . g . ,  the Arabic, the  Baluchi, 
the Kurdish, the Azari). To be su re , both the  Baluchi and the Kurdish 
have a common root with th e  Persian language. These are branches o f  the  
Indo-Irani an family of languages. As a r e s u l t ,  a l l  of the concerned 
Iran ian  m inorities  must be defined as e th n ic -1 in q u is t ic  m in o r i t ie s .
All of these  m in o r i t ie s  are Muslims and e i th e r  belong to  the 
o f f i c i a l  denomination of Shiism ( e .g . ,  the Arabs, the  Turks, and the 
Kurds o f  Kirmanshah and Elaam) o r are id e n t i f i e d  with Sunnism ( e . g . ,  
the  Baluchis, and the Kurds of Kurdistan and West Azarbijan). However, 
n ine ty  percent of the Iran ians  are S h i i te .  Geographically, the t a r g e t  
m in o r i t ie s  a re ,  in h i s to r ic a l  terms, s e t t l e d  in  the following order.
The Arabs reside  in the Southwestern province o f  Khuzistan, the  o i l
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r ich  area  o f  Iran . There a re ,  in f a c t ,  o th e r  Arab people , the B aseris , 
who re s id e  in the  Southern province o f  Pars and, with four Iranian 
t r i b e s ,  c o n s t i tu te  the  t r i b a l  federa t ion  o f  Khamseh ( i . e . ,  the  Five) 
(Frye, 1953:9). The Baluchis re s id e  in the Southeast where, across 
the  I ran ian -P ak is tan i border, the  Pakistani Baluchis l i v e .  The Kurds 
are  s e t t l e d  in the  west, the  Turks in the  northwest, and f in a l ly  the 
Turkomans re s id e  in the north o f  th e  country.
Although because o f  the  regim e's  p o l ic ie s  no s t a t i s t i c s  about 
the  population s ize  of e th n ic  m in o r i t ie s  are a v a i la b le ,  these  groups 
a l leg ed ly  c o n s t i tu te  one h a l f  o f  the  to ta l  Iranian population . Beck 
(1980:14) s t a t e s  th a t  " le ss  than h a l f  of the to ta l  Iran ian  population 
o f  35 m il l io n  speaks Persian as a f i r s t  language." Halliday (1978b:10) 
a lso  emphasizes th a t  " I t  is  o f ten  fo rgo tten  th a t  a t  l e a s t  h a l f  of 
I r a n 's  population is  not Persian speaking."
According to  the Iran ian  h is to r ia n  Ahmad Kasravi (1956/1977: 
53), even the  pure Persian "E ils"  ( i . e . ,  t r i b e s )  under the  Safav id 's  
(1502-1747) cen tra l  ru le  exerc ised  some s e l f - r u l e  agreed-upon by the 
cen tra l  government. Before the  Safav ids , Iran was a country o f  several 
independent s t a t e s ,  and a f t e r  the  S afav id 's  e ra ,  the  country a lso  
continued i t s  segmentations though under sem i-cen tra lized  au th o r i ty .  
Indeed, the  Iran ians as a whole a re  more id e n t i f ie d  with t h e i r  Eyalats 
( i . e . ,  local s t a t e s ) ,  provinces, cou n tie s ,  hometowns, and t r i b a l  
o r ig in s  than o the r kinds o f  id e n t i f i c a t io n s .  An in d ica t io n  o f  th i s  is  
the  I r a n ia n s '  l a s t  names which usually  are derived from e i th e r  th e i r  
t r i b a l / e t h n i c  ancestors o r  p lace o f  b i r th  or both.
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To c la r i f y ,  the  e x ten t  of the au th o ri ty  exercised  by m inorities  
was usually  determined by the s treng th  o f  the cen tra l  government and i t s  
a b i l i t y  a t  " co n f l ic t  re s o lu t io n ."  However, the conscrip tion  fo r  the 
cen tra l  army in times o f c r i s i s  and, more im portantly , the  leveling  of 
tax  symbolized the general power pa tte rn  exercised over e thn ic  m ino rit ie s .  
To be su re ,  tax was c o llec ted  from the t r i b e s '  members and paid to  the 
c en tra l  government by the local governor, the t r i b a l  c h ie f  ( i . e . ,  Wali, 
Amir, o r  Khan). This procedure in i t s e l f  ind ica ted  the sphere of 
influence  o f  the t r ib a l  ch ie fs  and the q u a li ty  o f  governmental dominance 
over l o c a l i t i e s  and e thn ic  communities. However, from the l a te  nine­
teen th  century , when the  cen tra l  government began to  assume a "nation­
s ta t e "  p a t te rn  of governance, e thnic  m inorities  came to  re a l iz e  th a t  
". . . the  policy o f Theran [was] d irec ted  towards the  gradual suppression 
o f a l l  semi-dependent a u th o r i ty  in non-Persian hands, and the cen tra ­
l i z a t io n  o f executive power" (Curzon, 1966:326). This policy  l a t e r  
was incorporated in I r a n 's  f i r s t  Constitu tion of 1906-7. However, in 
terms o f rep resen ta tion  in  the  Parliament, the C onstitu tion  preserved 
minimum e th n ic ,  lo c a l ,  or t r i b a l  r ig h ts  fo r  some m ino r it ie s  though 
within  a un if ied  and c e n tra l iz e d  Iran.
With Reza Shah's take-over , the e thnic  m in o r i t ie s '  t r a d i t io n a l  
a u th o r i ty  came under system atic  challenge and f in a l ly  was terminated.
Frye (1953:8) notes th a t  "Reza Shah (1925-1941) t r i e d  unsuccessfully  
to  break t h e i r  organization and s e t t l e  them on the  land , but the r e s u l t  
was not only a near d i s a s t e r  fo r  the t r ib e s  but a d isrup ted  economy 
between townsmen and t h e i r  source of meat, h ides, and the l ik e ."  In 
t h i s  re spec t two points must be made. F i r s t ,  in the c la s s ic  l i t e r a t u r e ,
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e thn ie  m in o r i t ie s  were mostly defined and categorized as s c a t t e r  t r ib e s  
with simple socia l o rganization . The ev iden t flaw with th i s  d e f in i t io n  
i s  th a t  i t  overlooked both t h e i r  e thn ic-based  p o l i t ic a l  r ig h ts  and th e i r  
local a u th o r i t i e s .  Next, in f a c t ,  even p r io r  to  Reza Shah's e ra ,  a l l  
o f  the  t a rg e t  m in o r i t ie s ,  or " t r ib a l  people,"  had already enjoyed a 
sedentary l i f e .  However, such a l i f e  was based on a p a s to ra l ,  a g r ic u l­
t u r a l ,  and commercial mode o f production in  which feudalism and not 
in dus tr ia lism  was the  p reva iling  p a t te rn .
Throughout Reza Shah's ru le  none o f these e thn ic  m inorit ie s  
ceased e thn ic  claims e i th e r  in symbolic terms or in some kind o f armed 
re s is ta n c e .  But, none o f them obtained i t s  t ra d i t io n a l  au th o r i ty .
Besides, a l l  o f  them were subjected to  systematic P e rs ian iza tion  and a t  
the  same time were forced to  abolish  t h e i r  e thnic  t r a d i t i o n s ,  e sp ec ia lly  
the  study o f the na tive  language (Afshar, 1927; Sykes, 1930; Lockhart, 
1948).
A fter the  f a l l  o f  Reza Shah and in the  wake of World War I I ,  the 
Turks were somehow able to  e s ta b l ish  t h e i r  Republic of Azirbijan in 1945. 
The Kurds a lso  formed th e i r  Republic o f  Mehabad in 1945-6. Each o f these , 
however, was to rn  down by the regime ( e .g . ,  Sykes, 1927; Roosevelt,
1947; William, 1963). With respec t to  the  Arabs, "Khuzistan remained 
mostly Arab in population and Arabic language. . . .and a f t e r  Reza 
Shah's abdication  the  Arab tribesmen th e re  re turned to  t h e i r  old dress 
and nomadic customs" (Forbis, 1980:251-2). In tu rn ,  they revo lted  
aga in s t  the cen tra l  government, in 1945-6, and ca lled  fo r  " incorporation" 
in to  the neighboring Arabian Iraq ( e .g . ,  Elwell-Sutton, 1955; Lenczowski,
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1980). This reb e ll io n  too was crushed by the regime's a u th o r i t ie s  who 
used some r iv a l  Arab ch ie f ta in s  to  suppress the  movement. Consequently, 
many Arab leaders took refuge in Iraq , were k i l le d  in the confron ta tion , 
imprisoned, or ex iled  with t h e i r  fam ilies  to  the  north of Iran . Re­
fe r r in g  to  th i s  event F i r z l i  notes th a t  the  Shah " . . .  gave the  order 
fo r  s ix teen  of t h e i r  ch iefs  to  be buried a l iv e  to  s e t  an example so 
as to  disuade the  population from o th e r  rev o lts "  (1981:96).
As was the  case under his f a th e r ,  under the Shah's government 
a l l  these  m inorit ie s  were subjected to  a two-fold policy—denial of 
any e th n ic  r ig h ts  and P e rs ian iza t io n .  They were fo rc ib ly  persuaded 
to  ge t t h e i r  education in the Persian language, to  be rec ru i ted  in to  
the  Army, and to  be ru led  by Persians o r heterogeneous e thn ic  a u th o r i t ie s .  
Meanwhile, they were proh ib ited  from studying t h e i r  own languages.
Their t r a d i t io n a l  areas of residence were dismembered or incorporated 
in to  o ther areas and th e i r  populations were transformed and re located .
In th i s  re sp ec t ,  some examples are  worth mentioning. Instead o f a unified  
t r a d i t io n a l  domain, the Kurds have been divided and re located  in d i f ­
fe re n t  areas though w ithin the  h is to r ic a l  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  dominance. This 
new residency embraces four provinces in which the  Kurds e i th e r  mixed 
with o thers or separated from th e i r  own union.
They were s e t t l e d  in th i s  way: (1) the  S h i i te  Kurds were
assigned to  (2) Elam province with aggregates o f  the  S h i i te  Lurs, and 
(b) to  the  Kirmanshah Province where they embrace the m ajority  o f  the 
in h ab itan ts .  (2) The Sunni Kurds were s e t t l e d  in (2) Kurdistan pro­
vince when they a re  a m ajo rity , and (b) in the Western Azirbiian province 
with the  S h i i te  Turks. The Turks, in tu rn ,  e i th e r  were mixed with the
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Sunni Kurds as sa id  before , o r  s e t t l e d  in the Eastern Azarbijan province 
as the dominant m ajority . However, in the  eyes of the Turks and the 
Kurds, A zirb ijan  and Kurdistan a re  u n if ied  Turkish and Kurdish areas 
re sp ec tiv e ly .  The Baluchis, who a re  Sunni, were id e n t i f ie d  with t h e i r  
Baluchistan as a t r a d i t io n a l  realm o f  residence and in fluence , but in 
the  recen t governmental d iv is ions  they were annexed to  o the r  Persians 
from S is tan  to  form, toge ther ,  the  S is tan-B aluch is tan  province.
The case o f  the Arabs is  a lso  in te r e s t in g .  The Arabs had been 
in the very southwest o f  Iran ad jacen t to  Iraq . They came to  t h i s  area 
"in successive waves from the Arabian Penninsula well before Islam" 
( F i r z l i ,  1981:49). However, before the  Islamic era  th e re  were ancien t 
Persians who l iv ed  in  the very n o rth eas t  of the area. With the I s l a -  
mization o f  Iran  in  600 's ,  the Arabs designated the name Al-Ahwaz ( i . e . ,  
"appropria tion) to  t h e i r  region. In the  ancien t te x ts  and maps th i s  
name as well as the  designation "the Arabs" were used interchangeably 
in re fe r r in g  to  th i s  t e r r i t o r y  and i t s  people ( e . g . ,  Curzon, 1966). 
According to  Kasrawi (1356/1977:46-47), with the  emergence of the 
powerful Safavid dynasty (1502-1737), the Arabian area was o f f i c i a l l y  
given the Arabic-Persian designation o f  Arabistan ( i . e . ,  the land o f 
the Arabs) by the Safavid kings in refe rence  to  i t s  in h ab itan ts .  Kasravi 
(156/1977:257F) a lso  argues th a t  although th is  designation meant but 
the western p a r t  o f  the region in which the Arabian Moucha'ch i s ta t e  
was in o rder ,  i t  f in a l ly  covered a l l  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  the  region including 
the Persian-dominated p laces. The Arab dominance continued u n t i l  the 
ear ly  1920's .  In 1923, the would-be Reza Shah modified the  name of 
Arabistan to  Khuzistan ( i . e . ,  the land o f  the Khuz). The Khuz, pre-
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sumably, were a Persian people who once l ived  somewhere in the very 
northwestern f r o n t ie r  of the  area long before the  dawn of Islam. In 
1925, Reza Shah somehow was ab le  to  overthrow the  r u l e r  o f  A rabistan, 
Shiekh Khazal, and began Pers ian iza tion  devices. These events had 
severe consequences and the  following are examples.
F i r s t ,  the Arab's overwhelming population came under gradual 
challenge by Persians whose immigration has always been encouraged by 
the  rap id  development of the o i l  industry  in the area ( e .g . ,  Curzon, 
1966; Cottam, 1979:110-111). However, un ti l  now the Arabs have not been 
outnumbered by the I ran ians . Second, the Arab's c i t i e s  and towns such 
as A'bbadan, Al-Ahwaz, Al-Hwaizeh, Al-Dawraq/Al-Falaheiah, Khour-Mousa, 
Al-Khafajeiah, M'ashure, and Al-Mohammareh were given Persian names 
( e .g . ,  th e  Iranian Academy of Language, 1353/1974), o r  "Persianized" 
names based on Persian phonetics. Such a phonetic shade o f d iffe rence  
between the Arabic and Persian languages caused the  a ffec ted  names a 
loss  of etymological meaning and pure Arabic id e n t i ty .  Third, the Arabs 
were denied the r ig h t  to  study t h e i r  Arabic language and a t  the same 
time were compelled to  study the  Persian language system atica lly  
( e . g . ,  Afshar, 1927). Fourth, the Arabs were conscrip ted  in to  the army. 
F in a lly ,  the  Arabs were constan tly  subjected to  disarmament even though 
they were not approved to  be armed.
Economically, e th n ic  m in o r i t ie s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  in the ru ral a re a s ,  
su ffe red  under the P ah lav i 's  c en tra l ized  ru le .  The Baluchis res ide  in 
the  most a r id  and the l e a s t  developed region o f  I ran . As a r e s u l t ,  they 
" . . .  have the  lowest s tandard  o f  l iv ing  and per c ap ita  income o f any 
p a r t  o f  the  economy" (H alliday , 1979a:224). In the  ear ly  1970's ,  a f t e r
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years o f  negligence and downplay, the regime somehow implemented some 
short- te rm  local development p ro jec ts  to  improve t h e i r  d e te r io ra t in g  
economic conditions. Yet, in Summer of 1979, the Provisional Prime 
M inister Madhi Bazirgan (1979:8), a f t e r  a short v i s i t  to  the region, 
declared t h a t ,  sho rt  of "bread," the  Baluchi (and S is ta n i )  people "fed 
on g ra s s ."  Concerning the Turkomans' s i tu a t io n  Tymaz (1358/1979:15-25) 
s t re s se s  the miserable l i f e  o f  t h i s  people who a lso  experienced "forced 
labor" under the a u th o r i t ie s  "whipping." As Algar in d ic a te s ,  "A par­
t i c u l a r l y  g la ring  example was in Khuzistan, which was the source of 
the  major wealth o f  the country through the o i l  industry . One finds th a t  
the o i l  workers in Abadan, most o f  whom are Arab, e th n ic a l ly  speaking, 
l ived  in the  most miserable conditions" (1981:109). Due to  such impo­
verishment, many of the e thn ic  m in o r i t ie s ,  e sp ec ia l ly  from ru ra l back­
grounds, migrated to  d i f f e r e n t  a reas within and beyond the Iranian 
t e r r i t o r i e s ,  including Iraq , Kuwait, and the Persian Gulf Emirates.
P o l i t i c a l l y , e thn ic  m in o r i t ie s  lived  a lso  under suppressive 
measures. Beck (1980:15) notes th a t  "those o f  t r i b a l  a f f i l i a t i o n  were 
not usually  represented in government, except fo r  some t r ib a l  e l i t e s ,  
most o f  which did not rep resen t t r i b a l  concerns but, r a th e r  th e i r  own 
c lass  and personal in t e r e s t s . "  In f a c t ,  those " t r ib a l  e l i t e s "  who 
rose to  power were, e sp ec ia l ly  from the ear ly  1960's on, backed by and 
id e n t i f ie d  with the Court and SAVAK connections, but not e thnic  a f f i ­
l i a t i o n s .  They were feudals and on the  whole did not work fo r  e thnic  
causes and id e a ls .  Nevertheless, beginning from the ear ly  1940 's, the 
Kurds formed t h e i r  Kurdish N a t io n a l is t  Society, Kumelh, in 1943, and the 
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran in  1945 (Roosevelt, 1947). The Turks
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also  created  t h e i r  A zirbijan  Democratic Party in 1944 (Lenczowski, 1980) 
which merged with the  Tudeh Party of Iran in 1960 (H alliday, 1979a:225).
As ea r ly  as 1924, the  Arabs created the Saadeh ( i . e . ,  happiness) 
Insurrec tion  Committee (Kasravi, 1356/1977:236), o r  the  Saadeh C oalition  
“created by Sheikh Khazaal with neighboring t r ib e s  in order to  r e s i s t  
Reza Shah" (F irz l i  1981:97F). In 1958, they formed the Front o f  the 
Liberation of Ahwaz (H alliday, 1979a:223) or the Front o f  the L iberation 
of Arabistan which was followed by, merged w ith , and remerged from o th e r  
p o l i t i c a l  f ro n ts  a l l  o f  which claimed e thn ic  ideals  and worked f o r  
l ib e ra t io n  ( e .g . ,  Al-Heloo, 1966; F i r z l i ,  1981:95-98). The Baluchis, 
in tu rn ,  came up with t h e i r  Baluchistan People 's League which claimed 
e thnic  r ig h ts  and a lso  the union of the Baluchi people across the 
P ak is tan i-Iran ian  border (H alliday , 1979a:224-5).
All of these  e thn ic -o rgan iza tions  worked underground but some­
how did not achieve t h e i r  id ea ls  in p rac tica l  terms. In f a c t ,  the  
regime's pressures and i t s  a n t i - e th n ic  devices such as land disemem- 
berment and annexation, system atic  P ers ian iza tion  and constant p ro h ib i­
tion  aga ins t  studying native  languages, functioned to  (a) loosen e thn ic  
bonds within e th n ic i t i e s ,  and (b) a t  the same time caused c o n f l ic ts  
both within and between e thn ic  m inorities  and the dominant m ajority  as 
well. Indeed, th i s  was what the  regime meant by such a "d iv ide-and-ru le"  
policy. However, in symbolic terms, e thn ic  p o l i t i c a l  organizations 
served several ends such as awakening, energ izing , and mobilizing 
ethn ic  groups fo r  days to  come. In sum, e thn ic  activ ism , though mostly 
subterranean, helped the prolongation of e thn ic  claims in the absence 
of ethnic-based au th o rity .
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Thus, in terms of p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r ty ,  economic e q u a l i ty ,  and 
c u l tu ra l  p lu r a l i t y ,  a l l  the Iran ian  e thn ic  m inorities  were deprived 
under the Shah's regime. However, they would not be d iscrim inated  
a g a in s t  i f  they did not claim e th n ic  r ig h t s  o r  seek p o l i t i c a l  p r iv i ­
leges through e thn ic  channels. The Pahlavis f a i l e d  to  a ss im ila te  
e th n ic  m in o r i t ie s  in to  the dominant Persian cu ltu re  and to  overcome 
the problem in the sense of Persian-conformity. They a lso  f a i le d  to  
manage fo r  a "melting pot" so lu tio n  in which a l l  the  involved cu ltu re s  
toge ther  would evolve in to  a new blend (Gordon, 1964:34-51). I n te r e s t ­
ing ly , even the  re l ig io n  of Islam could not help the c rea t io n  o f  such 
a blend among e thnic  m inorities  and the Persian so c ie ty ,  a l l  o f  which 
were Muslim.
The regime a lso  prevented the evolution of a p l u r a l i s t  so lu t io n ,  
fo r  none o f the e thn ic  languages were allowed to  be s tud ied  system atica lly  
and to  be used in te l le c tu a l ly .  This, however, was the major reason 
fo r  the f a c t  th a t  a l l  I ran 's  e th n ic  m in o r i t ie s ,  with the exception of 
some Turkish elements, added nothing s ig n i f ic a n t  to  the wholesale 
Iranian l i t e r a t u r e  and w ritten  c u l tu re —n e ith e r  in t h e i r  own nor in 
the Persian languages. In f a c t ,  by studying the Persian language, e i th e r  
by force or by persuasion, e th n ic  m ino r it ie s  sought more job careers  
than academ ic /in te l lec tua l expressiveness.
On the o ther hand, among a l l  I r a n 's  m in o r i t ie s ,  e th n ic  minori­
t i e s  were th e  le a s t  p r iv i leged . In d ica tive  of th i s  i s  the f a c t  t h a t  the 
Iranian re l ig io u s  m inorities  ( i . e . ,  the C h ris t ian s ,  the Jews, the 
Z oroastr ians) had co n s t i tu t io n a l  r ig h ts  o f  p o l i t ic a l  re p re sen ta t io n .
The f i r s t  two re l ig io u s  groups were a lso  allowed to  study t h e i r  cu ltu ra l
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h e r i tag e  and h i s to r ic a l  background in t h e i r  own languages and in th e i r  
own p r iv a te  schools. This, however, was enjoyed up to  the high school 
level and was p rac ticed  along with the  Iranian o f f i c i a l  curriculum.
To be su re ,  the Zorostarians did not need such a p r iv i leg e  fo r  they are 
ancien t Pers ians. Thus, "Tribal popula tions , as well as e thn ic  nation­
a l i t i e s  in I ran ,  were denied many national r ig h ts  under the  Pahlavis 
and were victim s o f Persian Chauvinism" (Beck, 1980:16). A member from 
the  Turkish e th n ic i ty ,  Baraheni, emphasizes th a t  "The people o f  the 
country a re  being a lien a ted  from t h e i r  c u ltu ra l  and e thn ic  roo ts  and 
thus from t h e i r  id e n t i ty "  (1976:5).
F in a l ly ,  such a system atic  a l ie n a t io n  and p e r s i s t in g  f r u s t r a ­
t io n  had always accumulated tension  and s t r a in .  In the revo lu tionary  
episodes o f  1978-9 i t  might be observed th a t  a t  l e a s t  h a l f  o f  the 
p a r t ic ip a n ts  demonstrated fo r  a two-fold purpose: the  downfall of the 
Shah's regime and a t  the same time the  acqu is it ion  o f  t h e i r  e thn ic  
idea ls  under a new p o l i t i c a l  o rder. The depth o f t h e i r  s t r a in  and the 
bredth o f  t h e i r  hope can be b e t t e r  re a l iz e d  i f  one observes t h e i r  
m i l i t a n t  e th n ic  demands which b u rs t  r ig h t  a f t e r  the e ruption  o f  the 
Iran ian  Revolution and are  s t i l l  ab laze .
In add ition  to  (1) the imposition o f  such e th n ic a l ly  s t ra in fu l  
co n d it io n s ,  (2) the absence of a defined ideology, (3) the  monopolization 
of power and valued o f f i c i e s ,  and (4) the esca la t io n  of  economic in ­
e q u a l i ty ,  the  Shah's regime was a lso  id e n t i f ie d  with and su ffe red  from 
a le g i t im a tio n  problem to  be discussed  below.
7. The Problem o f  Legitimacy 
"Many of the concepts used in  theo rie s  o f  rev o lu tio n —such as
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. . . ' le g i t im a c y ' .  . . - - r e f e r  to  complex and m u ltiface ted  phenomena 
th a t  elude prec ise  d e f in i t io n s "  (S a le r t ,  1976:19-20). The essence of 
t h i s  problem is  the  two in tertw ined questions o f  "power" and "au th o r i ty ."  
In t r a d i t io n ,  so c io lo g is ts  owe the d is t in c t io n  between power and 
a u th o r i ty  to  Weber (1947) who defined au tho rity  (Herrschaft) as l e g i ­
t im ate  power and power (Macht) as the a b i l i t y  to  exerc ise  one 's w ill 
over others in s p i te  o f  t h e i r  re s is tan ce .  What then leg it im izes  power, 
o r  how does power ge t leg it im a ted ,  to  be exerted  as au th o r i ty  by e l i t e s  
i s ,  indeed, the problematic issue .
Thomas Hobbes (1980), whose major i n t e r e s t  was "the problem of 
order" a t  large and the emergence of the " s t a t e ,"  argued th a t  in order 
to  ge t r id  of th e i r  chao tic  " s ta te  of nature" people made a "contrac t"  
based on which th e i r  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  should be regu la ted  by Leviathan 
o r an authorized body. Jean Jacque Rousseau (1981) claimed th a t  such 
a co n trac t was made on the  assumption th a t  people would be able to  
re tu rn  to th e i r  o r ig in a l  normative and p a c if ic  " s t a te  o f  nature" a f t e r  
i t  has been d is turbed  by the  p rac t ice  o f  p r iv a te  property . This p rac t ice  
began with the  ownership o f  "a piece o f  ground" and re su lted  in  severe 
competition and f in a l l y  "crime, wars, and murders." John Locke, in 
tu rn ,  s ta ted  th a t  " I f  a government v io la ted  th i s  t r u s t ,  the con trac t 
was broken, and the people had the r ig h t  to rebel in order to  re s to re  
t h e i r  freedom" (Robertson, 1981:501).
In the modern socio log ical explanation o f  authorized power and 
the  whole problem o f  leg itim acy, the fu n c t io n a l i s t s  ( e . g . .  Parsons, 
1964:1968; Davis and Moore, 1945; Blau, 1964) observe th a t  what a c tu a lly  
leg it im a tes  the exerc ise  o f  power is  the  common consensus among people
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who assign power to  a group of in d iv id u a ls ,  the e l i t e s ,  to  manage soc ie ty . 
This consensus is  based on the shared values and norms which are i n t e r -  
an lized , through the process o f  s o c ia l iz a t io n ,  in to  the individual 
' Consciousness and are  o b je c t i f ie d  in c e r ta in  in s t i t u t i o n s ,  agencies, and 
arrangements. However, i f  "the ru les  o f  the  game" are v io la ted  by the 
e l i t e s ,  power d e f la te s  and legitim acy i s  challenged. Hence, a "revolu­
tionary  change" fo r  order re s to ra t io n  and re in teg ra t io n  i s  l ik e ly  
(Johnson, 1966). In th is  sense, c o n f l i c t  is  seen as "functional"  in 
th a t  i t  reproduces socia l cohesion and leg it im izes  the use of power 
anew (Coser, 1956). However, c o n f l ic t  and c lass  s trugg le  are not the 
ru les  of socia l l i f e  but the exception.
On the o th e r  hand, the rad ica l c o n f l ic t  th e o r is t s  ( e .g . ,  Marx 
and Engles) view socia l l i f e  as h i s to r i c a l l y  immersed in c o n f l i c t  and 
overwhelmed by the  p rac tice  o f power in the hands of the few. Therefore, 
power i s  not leg i t im a te  by the p rev a il in g  values fo r  they pe rta in  to  the 
dominant c la s s .  Power w ill  be authorized only a f t e r  a sweeping s o c i a l i s t  
revolution e ru p ts .  Such a d ra s t ic  change w ill put power in the hands 
of the many, the whole socie ty  in f a c t .  Hence, in the u lt im a te , c o n f l ic t  
w ill have no place in the tru e  communist so c ie ty .  Dahrendorf (1959) 
understands th a t  c o n f l ic t  is  an e v e r - la s t in g  phenomenon and is  based 
on several i n t e r e s t s ,  including economic concerns. Under c e r ta in  con­
d i t io n s ,  discussed before , a p o l i t i c a l l y  deprived group overthrows the 
powerful suppressive group and, in tu rn ,  i s  i t s e l f  u ltim ate ly  challenged. 
Therefore, those who r i s e  to  power in co n f l ic tu e l  s i tu a t io n s  are taken 
fo r  granted as leg it im a te  ru le rs .  In th i s  con tex t. Wrong (1980:89) 
charges th a t  c o n f l i c t  th e o r is t s  "neg lect the  in te ra c t io n  and mutual
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in fluence  between legitim acy and coercion in s tab le  power r e la t io n s ."
More s p e c if ic  c r i t ic is m  is  developed in the  sense t h a t ,  i f  in a given 
c o n f l ic t  s i tu a t io n  t h a t  subordinates view the au th o r i ty  re la t io n sh ip  
as leg it im a te ,  why then would they ever want to  rebel?  (Turner, 1973).
However, the  n a tu re ,  the l im i t s ,  and the  m anifestations of the  
exercised  power as a u th o r i ty ,  as well as the  question of leg it im a t io n /  
d e - leg it im a tio n , remain paradoxical in e th i c a l ,  ph ilosoph ical,  and
socio log ica l terms, both in  theory and in p ra c t ic e .  Nevertheless, in
the  f in a l  analysis  o f  t h i s  problem two questions must be advanced. F i r s t ,
a re  power wielders agreed-upon through a s o c ia l ly  defined measures
( e .g . ,  f ree  e lec t io n )?  Second, i f  such arrangements are  i n i t i a l l y  lacking, 
do those who assume power ( e .g . ,  through a m il i ta ry  coup) j u s t i f y  and 
le g a l iz e  th e i r  accession to  power by means o f ,  say, honest s a c r i f i c e  
fo r  the cause o f  the people? With a l l  these  considerations in mind, the 
legitim acy of the  Shah's ru le  i s  approached and assessed. To be su re ,  
t h i s  assessment is  attempted in the r e a l iz a t io n  th a t  "A lack o f  na­
t i o n a l i s t i c  legitim acy had not proved important enough to  bring down 
the  regime, but i t  had denied i t  depth o f  support" (Cottam, 1979:338).
The Shah's c r i t i c s ,  c i te d  throughout, have, in one way or 
ano ther ,  pointed out "the U n co n sti tu tio n a l i ty  Side" of h is  regime, 
charac te r ized  by abuse o f  a u th o r i ty .  K issinger notes th a t  "In Iran , 
whatever the dynasty, the  a u th o r i ty  o f  governance u lt im ate ly  resided  
in the  remoteness o f  the  emperor: i t  was h is  h is to r ic a l  s tre n g th ,  as 
well as h is  weakness. Without doubt the Shah was an a u th o r i ta r ia n  ru le r .
. . . This was for a time the  source o f  h is  s trn eg th  j u s t  as i t  became 
l a t e r  a cause of h is  downfall" (1979:1259). The "emperor," in f a c t ,
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t raversed  the defined l im i t s  o f  his  a u th o r i ty  and used fo rcefu l means to  
reach h is  ends. However, "Force is  a source o f power, but i t  can have 
longer range e f fec t iv en ess  only when i t  i s  linked to  a p r in c ip le  o f  
legitimacy" (Huntington, 1968:269). To s c r u t in iz e  the  Shah's misuse 
o f  power, i t  i s  a lso  necessary to  go back to  the promulgation o f  I r a n 's  
f i r s t  C onstitu tion  o f  1906-7, which envisaged a " co n s ti tu t io n a l  monarchy" 
modeled on the Belgium t r a d i t io n .
In 1921, the  Shah's f a th e r ,  through a B rit ish -des igned  coup, 
took over and l a t e r ,  in  1925, overthrew the  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  dynasty and 
founded his own. This attempt may be considered the f i r s t  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
v io la t io n  on behalf  o f  the Pahlavis. Yet, i t  might be argued th a t ,  
given the  incompetency o f  the Q ajar 's  regime, t h i s  v io la t io n  was 
" functional"  fo r  the people and hence to le r a b le .  But t h i s  can be con­
t r a s te d  with the f a c t  th a t  (1) Reza Shah's coup was backed by foreigners  
and th e re fo re  caused fo re ign  in te rven tion  in  national d e s t in y ;  (2) the 
coup was a lso  based on personal ambitions and specu la tions  and not 
necessa r i ly  the i n t e r e s t s  o f  the people, as i t  l a t e r  became evident.
One may a lso  counter-argue th a t  Reza Shah i n i t i a l l y  proposed 
a republic  system fo r  I ran ,  but the  Iran ians  ". . . p re fe rred  to  main­
ta in  the  t r a d i t io n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  of the  Shah, and f e l t  t h a t  i t  would 
p ro te c t  t h e i r  in te r e s t s "  (Shmuelevitz, 1979:37). Therefore, even a f t e r  
his coup, had Reza Shah kept in  l in e  with the  C onsti tu tiona l p r in c ip le s ,  
h is  regime would not have been judged as d ic t a to r i a l  and suppressive 
and hence i l l e g i t im a te .  But he did not. This saga, however, might 
be considered as a h i s to r ic a l  base of the  questionable  l e g a l i t y  of 
Reza Shah's successor, his son, the Shah.
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As the A llie s  overthrew Reza Shah and appointed h is  son as his  
s u b s t i t u t e ,  the second consitu tiona l v io la t io n  occurred. S p e c if ic a l ly ,  
although t h i s  power transform ation in favor o f  the  "Crown Prince" was 
c o n s is te n t  with the C o nsti tu tion , in the  process, the w ill  o f  the Iranian 
people was not incorporated a t  a l l .  Hence, in p r in c ip le ,  th e  Shah's 
accession to  power might be considered as imposed and f i n a l l y  unconsti­
tu t io n a l .  However, from the la te  1940 's, th e  Shah began to  exercise 
power beyond the l im i t s ,  and th i s  is  why he was fo rce fu l ly  persuaded 
to  ru le  c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly .  But, as was the  case with h is  f a th e r ,  the 
Shah too executed a coup, th i s  time designed by the  Americans, and 
c a s t  down the legal and popular government o f  Massadeq. Further , as 
a lso  s ta te d  in the h i s to r ic a l  n a r ra t iv e ,  th e  Shah a l te re d  the  Consti­
tu t io n  th ree  tim es, two o f  which had nothing to  do with the  cause of the 
people but ra th e r  were in the in te r e s t  o f  the  Pahlavi family.
P r a c t ic a l ly ,  the  Shah denied the  co n s t i tu t io n a l  r ig h ts  of the  
people in the sense o f  freedom of speech, p re ss ,  and assembly. These
r ig h ts  were assumed and emphasized in the  1906-7 C onsti tu tion  (A rtic les
8-25). He accumulated and monopolized a l l  the  execu tive , l e g i s l a t i v e ,  
and ju d ic ia l  powers and deprived his  opposit ion , indeed h is  people, o f  
these  scarce but valued resources . By Zonis' analogy, " I f  government 
in th e  United S ta tes  i s  in  theory 'o f  the  people, by the  people and
fo r  the  peop le , '  and in  p ra c t ic e , 'o f  the  people, by a p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e ,
fo r  th e  peop le , '  as a l l  governments to  some degree must be, then 
the  government o f  Iran h i s to r i c a l ly  has been and continues to  be 
'o f ,  by, and fo r  the e l i t e ' "  (1971:133). In f a c t ,  in add ition  to  th e i r  
depriva tion  of  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r ig h t s ,  the  Iran ians  were a lso  required
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to  comply to  what was not C o n s ti tu t io n a l ,  the  best example o f  which was 
the  compulsory membership in the Shah's Resurgence Party.
Id eo log ica lly , th e  Iran ians , including the overwhelming majority 
o f  the  re l ig io u s  leaders  and scho la rs ,  did not r e je c t  the  i n s t i tu t io n  
o f  the  co n s t i tu t io n a l  monarchy, and the promulgation o f  I r a n 's  f i r s t  
C onstitu tion  i s  the  evidence to  c i t e .  This i n s t i t u t i o n ,  o f  course, 
must recognize the  r ig h t  o f  the  re l ig io u s  leaders  to supervise l e g i s ­
la t io n  and to  accomodate them to  the Islamic p r inc ip le s  as discussed 
e a r l i e r .  However, the  rad ica l S h ii te  re l ig io u s  leaders and scholars 
hold th a t  monarchy and the royal power a re  n e ith e r  d ivine nor inherent.
I f  he i s  in o rder, the  monarch, as an authorized individual and not a 
paramount soverign, functions  only on t r u s t  on behalf o f  the  Hidden 
Imam. S t i l l ,  since in the  absence o f the  Hidden Imam the most q u a l i ­
f ie d  re l ig io u s  leaders  a re  in charge o f the  well-being of the  Islamic 
community, the monarch should operate  under th e  guidance o f  these  
le ad e rs ,  as surrogates (Algar, 1966; 1981; 6-23). Therefore, in th i s  
theo log ical scheme, the  Shah may be le g it im a te  as an individual ru le r ,  
and t h i s  legitimacy does not descend autom atica lly .
From another viewpoint, Della Fave (1980:956) sp ec if ie s  th a t  
leg itim acy can apply to  a t  l e a s t  four system lev e ls :  (1) the  p a r t i ­
c u la r  s ta tu s  occupied by a p a r t ic u la r  individual or group, (2) a 
p a r t i c u la r  regime in  power, (3) a p a r t i c u la r  system of p o l i t i c a l  
economy, and (4) a p a r t i c u la r  system o f  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n .  In Shah's 
Iran , as discussed prev iously , the problem o f  leg it im a tion  i s  re levan t 
a t  each system le v e l .  This contention may a lso  be sp ec if ied  by these 
concluding remarks. F i r s t ,  the Shah, e g o t i s t i c a l ly ,  l ik e  Charles I o f  
England , Louis XVI of France, Nicholas II  o f  the C zaris t Russia,
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and th e  Manchu ru le rs  o f  China, idea l ized  him self and id e n t i f ie d  h is  
legitim acy with a self-proclaim ed "divine mission" or the "mandate of 
heaven." In e f f e c t ,  he emphasized what had caused the co llapse  o f  
Louis XVI more than two hundred years ago: L 'E ta t ,  C 'es t Moi.
Second, as ind ica ted  before , "In th eo ry ,  the Shah observed the
1906 C o n s t i tu t io n .................... In p ra c t ic e ,  th e  C onstitu tion  only served
as a p o in t o f  reference when convenient" (Graham, 1979:131). In th i s  
re sp ec t ,  " H is to r ic a l ly ,  the  Pahlavi regime had come to  power and main­
ta ined  i t s  pos it ion  by coups, thereby crushing the  democratic opposition 
and v io la t in g  the C onstitu tion" (H alliday, 1979b:85). Third, as Revel 
(1981:22) observes ". . . when i t ' s  a question of the Third World, the 
notion o f  re sp o n s ib i l i ty  d isappears completely. This i s  even more un­
j u s t i f i e d  in th a t  the la rge  m ajority  o f  Third World leaders  took power 
through coups or adm inister t o t a l i t a r i a n  systems. Their so le  l e g i t i ­
macy, i f  one can ca l l  i t  t h a t ,  is  derived from re s u l t s  obtained a f t e r  
the fa c t"  (emphasis added). In the Shah's case , the  " r e s u l t s , "  as 
d iscussed e a r l i e r ,  were not promising. Hence, on the ground o f  the 
above reasoning, the Shah f a i le d  to  take a c t io n  to  leg it im ize  h is  own 
take-over and the ensuing t o t a l i t a r i a n  t r a d i t i o n .
Fourth, the Iran ians as a whole did not break the  c o n s t i tu ­
t io n a l  "con trac t"  based on which I r a n 's  n a t io n - s ta te  could opera te .
This was ev iden t in the  n a t io n a l i s t  movement o f  the ear ly  1950' s ,  the 
upris ing  o f  the ea r ly  1960 's , and the  e a r ly  claims during the episodes 
o f  1978-9 in  which what was demanded a t  f i r s t  was the re tu rn  to  the 
1906 C onsti tu tion . Indeed, i t  was the monarch who v io la ted  the  so - to -  
speak "consensus." F i f th ,  by power abuse and economic mismanagement
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the  regime widened the gaps between social c la sses  and favored the  upper 
over th e  lower s t r a t a .  In such a s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  system, both equal 
opportunity  and p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r ty  were in sh o r t  supply, but economic 
in e q u a l i ty  was p reva iling .
F in a lly ,  as Time (1978:40) in d ic a te s ,  the  Shah ". . . ruled 
as an abso lu te  monarch--no m atter how worthy h is  goa ls—and depended 
on rep ress iv e  measures to  keep the d isp ara te  fo rces  in l in e .  . . , "  and 
i t  i s  sa id  th a t  "Power c o r ru p ts ,  but abso lu te  power corrupts  abso lu tely"  
(Lord Acton). Thus, one i s  j u s t i f i e d  in concluding th a t  the  Revolution 
of Iran was " . . .  preceded by an erosion o f th e  legitim acy o f  the 
e x is t in g  system" (Robertson, 1981:480), and as Lipste (1959:78) no tes ,
"a c r i s i s  o f  legitim acy i s  a c r i s i s  o f  change" (emphasis added).
In the  following sec t io n ,  th i s  d iscuss ion  o f the causes o f  the  
Iranian Revolution, as demonstrated in the  n a r ra t iv e  and a n a ly t ic a l  
accounts, w ill be concluded.
D. Conclusion
In the  preceding accounts, i t  was argued th a t  the Shah’s regime 
was id e n t i f i e d  with f ive  fundamental f a i l u r e s  ( i . e . ,  economic in ju s t i c e ,  
p o l i t i c a l  oppression, ideological i l l u s io n ,  e th n ic  s t r a in ,  and l e g i ­
timacy c r i s i s )  a l l  o f  which must be considered as independent v a r iab les  
th a t  j o i n t l y  brought about the  Revolution. The cu rren t concern is  
th re e fo ld .  F i r s t ,  what, in  a narrow but in c lu s iv e  scheme, put an end 
to  the Shah's era? Here, the  Shah's modernization w ill be assessed  and 
emphasized as the  s ix th  and l a s t  va riab le  t h a t  a lso  contributed  to  his 
downfall. Second, how did the  Shah's seemingly healthy and a c tu a l ly  
wealthy s t a t e  f a i l  f i n a l ly  to  r e s i s t  or curb the  challenge? Here,
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two fa c to r s  w ill be considered—the Shah's a l i e n a t io n , and the  s trength  
o f  h is  opposition . I t  i s  hypothesized th a t  each of these  fac to rs  
f a c i l i t a t e d  but, unlike th e  o ther v a r ia b le s ,  did not cause the  Revolution. 
F in a lly ,  where, a f t e r  a l l ,  does the "Islamic Revolution o f  Iran" f i t  
in th e  socio log ica l theory o f  social movements in the  cu r re n t  time?
l.The All-encompassing Cause o f  the  Revolution
In t h i s  co n tex t ,  some re lev an t specu la tions  about the  overall 
cause o f  th e  Shah's co llap se  can be arrayed as follows.
(1) Bordewich (1980:66) holds t h a t ,  "The Shah t r i e d  to  t e l e ­
scope hundreds o f years  o f  Western s o c ia l ,  economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and 
( im p l ic i t ly )  psychological change in to  a forced march o f  tw enty-five 
y e a rs .  . . . But by so doing he put in motion the same forces  th a t  
generated f a s c i s t  reac tion  in  Europe, dynamic cap ita lism  corroding
a p ass iv e ,  t r a d i t io n a l  economy; the indiv idualism  in sp ired  by in d u s t r i a l ­
iz a t io n  competing with a c o n s t r ic t in g  web o f  medieval re la t io n sh ip s ;  
indigenous values versus half-understood foreign  ones."
(2) Rejecting charges th a t  h is  human r ig h ts  emphasis c o n t r i ­
buted to  the  Shah's d epar tu re . P resident C arter (1981:A10) notes th a t  
"I d o n ' t  be lieve  th a t  the  po in t out o f  the  need to honor the  r ig h ts  of 
h is  people caused h is  downfall. I f  th e re  was a cause, i t  was because 
he f a i l e d  to  honor the demands of his  own people."
(3) Cottam (1979:354) understands th a t  "Mass re c e p t iv i ty  for 
p r o te s t ,  even v io len t p r o te s t ,  aga ins t  the  regime was a consequence
of th e  deep economic d i s t r e s s  most Iran ians  were experiencing because o f  
the uncontro lled  in f l a t io n ."
(4) Fischer (1980:190) in d ica te s  t h a t  "The causes o f  the
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rev o lu t io n ,  and i t s  tim ing , were economic and p o l i t i c a l ;  th e  form of 
the  revo lu tion , and i t s  pacing, owed much to  the t r a d i t io n  o f  re l ig io u s  
p r o te s t . "
(5) Graham (1980:229) observes th a t  "There are a t  l e a s t  s ix  
main reasons why t h i s  dramatic end came with such bewildering speed:
(1) The Shah underestimated the  s tren g th  o f  the  opposition. (2) The 
concessions made to  th e  opposition were always too l a t e  and inadequate.
(3) All h is  actions  suffe red  from a lack o f  c r e d ib i l i ty .  (4) His close 
t i e s  with the U.S. allowed n a t io n a l i s t  sentiment to  brand him as an 
American puppet. (5) His personalized system o f  government prevented 
him from d is tancing  him self from any e r ro r s  committed. (6) He became 
too dependent upon the  m il i ta ry  fo r  h is  survival and was sub jec t  to  
t h e i r  hard line  p re ssu re ."
(6) Halliday (1979b:88) notes th a t  " . . .  the major causes of 
the revo lu tion  were (a) the  denial o f  the  basic p o l i t ic a l  r ig h ts  o f  the 
population and (b) the  so c ia l ly  unequal and increasing ly  in e f f i c i e n t  
manner in which th e  s t a t e  was managing the  economy."
(7) Abrahamian (1980:23) contends th a t  " . . .  the s t ru c tu ra l  
tensions  were aggravated not by modernization per se , but by the way 
the  modernization was implemented and by the  fa c t  th a t  the  c a p i t a l i s t  
method of modernization invariab ly  b e n e f i ts  the r ich  more than the  r e s t  
o f  so c ie ty ."
(8) Godsell (1980:12) argues t h a t  "By the second h a l f  of the 
decade, the p o l i ty  o f  Iran proved unable to  d igest  what was being forced 
on i t .  Boom turned in to  bus t ."
(9) K issinger (1979:1259) emphasizes th a t  "One of the prime
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causes o f  h is  [the  Shah 's] d i s a s te r ,  in f a c t ,  was th a t  he modernized 
too ra p id ly .  . . . "
(10) Ledeen and Lewis (1980:9-11) speculate  these  "symptoms
of c r i s i s "  which "Iran had long demonstrated:" demographic d is lo c a t io n ,  
lack o f  adequate socia l se rv ice s ,  the growth o f  a h o s t i le  middle c la s s ,  
growing v a c i l la t io n  o f  the  Shah, concentration o f  s treng th  in the  hands 
of the re l ig io u s  le ad e rs ,  and the h o s t i l i t y  o f  the Bazaaris.
(11) Summarizing a one-thousand-page report  by the S ta te  
Department on the revo lu tionary  c r i s i s  o f  I ran , Armstrong (1980:A18) 
draws th i s  conclusion: "Affluence re s u l t in g  from the 1973-74 quadru­
p ling  of  the  p rice  o f  o i l  had led to  doub le -d ig it  in f l a t io n ,  caused mass 
migration from the countryside to  the c i t i e s ,  served to  break up the 
t r a d i t io n a l  Islamic family and cu l tu ra l  p a tte rns  of the  so c ie ty ,  and 
had ra ised  expectations throughout the populace. Furthermore, wide­
spread corruption in high places was u n iversa lly  recognized and despised. 
While such corruption 'u n fo rtu n a te ly  permeated the t r a d i t io n a l  Iranian 
socia l system,' i t  nevertheless  made many in  the socie ty  'c y n ic a l , '  
according to  the r e p o r t ."
(12) Lenoczowski (1980:224) notes th a t  "The Iran ian  p o l i t ic a l  
system was subjected to  serious s t r a in s  th a t  could b r ie f ly  be ca lled  
' th e  King's dilemma,' namely how to reconcile  modernization in the 
social and economic sec to rs  with a lack of corresponding progress in 
the p o l i t i c a l  sec to r ."
(13) Robertson (1981:614) notes th a t  " . . .  a sudden in flux  
o f o i l  wealth, combined with an au to c ra t ic  Shah's attempt to  transform 
a backward nation in to  an in d u s tr ia l  and m il i ta ry  power, provoked a
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v io le n t  rev o lu tio n , a re tu rn  to  more fundam entalist re l ig io u s  p r in c ip le s ,  
a new fe e l in g  of Iran ian  nationalism  and continuing p o l i t i c a l  disagreement 
between t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s  and those favoring renewed m odernization."
(14) In her Roots o f  Revolution, Keddie (1981:276), approaches 
th e  Iran ian  Revolution h i s to r i c a l ly  and reaches t h i s  conclusion:
Iranians see foreign powers, which recen tly  meant 
mainly the Americans, as using them fo r  t h e i r  own purposes; 
always fo r  I r a n 's  s t r a t e g i c  ro le ,  with the hope of scoring  gains 
and stopping gains by o th e rs ,  c h ie f ly  the  Russians; in  the 
tw en tie th  century fo r  o i l ;  and by the  Americans a lso  as a gen­
darme o f  the region aga ins t  Soviet o r  Communist advance. Foreign 
governments have a lso  promoted ex p o rts ,  investments, construc ­
t io n  o f  in f r a s t ru c tu re ,  and banking by th e i r  na tiona ls  o r  govern­
ments in  Iran . As noted , huge American sa le s  o f  arms, a g r i ­
c u l tu ra l  equipment, high technology, and consumer goods 
in ad v er ten t ly  helped d e s ta b i l iz e  I r a n 's  economy and con tribu ted  
to  the Iran ian  Revolution. However wrong and se l f -d e fe a t in g  
have many of the  methods and p o l ic ie s  used in Iran s ince th a t  
Revolution, one may understand the  I ran ian s '  widespread d es ire  
to  demonstrate t h e i r  re lease  from foreign  control and foreign 
ways and to  bu ild  up an economy, so c ie ty ,  and cu ltu re  t h a t  are 
independent or f r e e ly  in terdependent, ra th e r  than subordinate 
to  Western powers.
As the above specu la tions  about the  roo t cause o f  the  Iranian 
Revolution suggest, th e  Shah's "d isas te r"  (which in fa c t  means the  ex­
p losion o f  the  Revolution) was caused by the  Shah's modernization e n te r ­
p r is e .  This endeavor was associated  with both foreign dominance and 
in te rn a l  displacement. Therefore, the  Shah's modernization must be 
assessed  in  regard to  i t s  n a tu re ,  scope, d i r e c t io n ,  and more importantly 
i t s  co s t  fo r  the Iran ian s .  But f i r s t  i t  i s  useful to  understand the 
meaning o f  modernization as i t  i s  linked to  in d u s t r ia l i z a t io n .  Lauer 
(1978:19) notes th a t  ". . . i n d u s t r ia l i z a t io n  may be viewed as an essen­
t i a l  economic p a t te rn  o f  development, while modernization re fe rs  to  the 
soc ia l  and p o l i t ic a l  changes th a t  are o f te n ,  though not n e ce ssa r i ly ,  
a sso c ia ted  with in d u s t r i a l i z a t io n ."
However, a t  both scholarsh ip  and leadersh ip  le v e ls  the two
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phenomena have mostly been b lurred  by ideological viewpoints or p ra c t ic a l  
p e rp le x i t ie s .  I t  is  then not su rp r is in g  to  contend th a t  "Rare were those 
who suggested th a t  modernity is  not necessa r ily  synonymous with progress 
o r  w ell-be ing , o r  t h a t  the concepts o f  economic development curren t in 
the  West—where quick material gain is  often the only v a lid  c r i t e r i o n — 
does not n e ce ssa r i ly  correspond to  the tru e  needs and in te r e s t s  of 
developing nations"  (Rouleau, 1980:1). In t h i s  l in e  o f  debate , the 
Shah was not only among the leading ru le rs  of the Third World who were 
overwhelmed by the  ideal o f  in d u s tr ia l iz a t io n -m o d e rn iza t io n ,  but he a lso  
was the  ru le r  who took the leading ro le  in th i s  process. In his approach 
to  progress, growth, development, t e r r i t o r i a l  dominance, and regional 
in f luence , in d u s t r i a l i z a t io n  was a preoccupation per se . Meanwhile, 
what in d u s t r ia l i z a t io n  s ig n if ie d  to  him was modernization par excellence.
The Shah's in d u s t r ia l i z a t io n  was (1) id e n t i f i e d  with poor 
in f r a s t ru c tu re  and h e s i ta n t  p lanning, (2) ch arac te r ized  by assembly and 
not manufacturing e n te rp r i s e s ,  (3) dependent on imported know-how and 
technology, and (4) developing a t  the  cost of the  co u n try 's  a g r ic u l tu re ,  
widening social gaps, and c u l tu ra l  disarrangement. I f  modernization in 
the  p o l i t i c a l  sphere, as Huntington (1966:378-414) holds, is  charac te rized  
by (a) ra tiona l a u th o r i ty ,  (b) increased p a r t ic ip a t io n  in the  p o l i t ic a l  
p rocess ,  and (c) d i f f e r e n t ia te d  p o l i t i c a l  s t ru c tu re ,  under the Shah's 
r u le ,  none of these  were met. National au th o r i ty  was, in f a c t ,  a 
c en tra l iz e d  and monopolized power; mass p a r t ic ip a t io n  was not allowed; 
and the  p o l i t i c a l  s t ru c tu re  symbolizing d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  in the  national 
s t ru c tu re  was confined to  a c la s s  of e l i t e s  who, in tu rn ,  were dominated 
by a s ing le  fam ily—the Pahlavis.
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What was worse, the Shah equated modernization with Westerni­
z a t io n .  Thus, h is  downfall must be a t t r ib u te d  to  the Westernization 
o f  a p re - in d u s t r ia l  so c ie ty  which was (and s t i l l  i s )  bound to  r e l ig io u s ,  
e th n ic ,  t r i b a l ,  n a t io n a l i s t i c  and h is to r ic a l  values from which i t  was 
traum atic  to  detach. These values, however, are  not n e ce ssa r i ly  con tra ­
d ic to ry  t o ,  or in c o n f l i c t  with, those o f  the Western s o c ie t i e s ,  though 
from the  l a t e  19th century  on they have been severely challenged by the 
West. With respec t to  European co lon ia lism , a l l  the Muslim so c ie t ie s  
were co lon ia lized  d i r e c t l y  or otherwise. A fter achieving t h e i r  inde­
pendence, these  s o c ie t ie s  were encompassed by neo-colonialism  and imper­
ia l ism , with inc reas ing  economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  m i l i t a ry ,  technological 
and c u l tu ra l  influence over and in te rfe ren ce  in domestic arrangements. 
Imperialism imposed i t s e l f  on the developing nations as a successor to 
co lonia lism  with a legacy o f  the same ta s t e s  and in te r e s t s  but with 
d i f f e r e n t  means and devices. In t h i s  course , the United S ta tes  o f  
America has played the  dominant ro le .  Hence, the I ran ia n s '  pun "Miras- 
Khwar-e I s t e a m a r " ( i . e . , the  h e ir  of colonialism ) which appeared as a 
t i t l e  of the Iran ian  w r i te r  Mehdi Bahar (1344/1965).
While the  circumstances were not conducive, the  Shah, with 
" fu l l  speed" but in the  "wrong d i re c t io n ,"  pushed his so c ie ty  toward a 
W estern-style of l i f e ,  mode of production, and even psychological co lo ra­
t io n .  As an example, ". . . in  his  r e le n t le s s  pu rsu it  o f  W estern-style 
modernization, the  Shah imported f le e t lo a d s  o f  western technology and 
te ch n o c ra ts ,  but he was never able to  t r u s t  h is  own people to  run his 
new socie ty"  (Newsweek, 1980:41). The Shah's motive fo r  Westernization 
was deeply rooted in h is  own p e rsona li ty .  I t  is  observed th a t  "Though
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his Swiss schooling helped to  r id  him of h is f a th e r 's  provincialism , i t  
c rea ted  a cu ltu ra l  schizophrenia—an admiration fo r  and fa sc ina tion  with 
Western c u l tu re ,  technology and in s t i t u t i o n s .  . . (Graham, 1979:58).
Moreover, while the  Shah had a Western-type so c ie ty  in mind, in 
r e a l i t y  h is  W esternization was the ". , . Americanization o f  Iranian 
m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e s "  (Paarberg, 1978:24), and, in the end the 
Americanization o f the  Iran ian  socie ty  a t  la rge . The Shah's moderniza­
t io n ,  as Ahmad (1979:7) observes, went through two stages "both under 
American tu te la g e ."  In the  f i r s t  stage (1949-1968), "with the  b r ie f  i n t e r ­
regnum o f  Mossadegh's government," the modernization o f  the  police fo rces ,  
gendarmerie, bureaucracy, and the armed forces took place and the SAVAK 
was created,. In the  second s tage , which began in 1970, I r a n 's  moderni­
za tion  witnessed a transform ation in to  a "regional power."
By h is  a c c e le ra t in g  move toward a Western and e sp ec ia l ly  an 
American way o f l i f e ,  the  Shah undermined the  t r a d i t io n a l  a t t i tu d e s  and 
ideological in te r e s t s  o f  the  n a t io n a l i s t ,  r e l ig io u s ,  and communist who 
fo r  several reasons could not a ffo rd  Americanization. The re lig ious  
community saw the  American symbolic and p rac tica l  influence on Iran, 
as well as the American secularism, as uprooting and in to le ra b le .  This 
was j u s t i f i e d  and re in forced  by two f a c to r s .  F i r s t  was the  Americans' 
p e r s i s te n t  support of Is rae l  a t  the cost o f  the  "oppressed P a lestin ians"  
whose dilemma has become more a humanitarian problem than e th n ic ,  r e l i ­
g ious, o r  id eo lo g ica l .  Second, the p reva il ing  fea tu re  o f  the  American 
c u l tu re  th a t  d e l ib e ra te ly  was imported to  Iran was e th ic a l ly  corrupt 
and lacked substance even by American standards. Asked "How was Western 
c u l tu re  perceived in Iran during the  Shah's ru le ,"  C lin ton , a s p e c ia l i s t  ,
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on Iran , rep lied  th a t  " I t  was almost a c a r ic a tu re  o f  our c iv i l i z a t io n  as 
we know i t .  When I was th e re ,  i t  was embarrassing to  see Peyton Place 
in Persian . Movies and TV gave the  impression th a t  the  West was t o t a l l y  
m a te r i a l i s t i c ,  s e l f i s h ,  and consumer-oriented. Conservative Iranian 
Muslims saw t h e i r  sons and daughters corrupted by these  influences from 
the  West. They f e l t  powerless" (1979:70-71).
The n a t io n a l i s t  I ran ian s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  those who were associated  
with Mossadeq's n a t io n a l i s t  movement and the National Front, had a lready  
suffe red  from the  CIA's l iq u id a tio n  of  the movement and t h e i r  re s u l ta n t  
p o l i t i c a l  c a p t iv i ty  a t  the  hands o f  th e  regime. Needless to  say, the 
L e f t i s t  groupings, from whatever ideo log ical o r ig in s ,  could not adhere 
to  and did not accept the Iranian so c ie ty  to  be modeled on a c a p i t a l i s t  
system in which the ownership o f  the  means o f  production was in the 
hands of the e x p lo i ta t iv e  bourgeoise c l a s s ,  and a t  th e  cost  o f  the 
p r o le ta r i a t  labor and t o i l —as the Marxist premises go. Thus, the  Shah's 
version o f modernization in te n s i f ie d  the  resentment and the u n if ica t io n  
o f  d i f f e r e n t  forces  who, in sp i te  o f  t h e i r  p a r a l l e l s ,  had a lso  th e i r  
own ideological c o n tra s ts  (which surfaced immediately a f t e r  the take­
over) .  In o ther words, " . . .  the a sso c ia t io n  o f  the  Shah's regime with 
Western c u l tu re ,  commodities, and v ices brought on a t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  
reac tio n  even among many former W esternizers, which often  took an Islam ic 
form" (Keddie, 1980:182).
In te re s t in g ly ,  as ear ly  as 1961 the Shah h im self professed and 
s t re sse d  the problems endemic to  a b lind  W esternization. He wrote
E specia lly  in a country with such venerable t r a d i t io n s  
as ours , rapid  change n a tu ra l ly  brings i t s  s t r a in s  and s t r e s s .
These are the  p r ices  we must pay fo r  Westernization and moder­
n iza t io n .  But I do not propose th a t  we abandon our great h e r i ­
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tage . On the co n tra ry , I have every confidence th a t  we can 
enrich  i t .  Religion and philosophy, a r t  and l i t e r a t u r e ,  
science and c ra f tsm ansh ip --a ll  w ill  prosper more as we develop 
our economy so th a t  the  common people o f  th i s  anc ien t land 
can enjoy a l l  the e s s e n t ia l s  o f  l i f e .  Instead o f  the  few f lo u r ­
ishing a t  the  expense o f  the  many, they w ill do so with the 
many. Se lec t ive  and jud ic ious  W esternization can help us 
towards the goal o f  democracy and shared p ro sp e r i ty ;  th a t  i s  
why I r e fe r  to  i t  as our welcome ordeal (Pahlavi, 1961:160).
But, in the  course o f  a c t io n ,  he came to  th ink  o f  Iran as an 
"ex trapo lation" o f  th e  contemporary Western socie ty  and attempted to  shape 
i t  t h a t  way. He ignored c e r ta in  f a c t s  in th e  progress. F i r s t ,  the path 
to  socia l change i s  n e i th e r  un id irec t io n a l  nor i s  Western socie ty  the 
u lt im a te  a l te rn a t iv e  to  social evo lu tion  ( e .g . ,  Moore, 1967; Hoffer, 1952; 
Lerner, 1958; Rander, 1967; Etzioni and E tz ion i, 1973; Lauer, 1978;
Vago, 1980). Second, "Where the West has had some four c en tu r ie s  to  
a d ju s t  to  the fa r-reach in g  t r a d i t io n  from an agrarian  to  an in d u s tr ia l  
so c ie ty ,  the non-Western world has had a bare century in  which to  absorb 
an in trud ing  and dynamic c iv i l i z a t io n "  (Benda, 1971:39). With the 
increasing  p e tro d o l la r s ,  the Shah thought th a t  such a time gap would be 
bridged e a s i ly  and ab rup tly . Third, "The momentum o f  change which in 
the  West had la rg e ly  stemmed from w ith in ,  has been imposed on the non- 
Western world from without" (Benda, 1971:38). Even i f  managed acu te ly ,  
such an imposed change would cause psychological displacement and material 
d iscrepancies .
Fourth, even i f  the Western soc ie ty  is  taken fo r  granted as a 
pro to type, i t  cannot be traced  and copied without regard to  domestic 
s i tu a t io n a l  arrangements. Otherwise, the p re - in d u s tr ia l  so c ie ty  cannot 
re c e iv e ,  a s s im i la te ,  and d ig e s t  whatever is  in jec ted  to  i t .  Realizing 
th i s  problem, even some of the Shah's in t e l l e c tu a l s  repeated  and prin ted
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in h is  press: "Danish-e Garb Ne Rah-e Hal hay-e Gharbi" ( i . e . ,  Iran
must adapt the West's science and technology but not the  Western so lu ­
t io n s ) .  By his in d iv id u a l i s t i c  am bitions, ideological i l l u s io n ,  and 
th e  erroneous d e f in i t io n  o f  the s i tu a t io n ,  the Shah, consciously or 
o therw ise , attempted to  destroy , and to  an ex tent destroyed , a socio­
economic s t ru c tu re  and a r e l ig io u s ,  c u l tu r a l ,  and p o l i t i c a l  system th a t  
required  adjustment to  the r e a l i t y  o f  today but not displacement. In 
t h i s  i l lu s o ry  approach, he, in f a c t ,  overexploited the  tendencies of many 
Iran ian  s t r a t a  who looked fo r  and were exposed to  modernization. Mean­
w hile , he overlooked the  a t t i tu d e s  o f  o ther s t r a ta  who could not trade  
t h e i r  own way o f l i f e  fo r  th a t  o f  o th e r s —The Westerners. The Shah's 
e n te rp r is e  then exemplified the contention th a t  "Destruction of the  
t r a d i t io n a l  s t ru c tu re  is  f a r  e a s ie r  than the long reconstruc tion  of the 
new, a period in which few ru le rs  have survived fo r  long" (Bayne, 1965:
256)—but the  Shah has not.
Therefore, i t  was d is ru p tio n  and not consistency th a t  shocked 
th e  Iranian soc ie ty  to  break down i t s  p o l i t ic a l  system. Such a d es truc ­
t i v e  shock was, in f a c t ,  the  cos t  o f  the  Shah's modernization. I t  is
argued th a t ,  in the developing n a tio n s ,  the cos t  o f  modernization is  
ch arac te r ized  by ". . . th e  d isrup ted  t r a d i t i o n s ,  the  breakup o f fam ilies  
and v i l la g e s ,  the  impact o f  vast economic and social fo rces  th a t  can 
n e i th e r  be understood nor adapted to  in terms o f in h e r i te d  wisdom and 
ways of liv ing"  (B e lla ,  1976:337). I r a n 's  Shah was no exception.
N evertheless, whatever the  substance, the  magnitude, the 
d i r e c t io n ,  and the  co s t  of the  Shah's modernization, i t  a c tu a l ly  con­
t r ib u te d  to  the awakening o f Iranians and f in a l ly  the  breakdown o f the
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regime I t s e l f .  Although, the Shah's modernization s t ra in e d  the Iranian 
people, i t  fu r thered  th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  consciousness and ra ised  th e i r  
expectations fo r  a b e t t e r  l i f e  or a d i f f e r e n t  path to  th e  ex is t ing  
r e a l i t i e s ,  including the r e a l i t y  o f  modernization.
With t h e i r  r ic h e s ,  h is to r ic a l  backgrounds, growing middle- 
c la s se s ,  expanding education, and spreading communication a t  both 
national and in te rn a t io n a l  le v e l s ,  th e  Iranians came to  r e a l iz e  fu r th e r  
th a t  Iran would be b e t t e r - o f f  under a new p o l i t ic a l  system. I t  is  
observed th a t  the  "revolu tion  o f  r i s in g  expectations" has become possible  
by means o f  "The spread o f communication system throughout the world. . . . 
And so the economic achievements, prim arily  those in the  consumer sec to r ,  
which once had been a d i s ta n t  dream or not even thought o f ,  are now 
passionately  demanded" (B r ig i t te  Berger, 1979:50-51).
Peter Berger and a sso c ia te s  view the in troduction  of moderniza­
t io n  into the t r a d i t io n a l  so c ie t ie s  and the reaction  to  i t  as a "C ollis ion  
o f  Consciousness." They note , "The new images of modernity inev itab ly  
c o l l id e  with the symbols, values, and b e l ie f s  of t r a d i t io n a l  society" 
(1973:141). However, in the 1970s, the Urban Iranian so c ie ty ,  which 
c o n s ti tu ted  some 50 percent of the  to ta l  population, was not a t r a d i t io n a l  
soc ie ty  s t r i c t l y  a ttached to  the pas t  and shocked by the  fu tu re . Nor 
was i t  a t  the gates o f  in d u s t r ia l iz a t io n  as the Shah and h is  e l i t e s  
exaggerated. R e a l i s t i c a l ly ,  i t  was in a t ra n s i t io n a l  phase from t r a d i ­
tiona lism  to in d u s tr ia l ism , though not in  a Western sense.
I t  might be adduced and argued th a t  radical socia l  changes are 
le s s  l ik e ly  to  occur in two types o f  s o c ie t ie s ,  in d u s t r ia l iz e d  and 
t r a d i t io n a l .  In the in d u s tr ia l  s o c ie t ie s  rapid economic and technolo-
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log ica l  changes are  occurring and the  democratic t r a d i t io n  i s  in progress. 
As a r e s u l t ,  . .aggressive  movements in a democracy seldom reach 
revolu tionary  proportions p a rtly  because th e re  are so many o f them"
(May, 1943:191). In t r a d i t io n a l  s o c ie t i e s ,  s im i la r i t i e s  are  prevalent, 
c la ss  s tru c tu re  i s  mostly in ta c t ,  stratum consciousness, in  ac tive  
p o l i t i c a l  terms, is  absen t,  and, in a word, s t ru c tu ra l  conduciveness 
fo r  rad ical ac tion  is  not present. Hence, i t  is  in the process of ta k e -o ff  
from trad it io n a l ism  to  in dus tr ia liza t ion /m odern iza tion  th a t  the proba­
b i l i t y  of revo lu tionary  changes might be sought. This l ike lihood  is  
subs tan tia ted  by the f a c t  th a t ,  in  the t r a n s i t io n a l  phase, so c ie t ie s  
undergo, with a d i f f e r e n t ia te d  preference , a th re e -fo ld  process simul­
taneously: (a) the  maintainence o f the  o ld , (b) the  adoption of the new, 
and (c) the accommodation and coordination o f the two. In t h i s  course, 
a government's s t r a t e g i c  f a i lu re  may cause a d ra s t ic  reac tio n  by the 
involved socie ty .
F ina lly , the  Shah's modernization, fo r  reasons discussed above, 
i s  considered as the s ix th  and l a s t  v a r iab le  which in te ra c ted  with the 
o ther f ive  variab les  ( i . e . ,  economic in ju s t i c e ,  p o l i t i c a l  repress ion , 
nonexistence o f unify ing  ideology, e thn ic  s t r a in ,  and leg it im ation  c r i s i s )  
to  cause j o in t ly  the Revolution. This in te ra c t io n ,  however, was twofold.
On the  one hand, the Shah's modernization caused c u l tu ra l  a l ien a tio n  
and, on the o th e r ,  i t  helped the c u l tu r a l ly  a lien a ted  groupings to 
advance p o l i t ic a l  awareness, to fu r th e r  claim valued o f f ic e s  and 
resources , and to  in te n s i fy  th e i r  s trugg le  in the process. S t i l l ,  two 
more fac to rs  f a c i l i t a t e d  (though were not an o rig in  of) the  Revolution.
They are discussed below.
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2 .s treng th  versus Decay 
To shed more l ig h t  on the  Shah's co llapse  and the  occurrence of 
the Revolution, fu r th e r  speculations a re  necessary. To be sure , these 
a re  not assoc ia ted  with the root o f  th e  Iranian  Revolution but are 
connected with (a) th e  regime's f a i l u r e  to  r e a l iz e  the  progressing 
d issidence  (and to  d if fu se  i t  d e l ib e r a te ly ) ,  and (b) the  growing s treng th  
o f  the  opposition . Both o f  these  fa c to r s  f a c i l i t a t e d  but did not cause 
the  Revolution.
a .The Shah's A lienation . In t h i s  con tex t, i t  might be asked why 
the  Shah fa i le d  to  r e a l iz e  and r e s i s t  a sweeping change while (1) he 
defined himself as "supermodern" r u l e r ,  (2) he ru led a r ich  and wealthy 
country , (3) he id e n t i f ie d  with a soc ie ty  th a t  had been associated  (and 
some may argue adapted to )  a monarchical t r a d i t io n  fo r  2500 years ,  (4) 
he enjoyed the support o f  a strong well-equipped army, (5) he was backed 
by w ell-educated, experienced, and so p h is t ica ted  p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e s  and 
tech n o cra ts ,  (6) he had adequate access to  domestic and foreign channels 
o f  inform ation, conventional and in te l l ig e n c e ,  and (7) he was favored by 
an in te rn a t io n a l  o f f i c i a l  support symbolic and/or instrum ental?
The answer might be sought in two r e a l i t i e s —the growing s treng th  
o f  h is  opposition , o t  be discussed l a t e r ,  and h is  own increasing  a l ie n a ­
t io n  to  be discussed immediately. The Shah's a l ie n a t io n  must be considered 
as a s e l f -c re a te d  and, a t  the  same tim e, an imposed phenomenon. With 
the passage o f  tim e, and in the guise o f  developing a charism atic  per­
so n a l i ty ,  he i s o la te d  the  masses from him self and was u lt im a te ly  segre­
gated from them. Based on his  e g o is t ic  a t t i tu d e s  and dynastic  tendencies , 
he a lso  d i f f e r e n t ia te d  h is  own e l i t e s  from the masses and from himself 
as w e ll—and was f i n a l ly  deprived o f t h e i r  own loyal c r i t i c i s m .  In the
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Shah's Iran , "Higher o f f i c i a l s  did not give a damn about the  impact of 
t h e i r  statements on the  people, only about the reac tio n  o f  the  Shah" 
(Hoveyda, 1980:26).
Immersed in and impressed by h is  absolutism and unrealism, the 
Shah's e l i t e s  followed h is  lead s ig h t le s s ly .  Otherwise, t h e i r  own 
personal and c o l le c t iv e  in te re s t s  would not be re a l iz e d .  In th is  a l i e ­
nation-proven s i tu a t io n ,  the Shah may be seen enthroned in the  "Peacock 
Throne" as an "irony tower," overwhelmed by imperial dreams and guarded 
by domestic and fo re ign  sec re t  s e rv ice s .  The Throne was not guarded by 
the  masses, the  in v in c ib le  power and the  viable source o f  support and 
le g i t im a tio n .  In B i l l ' s  words, "He ru led  as a lion  and a fox, but in 
the process he fo rgo t the needs o f  h is  people. He in su la ted  and iso la ted  
h im self from them, and in the end he f a i le d  to  build  the  p o l i t ic a l  
in s t i t u t i o n s  and socia l t r u s t  they needed" (1980:37).
The Shah saw the "surface calm" th a t  was maintained by his 
s e c re t  serv ices  as a co n s is ten t  s t a b i l i t y  and t r a n q u i l i t y  fo r  which he 
ought to  be acknowledged by foreign  f r ien d s  and a l l i e s ,  and the Iranians 
as w e ll .  Without ev ident h e s i t a t io n ,  the  Americans from President 
Roosevelt to  P res iden t C arter (ca. 1953-1978), p ra ised  the  Shah's alleged 
so l id  leadersh ip  in Iran and h is  leading  ro le  as an a l ly  in  the region.
The Russians, from th e  ear ly  1960s, though fo r  d i f f e r e n t  reasons, held 
de ten te  with the  pro-Western Shah's regime. From the e a r ly  1970s, the 
Chinese jo ined  forces to  acknowledge th e  Shah and to  welcome warmly his
s i s t e r s ,  his Prime M inister Hoveyda, and the Queen in Peking. In
September 1978, when the  Shah was on the  verge o f  Collapse, China's
Hua Kuo-feng toas ted  the  Shah in his Ni varan Palace in Tehran. Throughout
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his reign,many Arab lead e rs ,  as i s  s a id ,  "from Moracco to  Bahrain," 
enjoyed a p o l i t i c a l  honeymoon with the  Shah even a t  the cost o f  th e i r  
claimed t e r r i t o r i a l  and national r ig h ts  in the  "Arabian Gulf" and in 
"Arabistan" (Khuzistan). Very freq u en tly , the Arab Kings, Sultans, 
P res id en ts ,  and Shiekhs, consorted a t  the  Shah's court  and praised "His 
Imperial M ajesty." A ltogether, these  external worldwide supports, 
reco g n it io n s ,  and admirations, in  tu rn ,  caused and in te n s i f ie d  the 
Shah's ignorance o f  and a l ie n a t io n  from I r a n 's  ongoing in te rna l r e a l i t i e s .
I t  must be considered th a t  some o f h is  adv isors  were aware of 
the na ture  of the  regime's s te a d in e ss ,  but "No one dared to  t e l l  the  
t ru th  to  the  Shah. . . .As h is  image o f himself grew, he stopped con­
su l t in g  even h is  c lo se s t  a d v ise rs .  . . .Even in  June 1978, when there  
was r io t in g  in  Tehran, the Shah s t i l l  had no in k lin g  of the  bloody 
revolu tion  to  come" (Diane K. Shah, 1980:41). Further, in the same 
time, he commented th a t  "Nobody can overthrow me. I have the support 
o f  700,000 tro o p s ,  a l l  the  workers and most of the  people. . . .1 
have th e  power, and the opposition  cannot be compared in s treng th  with 
the government in any way" (Pah lav i, 1978:37). However, in December 
1978, in response to  a foreign re p o r te r  about where h is  supports were,
the Shah simply sa id  "Search me" (Abrahamian, 1980:26).
Yet, i t  seems th a t  h is  a l ie n a t io n  prevented even his be la ted  
awakening to  r e a l i t y .  Pointing to  the Iranian people, in December 1979, 
the  Shah wished th a t  ". . . i f  only I had had th re e  more years .  . . .
Then they would have known what i t  was I wanted to  do" (Pahlavi, 1979:47),
However, interviewed by ABC Television Network and speculating  about 
the cause o f  h is  co llap se ,  he prophesied th a t  " I t  might be an end of
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e ra "—the  monarchical t r a d i t io n .  With Nickle (1979:102) one may draw 
the conclusion th a t ,  "Having progressively  cut himself o f f  from r e a l i t y  
by h is  own au to c ra t ic  s ty le ,  his  world or gaudy v is ions  quickly co llapsed ."  
Thus, the  Shah's a l ien a tio n  from r e a l i ty  may be seen as a d e f in i te  
kind o f  " fa lse  consciousness" caused by u n re a l i s t ic  "d ef in it ion  o f  the 
s i tu a t io n ."
b. The Shah's Army. Since the ro le  of the armed forces in the 
revo lu tionary  process i s  of specia l concern in the l i t e r a t u r e ,  some l i g h t  
must be c a s t  on the case of the Iranian am y. In general terms, some 
w rite rs  and revo lu tionaries  s t r e s s  the d is lo y a lty  o f  the  army as a deci­
s ive  f a c to r  fo r  successful rev o lu tio n s ,  and o thers  claim th a t  the  masses 
can win a revolution in s p i te  o f  the loya lty  o f  the armed forces (R usse ll ,  
1974:80). According to  R ussell ,  the view of the f i r s t  group has been 
proved c o rrec t  and the contention o f the second group "has to  be re jec ted"  
(1974:80). However, the s i tu a t io n  o f  the Iranian armed forces demonstrates 
an in te r e s t in g  example.
The Shah's army did  not deny loya lty  to  the  Shah u n t i l  h is  
abdication  was in e v i ta b le ,  nor did i t  side with the opposition from the 
ear ly  s tage o f  challenge to  weaken the regime's p os it ion . Although th i s  
army f in a l l y  defected and s p l i t ,  th i s  occurred only a f t e r  the Shah's 
forced abdica tion . This defection  or "n eu tra l i ty "  can be explained 
by (1) constant mass pressure  on the army and (2) the army's ideological 
i l lu s io n  a f t e r  the  Shah's absence. S p e c if ic a l ly ,  the ideological base 
o f  the  Iranian armed forces was simply the o f f i c i a l  slogan of lo y a lty  
to  God, Shah, and homeland. After the Shah's hum iliating departu re , 
which was caused by some s ix  months of s t r e e t  demonstrations, the army
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l o s t  i t s  personalized ideological stand. In the  absence o f  the  "Bozorg 
Farmandeh" ( i . e . ,  the  h igher commander, the  Shah), the army f e l t  no 
urgent and j u s t i f i a b l e  commitment to  defend a kingless Crown.
Further, "God" and "homeland," the  o ther two ideo log ical p r in ­
c ip le s ,  were s t i l l  th e re ,  and, o f  course, were more than ever before 
advocated and expressed with revo lu tionary  fe rvor throughout the  long- 
la s t in g  demonstrations. This s i tu a t io n  i s  comprehensible in  th a t  the 
Iran ian  revolu tionary  movement developed i t s e l f  as a n a t i o n a l i s t - p a r t i o t i s t  
( i . e . ,  a n t i - im p e r ia l i s t ) ,  humanitarian, and re l ig io u s  movement with which 
the  Shah's regime was not id e n t i f ie d  and by which i t  was charged and 
challenged. In t h i s  process, the army was not only a ffec ted  by a 
leadersh ip  vacuum and an ideological bewilderment but was a lso  emotional­
ized by popular humanitarian, r e l ig io u s ,  and n a t io n a l i s t  va lues , which 
awakened and inv ited  i t s  m il i ta ry  s p i r i t  to  s ide  with God, so c ie ty ,  and 
the  homeland.
Hence, the armed forces received what was a c tu a l ly  denied to 
them under the Shah's ru le :  a popular but independent ch a rac te r .  Under 
the  Shah, the  army, l ik e  any o ther i n s t i t u t i o n ,  was emphasized as "the 
Shah's army" and an achievement o f  the  Pahlavi dynasty. I t  was a lso  
supervised by the American "adv ise rs ."  F urther ,  from 1945-6 onward, the 
army was not involved in any national o r  in te rn a tio n a l  c o n f l ic t  to  
demonstrate pa tr io t ism  and develop p o p u la r i ty .  F in a lly ,  a f t e r  the  Shah's 
supreme commandment, the  armed forces were co n tro lled  by m il i t a ry  e l i t e s  
who were widely separated from the people, the  o rig inal source fo r  
support and popu larity .
In f a c t ,  i t  was t h i s  mutual process o f  demoralization-emotion-
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a l iz a t io n  th a t  functioned fo r  the  people but aga ins t  the Shah and a t  
l a s t  disarmed the  army or neu tra l ized  i t .  However, a c lo se r  observation 
reveals  a th re e - fo ld  erosion in the armed fo rces .  In t h i s  co n tex t ,  a 
group o f  the  Shah's Generals, represented  by Azhari and Ovisee, were 
quick to  f le e  th e  country even when the  Shah was s t i l l  th e re .  The next 
group, represen ted  by Fardoust and Gharabaghi, were coopted simply to  
save t h e i r  l i v e s .  The l a s t  group, represented  by Badrai, Rabyi, Khosru- 
Dad, and N aji ,  l o s t  control of the  s i tu a t io n  while remaining somewhat 
loyal to  the  regime but not n ece ssa r i ly  to  the Shah. All the generals  
o f  t h i s  category were k i l le d  o r  executed throughout the process of 
massive take-over .  Concerning the  "n e u t ra l i ty "  o r  " d is lo y a l ty ,"  "defec­
tion"  or "cooption" o f  the army, some confusion s t i l l  e x is t s  most o f  
which r e la te s  to  the so -ca lled  Huyser's mission (pp. 115-6 ) .  However, 
Su ll ivan , the then U.S. Ambassador to  Tehran, emphasizes th a t :
. . . Washington d ire c ted  a s e r ie s  o f  ta c t ic a l  a c tions  
which succeeded in placing the  re l ig io u s  and the  m il i ta ry  in 
antagonism to  each o the r .  This re su l te d  in the  consequences 
we c o n s is te n t ly  warned abou t-- the  d is in te g ra t io n  o f  the  m i l i ­
ta ry  and th e  spewing of perhaps one hundred thousand weapons 
in to  the  hands o f  the  s t r e e t  gangs (1981:273-274).
I t  should a lso  be noted t h a t  in terms o f the social composition 
o f  the  middle-rank o f f ic e r s  and the  c o n sc r ip ts ,  the  Iranian armed forces  
belonged to  the  middle and lower c la s se s  which co n s t i tu ted  the  backbone 
of the opposit ion . This observation can be subs tan tia ted  by the  
f a c t  th a t  the  army was not d isso lved  or massively purged a t  the level 
o f  the  mentioned ca tego ries  which comprise the m il i ta ry  establishm ent 
o f  pos t-rev o lu tio n a ry  Iran . Needless to  say , the middle and lower 
c lasses  rep re sen ta t io n  in the Shah's army was a r e s u l t  o f  the  on-going 
social m obility  in  socie ty  which a c tu a l ly  did not exclude the i n s t i t u t i o n
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of the Shah's armed fo rces .
F in a l ly ,  i t  must be concluded th a t  the way in  which the  revolu­
tionary  masses throughout months o f  s t r e e t  demonstrations approached 
the  army had a determining e f f e c t .  This approach was a su i ta b le  empi­
r ic a l  example of R u sse ll 's  suggestion th a t :  "Revolutionaries should
t r y  to  make i t  more l ik e ly  th a t  the armed forces personnel can id e n t i fy  
with them. This might be f a c i l i t a t e d  by f r a te rn iz in g  as much as possible  
with them, i n f i l t r a t i n g  the  armed fo rce s ,  playing down the  d ifferences  
between themselves and members o f  the armed forces in s tead  of maximizing 
these  d i f fe ren c es .  . ." (1974:87). (As will be seen in  Chapter VII,
The Egyptian Army, demonstrated a t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  p ic tu re  in  the 
process o f  p o l i t i c a l  challenge and radical social change.)
In the  context of the  socio log ica l theory o f  rev o lu tio n ,  the 
Shah's decay and departu re , on h is  own p a r t  and not n e ce ssa r i ly  on be­
h a l f  o f  h is  opposition , can be explained by the c la s s ic  th eo r ie s  of 
A r is to t le  (1980), Ibn Khaldun (1967), Pareto (1963), and Michels (1967). 
A ltoge ther, these  th eo rie s  suggest th a t  a f t e r  t h e i r  accession to  
power and the  congruent s a t i e t y ,  the  e l i t e s  become a p a th e t ic ,  i n d i f ­
f e r e n t ,  s e l f i s h ,  and co rrup t.  The u ltim ate  end of t h i s  gradual "dys- 
functioning" i s  t h e i r  decay and f a i lu r e  to  c i r c u la t e .  This kind of 
exp lana tion—th a t  i s ,  a l ie n a t io n  from the masses and erosion from 
w ith in—however, is  only one way o f  approaching the co llapse  o f  I r a n 's  
old regime. D iffe ren t explanations should be traced  to  the  s treng th  
o f  the  reg im e 's  challengers .
c. The Strength o f  the Opposition. I t  is  not attempted here to  
c h a rac te r iz e  the  o rgan iza tion , th e  leadersh ip , o r  the  s t ra te g y  o f  the
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c o u n te re l i te s  in t h e i r  confronta tion  with the old regime. Rather, th is  
section in tends to  demonstrate wh^ re l ig io n  in Iran functioned both as 
a system o f  c u l tu ra l  values held by 98 percent o f  the population and 
as p o l i t ic a l  p r in c ip le s  on behalf  o f  c e r ta in  ca tegories  w ith in  t h i s  
population. Present concentration on re l ig io n  should be j u s t i f i e d  by 
the  f a c t  th a t  (1) the  Iranian Revolution has, o f f i c i a l l y ,  been defined 
Islam ic, and (2) i t s  re l ig io u s  substance i s  a lso  acknowledged in the 
re levan t l i t e r a t u r e .  In t h i s  approach, however, two po in ts  must be 
considered. F i r s t ,  our emphasis on the  Islamic c u l tu re ,  and not 
n ecessa r i ly  the  Islamic p o l i t i c a l  ideology, is  based on th e  assumption 
th a t  "Most who p a r t ic ip a te d  in  the Revolution were f ig h t in g ,  not fo r  a 
c le r ic a l  r u le ,  but fo r  an ideological v is ion  of Islam th a t  embodied 
ideals  o f  a j u s t  socie ty  th a t  the s e c u la r i s t s  voiced in  o th e r  terms" 
(Keddie, 1981:272). Second, he re in , c u ltu re  is  viewed in  th e  Parsonian 
sense, th a t  i s ,  as a congerie o f  moral va lues , b e l i e f s ,  and symbols 
which shape the  so c ia l ly  perm issible  m anifestation  o f  the  a c to r s '
"drives o r needs" (1964:326-383).
To b e t t e r  understand the ideological l in e s  of the p a r t ic ip a n ts  
in the  Revolution, a sketch o f these  l in e s  i s  necessary. According to 
Abrahamian (1979:7-8), there  were f iv e  ca tegories  involved—the re l ig io u s  
conservatives, the  re l ig io u s  re a c t io n a r ie s ,  the re l ig io u s  r a d ic a l s ,  
the  secu lar reform ers, and the  secu lar  ra d ic a ls .  I f  by the  l a s t  
category—th a t  i s ,  the secu lar r a d ic a l s —the communist l e f t  i s  meant.
I t  includes a v a r ie ty  o f  small groups espousing loya lty  
to China (The Tufan, or Typhoon, group), Albania, o r  o th e rs ,  
and even a S o c ia l i s t  Workers' Party  o f  T ro tsky is t  o r ie n ta t io n .
I t  includes underground organ izations  professing adherence to  
Marxism and demanding autonomy fo r  the people 's  o f  the Kurdish,
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Arab, and Baluchi a reas ,  where these  organizations a re  a c t iv e .
I t  even includes secu lar  s o c i a l i s t  groupings, such as The 
National Democratic Front (an o ffshoot o f  the  C en tr is t  Nat­
ional Front, a secu lar  grouping th a t  opposed the  Shah in the 
la te  1950's and ea r ly  1960 's) . Perhaps the  most in te re s t in g  
groups on the l e f t ,  however, a re  the  Tudeh, the Fedaiyin-e 
Khalq, and the Mojahedin-e Khalq (Chubin, 1980:2-3).
However, in l in e  with the  cu rren t  underlying assumption, the  
opposition i s  approached in terms of th ree  broad c a te g o r ie s—the r e l ig io u s ,  
the n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  and the Left. Since rad ica l p r in c ip le s  a re  a lso  
found in th e  re l ig io u s  and n a t io n a l i s t  c a teg o r ie s ,  the Left here would 
mean the communist l i n e ,  stemming from a l l  the in te l l e c tu a l  roots  
toge ther.  As Muslims by t r a d i t i o n ,  a l l  these  r e l ig io u s - s e c u la r  c a te ­
gories  id e n t i fy  with the Islamic cu l tu re  as a c u ltu re  o f  movements, 
rev o lu t io n s ,  rad ica lism , j u s t i c e ,  e q u a l i ty ,  Mahdism ( i . e . ,  Islamic 
Messianism), Jihad ( i . e . ,  holy war), and Shahadit ( i . e . ,  martyrdom).
The S h ii te  t r a d i t i o n ,  whose followers c o n s t i tu te  th e  m ajority  in Iran 
(and Iraq) but are the  minority worldwide, id e n t i f ie d  i t s e l f  with a 
h is to r ic a l  subjugation by the Sunni r u le r s .  Such a t r a d i t io n  had been 
taught o f f i c i a l l y  fo r  cen tu ries  in I ran ,  and was symbolized and r e ­
inforced by re l ig io u s  r i t u a l s  year round. Thus, Shiism, as i t s  f o l ­
lowers would argue, provides the  revo lu tionary  t r a d i t io n  of  Islam with 
more m ilitancy  and radicalism .
To be su re , the  present approach to  Islam as both cu ltu ra l  
values fo r  the  many and p o l i t i c a l  id ea ls  fo r  c e r ta in  c a te g o r ie s ,  does 
not overlook the ro les  of the  n a t io n a l i s t s  and the  L e f t i s t s  in the 
anti-Shah s t ru g g le .  However, fo r  reasons to  be discussed immediately, 
n e i th e r  nationalism  nor communism were strong and popular enough to  bring 
down the regime.
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In the case o f na tionalism  i t  should be emphasized th a t  na tiona­
l i s t  values a re  not a defined socio-economic ideology based on which a 
s p e c if ic  p o l i t i c a l  system and a concrete mode o f  production and d i s t r i ­
bution can be c rea ted ,  implemented, and maintained. The s ig n if ican ce  
and functioning o f  nationalism  should be traced  to  the  r e a l i t y  o f  o ther 
s i tu a t io n s .  For example, in times o f  c r i s e s  ( e .g . ,  wars, in te rn a tio n a l  
aggression, s e c e ss io n is t  movements), n a t io n a l i s t  sentiment couples with 
p a t r i o t i c  t r a d i t io n  to  accomplish o ffen s iv e ,  de fensive , o r  preemptive 
measures. Iranian nationalism  i s  no exception. The Iranian n a t io n a l i s t  
va lues , in d iv id u a l ly ,  were not only incapable of providing and promising 
a new socia l order but a lso  were inep t a t  m obilizing th e  Iran ian  masses 
fo r  p o l i t i c a l  challenge ag a in s t  the  Shah. The recen t h is to ry  o f  Iran 
provides so lid  evidence fo r  t h i s  contention .
F i r s t ,  the  Iran ian  C onstitu tional Revolution o f  the 19QOs 
was not n a t io n a l i s t  per se as some would argue, but a re l ig io u s -  
n a t io n a l i s t  movement. At l e a s t ,  a t  the leadersh ip  l e v e l ,  the movement 
was predominantly r e l ig io u s .  Second, the Mossadeq's n a t io n a l i s t  movement 
o f  the  ea r ly  1950s f a i le d  to  challenge the  Shah and h is  foreign support 
because i t  was denied support from the r e l ig io u s  and communist groupings. 
Third, the  National Front, the legacy o f the  n a t i o n a l i s t  Mossadeq, even 
u n ti l  the  eve o f  the  Revolution, id e n t i f ie d  i t s e l f  with the  re tu rn  to 
the 1906-7 C onsti tu tion—the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  monarchy. Yet, i f  executed 
p e r fe c t ly ,  th is  c o n s t i tu t io n  would very l ik e ly  be in the  hands of 
the  re l ig io u s  le ad e rs ,  e sp e c ia l ly  in the l e g i s l a t i v e  sphere. This, 
u l t im a te ly ,  downplays Iran ian  nationalism  in favor o f  Muslim universalism . 
(The new regime of Iran has approved of t h i s  p re d ic t io n —irre sp e c t iv e
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o f  what has been achieved in the p rocess .)
Fourth, the  leadersh ip  of I r a n 's  n a t io n a l i s t  movement, from 
Mossadeq on, has emerged from t r a d i t io n a l  f e u d a l i ty ,  chieftainhood, or 
a r is to c racy  which, id eo lo g ic a l ly ,  does not rep re sen t  the  in te r e s t  of 
the masses but r a th e r  i t s  own. In na tiona lism , in add ition  to  p a t r io ­
tism , the masses seek d i s t r ib u t iv e  ju s t i c e  in  both economic and p o l i t ic a l  
terms. I t  might be o f  value to  support t h i s  claim with a regional 
experience. After achieving th e i r  independence, the  leading Arab 
n a t io n a l i s t s  came to  r e a l iz e  th a t  (a) communism was f lou r ish ing  in 
t h e i r  so c ie t ie s  and (b) bare nationalism  could not p e r s i s t  to  function 
to  promote fu r th e r  id ea ls  and n a t io n a l i s t i c  in t e r e s t s  and to  re s to re  
o rder. Hence, o th e r  ideological p r in c ip le s  ( i . e . ,  p o l i t i c a l  democracy 
and socialism) were advocated and coordinated with the sentiment o f  
nationalism . Regardless o f  what has been gained in the course o f  
ac tio n ,  these  th ree  fundamental p r in c ip le s  formed Presiden t Nasser 's  
ideological s tandpoin t ( e . g . .  Nutting, 1972; Dekmejian, 1971), and have 
been the  p i l l a r s  o f  the  Arab S o c ia l i s t  Party ( e . g . ,  A'Ysami, 1977;
Farah, 1978).
F if th ,  with i t s  d iv e r s i ty  o f  n a t i o n a l i t i e s ,  t r i b e s ,  and loca­
l i t i e s ,  I r a n 's  na tionalism  could not (and cannot) develop countrywide 
rep resen ta tion  and support. As an in d ic a t io n ,  many Iran ian  ethnic 
and t r ib a l  groups took refuge in the communist and Islamic ideologies 
p r io r  to  and in the  wake o f the  Revolution. S ix th , while the Shah's 
na tiona lism -patr io tism  was in question, some p o l i t i c a l l y  confused, or 
economically p r iv i leg e d ,  or chauvin ist ( e . g . ,  the  P an -Iran is ts )  Persians 
understood him as the  rev iv e r  of the  Golden Age of P e rs ia .  They seemed
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to  maintain t h a t ,  although the Shah had overstepped his a u th o r i ty ,  
h is  "mission" was worthwhile. This understanding weakened the  n a t io n a l i s t s '  
a c tion  a g a in s t  the Shah. As an example, while the  National Front, from 
1953 on, was not allowed to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  the p o l i t ic a l  process, the 
P an -I ran is t  Party and i t s  o ffshoo t,  the  Iranian Party , were represented 
in  the  Shah's regime.
F in a l ly ,  in a c r i t i c a l  time, while the  fa te  o f  the  (1978-9) 
movement dependent on continuing j o i n t  ac tion  and s t r a te g ic  coord ination , 
the n a t io n a l i s t s  s p l i t .  Shapour B akhtiar , the  leader o f  the  Iran Party , 
a l i fe t im e  a f f i l i a t e  o f  the  National Front, was co-opted and inaugurated 
as the  Shah's new, and co inciden tly  l a s t .  Prime M inister . As Su ll ivan , 
the  then U. S. Embassador to  Tehran, n a r ra te s ,  Bakhtiar had acknowledged 
to  him th a t  he had intended "to ' s t e a l  the  revo lu tion ' from the a y a to l ­
lah . . . ,  to  confront the  revolu tion  and to  d isperse  i t s  challenge by 
the minimal use o f  m il i ta ry  force" (1981:235-234). This s p l i t  shook 
the re v o lu t io n a r ie s '  s trugg le  a t  the time and loosened the n a t io n a l i s t s '  
pos it ion  ever s ince . In sh o r t ,  fo r  a v a r ie ty  o f  c i r s s -c ro s s in g  reasons 
as well as the r iv a l ry  o f  the Islamic c u l tu re  and the communist in ­
c l in a t io n s ,  I r a n 's  nationalism  alone was incapable o f  bringing about 
the Revolution.
Concerning the  communist ideology, i t  should be noted t h a t  many 
Iranians owe a prominent o rgainzational experience to  I r a n 's  communist and 
the Tudeh (mass) P a r t i e s ,  formed in 1920, and 1941, re sp ec tiv e ly .  But, in 
Iran , communism had not been represented by only the pro-Moscow Tudeh 
Party , fo r  the re  had been independent and pro-Peking L e f t i s t  in c l in a ­
t io n s .  All the Iran ian  communist groupings were id e n t i f ie d  with s e l f -
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created and imposed s i tu a t io n a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which enabled them to 
provide a s trong ideological base in  the  country. F i r s t ,  in 1953, while 
the  s i tu a t io n  was c r i t i c a l ,  the  Tudeh Party ceased co llabo ra t ion  and 
denied i t s  v i ta l  support to  the Shah's celebra ted  cha llenger,  Mossadeq. 
This d e n ia l ,  in  tu rn ,  helped the Shah to  re s to re  order. "According to
Moscow, the  Tudeh had erred through in s u f f ic ie n t  understanding o f the
progressive c h a rac te r  of the  Mossadeq movement and l e f t  wing of the 
national bourgeoise" (Atkin, 1981:55). Such an e r ro r  antagonized the 
n a t io n a l i s t  Iran ians  and o ther supporters o f  Massadeq, including some 
rad ical re l ig io u s  leaders  and secu la r  f igu res  with re l ig io u s  a f f i l i a t i o n s .
Second, Moscow's healthy re la t io n s  with the  Shah, which deve­
loped from the e a r ly  1960s on, d isc red ited  the Russians and the  now 
outlawed Tudeh Party  on behalf o f  the  progressive fo rces . That i s  why 
Russia took a number o f  t a c t i c a l  s teps  to  improve and strengthen the 
base o f  i t s  a f f i l i a t e s  in Iran . The Russians reshuffled  the leadersh ip  
o f  t h e i r  c l i e n t  Tudeh Party , created  new p o l i t i c a l  groups, including 
the Iranian People 's  Democratic Union (founded in 1978), began to  s ide  
with the  movement a f t e r  the co llapse  o f the Shah was imminent, and, in
some ways, encouraged th e i r  a f f i l i a t e s  to put up with the  re l ig io u s
ca tego rie s . Atkin observes th a t  in the episodic revo lu tionary  ac tiv ism , 
"Iranian  communists staged public demonstrations in which they ca r r ie d  
p ic tu res  o f  Khomeini, and the female p a r t ic ip a n ts  wore chadors while 
shouting slogans c r i t i c a l  o f  the Shah and the United S tates"  (1981:64).
With regard to  the  o ther communist groupsings, which were 
e i th e r  independent from Moscow or Peking or belonged to  one or the 
o th e r ,  fu r th e r  fa c ts  were observed, a l l  o f  which ind ica ted  the  i n a b i l i t y
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of communism. F i r s t ,  a l l  these  groups emerged from the 1960s on, and 
hence they had a h is to ry  o f  experience, s t ru g g le ,  and m obilization 
e f f o r t s  too sh o r t  to  make them able to  achieve a popular and e f fe c t iv e  
support. Second, they a l l  evolved out o f  student c i r c l e s ;  t h e i r  le ad e r­
sh ips , though based on rad ica lism , were overridden by the t r a d i t i o n a l ,  
o ften  moderate, r e l ig io u s  and n a t io n a l i s t  lead e rs .  Third, s ince these  
groups attempted armed s tru g g le ,  they went underground where, in f a c t ,  
they were born. This s i tu a t io n ,  in tu rn ,  caused them unpopularity  with 
the  masses who were unprepared fo r  armed confron ta tion  with the regime. 
Through the  s t a t e  media, some bloody even ts , in which innocent people 
got h u r t ,  were also  used aga ins t  and blamed on the a c t i v i s t s .  Fourth, 
the  SAVAK, from the very beginning, was ab le  to  i n f i l t r a t e  in to  the  
g u e r r i l l a ' s  networks and t h i s ,  among o th e r  setbacks, caused them in te rna l 
c o n f l ic t ,  segmentation, o r  l iq u id a tio n  a t  the level o f  leadersh ip .
F i f th ,  on occasion, members o f  these  groups recanted , and a t  
o ther times even co llabo ra ted  with the  Shah's regime. Needless to  say, 
t h i s  conduct shook the  in fa n t  base o f  rad ica l activ ism , which was 
e s s e n t ia l ly  t ru e  in the L e f t 's  case. S ix th , the  Shah's media d irec ted  
two m oral-ideological charges agains t these  a c t i v i s t s  both o f  which 
hurt th e i r  repu ta tion . One was the permissive sexual a t t i tu d e s  and 
conduct among a c t i v i s t  males and females. The o ther was th e i r  ideo lo ­
gical fa l la c y  of Islam ic-M arxist, s ign ify ing  an unhappy marriage between 
the s p i r i t u a l i s t i c  Islam and the m a te r i a l i s t i c  Marxism. F in a lly ,  while 
some communist groups had sh if te d  a t te n t io n  from the "opportunist"
Moscow to  the "uncompromising" Peking, from the  ear ly  1970s, Mao and the 
Shah's developing diplom atic  re la t io n sh ip ,  as discussed prev iously ,
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took them by su rp r ise .
Thus, "The Marxist Left has been hurt in the l a s t  ten  years 
by the  f a c t  t h a t  the  Soviet Union and the  People 's Republic o f  China 
have openly supported the Shah" (Abrahamian, 1979:8). Yet, as discussed 
above, ano ther problem weakened the  L e f t ' s  position  in the  country. As 
Chubin (1980:2) observes "The Left in Iran  i s  s p l i t  in to  a dozen s p l in te r  
groups w ithout any one dominant force  around which o thers  can coalesce ."  
I t  i s  not su p ris in g  then to  see the d isu n i ty  of the Iran ian  l e f t i s t  
forces  and t h e i r  in a b i l i t y  to  o r ig in a te  and lead a massive ac t io n --a  
rev o lu tion .
In such a devasta ting  s i tu a t io n  where (a) national independence 
was undermined by foreign in f luence , (b) e thn ic  r ig h ts  and local ru les  
were abolished  in favor o f  cen tra lism  and the  ru le  o f  the  Persian "so lid  
m ajo rity ,"  (c) r i s in g  expectations were f r u s t r a te d  by constan t p o l i t ic a l  
suppression and widening socioeconomic gaps, and f in a l ly  an all-embracing 
challenging ideology was lack ing , re l ig io n  came to meet a "functional 
necessity"  and to  play a reviving ro le .  In general terms, such a 
functioning  o f  re l ig io n  i s  c r y s ta l l i z e d  in social s o l i d a r i t y ,  desired  
socia l change, socia l c o n tro l ,  the  prov is ion  of meaning to  l i f e ,  and 
psychological support ( e .g . ,  Durkheim, 1965; Weber, 1958; Parsons, 1964; 
Glock and B e l la ,  1976; Berger, 1969). An Iranian h is to r ic a l  heroic 
s to ry  holds t h a t  "The to i le d  a f f l i c t e d  people always look forward to  a 
heavenly r e l i e f . "  From the Shah's regime and i t s  excessive rep ress ion , 
n e i th e r  the  e a r th ly  communism nor the  t e r r i t o r i a l  na tiona lism , whose 
scope o f  mass a t t ra c t iv e n e s s  was discussed  independently, could provide 
such a r e l i e f .  Religion did . In t h i s  re sp ec t ,  Bella (1964:356-374)
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in d ica te s  th a t  t r a d i t io n a l  s o c ie t i e s  tend to  be id e n t i f ie d  with p re sc r ip ­
t iv e  value systems; th a t  these  systems embrace almost every s i tu a t io n  in 
l i f e  and a re  always in teg ra ted  with u ltim ate  re l ig io u s  values; t h a t  any 
p o l i t i c a l  movement in these  s o c ie t i e s ,  where the  p o l i t i c a l  does not 
have independent leg itim acy, "must" take on a r e l ig io u s  co lo ra t io n .
To be sure , a fu n c t io n a l i s t  approach to  re l ig io n  as applied 
here does r e s t r i c t  the  c o n f l i c t  t h e o r i s t s '  d e f in i t io n  o f  r e l ig io n - -
a force th a t  i s  u t i l i z e d  and monopolized by a group to  govern or by a 
governing c la s s .  However, taken toge ther  the two approaches would 
provide a s u f f ic ie n t  explanation o f  the  values and functions of re l ig io n s  
in d i f f e r e n t  social s i tu a t io n s .
With t h i s  in mind, in the  case of Iran not only did re l ig io n  
function as both cu ltu ra l  values fo r  the many and a lso  p o l i t i c a l  p r in c i ­
ples fo r  c e r ta in  ca teg o r ie s ,  the  leadership  of the  Revolution was too 
dominated and shaped r e l ig io u s ly .  This leadersh ip  was mostly id e n t i f ie d  
with Ayatollah Khomeini whose leading s p i r i tu a l  ro le  must be sought in 
two r e a l i t i e s —a leadership  vacuum and his own overa ll  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s .  
"He was perceived as a t r a d i t io n a l  re l ig io u s  le a d e r ,  a man o f poverty , 
honesty, le a rn in g —everything th a t  the  Shah was not" (C lin ton, 1979:71). 
The lack o f an e f fe c t iv e  g enera lly  agreed-upon p o l i t i c a l  leadersh ip  as 
well as h is  ob jec t ive  p o l i t i c a l  s tand , humanitarian claim s, and s t a t e  of 
e x i le  helped Ayatollah Khomeini to  develop a s p i r i tu a l  and charism atic  
sense o f  leadersh ip  and leg it im acy -- to  lead the  Revolution.
Viewed as a system o f cu l tu ra l  values and norms, the  Islamic 
r e l ig io n  was genera lly  acknowledged by and manifested in  a l l  the  involved 
s t r a t a  in the  anti-Shah s tru g g le .  In p o l i t i c a l  ( id eo lo g ica l)  terms such
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a consensus was not in  o rd e r .  There were c e r ta in  ideological d ifferences  
between the rev o lu t io n a r ie s .  These d iscrepancies  were not r e la te d  solely  
to  the nature and the operation o f  the fu tu re  system, but they a lso  
concerned the  opposition s t r a te g ie s  and t a c t i c s  as well as the  approaching 
t r a n s i t io n  o f  power. As e a r ly  as May 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini empha­
sized to  a rep o r te r  from Le Monde th a t ,  "No, we will not co llabo ra te  
with th e  Marxists, not even to  overthrow the  Shah. . . .We are  opposed 
to  t h e i r  ideas; we know they  want to  s tab  us in  the back; and i f  they 
achieved power, they would e s ta b l ish  a d ic t a to r ia l  regime con tra ry  to  
the  s p i r i t  o f  Islam" (1978:20). On the o th e r  hand, in January 1978, 
p r io r  to  the  revolu tionary  take-over (February 11, 1979), the  Marxist 
Organization o f  the  People 's  Fedayin, in an "open l e t t e r "  to Ayatollah 
Khomeini, emphasized th a t
We announce with utmost frankness th a t  t h i s  revo lu tion  
and what has brought people uniform and united  in to  the s t r e e t s  
. . . i s  th e i r  increasing  economic, p o l i t i c a l  and national 
oppression. The s tru g g le  th a t  i s  taking place i s  fo r  freedom 
and l ib e ra t io n .  I t  i s  an a n t i - d i c t a t o r i a l ,  a n t i - im p e r ia l i s t  
and p a t r io t i c  s t ru g g le .  . . . Real freedom and democracy— 
which w ill be gained only a f t e r  the overthrow of imperialism 
and reac tio n —is  the  most revered a sp ira t io n  th a t  has united 
a l l  social s t r a t a  and c la sses  o f  the people from workers and 
s tuden ts  to  o f f ic e  workers, the  clergy and farmers and has 
brought them to  s tru g g le  to  death ag a in s t  the  regime.
I f  your understanding of the Islamic S h a r i 'a  and the  
Islamic movement means pers is tence  in th e  a n t i - im p e r ia l i s t  
and a n t i - d ic t a to r i a l  s tru g g le ,  we admire such an understanding 
by you because t h i s  s tru g g le  and s a c r i f i c e  has been the highest 
a sp ira t io n  and hope o f  a l l  Fedayi martyrs and comrades and has 
always been a p a r t  o f  t h e i r  sk in , f le sh  and blood. But i f ,  on 
th e  con tra ry , the purpose of appealing to  Islam and i t s  te ach ­
ings is  the  rep ress ing  of every opposing thought, form and 
opin ion , the  chaining o f  thought and revival o f  an in q u is i t io n  
and instruments o f  rep ress io n ,  the rev iva l of the slogan of 
"only one party" and th e  muffling of every freedom-seeking 
voice under the p re te x t  o f  defending the  Koran and the  S h a r i 'a ,  
we are  ce r ta in  every l i b e r a t i o n i s t  p a t r i o t  w ill condemn i t  and 
we believe th a t  the  people a lso  will r i s e  to expose and destroy 
i t  because they see i t  as a ploy in the hands of imperialism 
and reac tion .
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The n a t io n a l i s t  ca teg o rie s  f i r s t  were s a t i s f i e d  with the Shah's 
concessions which presumably would culminate in  the  e f fe c t iv e  execution 
o f the  1906-7 C onsti tu tion  and implied a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  monarchy. 
F in a lly ,  the  m ajority  o f  these  f a c t io n s ,  led by Karim Sanjabi, accepted 
the  f ig h t  to  the end, but the  m inority , led by Shapour Bakhtiar, were 
co-opted. However, i t  i s  a lso  observed th a t  the  " . . .  p ro -n a t io n a l is t  
sentim ent, i s  wider than the  pro-Khomeini sentim ent, but the  re l ig io u s  
segment r e a l ly  has an unquestionable hegemony over the  movement, by 
even those who are  not a l to g e th e r  comfortable with i t "  (Falk, 1979:9).
In t h i s  l in e  o f argument i t  i s  a lso  claimed th a t  "The a y a to l lah ,  a f t e r  
a l l ,  received very l i t t l e  support from his re l ig io u s  colleagues during 
his  long s trugg le  ag a in s t  the  Shah. The m ajority  o f  them, so many 
Vicars o f  Bray, jumped on the  revo lu tionary  bandwagon only four or 
f iv e  months before i t  r a l l i e d  to  v ic tory"  (The Economist, 1981:29).
Yet, Abrahamian comes to  the  conclusion th a t  among a l l  the  involved 
ca teg o r ie s  in  the  an ti-reg im e s tru g g le ,  . .The re l ig io u s  ones have 
so f a r  achieved most success in mobilizing a mass following, e sp ec ia l ly  
among the bazaar population, the  Shanty-town poor, and even the
in d u s t r ia l  p ro le ta r ia t "  (1979:8).
3. Why Religious Uprising?
In terms o f s c i e n t i f i c  c u r io s i ty ,  one may s e t  fo r th  the 
following question: Why, in t h i s  modern time where secularism is  
p re v a i l in g ,  does re l ig io u s  m ora lity  a s s e r t  i t s e l f  in  d i f f e r e n t  forms? 
Some ( e .g . ,  Glock and B e lla ,  1976; Berger, 1969, 1981) in d ica te  th a t  
th e re  i s  a "new re l ig io u s  consciousness" and a " re l ig io u s  rev ival"  
worldwide including the  modern in d u s t r ia l iz e d  United S ta te s .  In the
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Iranian case which i s  linked to  the  Muslim world as a whole, some fa c ts  
are observable.
F i r s t ,  in the  l a s t  two c e n tu r ie s ,  the  Muslims have been over­
ridden by the  God-fearing Western c o lo n ia l i s t - im p e r ia l i s t  fo rces .  This 
dominance has taken d i f f e r e n t  shapes and a t  the  p resen t i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  
held techno log ica lly . However, Islam shares c e r ta in  p r in c ip le s  with 
the C hris tian  West such as monotheism and the  r ig h t  o f  p r iv a te  ownership 
though with d e f in i te  d if fe ren ces  and not in th e  sense o f  the  American 
c a p i t a l i s t  t r a d i t io n .  These s im i l a r i t i e s  might be a major reason and 
ju s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  the idea th a t  "Islamic c iv i l i z a t i o n  and Western 
c iv i l i z a t io n  can and should merge in  order to  c re a te  a b e t te r  c i v i l i z a ­
t io n  fo r  a l l "  (H ejazi, 1979:13).
Second, from the e a r ly  1920s, the  Muslims have a lso  been, 
ideo lo g ica l ly  speaking, challenged and in some cases crushed by "Godless" 
communism. Again th e re  are  some th e o re t ic a l  agreements between the 
two ideologies. Hodgkin (1981:233-236) summarizes these  p a r a l l e l s  as 
(1) the  idea o f  the  in d iv id u a l 's  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  everything he/she 
does and b e lieves , (2) the  idea o f  ac tiv ism , (3) the idea o f  a u s te r i ty  
(or the  Islamic "Zuhd"), (4) the eg a li te r ian -d em o cra t ic  t r a d i t i o n ,
(5) the  idea of u n iv e r s a l i ty ,  and f in a l ly  (6) the  idea o f  h is to ry .
Hence, ". . .There i s  a s u f f ic ie n t  common th e o re t ic a l  ground between 
revolu tionary  Muslims and Marxists fo r  them to  be able to  work toge ther  
e f fe c t iv e ly  in many kinds o f  p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n s "  (Hodgkin, 1981:235).
Third, in i t s  own r ig h t ,  Islam considers  i t s e l f  not only a 
re l ig io n  in the  conventional sense and a f l e x ib le  way o f  l i f e  but a lso  
an e ternal universal system. This system i s  considered revo lu tionary
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However, so c io lo g ica l ly ,  i t  i s  understood th a t  t h i s  c h a r a c te r i s t i c  
o f  soc ia l  r e a l i t i e s  does not (and should not) in v a lid a te  the f a c t  th a t  
each category of  soc ia l  f a c ts  i s  id e n t i f ie d  with c lass  s im i la r i t i e s  
and q u a l i f ic a t io n s .  Hence, no social phenomenon is  unique to  the  
e x ten t  th a t  i t  overshadows the s im ila r  phenomenon and places i t s e l f  in 
a so c ia l  vacuum. This i s  why, fo r  in s tance , what, two cen tu ries  ago, 
pu t an end to the French old regime, has been id e n t i f ie d  with what, two 
c en tu r ies  l a t e r ,  put an end to  the Persian Empire, th a t  i s ,  "revolution" 
and no t " revo lt"  (as Louis XVI and the Shah would have d e s ired .)
To b e t te r  comprehend the Iranian Revolution, i t  might be 
noted th a t  th i s  rev o lu t io n ,  as Heikal (S a lin g er ,  1981:137) would argue, 
should not be wrongfully understood by Iran ians  or o thers as (a) a 
s e c ta r ia n  ( i . e . ,  S h i i te )  revo lu tion , (b) an Islamic revolution in  Iran , 
or (c) an Islamic revo lu tion  a l ie n  from the  s im i la r  phenomena in the 
Islamic world o r  human socie ty  a t  la rge . This revolu tion  i s ,  in f a c t ,  
a humanit a r i an-m illenarian  movement which, regard less  of i t s  d irec t io n  
and performance to  d a te ,  exemplifies man's b e l i e f  in and s trugg le  fo r  
e q u a l i ty ,  d ig n ity ,  and id e n t i ty  in rap id ly  changing circumstances.
This is  what the Muslims may l ik e  to  id e n t i fy  with the Islamic t r a d i ­
t io n  fo r ,  "Islam was e s tab lish ed  on the basis  o f  universal laws and 
human nature" (Richard, 1981:288). Therefore, the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution can be defined as an e x i s t e n t ia l  movement where such movements, 
as Turner (1964:390-405) observes, ch a rac te r iz e  the necessity  o f  our 
time and are concerned with the problems o f (1) man's a l ie n a t io n ,  (2) 
e x is ten ce ,  and (3) search fo r  a v iable  sense o f  s e l f .
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by i t s  advocates, and i t  i t  id e n t i f ie d  with and works fo r  equ ity , eq u a l i ty ,  
and ju s t i c e  in the  name of God, Allah, and by t r a d i t io n  o f  His Prophet 
Mohammad. The holy Qoran emphasizes th a t  "God does not change the  s t a t e /  
s i tu a t io n  of a people u n t i l  they change themselves inwardly" (X I I I : I I ) .  
However, with the  exception o f  the very dawn of Islam (seventh century, 
A.D.), the  Qoranic ru le s ,  except in small communities, have not been 
p rac ticed  as an econom ic/political system. In the  cu rren t time, i t  is  
a lso  observed th a t :
The various books and pamphlets on Islamic p o l i t i c s  
and economics w r i t ten  in the past twenty years do no t,  even 
had been followed in d e t a i l ,  provide an adequate basis  for 
s e t t in g  up a policy  th a t  could meet the  widely recognized 
needs fo r  socia l j u s t i c e ,  mass p a r t ic ip a t io n  in p o l i t ic a l  and 
economic l i f e ,  r ig h t s  o f  m inorities  and women, a t ru e ly  
functioning economy, and so fo r th  (Richard, 1981:229).
In a word, an au thentic  Islamic p rac tica l  order responsive to 
both the Qoranic p r in c ip le s  and the  complex world-system of today 
remained to  be seen in the fu tu re .
Fourth, in  th e  present century , though with c e r ta in  ideological 
d if fe ren c es ,  n e i th e r  the pro-Western nor the pro-Eastern Islamic s ta te s  
have been able to  overcome th e i r  socioeconomic problems, technological 
lag ,  and general underdevelopment. Each group i s  lagging behind the 
in d u s t r ia l  world and dependent on Western-Eastern technology and indus­
t ry .  Further, from 1917 on, the Muslims have a lso  been immersed in 
the question o f P a le s t in e  and the P a le s t in ian s  as a humanitarian, a 
r e l ig io u s ,  and fo r  the Arabs, a lso  a national question. In th i s  year, 
the B r i t ish  recognized the  crea tion  o f  a Jewish s t a t e  in Pa les t ine  which, 
a t  the  time, was under t h e i r  mandate. The Muslims would argue th a t  both 
the West and the East to g e th e r  might have been able to  s e t t l e  the
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question peacefu lly  i f  they had e n th u s ia s t ic a l ly  and jo i n t l y  approached 
the problem.
F i f th ,  within the  Muslim s ta te s  such ideologies as n a t io n a l i s t ,  
M arxist, soc ia l  democratic and c a p i t a l i s t ,  in d iv id u a lly  o r  j o i n t l y ,  
have not been able to  lay down a so lid  base fo r a promising fu ture  
charac te rized  by tru e  independence from foreign influence and sound 
d i s t r ib u t iv e  j u s t i c e .  In such a s i tu a t io n ,  the r e l ig io u s  Muslims came 
to  f u r th e r  r e a l i z e ,  as the  saying goes, th a t  "East and West, home is  
b e s t ."  In the M ili tan t Islam , Jansen (1981:198-90) comes to  the  same 
conclusion about the Muslim nations
In these n a t io n s ,  as in many o thers  o f  the  Third 
World, a l l  o ther a l t e r n a t iv e  forms of governance have been t r i e d  
and f a i l e d ,  e sp e c ia l ly  in the  a l l  important economic s e c to r .
One-man ru le ,  both monarchical and republican , has not produced 
the  desired  r e s u l t s ;  and i t  has been the  same with one-party 
regimes; so too with m u lt i-p a r ty  systems, both democratic and 
parliamentary and undemocratic and non-parliamentary; the  
m il i ta ry  men have t r i e d  t h e i r  hand with l i t t l e  success, and in 
some cases have ordered themselves back to  t h e i r  barracks; 
equally  unsuccessful have been the n o n -p o l i t ica l  technocra ts .
Since a l l  these a l te rn a t iv e s  have been used, and used up, what 
e ls e  i s  l e f t ?  In a way th e  Muslim coun tries  may count them­
selves  lucky th a t  they s t i l l  have l e f t  the  a l t e r n a t iv e  o f  
m i l i t a n t  Islam, an a l t e rn a t iv e  not av a i lab le  to  the  non-Muslim 
Third World coun tr ies .
4. Iden tify ing  the  Iranian Revolution 
Some argue th a t  ". . .d e sp ite  any p a r a l l e l s  or analogies  which 
might le g it im a te ly  be e s ta b l ish e d ,  the Iranian revo lu tion  i s  l ik e  no 
o the r .  I t  i s  sui generis  (Rouleau, 1980:2). But, in a socio log ica l 
perspec tive , where sociology in te g ra te s  o r  i n t e r r e l a t e s  s im i la r  social 
phenomena to  each o ther so th a t  a va lid  explanation of  r e a l i t y  i s  gained, 
any given socia l fa c t  might be considered an event o f  i t s  own kind.
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In sum, the  causes o f  the Iran ian  Revolution had been gen­
e ra te d ,  accumulated, and complicated throughout a h i s to r ic a l  process 
th a t  p e rs is te d  fo r  decades. The d iv e r s i ty  o f  the  roots  o f  t h i s  revolu­
t io n  i s  c ry s ta l l i z e d  in a blend of c u l tu r a l ,  r e l ig io u s ,  n a t io n a l ,  
e th n ic ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, le g i t im a tio n ,  and iden ti ty -based  values 
and v a r ia b le s  which to g e th e r  contributed  to  th e  c rea t io n  o f  a wide­
spread, profound tension  and unrest.  Such a s t r a i n ,  a t  the  time th a t  
the  Iran ian  wealthy soc ie ty  was undergoing a t r a n s i t io n a l  process from 
t ra d i t io n a l i s m  to  modernization, burs t ab rup tly . The nature  of the 
Shah's modernization f u r th e r  awakened the  I ran ia n s ,  as did the method 
of i t s  in troduction  to  th e  country. I t  shocked the people and in te n ­
s i f i e d  th e  already amassed pressure . The a l ie n  regime f a i le d  to  re a l iz e  
the  breadth and the depth o f  th is  s t r a in fu l  s i tu a t io n  so th a t  i t  could 
take preemptive and c o rre c t iv e  action to  d if fu se  or rechanneled the  c r i s i s .  
This f a i l u r e  can be seen as an erosion from within and a dec ircu la t io n  
of the e l i t e s .  Such an erosion f a c i l i t a t e d  and leg it im a ted  the  massive 
p o l i t i c a l  action  of the opposition to  e x p lo i t  the  regime's wearing 
away, to  a c t iv a te  the  tension  m i l i t a n t ly ,  and to  give b i r th  to  a 
rev o lu tio n .
The timing o f  th e  Revolutionary take-over was cuased by 
several f a c to r s ,  some o f  which, i t  i s  argued, are  s t i l l  concealed 
to  the observer and hence go beyond an ob jec t iv e  socio log ica l an a ly s is .
As an example, i t  i s  argued th a t  the timing o f  the Iranian Revolution 
had something to  do with the  fa c t  t h a t ,  in the  Middle-East, o i l  and 
p o l i t i c s  explode to g e th e r .  However, th e re  had been id e n t i f i a b le
252
f a c to r s ,  o r  p i t f a l l s ,  t h a t  acce le ra ted  the explosion o f  th e  Revolution, 
as was discussed in the  chronology o f the  pre-takeover events . F in a lly ,  
our overa ll  discussion on the causes o f  the  Iranian Revolution can be 
summarized diagrammatically (and not theorized) as follows (p. 254).
This w ill be followed by chapter VI in  which theo rie s  o f  revolution 
a re  applied  to  th i s  t e s t  case revo lu tion . In th a t  ch ap te r ,  fu r th e r  l i g h t  
w il l  a lso  be ca s t  on the  causes of the ta rg e t  Revolution.
253
A DIAGRAMMATIC SUMMARY OF THE CAUSES OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION
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CHAPTER VI 
TOWARD AN INTEGRAL THEORY OF REVOLUTION 
A. Prelude
Before applying theories  of revo lu tion  to the  t e s t  case revo­
lu t io n ,  some reserva tions  must be considered.
F i r s t ,  in the  proposed app lica t io n  n e i th e r  the  addressed 
th eo rie s  nor the  t e s t  case revolu tion  w ill  be ou tlined  and j u s t i f i e d .
This task  has a lready been performed in  the  preceding chapters . With 
th i s  in hand, each theory will be taken a p r io r i  and so will be the 
Revolution.
Second, by te s t in g  each theory aga ins t  the t e s t  case revo lu tion , 
a proposition w ill be derived accordingly. In th is  p ra c t ic e ,  in f a c t ,  
the applied theory i s  t ra n s la ted  in to  a concise and rigorous thread o f  
explanatory thought th a t  provides but a p a r t ia l  explanation fo r  the 
cause o f  revo lu tion . This concep tua liza tion , however, should not be 
understood as reductionism fo r  i t  i s  the  underlying deductive logic in 
th i s  d is s e r ta t io n .
Third, s ince based on th i s  deduction each theory so le ly  c o n t r i ­
butes to  the explanation of but does not t o t a l l y  explain  the  revo lu tion , 
an inc lus ive  theory consis ting  o f a s e t  o f  propositions i s  e n ta i led .
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This comprehensive explanation i s  indeed what i s  o ffe red  in th i s  
d is s e r ta t io n .
Fourth, th e o r i s t s  o f  revo lu tion  have usually  conceptualized 
both the "causes" o f  revolu tion  and th e  "developmental aspects"  o f  such 
ca tego ries  as " ideology," " leade rsh ip ,"  and "organization" of the 
"opposition" as a mixture or continuum. This schematic commission or 
omission obscures and complicates the  id e n t i ty  of the roo t cause of 
revo lu tion  ( e .g . ,  the  economic element) with the  very reason fo r  a 
successful revo lu tionary  take-over ( e . g . ,  appropria te  t a c t i c s ) .  In the 
cu rren t  approach, the  above mentioned ca tego ries  w ill  simply be t re a te d  
as a roo t cause fo r  a f r u i t f u l  revo lu tionary  action  and not the root 
cause o f  a s t r a in fu l  s i tu a t io n  which might lead to  revo lu tion . In a 
word, we w ill d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between and w ill not be confused with the 
cause of revo lu tion  and the  reason fo r  a successful t r a n s i t io n  o f  power, 
which is  a p re re q u is i te  fo r  the i n s t i tu t io n a l i z a t io n  o f  the  revolu tionary  
id e a ls .
This i s  why in the course o f  ap p lica tion  and synthesis four 
accumulative s teps  w ill  be taken. In the f i r s t  s tep  a t te n t io n  w ill be 
focused on those th eo r ie s  th a t  emphasize and r e l a t e  the  s t ru c tu ra l  cause 
o f  revolu tion  to  the "economic," " p o l i t i c a l , "  and " c u l tu r a l " fac to rs  
d i r e c t ly .  In the  second step "value-dissensus" w ill be approached through 
Johnson's "Revolutionary change." In the  th i r d  s tep ,  a l l  theories  
t h a t ,  in one way or another, emphasize "social s t r a in , "  from whatever 
source, as the cause o f  rev o lu tio n , w ill be considered. In the l a s t  
s tep  those th eo r ie s  w ill  be considered th a t  emphasize e f f o r t  management 
and resource m obiliza tion  as e i t h e r  the  cause of revo lu tion  or as pre-
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r e q u is i t e  fo r  a successful revo lu tionary  take-over ( a f t e r  the root 
cause was a lready id e n t i f i e d ) .
To be su re ,  in dealing with the  m ajority  o f  the  th eo rie s  
throughout the f i r s t  th re e  s tep s ,  some o f  t h e i r  im plica tions  fo r  the 
t e s t  case revo lu tion  w ill  be reserved fo r  the l a s t  s tep .  The l a s t  
s tep  addresses issues  o f  "resource m ob iliza tion ."  Examples o f  these  
im p lica tio n s , which a re  shared by d i f f e r e n t  th e o r ie s ,  a re  such ca tegories  
as ideology, o rg an iza t io n ,  lead e rsh ip ,  and stratum consciousness. Hence, 
by focusing on th e  addressed th e o r ie s  in the  f i r s t  s te p s ,  only the 
fundamental thought will be pinpointed and reformulated. Further, 
throughout the  sy n th e s is ,  only the  im plica tions  and not the  to ta l  expla­
nation o f  the  theory  fo r  the  t e s t  case revo lu tion  w ill be considered.
F i f th ,  as i t  was emphasized elsewhere, th eo r ie s  o f  revolu tion  
have many th ings  in common to  be in te g ra te d  and e labora ted . This charac­
t e r i s t i c  im plies , among o th e r  th in g s ,  t h a t  the th e o r ie s  can a lso  be sorted  
and c l a s s i f i e d .  Saltman (1978:3-8) observes th a t  th e re  are  th ree  defined 
approaches to  the  causes o f  social movements—(1) the  psychological, (2) 
the  c o l le c t iv e -b e h a v io ra l ,  and (3) the  socio logica l approach. The f i r s t  
category a sc r ib e s  the  cause o f  soc ia l  movements to  the  " in d iv id u a l 's "  
f r u s t r a t i o n ,  d is co n ten t ,  and s t r a in .  The next category holds th a t  a 
socia l movement i s  simply one type o f  c o l le c t iv e  behavior which is  
generated by c o l le c t iv e  s t r a in s  and grievances. The l a s t  category 
a t t r i b u t e s  the  cause of social movements to  soc ie ta l  arrangements and 
processes (such as c la s s  s tru g g le ,  o rgan iza tional dysfunctioning , and 
value d issensus.
According to  Robertson (1981:581:584), th e o r ie s  o f  social
257
movements can be subsumed under th ree  c la s s e s ,  (a) The psychological 
th e o r ie s  which consider socia l movements . . as simply one more form 
o f  i r r a t i o n a l  c o l le c t iv e  behavior."  (b) The " s t ra in "  th e o r ie s  which 
claim  th a t  the  main fa c to r  th a t  l i e s  behind the  emergence o f  social 
movements i s  some form o f  "social s t r a i n . "  In th i s  con tex t ,  some 
s o c io lo g is ts  a lso  observe " th a t  peop le 's  fe e l in g s  o f  depriva tion  a re  the 
source o f  social movements." (c) The resource-m obiliza tion  theory which 
m aintains th a t  " . . .  d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  may well e x i s t  in  society--w hether 
because o f  psychological f r u s t r a t i o n ,  socia l s t r a i n ,  fee l in g s  of d e p r i­
v a tio n ,  o r  fo r  any o th e r  reason—but a soc ia l  movement w ill not emerge 
u n t i l  people organize and take action  using the  resources a t  t h e i r  com­
mand" (Robertson, 1981:583).
Useem (1981:357-369) notes th a t  a l l  th eo r ie s  o f  socia l movements 
can be put in two major c a te g o r ie s .  The f i r s t  category i s  id e n t i f ie d  with 
th e  "Breakdown th e o r i s t s "  who claim th a t  a c to rs  who are  weakly in teg ra ted  
in to  t h e i r  community and experience d isco n ten t a re  l ik e ly  to  jo in  a 
p r o te s t  movement. The second category i s  id e n t i f ie d  with the  "S o lid a r i ty  
th e o r i s t s "  who argue t h a t  iso la te d  in d iv id u a ls  a re  le ss  l ik e ly  to  p ro te s t  
than o thers  and th a t  d isco n ten t  i s  un re la ted  to  p ro te s t .  These th e o r i s t s ,  
in  f a c t ,  po in t to  the  d is so lu t io n  o f  t r a d i t io n a l  social formations and 
communal s o l i d a r i t i e s  as a r e s u l t  o f  rap id  change.
The pos it ion  taken here i s  in te g ra t iv e  in th a t  revo lu tion  is  a 
socia l (or s o c ie ta l )  phenomenon; th a t  the  socia l i s  a complex o f  several 
fa c to r s  such as economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  c u l tu r a l ,  psychological, h i s to r i c a l ,  
e th n i c / r a c i a l ,  lo c a l ,  in te rn a t io n a l ,  ep is tem o log ica l , b iog raph ica l ,  
e x i s t e n t i a l ,  and the  l i k e ;  th a t  the  causes o f  revolu tion  a re  generated,
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accumulated, and complicated h i s to r i c a l l y  and id e n t i f ie d  with l i f e ­
cycle ; th a t  revo lu tionary  ac tion  occurs under r e la t iv e ly  unique conditions 
which vary , though not n ece ssa r i ly ,  from one place and space to  the 
o ther.
In the  ap p lic a t io n  and synthesiz ing  i n i t i a t i v e  which follows 
immediately, th i s  po s i t io n  w ill be illum inated .
B. Applying and Synthesizing the Theories 
In l in e  with th e  four s teps th a t  were proposed above, the 
addressed th eo r ie s  w ill be applied and accordingly c l a s s i f i e d  in the 
following form.
The F i r s t  Step: The S truc tu ra l  Causes of Revolution
1. The Marxist Theory Applied 
Although the Iran ian  Revolution, as both ch arac te r ized  e a r l i e r  
and defined o f f i c i a l l y ,  i s  not a "communist" revo lu tion , the  "Marxist" 
theory o f revolu tion  provides some causal explanation fo r  i t s  occurrence. 
This proposed p a r t ia l  explanation i s  assoc ia ted  with general category 
o f  economic-based c la s s  s trugg le  and c o n f l i c t .  As i t  i s  adopted in 
th i s  sy n th es is ,  c la s s  s t ru g g le ,  on behalf  o f  the opposition to  the 
ru lin g  c l a s s ,  i s  id e n t i f ie d  with several s t r a t a ,  including th e  p ro le ta r ia t .
F i r s t ,  fo r  a c e r ta in  stratum of the  Iran ians—th a t  i s ,  the 
workers—the opposition to  the regime had, b a s ic a l ly ,  economic motivation 
and m ateria l in t e r e s t s .  These workers were e i th e r  economically "deprived" 
or economically " f ru s t r a te d ."  In the  f i r s t  case, the  workers' material 
gain f a i le d  to  keep pace with the  mounting consumer expenditures and 
hence re su lted  in r e l a t iv e  depriva tion . This kind o f depriva tion  can 
be defined as " . . .  a s i tu a t io n  in which people may be able to afford
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basic  n ece ss i t ie s  but a re  unable to  maintain the standard o f  l iv in g  
considered normal in socie ty"  (Robertson, 1981:269). In the  next case, 
r e l a t iv e  deprivation did not occur. But, due to  (1) the  country 's  
flowing wealth and (2) r e la te d ly ,  t h e i r  own r is in g  m a te r i a l i s t i c  expec­
t a t i o n s ,  which were not met adequately, the  workers were thwarted and 
f r u s t r a te d .
However, the b lu e -c o l la r  workers alone were—in terms o f num­
ber,  o rgan iza tion , leadersh ip  and p o l i t i c a l  ideology—not powerful 
enough to  make a rev o lu tio n ,  p r o le t a r i a t  o r  otherwise. Further, given 
the overa ll  c h a r a c te r i s t ic s  o f  the  co u n try 's  economic development and 
in d u s t r ia l  transform ation , the Iran ian  workers were simply "lumpen- 
p r o l e t a r i a t . "  Hence, h i s to r i c a l ly  speaking, they were f a r  away from 
developing the revolu tionary  "class consciousness" seen as a p rerequ i­
s i t e  fo r  revolutionary  c lass  s trugg le  and p r o le ta r ia t  revo lu tion . This 
q u a l i f ic a t io n  does not sim plify  but in f a c t  s t re s se s  the  workers' economic- 
based d ispos it ion  to  and actual p a r t ic ip a t io n  in the  massive p o l i t ic a l  
ac t io n  th a t  eventually  toppled the  Shah's regime.
Second, fo r  o the r  Iranian soc ia l  s t r a t a  such as the m iddle-classes 
( i . e . ,  the  government employees, the  in t e l l e c t u a l s ,  the  Bazaaris, the 
re l ig io u s  community) and the farmers, economic incen tives  were, though 
with c e r ta in  between and within d i f fe ren c es ,  a base fo r  challenge. The 
m ajority  of the  farmers, though they did not noticeably  p a r t ic ip a te  in 
the  revo lu tion , were economically deprived in r e l a t iv e  o r  absolute  terms. 
"Absolute deprivation" may be defined as a s i tu a t io n  in  which people 
cannot afford  the basic  standards o f  health  care , education , nourishment, 
housing and c lo th ing  (Kolka, 1962). R elative  depriva tion  a lso  ex isted
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among the lower la y e rs  o f  the  m iddle-classes whose net economic gains 
f a i l e d  to meet the  r i s in g  cost o f  l iv in g .  Further, the  upper layers  o f  
the  m iddle-c lasses were a ffec ted  by an in te s i fy in g  f r u s t r a t i o n  which was 
caused by increasing  m aterial expec ta tion  (along with o th e r ,  non-economic, 
d e s ire s  to  be d iscussed elsewhere) and the paucity  o f  soc ia l  serv ices .
By and l a rg e ,  i t  was not only the low economic s i tu a t io n  t h a t ,  
in p a r t ,  revo lu tion ized  people fo r  p o l i t i c a l  action  but in  f a c t  the r e a l ­
iz a t io n  o f  the e x is t in g  economic d iscr im ina tion  symbolized by the  w ell­
being of the  upper c la s s e s .  All the economically a f fe c te d  s t r a t a  came to  
f u r th e r  r e a l iz e  t h a t  the  country was g e t t in g  r ich  ab rup tly  but i t s  r iches 
were not d is t r ib u te d  ap p ro p ria te ly .  Therefore, the i n f e r i o r  economic 
s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  as compared to  the  economic p ro sp e r i ty  o f  the wealthy 
provided a deeper sense o f  d iscon ten t and s t r a in .  People more l ik e ly  
r a is e  t h e i r  heads in  opposition  i f  they find  themselves overwhelmed by 
prosperous (and powerful) groups. Otherwise, as the  Arabic proverb says 
"Equal Oppression i s  J u s t ic e ,"  a s ig n i f ic a n t  opposition  i s  le s s  probable. 
I t  i s  a c tu a l ly  t h i s  sensed economic d iscr im ina tion  and not e s s e n t ia l ly  
the e x is t in g  poor economic s i tu a t io n  th a t  con tribu ted  to  the  Iran ians ' 
f r u s t r a t io n  and t h e i r  in c l in a t io n  to  p o l i t i c a l  ac tio n .
All these  s t r a t a  could have d i f f e r e n t  economic-based p o l i t ic a l  
in t e r e s t s  i f  they had not shared a common economic s t r a i n  fo r  p o l i t ic a l  
a c t io n .  Indeed, th e re  was a between-class economic d if fe ren c e  among the 
opposition  i t s e l f .  But, sharp economic ineq u a l i ty  which was caused by 
the  governing c la s s  and from which a l l  the  governed c la s s e s ,  in one way 
or ano ther, su ffe red ,  provided a common ob jec tive  fo r  m obiliza tion  and 
rev o lu tio n .  Such a r e a l i t y  i s  congruent with two r e la te d  f a c t s .  F i r s t ,
261
the economically poor people a re  so involved in  b u t te r  and bread problems 
t h a t  they cannot give preference  to  p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n .  Next, in order to 
emerge, revolutions need a base of physical needs and m otivations.
Thus, as i t  i s  perceived here, c la s s  s trugg le  should not be 
understood as a s trugg le  between only two c la s s e s - - th e  bourgeoisie  and 
the p r o le ta r i a t  as the  Marxists th e o r ic a l ly  perceive . Rather, should 
be viewed in terms o f economic values and ob jec t iv es  th a t  are  shared by 
d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t a ,  a l l  o f  which form the  opposition of a soc ie ty  whose 
c la ss  s t ru c tu re  is  not dyadic but multidimensional. In t h i s  l i g h t ,  and 
in the  case o f  Iran , th e  economic fa c to r  put d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t a  to g e th e r ,  
including the  p r o l e t a r i a t ,  but excluding the bourgeoise c l a s s ,  to  challenge 
the  dominant c a teg o rie s .  In o th e r  words, un like the  Marxist sharp c lass  
p o la r iz a t io n ,  the economic element, as ^  o b jec t iv e  fo r  and a^  source of 
p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n ,  s e t  in  motion several Iran ian  s t r a t a  fo r  c la ss  c o n f l ic t  
even though th e i r  overa ll  c la s s  in te r e s t s  were not a like  o r  could not be. 
In te re s t in g ly ,  these  s t r a t a  included c e r ta in  ca teg o rie s  with which the 
"supers truc tu re"  was i d e n t i f i e d —the re l ig io u s  ca teg o rie s .
Hence, a non-communist revolu tion  can be made possib le  with the 
co n tr ibu tion  o f the economic fa c to r ,  as a major cause, and the  p a r t i c i ­
pation  o f  the  p r o le ta r i a t  as one element o f  the  opposition . I t  i s  a lso  
t ru e  th a t  a Marxist revo lu tion  can emerge even i f  the  involved socie ty  
is  not in d u s tr ia l iz e d  and the  p r o le ta r i a t  a re  not the  only generating force 
o f  the  revo lu tion . " . . .  Russia and China were overwhelmingly agrarian  
co u n tr ie s  when the communists e s tab lish ed  themselves" (Moore, 1968:xi).
What i s  meant by th i s  overa ll  emphasis i s  th a t  the  Marxist theory o f  
revo lu tion  has several im plications fo r  various rev o lu t io n s ,  including
262
the Iran ian  "Islamic" Revolution, though not necessa r ily  in  the  Marxist 
terms and q u a l i f ic a t io n s .
Based on such a grasp of the  q u a l i ty  o f  the Marxist theory and 
i t s  t e s t a b i l i t y  agains t the  t e s t  case rev o lu t io n ,  the f i r s t ,  and not 
n ece ssa r i ly  and a b s t r a c t ly  the most explanatory , cause o f  revolution 
can be traced  to  the economic variab le  and can be t ra n s la te d  in to  the 
following p roposition .
Proposition 1: Given o the r  co n d itions , sharp economic d i f ­
ferences w ill l ik e ly  r e s u l t  in c o n f l ic t  and rev o lu t io n .
To be sure , what i s  meant by "other cond itions ,"  here and 
throughout th i s  sy n th e s is ,  i s  a l l  o th e r  va riab les  th a t  to g e th e r  are 
theorized  as causes o f  o r  con tribu tory  to  the  c rea tion  of revo lu tion .
In t h i s  l in e  o f  th e o r iz in g  i t  should be understood t h a t ,  in  the  t r a u ­
matic c re a t io n  of the complex phenomenon o f  revo lu tion , the economic 
v a riab le  alone cannot cause the revo lu tion . Several va r iab les  are 
involved in t h i s  p rocess , each o f which, as hypothesized here , w ill be 
d iscussed and derived as the  remainder o f  the  addressed theo rie s  are 
applied  re sp ec tiv e ly .
2. The Dahrendorf Theory Applied 
In terms of the  s t ru c tu re  o f  p o l i t i c a l  power, the Iranian 
so c ie ty  under the Shah's regime was po la rized  to  the powerful few and 
the  powerless many. While in economic terms the upper layers  o f  the 
opposition were p r iv i leg e d ,  a l l  the opposing groups were deprived 
p o l i t i c a l l y .  A n a ly tic a l ly ,  under the Shah's a u th o r i ta r ia n  ru le ,  
p o l i t i c a l  power and f r e e  p o l i t i c a l  expression were two d i f f e r e n t  a s ­
pects o f  the  same r e a l i t y .  Where the leadersh ip  o f  the  opposition
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camp had a d es ire  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  o f f ice  and governance, the  masses simply 
f e l t  the need of p o l i t ic a l  freedom to express t h e i r  increasing grievances. 
In the process, the regime denied the opposition , leaders  and fo llow ers , 
i t s  overa ll  p o l i t ic a l  o b jec t iv es .  Such a denial helped, among o ther  
th in g s ,  the opposition to  ignore i t s  in d iv id u a l i s t ic  in te r e s t  in the 
" p o l i t ic a l"  and to  confront the  regime as a u n if ied  whole.
Given th i s  s i tu a t io n ,  i t  seems resonable to  concentrate on 
D ahrendorfs  Theory in  terms o f  power re la t io n  between two broad c a te ­
go ries ,  the powerful and the  powerless, and not n ecessa r ily  within the 
"Imperatively Coordinated A ssocia tions."  A fte r a l l ,  th is  theory is  
". . .a socio logica l theory o f  c o n f l ic t  in in d u s t r ia l  society" in which 
"social groups" are id e n t i f ie d  with s t ru c tu ra l  complexity and the  in te n ­
s i f i c a t io n  o f  the d iv is ion  o f  labor. In a p re in d u s tr ia l  socie ty  l ik e  
th a t  o f  I ran ,  these arrangements were much le s s  complicated and cannot 
be approached by the addressed theory ap p ro p ria te ly .  However, in  l in e  
with the  fundamental p r in c ip le s  of th i s  theory , i t  must be emphasized 
th a t  the  conditions o f  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l ic t  e x is ted  in the Shah's Iran .
An in d ica t io n  o f  th i s  was the fa c t  th a t  the socia l  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  system 
was not r i g i d ,  openness e x is te d ,  and social m obility  was possib le . In 
th i s  con tex t, the major problem was the non-existence of equal opportunity  
fo r  social m obility  in  a l l  spheres and in the area  o f  p o l i t ic a l  power in 
p a r t i c u la r .  This gave sense to  and made the s trugg le  fo r p o l i t ic a l  power 
po ss ib le .  Such s truggle  can be traced  to  each o f  the opposing p a r t i e s ,  
a l l  o f  which acted aga in s t  those in power.
a. The Religious Community. T ra d i t io n a l ly ,  the re l ig io u s  
community in Iran was one o f  the most powerful s t r a t a  whose t r a d i t io n a l
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power stemmed from c e r ta in  f a c t s .  F i r s t ,  the  c lergy  are  id e n t i f ie d  
with the  "sacred" and considered by t h e i r  followers as a l in k  between 
God and people. Second, the  clergy  are  u sua lly  born out o f  th e  lower 
and t r a d i t io n a l  lay ers  o f  socie ty  and hence are  associated  with the 
masses s t r u c tu r a l ly .  Third , un ti l  recen t times the clergy  were 
among the  few educated ca tego ries  who had a d e s ire  fo r  both learn ing  
and teach ing . This d e s ire  revolved around two o b je c t iv e s—economic 
gains and re l ig io u s  m ission. This f a c t  deepened the c le r g y 's  social 
and in te l le c tu a l  p o s i t io n  in socie ty  and provided them with se lf-es teem  
and in te l l e c tu a l  power. F ina lly , the  r e l ig io u s  leaders  id e n t i fy  
themselves with a d iv ine  mission committed to  the  spread o f  j u s t i c e  
and eq u a l i ty  in so c ie ty .  Such an id e n t i f i c a t io n  requ ired , and t r a ­
d i t io n a l ly  was endowed with p o l i t i c a l  power, e sp ec ia l ly  in the  ju d ic ia l  
branch o f government. All these q u a l i t i e s  and n e c e s s i t ie s  po in t to  
the  Islamic idea th a t  "Al-Molk Wa Al-Din Towaman" ( i . e . ,  s t a t e  and 
re l ig io n  are  tw ins).
Because of the recen t waves o f  modernization, such as the  
emergence o f  the n a t io n - s ta te  and the  s e c u la r i s t  tendencies in  so c ie ty ,  
th e  c le r g y 's  t r a d i t io n a l  s treng th  decreased o f f i c i a l l y  and, in con­
nec tion , t r a d i t io n a l ly .  With the passage o f  time, the  c le rgy  came 
to  fu r th e r  r e a l iz e  t h e i r  c ircum stan tia l powerlessness and even nothing­
ness. In the eyes o f  some of t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  followers they  were 
a lso  seen as dysfunctioning ca teg o r ie s .  Such a perception of s e l f  and 
evalua tion  by o thers  caused co-option , in d if fe re n c e ,  o r  p o l i t i c a l  
ac tion  in the r e l ig io u s  c i r c l e s .  The m ajo rity  o f  the  c lergy  chose 
to  a c t  aga in s t  the  regime, in symbolic te rm s, to  achieve two o b je c t iv e s - -
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prevention o f  the  d e te r io ra t in g  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  and re s to ra t io n  of 
the  t r a d i t io n a l  s tren g th  and s ta tu s .  With o th e r  opposing c a te g o r ie s ,  
the  re l ig io u s  community overthrew the  governing c lass  and, to  d a te ,  
became the  governing c la s s  themselves. They achieved p o l i t i c a l  power 
in both s t a t e  and t r a d i t io n a l  terms incomparable to  any period o f  time.
b. The T rad it ional P o l i t ic a l  Leadership. This stratum had 
been somewhat a c t iv e  under the Shah's a u to c ra t ic  ru le .  From the ear ly  
1950's, a f t e r  the  Shah res to red  power, members o f  th i s  leadersh ip  were 
ex iled  and imprisoned and o thers  were p roh ib ited  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i c ip a ­
t io n .  For those in d iv id u a ls ,  who had a lready  enjoyed p o l i t i c a l  power 
in the p a s t ,  powerlessness was d i f f i c u l t  to  l iv e  with. They were 
experienced p o l i t i c a l  leaders  who were a lso  economically p riv i leged  
and academically w ell-educated. They f e l t  a social vacuum and a sense 
o f  nothingness which could be f i l l e d  in and reimbursed only by accession 
to  and exerc ise  o f  p o l i t i c a l  power. Their  t r a d i t io n a l  so c io p o l i t ic a l  
position  in so c ie ty ,  as well as the p o l i t i c a l  s truggle  o f  o th e r  opposing 
groups, strengthened and enforced t h e i r  a c t io n  against the regime. 
F in a lly ,  with t h e i r  u n s a t is f ied  t a s t e  fo r  power, so l id  economic base, 
and supportive masses, the t r a d i t io n a l  leade rs  contributed  to  the  
dethronement of the Shah and the  c rea t io n  o f  a new s t ru c tu re  o f  power.
c . The Bazaaris (Petty  Bourgeoisie and Craftsmen). This 
stratum which was t r a d i t i o n a l ly  involved in o r  somehow used fo r  p o l i t i c a l  
o b je c t iv e s ,  had a dual s i tu a t io n  under the  Shah's regime. I t  was 
economically th rea tened  by the  rap id ly  growing c a p i t a l i s t  c l a s s ,  big 
businesses and modern marketing e n te r p r i s e s .  At the same tim e, i t
a lso  saw the  c a p i t a l i s t  arrangements as a d es irab le  r e f le c t io n  o f  i t s
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own fu tu re .  However, unable to  compete with t h e i r  reference  group and 
not w il l in g  to  give up, the Bazaaris were engulfed in an undesirable 
economic s i tu a t io n .  These circumstances were in f a c t  c reated  or f a c i ­
l i t a t e d  by the  government which encouraged the modern and worked fo r  the  
abandonment o f  the old in d i f f e r e n t  terms. The B azaaris ' conservatism, 
t r a d i t io n a l  a l l ia n c e  with the r e l ig io u s  and n a t io n a l i s t  ca teg o rie s ,  
and the  t h r e a t  o f  what may be c a l le d  governmental cap ita l ism , increased 
t h e i r  in c l in a t io n  to  p o l i t i c s .  They sought in the  p o l i t i c a l  e i th e r  
expressive measures or channels whereby the  t r a d i t io n a l  arrangements 
could be secured o r changed d e s ira b ly .  With t h e i r  money, physical 
energy, and t r a d i t io n a l  r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l  supportive base, the  Bazaaris 
fue led  the  ongoing anti-regim e ac tion  and hence helped to  define the  
p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n  anew.
d. The I n t e l l e c tu a l s . A n a ly tic a l ly ,  the  Iran ian  in te l l e c t u a l s  
worked fo r  a " f a i r  share" of p o l i t i c a l  power, the  demonstration o f  t h e i r  
th e o re t ic a l  social p o l ic ie s ,  o r  both. Hence, t h e i r  p ra c t ic a l  and 
symbolic activ ism  was o rien ted  toward execution o f  p o l i t i c a l  power or 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in the  decision-making processes. The m ajority  o f  t h i s  
s tratum  was a lso  deprived economically and, in accordance, sought 
p o l i t i c a l  means fo r  economic ends. In a word, th e  in te l l e c tu a l s  were 
convinced th a t  th e i r  w ish -fu lf i l lm e n t  in p o l i t i c a l ,  i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  and 
economic terms would not be re a l iz e d  unless a gra in  o f  p o l i t i c a l  power 
and a sense o f  free  expression were enjoyed. Th is , indeed, was denied 
to  the  i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  Higher and e f f e c t iv e  p o l i t i c a l  o f f ic e s  were 
held by the  regime's lo y a l i s t s  who were s e le c t iv e ly  chosen and r a t i f i e d  
by s ec re t  se rv ices .  In ad d i t io n ,  on behalf  o f  the  i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  any
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s ig n i f ic a n t  professional promotion in a l l  o f f ic ia l  o rgan iza tions  was 
checked o r blocked by a u th o r i t ie s .
This governmental ongoing control o f  the s i tu a t io n  re su lted  
in the  a l ien a tio n  o f  th e  in te l l e c tu a l s  and th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  depriva tion . 
They fu r th e r  sensed a fee l in g  of both powerlessness and, as in te l le c tu a l  
production was concerned,nothingness. Powerlessness was p a r t ic u la r ly  
d ec is ive  among government employees who were the backbone o f  the  o f f ic ia l  
bureaucra tic  machine but were d i r e c t ly  and constan tly  co n tro l led  in the  
process o f  operation . Eventually, a l l  the  in te l le c tu a l  ca teg o rie s  got 
involved in c o n f l ic t  with the power w ielders  to  express grievances, to 
accomplish economic g oa ls ,  and to  p a r t i c ip a te  in the  p o l i t i c a l  processes. 
Since democratic and symbolic means alone did not accomplish the  desired 
ends, groups of i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  namely u n iv e rs i ty  s tu d en ts ,  resorted  
to  g u e r r i l l a  a c t iv i ty  and m ilitancy . I t  was out o f  t h i s  camp th a t  
g u e r r i l l a  organizations were born to  play a constructive  ro le  in the 
confron ta tion . In a word, symbolic and p rac t ica l  an ti-reg im e measures, 
which ranged from cover t  d ispute  to  overt  c o n f l ic t ,  s ig n if ie d  a d ra s t ic  
competition with those in  power. In response, the  regime continued i t s  
monopolization of p o l i t i c a l  power and in te n s i f ie d  i t s  pressure  on the 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a .  In the  end, the  powerful lo s t  the b a t t l e  to  the o f f i ­
c i a l l y  powerless, including the i n t e l l e c t u a l s .
e . The B lue-Collar Workers. This stratum o f the opposition , 
in both public and p r iv a te  s e c to rs ,  was engaged in d ispu te  and c o n f l ic t  
with th ree  ca teg o r ie s .  The f i r s t  category was the management which 
usually  sought economic re tu rns  a t  the  le a s t  possible  c o s t ,  including 
the  co s t  o f  labor. The second category consisted  o f the w h ite -co lla r
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workers who, in comparison to  the  btue-coTTar workers, were more p riv i leged  
in economic and p o l i t ic a l  terms. The w h ite -c o l la r  workers exercised  
bureaucra tic  and managerial a u th o r i ty  and force  over th e i r  i n f e r io r s — 
the  b lu e -c o l la r  workers. The th i r d  category was the  government i t s e l f ,  
represented by the SAVAK agents and r e t i r e d  m il i ta ry  men who, in several 
ways, checked on and co n tro lled  c o l le c t iv e  ac tion  in work p laces . More­
over, a t  the  higher o f f i c i a l  lev e ls  ( e .g . ,  the  M inistry o f  Labor and 
Social A f fa i r s ) ,  labor issues  were not taken se r io u s ly ,  fo r  the  c h a l­
lenging p a r ty ,  the management, was e i th e r  the  government i t s e l f  o r  the  
p r iv a te  sec to r  which had th e  upper hand in the process o f  c o n f l ic t  re so lu ­
t io n .
In sh o rt ,  economic a f f a i r s  as well as the lack o f f ree  p o l i t ic a l  
expressions f ru s t r a te d  the  Iran ian  b lu e -c o l la r  workers. I t  was in the 
f a c to r i e s ,  workshops, o i l  and petro-chemical in d u s tr ie s  th a t  labor 
d ispu te  and c o n f l ic t  were t ra n s la te d  in to  sit-dow ns, s t r i k e s ,  demon­
s t r a t i o n s ,  passive re s i s ta n c e ,  and open a c t io n .  I t  was the workers who 
paralyzed the system economically, and, in  tu rn ,  paved the way fo r  a 
new mode o f power d i s t r ib u t io n .
( f )  The Peasantry . Although the  Revolution o f  Iran is  defined 
as an "urban" revo lu tion , the receptive  a t t i tu d e s  and the supportive 
ro le  o f  the  peasants in the  re l ig io u s  Iran should not be ignored in  
the a n a ly s is .  This re a c t io n ,  however, was more sensed in the l a t e  
s tages o f  the  anti-regime ac tion  were p o l i t i c a l  violence became the 
p rev a il in g  order. From the e a r ly  1960' s ,  amazed by the Shah's Land 
Reform, a g rea t portion o f  th e  peasantry enjoyed a sense o f  d ig n ity  
m a te r ia lized  in the a l lo c a t io n  of land and independence from the 
t r a d i t io n a l  landlords. But, with the passing o f  tim e, the farmers
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observed th a t  they were l e f t  with merely b i t s  and pieces o f  land and 
were not backed by an e f f e c t iv e  technical and f in a n c ia l  support from 
the government.
With t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  conservatism, poverty , and i l l i t e r a c y ,  
the  peasantry  could not ge t ahead without the  support o f  the landlords 
o r  t h e i r  s u b s t i t u t e ,  the  government. The former, due to  the Land Reform 
p o l ic ie s ,  were absent from the scene and the l a t t e r  concentrated a t t e n ­
t io n  on in d u s t r ia l  e n te rp r is e s  and u rban iza tion . The regime also 
adopted new p o lic ie s  p e r ta in in g  to  ag ribusiness  and a g r ic u l tu ra l  co r­
po ra tions . None o f the  government's devices could prevent the d e te r ­
io ra t in g  a g r ic u l tu ra l  p ro d u c tiv i ty  and the inc reas ing  poverty in the 
countryside. The regime, which was f i r s t  considered by the  farmers 
as t h e i r  s av io r ,  now was thought o f  as the  major cause o f  t h e i r  poverty 
and soc ia l  d is ru p tio n .  In such a s i tu a t io n ,  a h o s t i l e  body of peasan­
t r y  was developed ag a in s t  th e  regime. However, the  peasants did not 
have a w ill  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  power but a need fo r  expressing th e i r  economic- 
based grievances. In t h e i r  v i l la g e s  and f o o t h i l l s ,  they did not con­
f ro n t  the  regime d i r e c t ly  but backed the  revo lu tionary  urban masses 
morally. In te re s t in g ly ,  the regime had, fo r  a long tim e, taken th i s  
moral support fo r  granted, though in i t s  own favor.
*  *  *
As sketched above, p o l i t i c a l  power and f ree  p o l i t i c a l  expres­
sion were denied to  a na tion  a t  la rge  and were monopolized by a c la s s  o f  
so c ie ty .  In the process o f  d if fe ren c e ,  d isp u te ,  and c o n f l i c t ,  the 
opposition  jo in t ly  became ab le  to  deny p o l i t i c a l  power and legitimacy 
to  the  c la s s  th a t  had exp lo ited  th i s  scarce resource h i s to r i c a l ly —
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i t  rebalanced power r e la t io n s .  Based on such an approach to  both the 
addressed theory and the  rev o lu t io n ,  the following proposition  is  
deduced.
Proposition I I .  In a given s i tu a t io n ,  the  more p o l i t ic a l  
power as a scarce resource is  unequally d is t r ib u te d  and unjustly  exer­
cised  over and denied to  those who have w ill to  power, the more l ik e ly  
c o n f l i c t  and revolu tion  w ill  emerge. However, unless o ther conditions
are met, open c o n f l ic t  and revo lu tion  will not a r i s e .
*  *  *
F in a lly ,  n e i th e r  the  d e s ir e  fo r  p o l i t ic a l  power, nor the 
economic in e q u a l i ty ,  alone o r  j o i n t l y ,  are the only source fo r  c o n f l ic t  
in so c ie ty .  There are a lso  occasions on which people r i s e  in action
fo r  c u l tu ra l  reasons. The c u l tu ra l  then may in te r a c t  with or even
overshadow o ther causes o f  socia l  c o n f l ic t .  This argument, however, 
leads to  G u sf ie ld 's  "Status p o l i t i c s "  and Geschwender's "Status incon­
s is tency"  hypotheses which are  applied  to  the t e s t  case revolution 
immediately.
3. S ta tus  P o l i t ic s  and S ta tus  Inconsistency Explanations Applied
The causes o f  soc ia l  movements, including th e  prototype revolu­
t io n ,  are  a mixture of such v a r iab les  as p o l i t i c a l ,  c u ltu ra l  ( i . e . ,  
n a t io n a l ,  r e l ig io u s ,  moral, r a c ia l  e t c . ) ,  economic, and psychological 
which somehow s e t  people in motion and involve them in p o l i t ic a l  ac tion . 
Economic in te r e s t s  and p o l i t i c a l  o f f ic e s  alone a re  no t necessarily  the 
so le  causes o f  p o l i t ic a l  v io lence . In c e r ta in  s i tu a t io n s  people may 
rebel even i f  they are economically prosperous and p o l i t i c a l l y  p r iv i -
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leged. Or a reb e ll io n  may a lso  take place when people give reference 
to  c u l tu ra l  values and national sentiments over o ther  in t e r e s t s .  In 
several a n t i - c o lo n i a l i s t  movements, the  co lon ia lized  people rose aga ins t  
the c o lo n ia l iz e rs  more under the  banners o f  moral sentiments and t r a ­
d it io n a l  e th ic s  than economic or p o l i t i c a l  issues .
In the  process o f s ta tus-based  p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n ,  and in social 
movements in  general,  the  cu ltu ra l  in t e r e s t s  and issues re la te d  to  
p res t ig e  and se lf-esteem  can function  in d i f f e r e n t  ways. They may 
symbolize the movement as a whole, inflame the  e x is t in g  economic and 
p o l i t i c a l  in e q u a l i t ie s  with c u l tu ra l  sentim ents, or operate as the 
major cause in  the process. In o the r  words, cu ltu ra l  sentiments and 
values may speak fo r  themselves and function independently or in te r a c t  
with o th e r  pressing r e a l i t i e s  to  cause or pre-empt a change, to  shape 
t h a t  change v a lu a t io n a l ly ,  or to  maintain th e  e x is t in g  moral order.
On the  o ther hand, in recen t times p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  th a t  i s  
fueled c u l tu r a l ly  may have taken place in two stages o f  social develop­
ment. The f i r s t  s tage i s  id e n t i f ie d  with the  importation o f  in d u s tr ia l ism  
in to  the p re - in d u s t r ia l  so c ie ty ,  as a new way o f l i f e  and mode o f  
production challenging the t r a d i t io n a l  arrangements. The next s tage is  
id e n t i f ie d  with in te n s i f ie d  and too rapid  in d u s t r i a l i z a t io n  in the 
already in d u s t r ia l iz e d  soc ie ty . Segments o f  t h i s  soc ie ty  cannot absorb 
excessive change very smoothly and see such a change as a kind o f 
demoralization o f  the already transformed t r a d i t io n a l  m orality . However, 
the na tu re , d i re c t io n ,  in te n s i ty ,  and s tra teg y  of s ta tu s  p o l i t i c s  in 
each stage are  not the same, though the  incen tives  a re .
In the  case of Iran , s ta tu s  p o l i t i c s  i s  charac te rized  by the
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f i r s t  case , namely, the  s i tu a t io n  in  which rap id  and inharmonious but 
imported in d u s t r ia l i z a t io n  challenged the  normative moral order and 
the t r a d i t io n a l  way o f  a people 's  l i f e .  The Shah's in d u s t r ia l i z a t io n ,  
modernization, or Westernization a f fe c ted  variously  c e r ta in  s t r a t a  a t  
l e a s t  in the urban cen te rs .  These processes began with Reza Shah's 
era (1921-1941) and aimed a t  modernizing a t r a d i t io n a l  socie ty  fo rce ­
fu l ly  and without q u a l i f ic a t io n s .  These p o lic ie s  were opposed by 
d i f f e r e n t  ca teg o r ie s  o f  the I ran ians . The f i r s t  category was the  
conservative t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s  who viewed modernization as d is ru p tiv e  
Westernization aimed a t  the des tru c tio n  o f  the conventional way o f  l i f e  
and socia l s ta tu s e s .  In add ition , i t  paved the way fo r  fu r th e r  i n t e r ­
ference in favor o f  the  a l ien  and foreign  fo rces . The next category 
was exposed to  and accepted modernity but re jec ted  the way in which 
modernization was introduced to  so c ie ty  and the  undesired c u l tu ra l  
transformation th a t  i t  caused.
Although the  two ca tegories  were d i f f e r e n t  in th e i r  perception 
of modernity, a f f i l i a t i o n  with the p a s t ,  and v is ions  about the fu tu re ,  
in the course of a c tion  they came to  common terms. Indica tions of 
th is  were the p ra c t ic a l  a l l ia n ce  between secu la r  in t e l l e c tu a l s  and 
the upper-middle c la sses  on the  one hand, and the re l ig io u s  community 
and the lower s t r a t a  on the o ther. These two categories  understood 
th a t  they had moral values in common and th a t  t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  l i f e ­
s ty le  were e i th e r  undergoing undesired transform ation or were not 
a t ta in a b le  under the  Shah's regime. However, t h e i r  e th ica l  pos it ion  
and l i f e - s t y l e  commitment were paradoxica lly  enforced by a th i rd  
category—ethnic  m in o r i t ie s .
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This category saw th a t  the  government's p o l ic ie s  in the  c u l tu r a l ,  
p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, and c e n t r a l i z a t io n  a re a s ,  by in ten tio n  and o th e r ­
wise, were ta rg e ted  toward the breakdown o f  the  t r a d i t io n a l  e thnic  
way o f l i f e  and e thn ic  l i b e r t i e s .  In f a c t ,  these  e thn ic  m in o r it ie s  
understood the  Shah's modernization as a double a l ie n a t in g  fo rce .  I t  
changed the t r a d i t io n a l  s t ru c tu re  in which they were included and i t  
attempted to  t o t a l l y  l iq u id a te  t h e i r  p a r t i c u la r  e thnic  re la t io n s  and 
customs. Although they had e thnic-based  s ta tu s  and moral d iffe ren ces  
with the  wholesale anti-Shah a c t i v i s t s ,  the  c u ltu ra l  in t e r e s t s  in  general 
un if ied  the  two p a r t i e s ,  a t  l e a s t  momentarily. This, again , reemphasizes 
the  poin t t h a t  the  Shah's adm in is tra tion  put d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t a  toge ther 
with c o n f l ic t in g  in te r e s t s  aga in s t  th e  regime.
As s ta te d  e a r l i e r ,  the actual th r e a t  to  the t r a d i t io n a l  
establishm ent began with Reza Shah's re ig n .  He ". . . abolished t i t l e s ,  
forbade the  wearing of v e i l s ,  turbans and national costumes ( .  . . ) ,  
reduced re l ig io u s  holidays, and decreed the  use o f  surnames" (Paine, 
1975:15). In f a c t ,  "Part o f  Reza Shah's modernizing nationalism  was 
a s e c u la r i s t  a t ta c k  on t r a d i t io n a l  d re s s .  . ."  (F ischer, 1980:186), and 
the imposition o f  the conventional European costumes, h a i r - s ty l e ,  and 
the l ik e .  This socia l policy continued, extended, and exacerbated in 
the Shah's e ra  in which " t ra d i t io n "  was h is  " f i r s t  enemy." In th i s  
era  many socia l cond itions , cu l tu ra l  va lues , and moral a t t i tu d e s  under­
went undesired changes by the  t r a d i t io n a l  moral s tandards.
These changes, however, were not endemic to  modernization, 
but mostly were caused by fa sc in a t io n  with Western l i f e - s t y l e ,  mis­
management, and inadequate provision fo r  a v iab le  adjustment. Impressed
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by Western music, movies, pornography, d resses ( e .g . ,  the  controversia l 
m in i - s k i r t ) ,  the  pet (e sp ec ia l ly  the  "impure" dog) r a is in g  h a b i ts ,  n ight 
c lubs , gambling c e n te rs ,  boy f r ie n d -g ir l  f r ien d  h a b i ts ,  and dancing 
p a r t i e s ,  many Iran ians  gave up the  t r a d i t io n a l  p rac t ices  in favor o f  a 
new mode o f  l iv in g .  Since these  p rac t ice s  were not prim arily  lodged 
on adaptive measures but simple im ita t io n ,  they were seen by the 
t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s  as bare Westomania, lo ss  o f  id e n t i ty ,  and absurd ity . 
In te re s t in g ly ,  these  a t t i tu d e s  and behavior a lso  pervaded the lower 
m iddle-classes who attempted to  catch up with the upper-c lasses , a t  
l e a s t  sym bolically , and, o f  course, s u p e r f ic ia l ly .  In these circum­
stances , c u l tu ra l  lag ,  moral inconsistency , and generational gaps 
surfaced and increased.
This s i tu a t io n  re su l ted  in  a kind o f  c u l tu ra l  depriva tion , 
s ta tu s  lo s s ,  and hum ilia tion  on which ground a moral crusade was 
launched. Such a crusade, however, was i n i t i a t e d  on behalf o f  i t s  own 
s e l f ,  in te ra c ted  with the  economic and p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv es ,  and to  a 
g rea t ex ten t symbolized the  Iran ian  Revolution as in t o t a l i t y .  This 
r e a l i t y  can be traced  to ,  among o ther  in d ic a t io n s ,  the  o f f ic ia l  
id e n t i f ic a t io n  o f  the  Iran ian  Revolution as " Is lam ic,"  th a t  i s ,  a 
re l ig io u s  rev o lu tio n .  I t  i s  a lso  observed t h a t ,  "The bulk o f the 
movements' rank and f i l e  i s  drawn from lower-middle c lass  property  owners, 
shopkeepers, t r a d i t io n a l  merchants, and c raftsm en--the  groups th a t  have 
been most th rea tened  by in d u s t r ia l iz a t io n  and modern mass marketing" 
(Bordewich, 1980:69).
On the  o the r hand, cu l tu ra l  values, in te l le c tu a l  i s su e s ,  and 
s ta tu s - r e la te d  in te r e s t s  had a p a r t ic u la r  im plica tion  fo r  th ree  ca tegories
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of the  Iran ian  opposition : re l ig io u s  le ad e rs ,  e thn ic  m in o r i t ie s ,  and 
the  p rofessional in t e l l e c tu a l s .  In each case , th i s  p a r t i c u l a r i t y  is  
explainable  by " s ta tu s  inconsistency" and non-temporal "downward 
m ob ili ty ,"  as proposed by Geschwender.
The re l ig io u s  le ad e rs ,  who t r a d i t i o n a l ly  and o f f i c i a l l y  were 
one o f  the  most h ighly ranked s t r a t a  in so c ie ty ,  saw themselves as 
i n f e r io r  r e l a t iv e  to  the past and lower in the  social h ie ra rchy  than 
the  comparable pro-regime ind iv id u a ls .  Their p res tige  and m obility  
were r e s t r i c t e d  o r  blocked by means o f  s e c u la r i s t i c  a t t i t u d e s ,  iso la t io n  
from the mainstream o f  p o l i t i c s ,  and the  concomitant c ircum stan tia l  
powerlessness. As a r e s u l t ,  even in t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  theo log ical 
spheres o f  in f lu en ce ,  such as Mosque and Madreseh ( i . e . ,  t r a d i t io n a l  
re l ig io u s  c o l le g e ) ,  they fa i le d  to  maintain t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  p re s ­
t ig io u s  p o s it ions  and se lf-esteem . The c lergy  and those people who 
advocated t r a d i t io n a l  and not n ecessa r i ly  reactionary  or conservative 
values were ca l led  by the newcomer s e c u la r i s t s  "Omol" ( i . e . ,  fogyish). 
This s ta tu s  d is to r t io n  was a lso  t ru e  with regard to  "modern" i n t e l l e c ­
tu a ls  and e th n ic  m in o r i t ie s .
Ethnic m in o r it ie s  did not gain p r iv i leg es  on the  ground o f 
e thn ic  a f f i l i a t i o n ,  e thn ic  r ig h t s ,  and e thn ic  a u th o r i ty  throughout 
the  Pahlavi regime. What was worse, with the  course o f  time they 
were forced to  give up c e r ta in  e thn ic  t i e s ,  sentim ents, customs and 
ambitions. They eventually  suffered  from id e n t i f ic a t io n  lo ss  in  a 
soc ie ty  in  which the  Arabs, the  Baluchis, the  Kurds, the  Turks, and 
the Turkomans were not id e n t i f ie d  as such o r even as "hyphenated" 
Iran ian s ,  but as pure Iran ians overwhelmed by the dominant c u l tu re .
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When c e r ta in  members o f  these  e th n i c i t i e s ,  usually  the Turks, rose to  
higher positions  t h i s  was achieved through absolute lo y a lty  to  th e  
regime and to ta l  withdrawal from e th n ic  claim and id e n t i f ic a t io n .  In 
f a c t ,  when i t  came to  ethnic-based p o s it ion  and career promotion in 
a sso c ia t io n  with e thn ic  r ig h t s ,  the  Iran ian  e th n ic i t i e s  had two incom­
p a t ib le  choices—to  submit to  and be ass im ila ted  into the dominant 
system or to  withdraw from ethnic-based social honor. Eventually, 
in  e i t h e r  way, e thn ic  o b jec t ives  were defeated and the p e rta in ing  p r i ­
v ileges  were not achieved.
In sum, while r e l i g io s i t y  and e th n ic i ty  were ac tu a l ly  considered 
two v iab le  sources of se lf -es teem , p re s t ig e ,  and social m obility  in  the 
p a s t ,  in the Shah's e ra  they turned out to  be b a rr ie rs  to  upward mobility 
in  non-economic terms.
In the case o f  the  professional i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  both s ta tu s  
inconsistency  and downward mobility were experienced under the Shah's 
ru le .  The only c r i t e r io n  based on which an individual could develop 
and promote h is  in te l l e c tu a l  and occupational careers  was lo y a l ty  to  
the regime. The c r i t i c  in t e l l e c tu a l s  lagged behind comparable in d iv i ­
duals in comparable governmental occupations. This cleavage was 
manifested in d i f f e r e n t  forms. For example, members o f the p o l i t i c a l l y  
a c t iv e  i n te l l ig e n t s i a  were expelled from or denied public jobs o r  were 
assigned to  occupations in f e r io r  and i r r e le v a n t  to  th e i r  sp e c ia l iz a t io n .  
The occupational promotion of o the r i n t e l l e c tu a l s  e i th e r  were be la ted ,  
suspended, or stalemated without occupational j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  but ra th e r  
fo r  p o l i t i c a l  reasons. In each case , the in d iv id u a l 's  social m obility  
was blocked and r e s t r i c t e d ,  and hence h is  socia l s ta tu s  was a ffec ted
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co n stan tly . I t  i s  worthwhile to  note th a t  t h i s  discussed case o f the 
Iranian in te l l e c tu a l s  (and s im ila r  ins tances) can be su i ta b ly  explained 
by s ta tu s  inconsistency theory which t r a d i t i o n a l ly  covers only e thnic  
and re l ig io u s  ca tego ries .
Along with s ta tu s  p o l i t i c s  and s ta tu s  inconsistency  approaches 
to  socia l c o n f l i c t ,  the Revolution o f  Iran was, to  a g rea t  ex ten t ,  
provoked by a search fo r  normative m orality , v iab le  e th ic a l  and e thnic  
s ta tu se s ,  functional id e n t i ty ,  and a meaningful s i tu a t io n  in a rap id ly  
changing so c ie ty  and c r i s i s  tim e. Responding to  Newsweek's question th a t  
"What are  the  successes and f a i lu r e s  o f  your rev o lu tio n ?" ,  the Iranian 
Presiden t Ali Khamenei (1982:42), re p lied  th a t  " . . . . We have freed  
our c u l tu re  to  a g rea t  ex ten t from the dependence which our enemies, 
e sp e c ia l ly  the  Americans, imposed on us. We have been born again" 
(Emphasis added).
Thus, in considering th e  im plication o f  s ta tu s  p o l i t i c s  and 
inconsistency  fo r  social a c t io n ,  in f a c t ,  the s ig n if ican ce  o f  the 
" su p e r - s t ru c tu re ,"  unlike what the  Marxist Theory holds, is  a t  is su e .  
However, based on the underlying theme of th is  sy n th es is ,  the functioning 
o f  e th i c a l ,  moral, n a t io n a l ,  r a c i a l ,  and e thn ic  values as well as issues 
o f  l i f e - s t y l e  blockage or a combination of them, i s  considered to  
provide a wider base fo r  economic and p o l i t i c a l  causes o f  revo lu tions . 
Moreover, to  avoid semantic confusion and to  provide fu r th e r  im plication 
o f  p o l i t i c a l  ac tion  based on is su es  of m ora li ty ,  d ig n i ty ,  id e n t i ty  
and l i f e - s t y l e ,  from now on we w ill id e n t i fy  t h i s  kind o f m il i ta n t  
p o l i t i c s  with Cultural A lienation . Therefore, th e  c u l tu ra l  va irab le  
w ill be considered the th i r d  o r ig in a l  source o f  socia l revo lu tions .
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With these  q u a l i f i c a t io n s  and co n sid e ra tio n s ,  the  following 
p roposition  i s  derived.
Proposition  I I I .  I f  a p eo p le 's  conventional wav o f  l i f e ,  
t r a d i t io n a l  id e n t i ty ,  and socia l s ta tu s  consistency undergo a sweeping 
change, these  people w ill  l i k e ly  r i s e  in c u l tu ra l ly  pre-emptive, sus­
ta in in g .  o r  promotional opposition  in symbolic, express ive , and/or 
p rac t ica l  terms. Cultural opposition  w ill not invoke c o n f l ic t  and 
revo lu tion  unless o the r  conditions  e x i s t .
*  *  *
So f a r .  in t h i s  f i r s t  s te p ,  the s t ru c tu ra l  causes o f  a po ten tia l  
and a b s t r a c t  revo lu tion  stemming from economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and cu ltu ra l  
sources have been discussed and formulated. This form ulation, however, 
i s  in l in e  with Weber's (1946) multidimensional ana lys is  o f  socia l 
d i f f e r e n t i a t io n .  In t h i s  a n a ly s is ,  people are considered to  be s t r a t i ­
f ied  on the  ground o f  (1) "w ealth ." to  which economic s ta tu s  is  con­
nected, (2) " p o l i t ic a l  power" which r e la te s  to  p o l i t i c a l  s t a tu s ,  and 
(3) "p res t ig e"  which is  a sso c ia ted  with socia l s t a tu s .  Thus, valued 
temporal and non-temporal resources on which stratum  in eq u a l i ty  is  
based and in which c o n f l i c t  i s  roo ted , are economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and 
so c ia l .  However, s ince th e  " s o c ia l ."  by d e f in i t io n ,  a lso  includes 
both the  "economic" and the  " p o l i t i c a l . "  we have a lready deviated from 
Weber's terminology in t h i s  p a r t i c u la r  case by su b s t i tu t in g  the 
" cu l tu ra l"  fo r  what is  r e la te d  to  socia l s ta tus-based  p o l i t i c s .
Along with t h i s  form ulation , i t  i s  a lso  theo rized  th a t  these 
fundamental' o r ig in s  o f  revo lu tion  w i l l ,  with a leading ro le  o f  one over 
the  o th e r ,  even tua lly  lead to  th ree  processes which a re  "value-d issensus ."
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" s t ra in -b u i ld  up," and "resource-m obilization" on behalf o f  the  opposi­
t io n .  In the subsequent s teps each o f  these  processes is  explained 
by th e  corresponding theory  out o f  which fu r th e r  propositions w ill  be 
developed.
The Second Step: The Emergence of Value-Dissensus 
1. Johnson's Revolutionary Change Applied
Based on the  C onsti tu tiona l Revolution o f  1906-7 which in  fa c t  
was a new d e f in i t io n  o f  th e  undesirable  s i tu a t io n ,  the Iranian people 
came to  terms with the  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  monarchy. This agreement was 
su b s tan tia ted  with the  implementation o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l  ru le s  and 
democratic measures. In the course o f time, the  monarch's a u th o r i ty ,  
which was c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  defined as symbolic, turned out to  be 
instrumental and abso lu te . The regime accumulated and monopolized  ^
p o l i t i c a l  power and denied valued a u th o r i ta t iv e  resources and democratic 
p ra c t ic e s  to  the people. The Pahlavi regime ignored, overlooked, or 
a l te r e d  the C o nsti tu tion , t h a t  i s ,  the encoded values based on which 
consensus was in i t i a t e d .
In f a c t ,  as was emphasized in chapter f iv e ,  the Pahlavi regime 
su ffe red  from a leg it im a tio n  c r i s i s  throughout i t s  e ra .  Such a c r i s i s  
should be in te rp re ted  as a constan t dissensus o r  a t  l e a s t  a doubtful 
consensus between the e l i t e s  and the masses. The most open c r i s i s  
p r io r  to  the  1978-9 Revolution was the 1953 coup through which a 
co n s t i tu t io n a l  monarch with ex ternal support overthrew the legal govern­
ment and res to red  power fo rc e fu l ly .  (This case , and s im ila r  ones, 
proposes a d e f in i t io n a l  problem in the sense th a t  any given p o l i t i c a l  
regime should not be considered as leg it im a te  simply because i t  i s
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"in power".)
For the Pahlavi regime, power gradually diminished, but 
contrary  to  t h a t ,  the masses gained a progressive leg i t im a tio n  fo r  
confronta tion  with the regime. In th is  dysnchronized value s t ru c tu re ,  
a new d e f in i t io n  of the s i tu a t io n  was in ev itab le .  The regime fa i le d  
to  in je c t  new blood in to  the d is in te g ra t in g  system, to  enforce the 
agreed-upon values, and to  avoid a p rac tica l  dissensus. Thus, the 
in s t ig a t io n  of  a new d iv is ion  o f  labor, a new value s t ru c tu re ,  and a 
new equilibrium  became the ta sk  o f  the opposition. This ta sk  was 
indeed the source of the o p p o s it io n 's  s treng th  and leg it im a tion  fo r  
open c o n f l ic t  and revolu tionary  change.
This im plication of the  theory fo r  revolu tion  can be generalized 
to  a b s t r a c t  cases as the following proposition holds.
Proposition IV. S tru c tu ra l  causes of c o n f l ic t  w ill  somehow 
produce value dissensus which, in  tu rn ,  w ill p re c ip i ta te  socia l ten s io n , 
leg it im ize  anti-regim e a c tio n ,  and, with o ther f a c to r s ,  pave the wav 
fo r  open c o n f l ic t  and re v o lu t io n .
To be su re , the assumed shared values among soc ie ty  do not 
n ece ssa r i ly  mean a fu n c t io n a l i s t  explanation o f  socia l r e a l i t y .  Rather, 
what is  r e a l ly  meant here is  t h a t ,  in the p re-revo lu tionary  c r i s i s ,  
the  s ta tu s  quo may be seen as de fa c to , which, fo r  the time being, is  
immune from or has the p o ten tia l  fo r  c o n f l ic t  and revo lu tion . In th is  
modern time and c iv i l iz e d  s o c ie ty ,  a "war o f  a l l  ag a in s t  a l l "  is  
in c red ib le .  A fac tual c o n trac t  o f  kind ( e .g . ,  a c o n s t i tu t io n ) ,  or 
some unwritten accords, must be put into e f f e c t  i f  a constan t chaotic 
s i tu a t io n  is  to be avoided. However, people w ill be j u s t i f i e d  to  ac t
281
agains t the s ta tu s  quo i f  the  ad hoc or ex is t in g  accords, c o n s ti tu t io n a l  
laws, and the  l ik e  f a i l  to  f u l f i l l  t h e i r  wishes. Such a f a i lu r e  as 
well as the p o l i t i c s  o f  the  opposition are toge ther  assoc ia ted  with the 
process o f  s t r a in  build-up as d iscussed immediately.
The Third Step: The Build-up o f  S tra in
Some theories  of revo lu tion  concentrate on the phenomenon of 
" s t ra in "  as the  cause o f  soc ia l  c o n f l ic t  and revo lu tion . In th is  
p erspec tive , the actual economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and e x i s t e n t ia l  causes of 
p o l i t i c a l  unres t are overlooked o r  are  not sp ec if ied  in the in te r e s t  
o f  a s t r a in fu l  s i tu a t io n  th a t  gives r i s e  to  revo lu tion . Such theories  
as those o f  Davies, Smelser, Gurr, and Geschwender a re  examples to  be 
applied  and u t i l iz e d  in th is  th i r d  s tep o f  the sy n th es is .  Since the 
q u a li ty  o f  s t r a in  build-up i s  approached d i f f e r e n t ly  in these th e o r ie s ,  
each theory w ill prim arily  be considered independently. The only 
exception is  Geschwender's hypotheses, two of which have already been 
covered in the f i r s t  s tep  and each of the remaining w ill  be used in 
the r i s in g  expectation and r e l a t iv e  deprivation explanations of revolu­
tio n .
1. Rise-Drop Model. This model, as formulated by Davies and 
supplemented by Geschwender, has some im plications though with some 
considera tion  fo r  the Revolution o f  Iran. The f i r s t  im plication is  
assoc ia ted  with the idea o f  " r is in g  expectation" per s e ,  t h a t  i s ,  
without regard to  an e sse n t ia l  comparison between a favorable  past and 
an in to le ra b le  fu tu re  viewed from the  p ess im is tic  perspec tive  o f  the 
p resent. Although I r a n 's  GNP began to increase  tremendously with the 
o i l  boom in 1973, i t  did not decrease noticeably  even un ti l  the very
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erup tion  o f  the Revolution. No "sharp rev e rsa l"  occurred in the process, 
as Davies' model holds a b s t r a c t ly .  In economic ga ins, the m ajority  o f  
the urban population continued to  earn more r e l a t i v e  to  the p a s t .
A dditionally , because o f  the appointment o f  the new government 
in  August 1977, some kind o f r e l i e f  was f e l t  by the masses who were 
undergoing c e r ta in  pressures caused by inadequate serv ices  and increased 
socioeconomic gaps. This r e l i e f  was enforced by new promises, p o l i c i e s ,  
and re sh u f f l in g ,  a l l  o f  which served two o b je c t iv e s .  This change 
confirmed, though im p l ic i t ly ,  the  regime's f a i l u r e  in d i f f e r e n t  areas 
o f  planning and adm in is tra tion . I t  a lso  encouraged the opposition  to  
r e a l iz e  fu r th e r  th a t  change was possib le  and the  s t a b i l i t y  o f  the 
regime was in p e r i l .  To be su re ,  the preceeding 13-year old government, 
headed by a veteran p o l i t i c ia n  loyal to  the Shah, was considered and 
recognized by the Shah as the most f i t  and winning card in Iranian 
p o l i t i c s  and c o n f l ic ts .
The second im plication o f  the r ise -d ro p  model is  th a t  the 
r i s in g  exp ec ta tio n s ,  which were not app rop ria te ly  met in the  1970's ,  
s t ra in e d  the Iran ians . However, these expectations aimed a t  two 
o b je c t iv e s ,  n e i th e r  o f  which is  explainable  by the  r ise -d rop  model.
One was the  un just d is t r ib u t io n  of  wealth and income caused by cap i­
t a l i s t i c  measures, and the o the r  was concerned with p o l i t i c a l  freedom. 
With re fe rence  to  the l a s t  o b jec t iv e ,  the  Iran ians  saw p o l i t i c a l  f r e e ­
dom e s s e n t ia l  fo r  two reasons. (1) The economic development neces­
s i t a t e d  the  accompaniment o f  p o l i t ic a l  democratization o f  some kind, 
and (2) democratic measures were considered as v i t a l  channels through 
which increasing  economic gaps could be balanced and narrowed. Hence,
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r i s in g  expectations in the case o f  I r a n ,  as understood here , were 
not based on economic in te r e s t s  alone but p o l i t i c a l  p r iv i leg e s  as well. 
I t  i s  a lso  emphasized th a t  th is  r i s e  did not stem from a comparison 
between two phases o f  development but was based on the  constan t es- 
c a l l a t io n  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t io n  in economic rewards and p o l i t i c a l  p r iv i ­
leges .
The th i r d  im plica tion  o f the Davies' model, which may be 
considered in l in e  with the  model i t s e l f ,  was assoc ia ted  with the lower 
stra tum  of the w h ite -c o l la r  workers and a m ajority  o f  the peasantry.
The lower w h i te -c o l la r s ,  who based t h e i r  l i f e  on government s a la r ie s ,  
f a i l e d  to  meet the  r i s in g  cost o f  the o i l  boom y ea rs ,  r e l a t iv e  to  the 
e a r ly  1970's and the  preceeding y ears .  In th i s  s i tu a t io n ,  th is  category 
saw i t s  cu rren t s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  as in f e r io r  to  the past conditions 
and i t s  fu tu re  was uncerta in  i f  the p resen t trends continued. However, 
because of t h e i r  powerlessness, economic dependence on the government, 
and th e  overwhelming operation o f soc ia l  c o n tro l ,  these  categories  
alone were by no means capable of c rea t in g  or rep resen ting  a revolu tion .
The peasantry did not r a i s e  expecta tions fo r  a b e t t e r  fu ture  
r e l a t i v e  to  the p a s t ,  but compared t h e i r  p resen t with the  p a s t .  In the 
e a r ly  1960's, the  regime appealed to  the  peasants and ra ised  th e i r  
morale through the program of Land Reform. With the  passage of time, 
and e sp e c ia l ly  in the  1970's ,  t h e i r  economic gains and socia l p r iv i leg es  
decreased d ec is iv e ly .  Hence, in the  process they advanced value capa­
b i l i t i e s  in d i f f e r e n t  a reas . The regime f a i le d  to  respond appropria te ly  
to  th e  expectations th a t  i t  had a lready  e leva ted . But, the  peasants 
did not make nor did they p a r t ic ip a te  d i r e c t ly  in the making of the
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Revolution.
In a word, in  the case o f  Iran and in l in e  with Geschwender's 
hypothesis , but un like  Pavies ■ argument, "The actual s t a t e  o f  socio­
economic development" must be considered as more and not " less  s ig n i­
f ic a n t  than the expecta tion  th a t  p rogress ,  now blocked, can and must 
continue in the fu tu r e ."  People more l ik e ly  ge t involved in v io len t 
p o l i t i c s  fo r  o b jec t iv e  reasons re la te d  to  th e i r  cu rren t s i tu a t io n ,  
r a th e r  than because o f  an ambiguous perception of an uncertain  fu ture . 
F in a lly ,  Davies-Geshwender's s t r a in  can a lso  be seen in the  l ig h t  of 
Sm elser's theory , though from a d i f f e r e n t  view.
2. Sm elser 's  Theory. This theory may be b e t t e r  considered 
as a comprehensive frame o f  analysis  of socia l movements and revolutions 
than as a novel explanation  of t h e i r  causes. However, as the orig ins  o f  
revo lu tion  are concerned, one "determinant" ( i . e . ,  s t ru c tu ra l  s t r a in )  
o f  t h i s  "value-added" approach w ill be considered in t h i s  s tep o f  the 
sy n thes is .  To be su re ,  the o ther fou r  determinants ( i . e . ,  generalized 
b e l i e f ,  p re c ip i ta t in g  fa c to r s ,  m obiliza tion  fo r  a c t io n ,  and the operation 
o f  soc ia l  con tro l)  w il l  be taken advantage of in the fourth  s tep ,  th a t  
i s ,  the category o f  resource m obiliza tion .
On the o th e r  hand, Smelser's " s t ru c tu ra l  conduciveness," 
which is  assoc ia ted  with (1) an id e n t i f i a b le  enemy, (2) the absence of 
channels o f  expressing grievances, and (3) favorable ecology fo r  
p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n ,  has already been covered in the f i r s t  s tep  of th is  
sy n th es is .  There we showed th a t  s t ru c tu ra l  socioeconomic inequality  
and cu ltu ra l  a l ie n a t io n  were born under the Shah's regime and 
produced national circumstance conducive to  m il i ta n t  p o l i t i c a l  action
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or a " h o s t i le  o u tb u rs t ."  Thus, what is  l e f t  of i n t e r e s t  o f  the  theory 
fo r  the present i s  the  determinant of s t ru c tu ra l  s t r a in .
In l in e  with Smelser's approach, i t  should be emphasized 
th a t  th e re ,  indeed, was a " s t ru c tu ra l"  s t r a in  in the Iranian socie ty  
under the Shah's ru le .  This s t r a in  was caused by "impaired social 
re la t io n s"  in  both " t ra d i t io n a l"  and " in s t i tu t io n a l"  areas and in 
"soc ia l"  and "socia l psychological" terms. T rad it ional arrangements 
underwent undesirable  change in n a t io n a l ,  r e l ig io u s ,  e th n ic ,  and e t h i ­
cal aspects o r ,  as we labeled  p rev ious ly , in  c u l tu ra l  terms. The 
in s t i tu t io n a l iz e d  values , which were assumed to  s u b s t i t u t e ,  challenge , 
or coex is t with the  h is to r ic a l  estab lishm ent, were mostly carbon 
copies of the West in the guise o f  Western-style modernization. In 
add it io n ,  the Shah's newly c rea ted  in s t i tu t io n s  were not managed 
appropria te ly  but were used and promoted fo r  group i n t e r e s t s ,  in d iv i-  
d a u l i s t i c  ambitions, fam ilia l hegemony, and c lass  dominance.
In those " in s t i tu t io n s , "  in f a c t ,  " re la t io n s"  governed the 
s i tu a t io n ,  and not standards o r  in s t i tu t io n a l iz e d  c o l le c t iv e  values.
As a r e s u l t ,  soc ia l  gaps and economic d ifferences  were widened and 
increased in the Shah's i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  though abso lu te  economic gains 
were m u ltip l ied . P o l i t ic a l  power was monopolized by the e l i t e s ,  and 
any p o l i t i c a l  appeal o f  the opposition was oppressed by the sec re t  
s e rv ices . Although social m obility  was noticeably  in  p ra c t ic e ,  higher 
and s t r a te g ic  o f f ic e s  were blocked to  the many.
F in a lly ,  where Davies and Smelser a t t r i b u t e  the s t ra in fu l  
s i tu a t io n  th a t  eventuates in revo lu tion  to  "sharp economic reversa l"  
and "impaired socia l re la t io n s"  re sp ec tiv e ly ,  G urr 's  theory o f  "aggres-
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Sion" and "frustration" i s  lodged on "relative deprivation."
3. Relative Deprivation Model. This explanation of  " p o l i t ic a l  
v io len ce ,"  which is  based on re la t iv e  dep riva tion , as formulated by 
Gurr and explored by Geschwender, a lso  has some im plications fo r  the 
causes o f  the Iranian Revolution. However, some considera tions  must 
be h igh ligh ted . F i r s t ,  as i t  w ill be sketched immediately, a l l  the 
"décrémentai," " a s p i ra t io n a l ,"  and "progressive" d ep r iv a tio n s ,  p revailed  
in the Iran ian  so c ie ty ,  though among d i f f e r e n t  ca tegories .  In o ther 
words, i t  is  not n e ce s sa r i ly  re levan t to  a t t r i b u t e  one type o f  d ep r i­
vation to  one stage o f  socioeconomic development as Gurr m aintains.
This q u a l i f ic a t io n  i s ,  however, connected to  the second conside ra tion . 
That i s ,  the  source o f depriva tion  should not necessa r ily  be id en tica l  
fo r  a l l  s o c ie ty 's  c lasses  as the theory holds. To specify  the  im pli­
cation  o f  th is  theory fo r  the  Revolution o f  Iran in a sso c ia t io n  with 
the  above mentioned co n sid e ra t io n s ,  the following app lica t io n  p rac tice  
is  advanced fo r  the t r a n s i t io n a l  soc ie ty  o f  Iran under the Shah's regime.
The t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  and lower ca tego ries  o f  the  Iran ian  society  
l o s t  some o f t h e i r  accustomed way of l i f e ,  mode of production and 
t r a n s a c t io n ,  and t r a d i t io n a l  au tho rity  and p re s t ig e .  This lo ss  was 
caused in  the in te r e s t  o f  a new mode o f economic exchanges and p o l i t i c a l  
r e l a t i o n s ,  and a system o f  v a lu e -o r ien ta t io n  in to  which they had not 
been ass im ila ted  a t  the  time. The upper middle c lasses  developed some 
a s p ir a t io n s  in p o l i t i c a l  and economic terms and in p a tte rn s  o f  l i f e .  
However, because o f  u n fa i r  d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  economic rewards and the 
monopolization o f p o l i t i c a l  p r iv i leg es  by the  e l i t e s ,  they f a i l e d  to  
f u l f i l l  t h e i r  wishes. The upper layers  o f  t h i s  category were a lso
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a f fe c ted  by progressive deprivation  stemming from d es ire  fo r  higher 
p o l i t i c a l  o f f ic e s ,  in t e l l e c tu a l  production, ideological maneuvering, 
and s e l f - s ty le d  but not imported s ty le  o f  l i f e .
However, these  c lues and instances do not imply a to ta l  
explanation  fo r  the t a r g e t  revolu tion  fo r  several reasons. F i r s t ,  
r e l a t i v e  deprivation  in f a c t  i s  not a cause fo r  revolu tion  but ra th e r  
i t  i s  an aspec t or a m anifesta tion  of s t ru c tu ra l  causes t h a t  had 
already  produced, among o ther  th in g s ,  dep riva tion . Second, people may 
not be deprived o f only one p a r t i c u la r  source such as va lue , sentim ent, 
commodity and the l ik e ,  but r a th e r  o f  a l l ,  o r  a combination o f ,  these 
values and in te r e s t s .  Third, they may a lso  be deprived a t  d i f f e r e n t  
lev e ls  and in variab le  s tages  o f  a p o te n t ia l ly  revo lu tionary  process. 
F in a l ly ,  based on t h e i r  p a r t i c u la r  s o c ia l iz a t io n  in to  the  norms of 
so c ie ty  and stratum , people may a lso  perceive o f  deprivation  d i f f e r e n t ly  
and define  the s i tu a t io n  in d i f f e r e n t  ways. Thus, the  assumed depri­
vation  in a given s i tu a t io n  can bring about d i f f e r e n t ,  c u t-c ro ss in g ,  
o r  even c o n f l ic t in g  s ta t e s  o f  a f f a i r s .
In the  case o f  I ran , there  was in f a c t  r e la t iv e  deprivation  
though with d i f f e r in g  o r ig in s ,  regions, m an ifes ta tions , exp lanations , 
and remedial reactions  on behalf  of the a f fe c ted .  For in s ta n tc e ,  while 
the  communist ca tegories  viewed deprivation  in s t ru c tu ra l  economic 
va lues , th e  re l ig io u s  groupings perceived of i t  in moral and e th ica l  
terms or even in an a sc e t ic a l  sense. I t  can a lso  be argued th a t  
the  p rofessional in t e l l e c t u a l s  defined t h e i r  depriving s i tu a t io n  
e x i s t e n t i a l l y  and prim arily  sought meaning fo r  l i f e  r a th e r  than con­
ventional p rosperity . Ethnic m inorities  might have envisioned th e i r
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s i tu a t io n  from an all-encompassing perspective  which a lso  covered a 
c o lo n ia l i s t  reference po in t fo r  t h e i r  subjugation. F in a l ly ,  the  
n a t io n a l i s t s  adhered to  a new p o l i t ic a l  d e f in i t io n  o f the  s i tu a t io n  
w ithin  the  ex is t in g  value system and the monarchical t r a d i t i o n .  Thus, 
what r e a l ly  matters in t h i s  syn thesis  i s  the  r e a l i t y  t h a t  depriva tion , 
in one way or another, prevailed  under the  Shah's ru le ,  and, in  tu rn ,  
caused aggression , f r u s t r a t i o n ,  and s t r a in ,  which somehow u lt im ate ly  
burs t  ou t in to  revo lu tion .
F in a l ly ,  on the  ground o f  both the  inc lusion  o f  s t r a in  in  the 
d iscussed th eo rie s  o f  revo lu tion  and the im plica tion  o f  s t r a in  fo r  the 
t e s t  case revo lu tion , the  following proposition  is  s e t  fo r th .
Proposition VI. I f  enduring sharp economic and p o l i t i c a l  
in e q u a l i t ie s  are  not reduced ap p rop ria te ly , and the  impulsing cu ltu ra l  
a l ie n a t io n  are not managed ap p ro p ria te ly ,  they  w ill l ik e ly  produce 
a s o c ia l ly  s t r a in fu l  s i tu a t io n  leading to c o n f l ic t  and re v o lu t io n .
This rad ica l  change w ill not occur unless s t r a i n  is  a c t iv a te d  c o l le c ­
t iv e ly  and m i l i t a n t l y .
The c o l le c t iv e  and m il i t a n t  a c t iv a t io n  o f  the  s t r a in f u l  s i tu a ­
t io n  as well as the  manipulation o f  the  s i tu a t io n a l  value-d issensus 
are  the  sub jec t  m atter o f  the  next steps in  t h i s  syn thes is  which cover 
the resource m obilization explanation o f  revo lu tion .
The Fourth Step.Resource Mobilization Explanation Applied
As discussed previously in chapter f iv e ,  the  Revolution of 
Iran was charac te r ized  by re l ig io u s  values and sentiments as a cu ltu re
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fo r  the  many and as p o l i t i c a l  idea ls  fo r  c e r ta in  ca teg o rie s  o f  people.
The Quran commands the  followers to man the  barricade ag a in s t  th e i r  
enemies with d i f f e r e n t  means and by d i f f e r e n t  a l t e rn a t iv e s .  As an 
example the Quran says "Do manage aga ins t  them whatever s treng th  you 
a ffo rd . . . . "  (IX:54). A. N. Jassem (1979) describes a v a rie ty  of 
s t r a t e g i e s ,  t a c t i c s ,  and resource management th a t  the  e a r ly  Muslims 
adopted to  expand Islam fo rce fu lly  or peacefully  in the  e ra  of the 
Prophet.
However, resource m obilization in the case o f  the  Iranian 
Revolution was not r e s t r i c t e d  to  re l ig io u s  p rac tices  and t r a d i t io n s .
I t  was a lso  based on communist and n a t io n a l i s t  experiences in both 
symbolic and p ra c t ic a l  terms.
A b r ie f  review of the  Iranian p o l i t i c s  from the l a t e  19th 
century , as was discussed in the "Narrative Account," revea ls  th a t  the re  
had always been d ispu te  and c o n f l ic t  o f  a kind between the regime and 
the  opposition. But, p r io r  to 1978-9, the  regime had gradually  been 
able  to  take hold o f  the  s i tu a t io n ,  to  overwhelm the opposition , and 
to  crush i t  d ec is iv e ly  a t  l e a s t  on two occasions, in 1953 and in 1963.
On these  two occasions, the opposing groups fa i le d  to  accomplish 
t h e i r  fundamental ends. This f a i lu re  was b a s ica l ly  caused by the growing 
s treng th  of the  e l i t e s  on the one hand, and the poor e f f o r t  management 
o f  t h e i r  counterparts  on the  other.
For in s tan ce ,  although the Shah was ab le , though through 
external support, to  put an end to  the  popular government o f  Mossadeq in 
1953, a c lose  observation of the  events reveals  another cause fo r the 
op p o s it io n 's  f a i l u r e .  According to Roosevelt (1978:166f), the  CIA
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agent in charge o f  th e  opera tion , " le ss  than $100,000. . was invested 
"during the  operation" to  mobilize the  Iranians ag a in s t  Mossadeq's 
movement and to  r e i n s t a l l  the  Shah in power. In a sense, t h i s  means 
among o ther th ings  t h a t  the opposition was short in  counter-balancing 
the  s i tu a t io n  by some $100,000. In te re s t in g ly ,  because o f  n a t io n a l i s t i c  
fe rvor enhanced by th e  n a t io n a l iza t io n  o f  o i l ,  the a n t i -B r i t i s h  sentim ent, 
and the  growing lo c a l ,  reg io n a l ,  and in te rn a t io n a l  popu la r ity  of 
Mossadeq, the overa ll  s i tu a t io n  was much more favorable fo r  the opposi­
t io n  than fo r  the regime.
In 1963, the Bazaaris ' an ti-reg im e action  and massive demon­
s t r a t i o n ,  which was b a s ic a l ly  id e n t i f ie d  with the  re l ig io u s  community, 
was denied s u f f ic ie n t  support from d i f f e r e n t  challengers  and e spec ia lly  
the communist c a te g o r ie s  and the n a t io n a l i s t  leadersh ip . This r e b e l l io n ,  
which the  new regime acknowledged as th e  beginning o f  the  Iranian 
1978-9 Revolution, was severely  crushed by the Shah's troops . Again, 
the s i tu a t io n  was more favorable fo r  th e  opposition than fo r  the regime. 
The regime was su f fe r in g  both in te rn a l  pressure from the  inner c i r c le  
and external pressure  and provocation from the r iv a l  P resident Nasser 
and even from the  Kennedy adm in is tra tion  which pushed the  Shah to  adopt 
some reforms. The opposition  was so immobilized and d isu n ited  th a t  i t  
f a i l e d  to  ex p lo it  the permissive and supportive circumstances for i t s  
own good.
In the 1978-9 episodes, which brought about the  Revolution, 
the  s i tu a t io n  d i f f e r e d  remarkably. This i s ,  in f a c t ,  a t t r ib u te d  to  two 
rec ip rocal processes: the  growing popular s treng th  o f  th e  opposition 
as a un ified  whole, and the decaying o f  the  regime. Such a decay was
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caused by the regim e's  own d is in te g ra t io n  from w ith in  and the  o p p o s it io n 's  
p ressure  from w ithout. The s treng th  o f  the  opposition stemmed from the 
management of i t s  e f f o r t ,  un ity , adoption o f  d i f f e r e n t  means fo r  challenge , 
and the  determination to  f ig h t  to  the  end. These determining e f fo r t s  
and s t r a te g ie s  fo r  a successful an ti-reg im e action  a re  sketched in the 
following passages.
The t r a d i t io n a l  opposition usua lly  provoked and encouraged the 
u n iv e rs i ty  s tudents  to  demonstrate o r  r i o t  on every possib le  occasion.
This was p a r t i c u la r ly  t ru e  in the  event of the  annual Shanizdeh Azar 
(December 17), the  "generational event" in  which th ree  Tehran University 
s tuden ts  were k i l l e d  on campus by the  Shah's troops (1953). This 
demonstration served a t  l e a s t  two ends: the  enduring p o l i t i c iz a t io n  o f  
d i f f e r e n t  generations o f  s tuden ts ,  and the continuous, though covert, 
parade o f  the old  opposition . In a word, the  event served as a constant 
r e v i t a l i z a t io n  o f  s tuden t p o l i t i c s  and s a c r i f i c e .
From the  e a r ly  1970 's, th e  u n iv e rs i ty  s tuden ts  were able to  
id e n t i ty  themselves with "student l i b r a r i e s " on major campuses. These 
e n t i t i e s ,  which were associated  with the  Marxist and Muslim s tuden ts ,  
u n if ied  the a c t i v i s t s ,  eased t h e i r  rec ru itm en t,  and t h e i r  e f fo r t s  o f  
p o l i t i c i z a t i o n .  The c o l le c t iv e  prayers o f  the Muslim s tuden ts ,  who 
were fu n c tio n a rie s  and b e n e f ic ia r ie s  o f  the  Muslim students  l ib r a ry ,  
s ig n i f ie d  the  emergence o f  a new r e l i g io - p o l i t i c a l  and revolu tionary  
generation .
The Iran ian  student o rgan izations  abroad, in  Western Europe 
and in  the United S ta te s ,  were among th e  most e f f e c t iv e  means through 
which the regim e's oppression was public ized  and denounced. In the
292
process , the  s tuden ts  with some help o f  the  in te rn a t io n a l  groups on 
human r ig h ts  were ab le  to  gain a minimal in te rn a t io n a l  support a t  an 
i n te l l e c tu a l  level fo r  th e i r  cause. Moreover, a f t e r  th e i r  re tu rn  to  
th e  country , many o f the a c t i v i s t  s tuden ts  continued t h e i r  challenge 
though with d i f f e r e n t  t a c t i c s ,  including armed s tru g g le .  The Iranian  
s tuden t organizations  abroad, which were favored by "Western democracy," 
p o l i t i c a l l y  so c ia l iz e d  d i f f e r e n t  s tudent generations and served as 
re fe rence  poin ts  fo r  th e i r  fellow a c t i v i s t s  in s ide  th e  country. Some 
o f  these  s tudents  abroad f in a l ly  became members o f  th e  "Revolutionary 
Council" and one o f  them became I r a n 's  f i r s t  P res iden t (to  be l a t e r  
denounced by the  Parliam ent).
From the e a r ly  1970s, two a c t iv e  Islamic and Marxist g u e r r i l l a  
o rgan iza tions  emerged to  i n i t i a t e ,  encourage, and symbolize armed 
s tru g g le  aga ins t  the  regime. The "Siahkal" Confrontation with the 
reg im e's  gendarmes, though o f a l im ited  scope, served as a turn ing  
po in t in an ti-reg im e ac tion . The bravery of the  g u e r r i l l a  Fadayeen 
in  t h i s  challenge was a lso  developed m etaphorically  in  some songs 
and gained n o ticeab le  popu larity .
The v i t a l i t y  o f  Mosques and o ther re l ig io u s  places as well as 
o f  the  re l ig io u s  sermons and preachings should a lso  be acknowledged 
as an e f fe c t iv e  but t r a d i t io n a l  kind o f p reparation  fo r  challenge.
Since the regime could not p ro h ib i t  Mosque attendance nationwide.
Mosques operated as almost the only places in which uno ff ic ia l  mass 
ga therings  were po ss ib le .  In such congregations, th e  d es irab le  marriage 
between two Islamic mates ( i . e . ,  r e l ig io n  and p o l i t i c s )  was in  p ra c t ic e .  
The regime fa i le d  to  understand the  f a c t  th a t  Mosque a ttendan ts  were not
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n ecessa r i ly  a l l  p ra c t ic in g  Muslims but people who had p o l i t i c a l  purposes 
which could not be advanced elsewhere and by o ther means. Some preachers 
c r i t i c i z e d  the  regime o v e r t ly ,  o thers  did so by im p lica tion , and hence 
the  Mosque became the only av a ilab le  place in which m i l i t a n t  p o l i t i c s  
were touched upon or a t  l e a s t  were expected to  be exchanged and com­
municated.
Another means which was exp lo ited  e a s i ly  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  a n t i ­
regime communication was the  Iran ian  t r a d i t io n  of "Dawrah. " Dawrah 
l i t e r a l l y  means course o f  time or a c t io n ,  but in t r a d i t io n  i t  means 
a "confluence o f  personal and group re la t io n s "  ( B i l l ,  1972:44). The 
Iran ians  are used to  ga thering  a t  c e r ta in  periods o f  tim e, weekly, 
biweekly, or monthly. The purpose o f  th i s  gathering is  the  main- 
ta inance  and reinforcement o f  family t i e s ,  f r iend ly  re la t io n s h ip s ,  and 
l e i s u r e  time. Dawrah i s  usually  staged a t  night and charac te rized  by 
h o s p i ta l i ty  and en terta inm ent. I t  takes place in every p a r t i c ip a n t 's  
home a l te rn a te ly  and t h i s  i s  another ra t io n a le  fo r  the  term. Under the 
Shah's ru le  where open p o l i t i c a l  d iscuss ions  and c r i t ic is m s  were a 
to ta l  r i s k ,  t h i s  "confluence" autom atica lly  functioned fo r  the opposi­
t io n  as covert overn ight media fo r  p o l i t i c a l  d iscuss ion , moblization, 
and fu tu re  ac tion . This t r a d i t io n a l  form o f  in te ra c t io n  was generally  
immune to  SAVAK p e n e tra t io n ,  fo r ,  t r a d i t i o n a l ly ,  i t  includes only 
c lose  re la t iv e s  and in tim ate  f r ie n d s .  I t  was on such occasions as 
the  Dawrah gatherings th a t  the  "what i s  to  be done" and "how should 
i t  be ca rr ied  out" issues  were discussed and determined.
The mountainous location  o f  the  cap ita l  c i t y  o f  Tehran was a lso  
exp lo ited  by the  in h a b i ta n ts ,  e sp e c ia l ly  the  youth, to  involve themselves
294
in p o l i t i c s  and ideo log ical dialogue a t  the  "summits." This prevalent 
p ra c t ice  usually  took p lace , and was e a s i ly  j u s t i f i e d ,  in the  guise 
o f  le i s u re  time a c t i v i t y  and camping which occasionally  la s ted  fo r  days. 
To re p e a t ,  such a recourse to  mother na ture  fo r  p o l i t ic a l  purposes was 
caused by the SAVAK's in ten s ify in g  check over the  conventional places 
o f  gathering in the  jammed c i ty  of Tehran.
"Shab-nameh" can be thought o f  as another t a c t i c a l  means in 
the  process o f  resource m obilization endeavors. Shab-nameh i s  a sec re t  
l e t t e r  which is  d is t r ib u te d  anonymously overn igh t. Since under the  
Shah's regime the press  and o ther public  means o f  communication were 
under constant censorsh ip , Shab-nameh served as a n igh tly  s ec re t  paper 
through which the opposition communicated to  the  c i t iz e n s  through 
th i s  kind o f paper, the  opposition sen t a lso  i t s  m i l i t a n t  and revealing 
messages to  the a u th o r i t i e s .  By adopting t h i s  means o f  communication, 
the  I ran ian s ,  in f a c t ,  revived a t r a d i t io n a l  p rac tice  to  which they 
had always resorted  h i s to r i c a l ly .
Poetry n ig h ts , though not held very o f te n ,  were among o ther 
means the  in te l l e c tu a l s  adopted to  speak ou t whenever p o ss ib le .  Persian 
poetry was h i s to r i c a l ly  used, e i th e r  d i r e c t l y  o r  by im p lica tion , as a 
channel fo r  p o l i t i c a l  c r i t ic i s m  and psychological c a th a r s i s .  I n te r ­
e s t in g ly ,  one of the  c h a r a c te r i s t ic s  o f  the  Iranian post-Is lam ic  poetry 
is  th e  "Sanat-e Eham" ( i . e . ,  the poetic  device o f  metaphor), which 
was developed a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y  because o f  the  nonexistence of f ree  
p o l i t i c a l  expression under d i f f e r e n t  regimes. At a poetry n ig h t ,  which 
was held in  Tehran in  1975, Hamid Mossadegh, a p a r t ic ip a t in g  poet 
addressed h is  audience o f some f i f te e n  thousand by the provocating
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question:
I f  I do not r i s e .
And you do not r i s e  
Who e lse  then w ill  r i s e ?
Furthermore, Dr. Ali S h a r ia t i ,  who advocated a modern human­
i t a r i a n  but m i l i t a n t  Islamic ideology, held countrywide le c tu re s  which 
were a ttended by d i f f e r e n t  groups and served to  o r ie n t  the  p a r t ic ip a n ts  
in r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l  terms. S h a ria ti  helped o r ie n t  youth toward defined 
p o l i t i c a l  and e th ic a l  id ea ls  and in  tu rn  sowed the  seed of a revo lu tionary  
ac tion  in t h e i r  recep tive  minds.
C assette  tapes  were also  used to  convey the  ex iled  Ayatollah 
Khomeini's messages and to  bridge the  geographical gap between him 
and h is  fo llow ers. In t h i s  p ra c t ic e ,  th e  so -ca lled  " t r a n s i s to r  revo lu­
t ion"  con tribu ted  to  the  c rea tion  of  the Iranian Revolution through 
p o l i t i c i z a t io n  and m obilization  of  d i f f e r e n t  ca teg o rie s  o f  th e  people 
fo r  m i l i t a n t  a c t io n .  These tap es ,  along with the A yato llah 's  l e a f l e t s ,  
were smuggled in to  Iran from Iraq by p ilgrim s and were e a s i ly  but 
c o v e r t ly  dup lica ted ,  m u lt ip l ied ,  and c i rc u la te d  nationwide.
In terms o f  f inanc ia l  support and o ther preparatory  measures, 
the  Bazaaris invested a g rea t deal o f  money, time, and energy. They 
had th e  money to  o f f e r  and the w ill to  continue t h i s  s a c r i f i c e .  In 
a d d it io n  to  t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  and re l ig io u s  in c l in a t io n  to  p o l i t i c s ,  
the  Bazaaris considered t h e i r  s a c r i f i c e  o f  money as r e l ig io u s  t i t h e s .
This p ra c t ic e  was both encouraged and leg a l ized  by the  re l ig io u s  
le a d e rs .  Thus, the  in te r l in k  between re l ig io u s  d u tie s  and p rac tica l  
p o l i t i c a l  n e c e s s i t ie s  can be observed as both leg i t im iz in g  and re in fo rc ing
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prophecies fo r whose purpose time, money, and energy were sa c r i f ic e d  
and apprecia ted .
In the revo lu tionary  episodes, the  opposition adopted s logans . 
t a c t i c s , and s t r a te g i e s  co n s is ten t with the  course o f  even ts .  While 
the  i n i t i a l  slogans and demands revolved around such issu es  as " p o l i t ic a l  
freedom," "sa la ry  in c rease ,"  and the  re tu rn  o f  Ayatollah Khomeini, with 
the  passage o f time, th e  slogan "down with the  Shah" became the  focal
p o in t .  In a gradual manner the opposition approached the  Shah's army
and th e  g u ie t  r e l ig io u s  m in o r i t ie s ; o ffe red  flowers to  so ld ie rs  and 
the  r i o t  troops , and d ive rted  th e i r  a t te n t io n  by p a t r i o t i c ,  re l ig io u s ,  
and humanitarian slogans and Quranic decrees. In th i s  con tex t ,  the now 
massive revo lu tion ized  opposition emotionalized or n eu tra l iz ed  i t s  
enemy and in the  end caused the s p l i t  in the  army.
So f a r  the  endogenous resource m obilization p rac t ice s  and
p o l ic ie s  have been d iscussed . With re fe rence  to  exogenous resource 
management, and in ad d itio n  to  s tudent activ ism  abroad, the  Organization 
fo r  L ibera tion  o f  P a le s t in e  was a lso  taken advantage o f  by the Iran ians. 
From the l a t e  1960 's , d i f f e r e n t  groups o f  the  young a c t i v i s t s  resorted  
to  the  PLO t ra in in g  camps in  Jordan and Lebanon. In ad d itio n  to  p a r t i ­
san t r a in in g ,  the t r a in e e s  a lso  fu r thered  and enriched t h e i r  th eo re t ica l  
and ideo log ical education and a lso  p a r t ic ip a te d  in some g u e r r i l l a  
a c t i v i t i e s  on the sp o t.  The core o f  the  two Iranian g u e r r i l l a  organiza­
t i o n s ,  Mojahideen and Fedayin, may be considered a t r a in in g  produce of 
the  PLO. I t  is  a lso  ind ica ted  th a t  the  backbone o f  the  "Revolutionary 
Guard Army," the p ride  o f  the  new regime o f  Iran , was t ra in e d  by the 
P a le s t in ia n s .
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F in a lly ,  c e r ta in  points  must be concluded and emphasized in the  
case o f  the Iran inas resource m obiliza tion . F i r s t ,  what was discussed 
in the  above passages must be considered and analyzed as an in teg ra ted  
whole: a network o f  in te r a c t io n ,  communication, c o l la b o ra t io n ,  and even 
construc tive  competition among the  revo lu tionary  fa c t io n s .  In f a c t ,  
th e re  were two regimes ac ting  aga in s t  each o ther: the regime in power, 
and th e  r iva l  regime t h a t  had a d e s ir e  fo r  power. Second, the  regime 
o f  the  opposition was mobilized fo r  two ultim ate  a l t e rn a t iv e s :  to  share 
p o l i t i c a l  power w ithin the  ex is t in g  system or to  bring about a new 
system in sp i te  o f  the w ill o f  power w ie lders . Since, as time went on 
the  opposition gained more s treng th  and determ ination, the second a l t e r ­
n a tiv e  became the  only id e a l ,  and i t  was achieved with success.
Third, in the process o f  resource m obiliza tion , c o n f l ic t  
re so lu t io n  among the  opposing camps, with some exceptions, was adopted 
e i th e r  as de ju re  o r de fac to .  This kind o f  consensus was a c o n tr ib u tin g ,  
i f  not a determining, f a c to r  fo r  a revo lu tionary  take-over . Whatever 
t h e i r  ideological and t a c t i c a l  d i f fe re n c e s ,  the r e l ig io u s ,  communist, 
n a t i o n a l i s t ,  and e th n ic  fac t io n s  a c tu a l ly  worked toge ther  to  topple the  
regime. Such a constan t u n i ty ,  though i t  suffered from occasional 
breaches and c leavages , was a t  the  very h ear t  o f  the o p p o s it io n 's  resource 
m obiliza tion . Fourth, in mobilizing t h e i r  resources, p o l i t i c iz in g  the 
in to le ra b le  value-d issensus  and rev o lu tion iz ing  the  s t r a in fu l  s i t u a ­
t io n  imposed on them, th e  Iran ians were favored by a r e l i g io - p o l i t i c a l  
revo lu tionary  t r a d i t i o n  which goes f a r  back in t h e i r  Islamic h is to ry . 
F i f th ,  such a national t r a d i t io n  was a lso  re inforced  by regional and 
in te rn a t io n a l  wars o f  independence, revo lu tionary  movements, and ongoing
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worldwide c o n f l ic t .  This, in tu rn ,  ra ised  the  Iran ians ' s i tu a t io n a l
consciousness, e levated th e i r  " s p i r i t  o f  tim e,"  and mobilized them for
construc tive  p o l i t i c a l  ac tion . Thus, the Iranian a c t i v i s t s  were able
not only to  assemble t h e i r  national resources to  challenge the  Shah but
a lso  to  e x p lo i t ,  to  a l l  possib le  e x te n t ,  the  in te rn a t io n a l  experiences
in extending th e i r  s i tu a t io n a l  consciousness, building up t h e i r  s treng th ,
and enforcing t h e i r  determ ination.
*  *  *
But, the  p o s i t io n  taken here i s  not th a t  e f fe c t iv e  resource 
m obilization  is  rev o lu tio n ,  as the  theory assumes. Rather i t  i s  argued 
th a t  the re  should p rim ari ly  be ob jec t iv e  socioeconomic in ju s t i c e  and 
substan tive  e x is t e n t ia l  issues leading to  social s t r a in  and s trangu la ­
t io n  around which resource m obilization e f fo r t s  could o r  would revolve. 
People are r a t io n a l .  They could not be mobilized fo r  m i l i t a n t  action 
i f  th e re  were not s t ru c tu ra l  causes fo r  mobilization and revo lu tion .
I f  such p o te n t i a l i t i e s  are  e x is t in g ,  t h e i r  a c tu a l iz a t io n  as well 
as the  recruitm ent and p o l i t i c iz a t io n  o f  adherents, c o n s t i tu e n ts ,  
t r a n s i to r y  teams, and b e n e f ic ia r ie s  would be the task  o f  resource 
m obilization s t r a t e g i e s .
I f  resource m obilization theory does not emphasize the  fac t  
th a t  the  s t ru c tu ra l  cause of revo lu tion  e x is t s  s i tu a t io n a l ly  but should 
be worked out in  m i l i t a n t  p o l i t i c a l  terms to  eventuate in revo lu tion , 
i t  would be considered a "truncated" theory . R e a l i s t i c a l ly ,  resource 
m obilization theory can b e t te r  provide an explanation fo r  the  f a i lu r e -  
success dichotomy of a revolu tionary  "take-over" than a s u f f ic ie n t  
explanation fo r  a revolu tionary  "cause." With these considera tions  one
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can b e t t e r  understand why the  Iranians were ab le  to  overthrow a v is ib ly  
powerful and in te rn a t io n a l ly  supported regime in 1979, but f a i l e d  to  do 
so in  1953 or 1963 when the  regime was weaker than ever before o r  
s ince . Based on the t e s t a b i l i t y  of the  theory  and the  proposed con­
s id e ra t io n s ,  the following proposition  i s  developed.
Proposition V. Given the in to le ra b le  (1) economic in e q u a l i tv .
(2) p o l i t i c a l  oppression, and (3) cu l tu ra l  a l i e n a t io n ,  the concomitant 
(a) va luational disagreement, and (b) s t r a in f u l  s i tu a t io n ,  w ill  not 
r e s u l t  in  severe c o n f l i c t  and succesful revo lu tionary  take-over unless 
people mobilize t h e i r  re so u rce s .
*  *  *
However, a successfu l resource m obiliza tion  i t s e l f  i s  conditioned 
on another s e t  of v a r iab le s  which a re  explored in the following s tep .
The F if th  S tep.Ideology, Leadership, and Organization
Resource m obiliza tion  s tra teg y  and i t s  i n e v i t a b i l i ty  fo r  a 
successful revo lu tionary  ac t io n  i s ,  indeed, based on and j u s t i f i e d  by 
two s e ts  o f  v a r iab le s .  One s e t  is  id e n t i f i e d  with the  in to le ra b le  
s t ru c tu ra l  shortcomings caused by th e  dysfunctioning o f  the  regime in 
power a g a in s t  which people r i s e  in opposit ion . This r e a l i t y  was 
considered previously . The o ther s e t  i s  id e n t i f ie d  with the  o p p o s it io n 's  
own ideology, leadersh ip , and o rganization  under whose banner and 
w ithin whose context the  people challenge th e  regime in power. There­
fo re ,  when they r i s e  in  a c t io n ,  people do no t merely question th e  
e x is t in g  establishm ent but a lso  propose t h e i r  own a l te rn a t iv e .
(1) By terms l ik e  "ideology," " b e l ie f  system," "generalized
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b e l i e f , "  " revo lu tionary  id e a l s , "  " P o l i t ic a l  program", "world view" 
(Weltanschauung) or "m anifesto", what i s  meant i s  simply t h a t  people 
must formulate and advocate t h e i r  own p o l i t i c a l  values and id ea ls  
once c o l le c t iv e  value disagreement i s  the  case . Based on these  proposed 
values and a l t e r n a t iv e s ,  the  regime is  hum iliated and a new system, 
however vague, i s  promised. Ideology as such is  emphasized in several 
th e o r ie s  o f  rev o lu tion . In p ra c t ic e ,  too , ideology i s  seen as v i t a l ly  
functioning  in  d i f f e r e n t  rev o lu tions . In th e  case o f  the  Iranian 
Revolution, the  s ig n if ic a n ce  o f  ideology was c ruc ia l  in the  process. 
Although they adhered to  d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  id e a l s ,  the Iran ians  were 
put toge the r  under the  banner o f  Islamic values. Accordingly, they 
advocated an "Islamic Government," which had not been examined elsewhere. 
However, the  Muslim Iran ians  t r a d i t io n a l ly  understood th a t  Islamic 
ru le  w ill  demonstrate e q u i ty ,  e q u a l i ty ,  and j u s t i c e .  These a re  the  
values th a t  Islam advocates and the Shah's regime fa i le d  to  i n s t i t u ­
t io n a l i z e .  In a word, "we speak o f an ideology when a c e r ta in  idea 
serves a vested in t e r e s t  in  socie ty"  (Berger, 1963:111).
(2) There must a lso  be a leader o r  leaders  who develop or 
emphasize these  a l t e r n a t iv e  idea ls  and/or lead the  movement. They 
must be aware o f time and s i tu a t io n a l  circumstances and must have the 
personal, i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and educational c a p a c i t ie s  fo r 
lead ing , func tion ing , and maneuvering. Again, the s ig n if ican ce  of 
leadersh ip  in  the revo lu tionary  process has been emphasized theo re ­
t i c a l l y  and observed em p ir ic a l ly .  Were i t  not fo r  s i tu a t io n a l  con­
sensus on Ayatollah Khomeini's s p i r i tu a l  le ad e rsh ip ,  the Iran ians 
would not have been able  to  a c t  as a u n if ied  whole. They adhered
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to  d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l ,  r e l ig io u s ,  n a t io n a l ,  communist, and e thnic  
l in e s  which, in d i f f e r e n t  ways, cu t-c ro ss  each o th e r .  I t  was the  
charism atic  leadersh ip  t h a t ,  to  a g rea t ex ten t ,  c rea ted  a confluence 
o f  in t e r e s t s  out o f  c o n f l ic t in g  i n te r e s t s ,  a t  l e a s t  momentarily, to  
challenge the  regime. When need i s  f e l t ,  ". . .each so c ie ty  produces 
the  men i t  needs" (Berger, 1963:111). In c r i s i s  s i t u a t io n s ,  such a need 
in t e n s i f i e s  and hence the  presence o f  leadersh ip  fo r  v iab le  action  is  
sensed dec is iv e ly .
(3) Ideology and leadersh ip  must operate  w ithin  a c e r ta in  frame 
o f  a c t io n ,  reac t io n ,  and in te r a c t io n ,  namely an o rg an iza tion . In such 
a framework, processes o f  d isp u te s ,  c o n f l ic t ,  exchanges, and r e d e f in i ­
t ions  o f  the  s i tu a t io n s  w ith in  the  opposite camps and between i t  and 
the  regime, as well as with the  "Third Party" o f  c o n f l i c t ,  must occur 
and advance. Whatever i t s  resou rces , the opposition  cannot overcome the 
regime i f  i t  a c ts  in  a d iso rd e r ly  manner. From m i l i t a r y  wars to  social 
rev o lu t io n s ,  and from bargaining ta b le s  to  open con fro n ta t io n s ,  o rgani­
za tion  i s  a determinant in goal atta inm ent. One c h a r a c te r i s t i c  o f  the 
Revolution o f  Iran was i t s  m ili tancy  which coupled with non-violence.
This condition helped the rev o lu t io n a r ie s  to  shape t h e i r  action  d es irab ly . 
Through t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  groups, g u e r r i l l a  o rg an iza t io n s ,  well-organized 
and popular demonstrations, and planned activ ism , they ac tu a lly  waged 
a system atic  "war o f  a t t r i t i o n "  aga ins t  the  Shah who l o s t  i t  u lt im a te ly .
In f a c t ,  the  organization o f  the  Iranian  revo lu tionary  movement in terms 
o f  p o l i t i c a l  c o a l i t io n ,  in te rn a l  c o n f l ic t  re s o lu t io n ,  pull and push 
p o l i t i c s  with the e l i t e s ,  and ta c t i c a l  devices, demonstrated a g rea t  
deal o f  s i tu a t io n a l  co ns is tency , f r u i t f u l  p o l i t i c a l  maneuvering, and
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responsive o rganizational f l e x i b i l i t y .
These th ree  p re re q u is i te s  o f  resource m obiliza tion , th a t  i s ,  
ideology, leadersh ip , and o rgan iza tion , a re  born h i s to r i c a l ly  and get 
developed with the course o f  action  or with the  in te n s i ty  o f  the 
s t ru c tu ra l  causes o f  revo lu tion . They a lso  get shaped with th e  accumu­
la t io n  o f  s t r a in  and the  in to le ra b le  value-disagreement in soc ie ty .
With a l l  these considera tions  in mind, t h i s  proposition is  developed.
Proposition VII. Resource m obilization s t r a te g ie s  and t a c t i c s  
w ill  not produce a d e s irab le  rad ical change unless they a re  adopted 
and exp lo ited  under appropria te  id e a ls ,  so ph is tica ted  lead e rsh ip ,  and 
through a responsive o rg an iza t io n .
However, the functioning  o f  leadersh ip , ideology, and organ i­
za t io n  in the twofold process o f  (1) resource m obilization and (2) the 
actual confron ta tion  with the  regime must produce s u f f ic ie n t  stratum 
p o l i t i c i z a t io n  and conciousness.(Stratum p o l i t i c iz a t io n  and stratum 
consciousness mean group p o l i t i c s ,  stemming from economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  
c u l t u r a l ,  r e l ig io u s ,  e th n ic ,  o r  national sou rces .)  In f a c t ,  i t  i s  
t h i s  gradual revolu tionary  p o l i t i c iz a t io n  and consciousness th a t  inflame 
and motivate people fo r  p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n ,  s a c r i f i c e ,  and confron ta tion . 
Active stratum p o l i t i c a l  consciousness a lso  j u s t i f i e s  people 's  commit­
ment to  the in te r e s t  of s e l f  and the ideal of the stratum. This 
s i tu a t io n a l  and sequential c o l le c t iv e  consciousness may revolve around 
such p e rp le x i t ie s  as (1) what s i tu a t io n  "we" a re  already engulfed in ,
(2) how i t  is  possible to  redefine  the  s i tu a t io n  favorably, and (3) 
how i t  i s  functional fo r  the  group and imperative to  us to  get involved 
in ac t io n .
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In the  case o f  the  Iranian Revolution, c o l le c t iv e  consciousness 
enhanced and complicated the  p o l i t i c s  o f  the  opposition . The Iranians 
were able  to  r e la te  to  d i f f e r e n t  r e l ig io u s /s e c u la r  idea ls  in p o l i t ic a l  
terms and defined t h e i r  s i tu a t io n  accordingly. They understood th a t  
they would be b e t t e r - o f f  under a new social system whose re a l iz a t io n  
required conscious p o l i t i c a l  s a c r i f i c e .  In the  process, active  
c o l le c t iv e  consciousness developed and anti-regim e ac tion  was promoted.
I f  simply p o l i t i c a l  consciousness, as the Marxist theory holds, i s  
not id e n t ic a l  with rev o lu tio n ,  a revolution o f  p o l i t i c a l  consciousness 
is  in e v i ta b le  fo r  the  emergence and success o f  revolu tionary  ac tion .
That i s  what happened in  th e  revolutionary  Iran as well as any o ther 
mass revo lu tion . In connection, the following p roposition  is  concluded 
and proposed.
Proposition V III. For ideology, leadersh ip  and organization 
to  succeed in  resource m obilization processes, a c t iv e  p o l i t ic a l  stratum 
consciousness must be p resen t among the  r e v o lu t io n a r ie s .
The Sixth Step.W indfalls as the P re c ip i ta t in g  Factors 
o f  a Revolutionary Take-Over 
Some th e o r i s t s  ( e . g . ,  Smelser and Johnson) po in t out the ro le  
of some "p re c ip i ta t in g  fa c to rs"  or "acce le ra to rs"  th a t  somehow promote 
revo lu tions . Whatever t h e i r  impact on the  p rocess , these  fac to rs  must 
be considered as Godsends o r  w indfa lls . These acce le ra to rs  may operate 
as l a t e n t  functions o f  e i th e r  some anti-regim e ac tion  or of the  operation 
of socia l control i t s e l f .  For example, the  execution o f a revolutionary  
figu re  by the  regime may, contrary  to  the  regim e's  expecta tion , fu r th e r  
re v o lu tio n a liz e  the  masses and hence advance the  occurrence of revolu­
t io n .
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I t  i s  a lso  t r u e ,  fo r  in s tance , th a t  the  untimed a ssass in a tio n  
of a top o f f i c i a l  by the  opposition can cause a setback fo r  the  opposi­
t io n  i t s e l f .  In t h i s  s i tu a t io n ,  the regime may take  severe revenge and 
hence minimize the p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  open c o n f l i c t  a t  l e a s t  momentarily.
Or, the  revo lu tionary  ac tion  may recede au tom atica lly  under the  p re tex t 
th a t  i t  has a lready  caused a lo ss  to  the regime and hence has achieved 
an end in the  course o f  con fron ta tion . In such a case ,  "wait and see" 
may become the o p p o s i t io n 's  new approach to  the  changing s i tu a t io n s .
As a recen t example, i t  seems th a t  the a ssa ss in a t io n  o f  President 
Anwar Al-Sadat by h is  opposition has t ra n q u i l iz e d  th e  anti-regim e m i l i t a n t  
ac tion  in Egypt and minimized the p ro b ab il i ty  o f  a revo lu tionary  move­
ment aga ins t  S ad a t 's  regime and h is  moderate successor.
In the  case o f  the  Iranian Revolution, some fa c to rs  were 
hypothesized as con tr ib u tin g  to  the  em otionalization  o f  the  people 
and the  explosion of revo lu tion  beforehand. However, i t  should be 
emphasized t h a t ,  as they are defined here and elsewhere, the  p re c i­
p i ta t in g  fa c to rs  do not cause a revo lu tion  but co n tr ib u te  to  the timing 
of a revo lu tionary  t r a n s i t io n  of power. As such, these  w indfalls  
can be viewed in the  l ig h t  o f  the  overall s t r a t e g i e s  and t a c t i ce o f  
resource m obilization  e n te r p r i s e .  H is to r ic a l ly ,  the  con tribu tion  of 
the  acce le ra t in g  fa c to rs  in revolutionay ac tion  has more or le ss  been 
observed and emphasized in rev o lu tio n s ,  including th e  t e s t  case revolu­
t io n ,  and in several th e o r ie s  o f  social movements. In t h i s  regard, 
i t  i s  p lausib le  to  supplement the  proposed syn thes is  with the  following 
p roposition .
Proposition IX. As f a r  as the  timing o f  revo lu tion  i s  concerned,
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some unprecedented factors may precipita te  conflict and accelerate 
the explosion of revolution. This is  true only i f  the revolutionaries 
manipulate, manage, and exploit the windfall events deliberately.
*  *  *
In the preceding steps the economic, p o l it ica l,  cu ltural, 
psychological, organizational, ideological, situational sources, and 
leadership enterpries as well as conditions of conflict leading to p 
probable revolutions were outlined,synthesized, and formulated. This 
overall enterpries is  diagrammed in page 307 .
In terms of specification, the diagram (p. 307) must be read 
as follows. F irs t ,  economic inequality, po litica l oppression, and 
cultural a lienation, jo in tly  or separately, constitute the basic source 
of po lit ica l transformation and drastic  social change. However, in 
dissim ilar circumstances one variable may dominante the others.
Second, once these pre-revolutionary conditions are existing, 
value dissensus and social s tra in  will emerge in the process.
Third, the eventuation of s tra in  and dissensus in revolution 
is conditioned on the opposition's resource mobilization efforts 
(re la tive  to the regime's).
Fourth, the resource mobilization enterpries is materialized 
in and characterized by the operation of leadership, ideology, and 
organization, which actually produce, among other things, stratum 
consciousness.
Fifth, the timing and the acceleration of revolution is also 
dependent upon some windfalls to be approached and manipulated by the 
opposition in the course of action.
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AN INTEGRAL THEORY OF REVOLUTION: 
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W indfalls
Obviously, the revo lu tionary  cause is  a complex phenomenon 
which develops h i s to r i c a l ly ,  booms c ircu m stan t ia l ly ,  and bursts  suddenly. 
Various fa c to r s ,  in one way or another and an t ic ip a te d  or no t,  are involved 
in the c rea tion  of the  causes o f  revo lu tion  as well as i t s  timing. The 
popular s ta t e  o f  mind th a t  somehow breaks out in to  a revolu tion  is  
em pirica lly  d i f f i c u l t  to  s c r u t in iz e ,  c h a rac te r ize ,  and measure rigorously  
and a b s t r a c t ly .  However, i t  i s  observed here th a t  the magnitude and the 
nature o f  social s t r a in  in r e la t io n  with resource m obilization e f fo r t s  
can provide d i f f e r e n t  types of revo lu tionary  (or p o l i t i c a l )  ac tion .
This point would be spec if ied  a f t e r  the next t e s t  case revolution was 
addressed and the f ina l conclusion was drawn.
F ina lly , although revo lu tions  are id e n t i f ie d  with th e i r  places 
o f  b i r t h —th a t  i s ,  a na tion , a country , or a n a t io n - s ta te —they a re , 
in f a c t ,  universal phenomena with ev ident in te rn a t io n a l  im plications.
This is  e sp ec ia l ly  tru e  in the  complex world system of today. Evidence 
of th is  can be tra ced ,  fo r  in s tan ce ,  to  the fa c t  th a t  some revolutions 
a re  promoted by in te rn a t io n a l ,  re g io n a l , or b i la te r a l  c o n f l i c t s ,  and 
other revolu tions con tribu te  to  s im ila r  encounters. The Revolution of 
Iran surely has contributed  to  the  ongoing war between Iraq and Iran , 
and the A rab-Israe li  c o n f l ic t  in the  1940's a lso  played a pa rt  in the 
Egyptian Revolution o f  1952. This l a s t  revolu tion  is  sketched in the 
next chapter to  serve as a t e s t  case fo r  the proposed syn thesis .
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CHAPTER VII
TESTING THE SYNTHESIS AGAINST THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION (1952)
In performing the  task  of t h i s  ch ap te r ,  two steps  w ill be 
taken successively . F i r s t ,  the h is to r ic a l  background o f  the Revolution 
w ill  be h igh ligh ted . Second, the syn thes is  w ill be applied  to  the 
Revolution while the  causes are  analyzed simultaneously.
A. The Egyptian Revolution: A H is to r ica l Background
As Issawi (1963:48-9) observes, "Of course the Egyptian, l ike  
o th e r  revo lu tions , was not j u s t  an acc iden t.  On the one hand i t  can be 
f a i r l y  e a s i ly  placed in i t s  context o f  contemporary events and on the 
o th e r  i t s  roots  run deep in the previous Egyptian so c ie ty ."  Thus, a 
s tatem ent o f  h is to ry  i s  necessary i f  t h i s  revo lu tion  i s  to  be under­
stood thoroughly.
Egypt, which came in to  being about 3000 B.C., i s  considered 
the  f i r s t  n a t io n -s ta te  in h is to ry .  From 525 B.C. un ti l  1952, she was 
ru led  by Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantine, Muslim Arabs, Crusaders, 
Mongols (T a ta rs ) ,  Turkish Mamluks, Frenchmen, Turkish Albanian, and 
th e  B r i t i s h .  From the  19th century u n t i l  a f t e r  WWII, th e  Arabian Egypt, 
in one way or another, was a v is ib le  scene fo r  the r i v a l r i e s  o f  and 
a l l ia n c e s  between th e  French, the B r i t i s h ,  the Germans, the  I ta l i a n s
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and the  Ottoman Turks. From the  e a r ly  1830s, the Egyptian n a t io n a l i s t  
and p a t r i o t i s t  sentiments were advocated and provocated aga ins t  the 
foreign  fo rces  and the ru ling  c la ss  which was not pure Egyptian o r i ­
g in a l ly  but Egyptianized Albanian with Turkish connections. These 
sentiments were colored with and inflamed by pure Egyptianism, pan- 
Arabism, o r  pan-Islamism, or a blend of these  id ea ls .  S o c ia l i s t  ideas 
a lso  emerged in the  country from the  1920s on.
From 1805 u n ti l  1953, Egypt was ru led  by Muhammad Ali (1769- 
1849) and h is  descendants. Muhammad A li ,  who i s  generally  considered 
the founder o f  modern Egypt, rose to  power in the wake of the expulsion 
o f  the  Frenchmen from Egypt by the  j o i n t  B r i t i sh  and Turkish fo rces .
In th i s  ev en t ,  he, as a Muslim Albanian o f f i c e r  under the command of 
the Ottoman S u ltan , p a r t ic ip a te d  v a l ia n t ly .  The ru le rs  o f  th i s  dynasty 
operated in Egypt as Governor General o r  Pasha (1805-1867), Viceroy 
or Khedive (1867-1914), Sultan (1914-1922), and King (1922-1953). In 
th is  era  Egypt underwent th ree  forms of sovereignty , namely. Autonomy 
(1805-1882), B r i t ish  Rule (1882-1922), and the Kingdom of Egypt (1922- 
1953) ( e . g . ,  P l a t t  and Hefny, 1958:31-48).
In 1882, Ahmad Urabi (1841-1911), the  pioneer Egyptian na tiona­
l i s t  o f f i c e r ,  reb e lled  aga ins t  the  B r i t ish  fo rce s ,  the  Ottoman Sultan 
who a c tu a l ly  was represented by the  Khedive o f  Egypt, and indeed the 
Egyptian ru l in g  c lass  as a whole. The B r i t i s h  dominance over Egypt 
began in 1839, though in d i r e c t ly  (Baker, 1978:1). This reb e l l io n  was 
f i n a l ly  crushed by the B r i t ish  in the  guise o f  supporting the a l l i e d  
Ottoman Sultan  and securing th e i r  own v i ta l  in te r e s t s  in the  Suez Canal 
which was mainly con tro lled  by them under a con trac t with the  Egyptian
309
government and the French p arty . The Canal was constructed in 1859-1869 
to  jo in  the  Red Sea to  the  Mediterranean. In 1882, Bismark sa id  "Egypt 
i s  o f  the  utmost importance to  England on account o f  the Suez Canal, 
the  s h o r te s t  l in e  o f  communication between the eas te rn  and western halves 
o f  the  Empire. This i s  l i k e  the  spinal cord which connects the  backbone 
with the  brain" (Ziad, 1965:33). However, in the  wake of Urabi re b e l l io n ,  
the  B r i t i s h  Army began an occupation th a t  la s ted  some seventy f iv e  
years (1882-1956).
Beginning from the l a s t  q u a rte r  o f  the  19th century, the 
r e l ig io u s  based p o l i t i c a l  opposition to  the c o lo n ia l i s t  forces and t h e i r  
domestic c i r c l e s ,  as well as the  in e ffec tiv en ess  of the  local ru le r s ,  
emerged in Egypt. This i n t e l l e c tu a l / r e l i g io u s  ideological development 
had already been i n i t i a t e d  by Al-Afghani (1839-1897), and l a t e r  by his 
contemporaries and d is c ip le s  the  Egyptian Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905), 
and Muhammad Rashid Rida (7-1935). This Islamic in te l le c tu a l  movement 
helped the  awakening o f the  Muslims to  the r e a l i t y  of t h e i r  backwardness 
and the  assoc ia ted  subjugation by the  c o lo n ia l iz e r s .  I t  also paved the 
way f o r ,  encouraged, coupled w ith, and in cases counteracted the  ongoing 
n a t io n a l i s t  curren ts  and upheavals ( e .g . .  Safran, 1961:62-84).
In 1899, the  B r i t i s h  declared th e i r  partnersh ip  in the Condomi­
nium o f the  Sudan. This t e r r i t o r y  had been recognized as Egyptian s ince  
the  era  o f  Mohammad Ali (1805-1848). About th i s  time, the Egyptian 
n a t io n a l i s t  movement was revived by Mustapha Kamil (1974-1980), " . . .  
the  f i r s t  prophet o f  Egypt modern nationalism . . ."  (Nutting, 1972:15). 
Kami 1, with a " license"  in law from France (1894), founded the f i r s t  
p o l i t i c a l  party  ( i . e . ,  the  National Party) in Egypt, made the f i r s t
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c a l l  fo r  an Egyptian u n iv e rs i ty  and the freedom of women, published the 
Al-Liwa (The Standard) paper, and p ro tes ted  the B r i t ish  dominance over 
both the Egyptian and the Sudanese t e r r i t o r i e s  ( e .g . ,  G a b r ie l i ,  1961: 
56-58; Safran, 1961:85-90). I t  was from th is  era th a t  the Egyptian 
youth provided the main re c ru i t in g  f i e ld  fo r  n a t io n a l is t s  and the 
p o l i t i c s  o f  nationalism . According to  legend, Kamil was f i n a l l y  
"poisoned" by the B r i t ish  in 1908 (Sadat, 1978:5).
In 1908, the B ri t ish  forced the  Egyptian government to  extend 
the concession o f the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company fo r  40 years beyond 
i t s  term ination in 1968. In 1914, with the inception o f  WWI, the 
B r i t i sh  o f f i c i a l l y  declared Egypt t h e i r  own P ro tec to ra te  under the 
p re te x t  of confronting both Germany and Turkey, The Axis. In 1913, 
r ig h t  a f t e r  the  War, Saad Zaghloul (1857-1927), the leading Egyptian 
p o l i t ic ia n  and n a t io n a l i s t  o f  th e  tim e, challenged the B r i t i s h  fo r  the 
independence of Egypt. In 1922, the Egyptians, under Zaghloul and his 
Wafd (delegation) Party achieved a "nominal independence," revoked the 
m artia l law which had been enforced by the B ri t ish  s ince  1914, and 
f i n a l ly  d ra f ted  th e i r  f i r s t  C onsti tu tion  (1923). But, in r e tu rn ,  the 
B r i t i sh  continued to  s ta t io n  t h e i r  troops in the country and began to  
control the le g is la t io n s  through B r i t ish  "advisers" (V a t ik io t is ,  
1969:314-373).
Furthermore, they continued th e i r  "punitive" demands, including 
the whole control of the "Anglo-Egyptian" Sudan, as they had already 
labeled  i t ,  which in ev itab ly  was granted to  them in 1924. About th is  
tim e, Fuad took over as the new king of Egypt with the r i g h t  o f  appointing 
m in is te rs  and dissolving the Parliament (V a t ik io t is ,  1969:265-291).
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This was contrary  to  the  C onsti tu tion  which s t ip u la te d  the  King's r ig h t  
to  re ign but not to  govern. However, th i s  a tta inm ent was enhanced and 
backed by the  B r i t ish  to  gain the  King's a l l ia n c e ,  even a t  the  expense 
o f  na tiona l independence and p o l i t i c a l  democracy. In 1935 King Fuad 
died and h is  16 year o ld  son, Farouk, rose to  power.
In 1936, the  B r i t i sh  persuaded the Egyptian government to  sign 
a "Treaty o f Alliance" by means o f which they obtained the r ig h t  to  
s ta t io n  some 10,000 troops in the  Canal Zone fo r  another 20 years with 
an option o f renewal. However, in co n tra s t  to  th is  Treaty , the  B ri t ish  
would have 80,000 troops in the  Canal Zone in 1949 (Nutting, 1972:23).
In r e tu rn ,  some kind o f sovereignty  was recognized fo r  the  Egyptian 
government over the  Sudanese t e r r i t o r y .  The uncompromising n a t io n a l i s t s  
were quick to  denounce th i s  "shameful" t r e a ty  which only fu r thered  
na tiona l hum ilia tion but secured the  B r i t i sh  m il i ta ry  presence in and 
p o l i t i c a l  dominance over the  country (Richmond, 1977:196-202).
About th i s  tim e, the  Egyptian n a t io n a l i s t  movement s p l i t  in to  
"spinal groups" which were more in te re s te d  in  p o l i t i c a l  o f f ic e s  than a 
rad ica l  p o l i t i c s  fo r  national id ea ls  (Nutting, 1972:10-11). This s i t u a ­
t io n  with o th e r  conditions promoted Islamic p o l i t i c s  and re l ig io u s  
p o l i t i c a l  o rgan izations . In p u rsu i t  o f the  Al-Afghani's ideological 
movement, in 1927, Abdul-Hamid Said founded the Young Men's Muslim 
Association. In 1928, too . Hassan Al-Banna, a prominent re l ig io u s  
le a d e r ,  c rea ted  the  Ikhwan Al-Muslimin (Muslim Brethern) Organization. 
The i n i t i a l  ideological goal o f  th i s  organization was the  p u r i f ic a t io n  
o f  Egypt and the  Nile Valley from m ateria lism , co rrup tion , and the 
p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y  occupation the  West had brought. In the  course of
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time, t h i s  o rgan ization  gained ex tensive  power and claimed the  r e s to r ­
a tion  o f  the  Islamic Caliphate with Cairo as i t s  c en te r  ( e . g . ,  H arris ,  
1964:111-211).
In 1936, Egypt once again became a ba ttle -g round  f o r  WWII, a 
c o n f l ic t  in  which the  Egyptians took n e i th e r  a p a r t  nor had an in te r e s t .  
About t h i s  tim e, "apart from a handful o f  Communists," the  Muslim 
Brotherhood was ". . .The only a c t iv e  and vocal n a t io n a l i s t  re s is tan ce"  
in the  country (Nutting, 1972:11). During the  War pe riod , the  Egyptians 
suffe red  d ec is iv e ly  in d i f f e r e n t  ways but were looking forward to  the 
"Day of Evacuation and Unity o f  th e  Nile Valley" in recogn ition  o f  th e i r  
s t r a te g ic  cooperation with the  A l l ie s .  But, th i s  hope turned to  despair 
even though the A llied  v ic to ry  was a lready granted. The B r i t i s h  simply 
promised a p a r t i a l  evacuation in 1947, to  be followed by a complete 
withdrawal in 1949 (Richmond, 1977:210-216; Mansfield, 1972:290-301).
The postwar Egyptian government placed before the  Security  Council of 
the  United Nations a complaint ag a in s t  the  B r i t ish  and claimed the 
r ig h t  o f  repud ia ting  the Treaty o f  1936 ( P la t t  and Hefny, 1958:47). 
However, the  B r i t i s h  f in a l ly  gave th e  r ig h t  to  the  Sudanese to  d e te r ­
mine th e i r  own f a te  under a common crown of Egypt.
About th i s  time, the  question o f  Arab un ity  and the  form th a t  
th i s  unity  should take was a t  is su e .  "The major d iffe ren ces  were between 
the  views of Egyptians and I raq is "  (Richmond, 1977:208). While the 
Iraq is  suggested a d e f in i t e  scheme fo r  unity  centered around Arab 
F e r t i l e  Crescent, the  Egyptians favored a "loose union" o f  the  ex is t in g  
Arab s ta t e s  and even tua lly  succeeded in ge tt in g  agreement on an Arab 
League (7 October, 1945) which was a lso  favored by the  B r i t i s h .  The
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League was formally inaugurated in Cairo on 22nd March, 1945. Since 
the  Arab League was " . . .  c rea ted  with the support of B r i ta in .  . . 
(G ab rie l i ,  1961:110), and was in accord to  the  Egyptian approach to  Arab 
u n ity ,  i t  was understood as "a loose confederation" (Mansfield, 1972:291). 
N evertheless, through th i s  League the Egyptians began to  assume formal 
p o l i t i c a l  leadersh ip  and national commitment in  the  Arab World and th e i r  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  the  f i r s t  Arab-Zionist c o n f l i c t  was a h is to r ic a l  
example.
In 1948, while s t i l l  su ffe r ing  from the  aftermath o f  WWII, 
the  Egyptians took p a r t  in  the  f i r s t  Arab-Zionist war in P a le s t in e .  In 
1917, the B r i t i s h ,  who were the  P ro tec to ra te  o f  P a le s t in e ,  recognized 
the  r ig h t  fo r  the Jews to  found a n a t io n -s ta te  in  P a le s t in e .  This 
recognition  i s  id e n t i f ie d  with the  "Balfour Declaration" a f t e r  the 
name o f  the  then B r i t ish  Prime M inister. At the time, the Jews comprised 
only e ig h t  percent o f  the P a le s t in ian s  while 92 percent o f  the popula­
t io n  was Arab (Nutting, 1972:25). In 1947, the  U.N., declared the 
p a r t i t io n  o f  Pa les t ine  in to  two Arab and Jewish s t a t e s ,  a d iv is ion  
th a t  took place with the "powerful American p ressures"  (Richmond, 
1977:213), and which was re je c te d  by the Arabs. In re a c tio n ,  and in 
the  face o f  the  expanding Jewish immigration, dominance, and presence 
in P a le s t in e ,  which was f a c i l i t a t e d  by t e r r o r i s t  a c t i v i ty ,  the Arabs 
engaged in  t h e i r  f i r s t  war with the Jews. They l o s t  the war u lt im a te ly .
Concerning the Revolution o f  Egypt, t h i s  war served as a 
p re c ip i ta t in g  fa c to r .  The concomitant de fea t  was a d ra s t ic  hum iliation 
fo r  the  many Arabs by the few but well-organized and wel1-supported 
Jews. I t  a lso  revealed c e r ta in  problems concerned with corruption .
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negligence, t reaso n , and s e l f - i n t e r e s t  on behalf o f  the Arab governments 
and the  Egyptian government in p a r t ic u la r  ( e . g . ,  Neguib, 1955:11-33; 
Nasser, 1955:79-114). In connection with th is  " lo s t  war," some points 
must be sp ec if ie d .  F i r s t ,  the war d e te r io ra ted  Egypt's economic and 
f inanc ia l  s i tu a t io n  which had not y e t  recovered from the aftermath of 
WWII. Second, the Egyptian n a t io n a l i s t  o f f i c e r s ,  the  nascent revolu­
t io n a r ie s ,  who were in combat in the war, c lose ly  observed th a t  the 
major cause o f  t h e i r  m i l i ta ry  defea t was rooted in  t h e i r  corrupt 
p o l i t i c a l  o rder. For example, they rea l ized  th a t  t h e i r  armaments were 
inadequate and d e fec tiv e ,  and the m il i ta ry  budget was embezzled by the 
a u th o r i t ie s  ( e .g . ,  Lieden and Schmitt, 1968:165; Sadat, 1957:87-97).
Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, the " n a tu ra l" leader o f  the 
Revolution who p a r t ic ip a te d  in the war and was wounded on two occasions, 
l a t e r  wrote th a t :  "When I now t ry  to re c a l l  the  d e ta i l s  of our experience
in P a le s t in e ,  I f ind  a curious th ing: we were f ig h t in g  in P a le s t in e ,  
but our dreams were centered in  Egypt. Our b u l le ts  were aimed a t  the 
enemy in h is  trenches before us, but our hearts  hovered over our d is ta n t  
country, which we had l e f t  to  the  care o f  the wolves" (1955:21).
Third, within the  Arab world, the Egyptian n a t io n a l i s t s  and 
re l ig io u s  a c t i v i s t s  f e l t  fu r th e r  humiliation because, in recent tim es, 
they had assumed the Arab's leadership  which achieved no end in th is  
c o n f l ic t .  From the m id - th ir teen th  century, when Baghdad f e l l  to  the 
hands of the Mongol, Cairo became the Arabs’ c u l tu ra l  cen ter (Nasser, 
1955:86-87). Thus, the 1948 d e fea t ,  as w ill  be emphasized l a t e r ,  nur­
tured  and promoted the revolu tionary  seed th a t  had already been sown 
in the h ear t  o f  the "Free O ff ice rs ."  According to  Baker (1975:48),
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"These young men had f i r s t  been drawn toge ther  in 1938 and 1939 when 
they graduated from the  Egyptian m il i ta ry  academy." In te re s t in g ly ,  
the t ra in in g  in th is  M ili ta ry  Academy was u n t i l  1936 a p r iv i le g e  fo r  the 
sons o f  the upper c la s se s .  But, "following the  s ignatu re  o f  the  1936 
Treaty with B r i ta in ,  the Egyptian army was being expanded. More 
o f f ic e r s  were needed quickly  and. . . they  were being re c ru i te d  from a 
broader socia l base ,"  which included the would-be m il i ta ry  revo lu tion ­
a r ie s  (Stephens, 1971:38-39).
On October 1951, the  1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was abrogated 
u n i la te r a l ly  s ince constan t negotia tions with the B r i t ish  were not 
productive. A fter th is  even t, the Egyptian p in-pricks  became v is ib le  
g u e r r i l l a  a c t i v i t i e s  a g a in s t  the B ri t ish  personnel and in s t a l l a t io n s  
( e .g . ,  Berque, 1972:668-670; Mansfield, 1972:295-301). As a re a c t io n ,
"On January [25th] 1952, B r i t i sh  forces surrounded the barracks o f  a 
u n i t  o f  Egyptian a u x i l ia ry  po lice  a t  Ism ailia .  I t  was believed th a t  th is  
u n it  had been cooperating with the g u e r r i l l a s .  . . ;  some fo r ty  Egyptians 
were k i l le d  and seventy wounded. . ." (Richmond, 1977:216). The Egyp­
t ian s  reacted  very quickly and m il i ta n t ly .  The climax o f t h i s  m i l i ­
tancy was reached in Cairo on Black Saturday (January 26, 1952) "when 
seven hundred h o te ls ,  b a rs ,  re s tau ran ts ,  cinemas, c ab a re ts ,  department 
s to re s ,  fancy shops, auto showrooms, banks, and modern commercial 
o f f ic ie s  were sy s tem a tica lly  loo ted , destroyed, and burned w ithin 
a few hours" (Safran, 1961:187). Another account describes the  event 
o f  Black Saturday in th i s  way:
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A National Liberation Army then came in to  being and 
went in to  action ag a in s t  the B ri t ish  troops in the Canal Zone 
e a r ly  in 1952, w hile , almost a t  the same time, Cairo f e l l  in to  
the hands o f  a maddened, murdering, loo ting  mob whose des­
t ru c t iv e  v io lence, d irec ted  by t ra in ed  s p e c i a l i s t s ,  followed 
a course and reached dimensions th a t  proved i t  to  be a revolu­
tiona ry  outbreak d e l ib e ra te ly  planned and organized by foreign 
Communists. The world-famous Shepheard's Hotel was one o f 
the many landmarks t h a t  went up in flames; the B ri t ish  Turf 
Club was a ttacked  and burnt to  the ground; a number o f  i t s  
members were murdered and th e i r  bodies, dead or a l iv e ,  were 
thrown in to  the flames. A pall of smoke hund over the c i ty ;  
and when order was a t  l a s t  re s to red  by Egyptian troops , a 
la rge  p a r t  o f  the  European Quarter lay a wilderness o f  ruins 
( J a rv i s ,  1955:285).
In the wake o f  the  "Cairo F i re ,"  o th e r  inc idents  followed and 
the revo lu tionary  environment matured rap id ly .  I t  is  observed th a t ,  
"Early in  the summer o f 1952 Egypt was oozing revolution from every 
pore" (J .  and S. Lacouture, 1958:125). As such, "The s i tu a t io n  was 
r ip e  to  the  po in t of ro t ten n ess ;  somebody had to  take ac tio n .  . ." 
(Berque, 1972:664). On Ju ly  23, 1952, the Free O ffice rs ,  led by 
Lieutenant Colonel Jamal Abdul Nasser, took over and dethroned King 
Farouk in favor of his one-year old son Ahmad Fuad I I .  On Ju ly  18, 
1953, Nasser declared Egypt a Republic and hence put an end to  the 
old o rder. Nasser (1918-1970), the son of a p o s t-o f f ic e  worker, was 
e lec ted  in June 1956 as Egypt's second Presiden t a f t e r  the Presidency 
o f the  "figure-head" o f  the  Revolution, namely. General Mohammad 
Neguib. Since Neguib was born in Sudan and was a ha lf-b lood Sudanese 
(Richmond, 1977:221; Neguib, 1955:37), th e re fo re ,  "Nasser was the 
f i r s t  na tive  ru le r  o f  an independent Egypt s ince the Persian invaders 
destroyed the tw enty-six th  and l a s t  Pharonic dynasty in 525 B.C." 
(Stephens, 1971:11). In h is  childhood whenever he had seen an a i r ­
plane in  the sky, Nasser often  shouted th a t  "0, Almighty God, may
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d i s a s te r  take the English!" (Nasser, 1955:65). After the  take-over 
he heartened h is  fellow c i t iz e n  by emphasizing: "0, my bro ther!
ra is e  your head fo r ,  indeed, the  ["English"] c o lo n ia l iz a t io n  era  is  
over."  F urther ,  "He and h is  followers. . .e s ta b l ish e d  a new govern­
ment th a t  evolved in to  the f i r s t  Arab S o c ia l i s t  s ta te "  (Goode, 1973:5).
In the  next s e c t io n ,  the causes o f  t h i s  revolu tion  w ill be 
sp ec if ie d  and the synthesis  w ill  be te s te d  accordingly.
B. Causes o f  The Egyptian Revolution 
In th i s  s ec t io n ,  the  causes o f  the  Egyptian Revolution w ill  be 
ou tl in ed  in  accordance with the  eleven p ropositions  of the  sy n th es is .
As was sketched prev iously , the  causes o f t h i s  revolu tion  too stem from
the e a r ly  h is to ry  of Egypt. However, fo r  the p resent purpose, these  
o r ig in s  w il l  be traced  to  the  B r i t ish  occupation o f the country , which 
began in 1882. "This fo re ign  oppression o f  Egypt's national c la s s e s ,  
national h e r i ta g e ,  national language and values was the bas is  fo r  the 
economic subjugation of the nation" (Hussien, 1973:17). Yet, the 
causes which w ill be concentrated on a re  r e la te d  to  the 1940s onward 
when the  s t ru c tu ra l  h i s to r ic a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  were aggravated and su r­
faced. Because o f  the afterm aths of the  Second World War and the 
F i r s t  A rab -Is rae l i  c o n f l i c t ,  both of which in te n s i f ie d  th e  chronic 
national problems, the whole Egyptian system was plunged in to  a 
manifold s t a t e  o f  c r i s i s .  As Berque (1972:583) no tes , during th i s  
"■. . .dark  period , . . .Egypt experienced disappointment as g rea t  as 
her hopes. . . . "
(1) The f i r s t  p roposition  revolves around "Economic Inequality"
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in a rev o lu t io n -s tr ick e n  so c ie ty ,  from which the Egyptian masses were 
a c tu a l ly  s u f fe r in g .  According to  the Egyptian w r i te r  Salama Musa, who 
wrote in the  beginning o f the  cu rren t cen tury , "The Egyptian question is  
an economic one" (Ibrahim, 1979:354). On the  o ther hand, according to  
Issawi, "In 1951 Egypt was an overwhelmingly agrarian  country , in which 
industry  accounted fo r  under 10 per cent o f  GNP" (1963:46). The over­
whelming m ajo rity  o f  the  Egyptian population consisted  o f  the  peasantry , 
who, h i s to r i c a l l y  speaking, u t i l i z e d  t r a d i t io n a l  means o f  a g r ic u l tu ra l  
production and a primary system of i r r i g a t io n .  In te re s t in g ly ,  while 
Herodotus understands th a t  "Egypt i s  an acquired country, a g i f t  o f  the 
r iv e r , "  the "capric ious"  Nile now and then d is tu rbed  the peasantry l i f e  
with the  "vagaries" o f  i t s  flow. The world o f  the Egyptian Fellaheen 
(farmers) was understood as the world of poverty , i l l i t e r a c y ,  d iseases , 
rapid population growth ( th ree  percen t) ,  m a ln u tr i t io n ,  and su ffe r in g .  
Taha Hussien (1948:27), the  well-known Egyptian w r i te r ,  defines his 
fellow c i t i z e n s ,  namely the  Fellaheen, as al-Muadhdhabun f i l -A rd  ( i . e . ,  
the s u f fe re r s  on ear th )  whose community su ffe red  h i s to r i c a l ly .
In the  l a te  19th century , "Because o f  t h e i r  need to  develop 
revenue quickly fo r  the se rv ice  and repayment o f  the debt, the  B ri t ish  
had favored a g r ic u l tu ra l  development. . ." in Egypt (Richmond, 1977:199) 
Even with such a given p r io r i ty  and the concomitant a id ,  the Egyptian 
farmer d id  not b en ef i t  in the  process, though the landlord  did . In 
Egypt, about 70 percent o f  the to ta l  population was d i r e c t ly  engaged 
in working the  land, and a g r ic u l tu re  produced nearly  40 percen t o f  the 
national income and supplied  94 percent o f  a l l  exports ( P l a t t  and Hen- 
fy , 1958:155). On the o th e r  hand, about 97 percent of Egypt's 386,000
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square miles was s t i l l  dese rt  in 1951 (H arris , 1964:105). The unjust 
p a r t i t io n  o f c u l t iv a te d  land was a p reva il ing  fe a tu re  of the country­
s id e .  About one th i r d  o f the land belonged to  the big absentee landlords 
who comprised only 0 .4  percent o f  the Egyptian population; the next th i r d  
belonged to  small and middle s ize  farmers who owned 5-50 "feddan" (each 
feddan equals 1.038 ac re s ) ;  the l a s t  th i r d  belonged to  some two m illion  
farmers each of which owned less  than 5 feddans (Issaw i, 1954:125;
Berque, 1972:618). Yet, "There was a lso  some m illion  and a h a l f ,  o f  
peasants owning t in y  p lo ts  of le s s  than 0.5 feddans, fo r  whom land 
was no longer a concrete means of production" (Berque, 1972:618). Put 
d i f f e r e n t ly ,  "In 1951 more than s ix ty  percent of the land under c u l t iv a ­
tio n  was owned by about s ix  percent o f  the population. About ten percent 
of the  land was owned by 270 persons" (Heaphey, 1966:177). This condi­
t io n ,  encouraged " . . .  the specu la tive  nature o f  Egyptian a g r icu ltu re  
to  develop s t i l l  fu r th e r"  (V a t ik io t is ,  1969:9).
Moreover, a g rea t  portion o f  peasantry a lso  was land less . These 
peasants were ". . . t o t a l l y  deprived o f the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  working them­
selves  and . . . [had] no o ther means of subsis tence than the sa le  o f  
t h e i r  labor power. They became a g r ic u l tu ra l  workers or migrant rural 
labore rs  (t a r a b i l ) and work[ed] very i r r e g u la r ly .  They co n s t i tu te [d ]  
th ree -fo u r th s  o f  the ru ral population" (Hussien, 1973:37). In 1948, 
th e re  were about 9.2 m illion  feddans o f  arab le  land (Safran, 1961:196), 
which somehow decreased to  le ss  than s ix  m illion feddans in 1952. In 
t h i s  tim e, more than 65 percent o f  Egyptians derived th e i r  l iv ing  
d i r e c t ly  from a g r ic u l tu re  and 70 percent of the in d u s t r ia l  labor man­
power worked in fa c to r ie s  th a t  depended on raw a g r ic u l tu ra l  crops
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(H arr is ,  1956:362). As a r e la te d  problem, in the l a t e  1940s, the re  were 
. .400,000 more Egyptians annually  [who] had to  be fed from le ss  
than 6 m illion  feddans" (Wheelock, 1960:75). In o th e r  words, a 21 
m ill ion  population with a 3 percent ra te  o f  in c rease ,  eked out a sub­
s is te n c e  below the one-half  feddan per person requ ired  fo r  a modest 
e x is ten ce .
On the o ther hand, Egypt's a g r ic u l tu re  was b a s ic a l ly  dependent 
on a s in g le  product, namely, co tton . According to  Brown (1953:8-9),
" I t  i s  impossible to  minimize the ex ten t to  which everything in Egypt 
depends on co tton . One can see no o ther crop which would support the 
p resen t population ."  The p r ice  o f  cotton boomed because of the  Korean 
War (Baker, 1978:9), but th i s  was immediately followed by a " c a ta s t ro ­
phic drop." According to  Hussien (1973:61), "Since cotton export 
revenue was such a decis ive  fa c to r  in the economy, t h i s  s i tu a t io n  r e ­
su lted  in a general economic imbalance which was se r io u s ly  aggravated 
by f r a n t i c  specu la tion—the p a r a s i t i c  ch arac te r  o f  investments was 
exacerbated by the  anxiety of a c lass  which viewed i t s e l f  as doomed."
I t  was a lso  tru e  th a t  "During the  war, f e r t i l i z e r  imports had been 
sharp ly  c u r ta i l e d ,  with the subsequent r e s u l t  t h a t  y ie ld s  per feddan 
declined  su b s ta n t ia l ly "  (Wheelock, 1960:74).
Not only did the production o f cotton decrease noticeably  but 
a lso  "The value of a ton o f  cotton f e l l  from 67 Egyptian pounds to  45 
and then to  33.5" (Hussien, 1973:61). What was worse, "The government 
repeated ly  intervened in the fu tu re s  market to  buy cotton  a f t e r  the 
Korean War boom in 1951" (Dekmejian, 1971:121). Not only was the crop 
of co tton  a ffec ted  as such, but the whole a g r ic u l tu ra l  production
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decreased in the 1940s, and even p r io r  to  th is  decade. "Between 1914 
and 1947, the growth ra te  o f  a g r ic u l tu ra l  production showed a sharp 
dec line ;  i t  f e l l  to  an [ s i c ]  0 .4  percent average" (Hussien, 1973:46).
On the whole, the  overa ll  s i tu a t io n  o f the Egyptian peasantry 
can be b e t t e r  seen in the l i g h t  o f  some concrete  conclusions. According 
to  Leiden and Schmitt (1968:164), "In the  p a s t ,  i t  was land not h is  own 
on which the  Egyptian peasan t,  the f e l l a h , labored. . . and th e  re n t  he 
paid was often  e x o rb itan t .  His crops were ravaged by in sec ts  as he him­
s e l f  was by a myriad of  d iseases . He was constan tly  in deb t,  uniformly 
e x p lo i te d ,  d e b i l i ta te d  by d isease  and a subsis tence  d ie t .  His only 
luxury was sex, his  only hope was the surcease o f  an e a r ly  death ."
H arris  a lso  reaches the same conclusion: "The peasants in add ition
su ffe red  chron ically  from a l l  the a f f l i c t i o n s  assoc ia ted  with m alnu tri­
t io n  and in san i ta ry  l iv in g  cond itions . . .About 85 percent o f  the  ru ral 
population has become the vic tim  of a se r ious  health  problem" (1964:107, 
109). According to  Hussien, th i s  s i tu a t io n  was caused by ". . . th e  c lass  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  the big land lords  and the  general in te r e s t s  o f  th e  B ri t ish  
as transm itted  by these  big landlords" (1973:20).
Thus, i t  i s  no wonder th a t  Nasser (1959:ix ), the leade r  of 
the  Egyptian Revolution, would emphasize th a t  "feudalism" was one of  the 
peop le 's  " t r ip le  enemy" (the  o ther two being "imperialism" and "monarchy"). 
To be s u re ,  the Egyptian peasants did not make nor p a r t ic ip a te  in the 
revo lu tion  but ". . .when the  revo lu tion  did come, i t  was made in th e i r  
name" (Leiden and Schmitt, 1968:164). However, the fe l la h ee n ,  the 
overwhelming m ajority  o f  the  people, were not the  only " su f fe re rs  on 
e a r th ;"  the  urban workers too suffered  from a miserable l i f e ,  exp lo i-
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t a t i o n ,  and unstable  economic conditions.
I t  i s  observed th a t  the un sk il led  Egyptian urban worker who
f le d  the  hopelessness o f  the countryside brought with him to  the squalor
o f the  c i t y ,  "All too o f ten .  . . tu rned  to  crime and hashish. In company
with o thers  he formed a p a r t  o f  the  Cairo (or Alexandria) ' s t r e e t ' ,  th a t
amorphous mass of humanity th a t  lends substance to  every r i o t  or demon­
s t r a t io n "  (Lieden and Schmitt, 1968:164). Further, as Berque notes, 
the working s t r a t a  in the  Egyptian soc ie ty  " . . .  had fo r  a long time 
been considered by p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  only as a subsid iary  resource which 
could be used or d iscarded a t  w il l"  (1972:624).
These s t r a t a  emerged from the e a r ly  19th century when in d u s t r ia ­
l i z a t i o n  made i t s  f i r s t  move under "Mohammad A l i 's  regime (1805-1849). 
Mohammad A li ,  whose dynasty ru led  Egypt u n t i l  1953, was considered the 
"Founder of Modern Egypt" fo r  his  in d u s t r ia l iz in g  e f fo r t s  in  the country 
(Barbour, 1972:27-35). But, as e a r ly  as the  1840s, Egypt's in d u s tr ia l  
development was ". . .a r r e s te d  by the  competition of European imported 
manufactured goods" (Richmond, 1972:199). As an example, the  B ri t ish  
". . .saw no need to  encourage in d u s t r ia l  growth in Egypt; i t s  products 
would compete with B r i t i s h  manufacturers" (Richmond, 1972:199). I t  is  
with regard to  th is  policy  th a t  Musa, the Egyptian w r i te r ,  notes th a t .
Had not th e  development o f  Egypt been in te rru p ted  
in  1882 by the B r i t i s h  occupation, she would have jumped to  
th e  fo re  o f  the c iv i l i z e d  world: she would have had complete 
l i t e r a c y ,  and a high sca le  of wages fo r  the workers; indeed 
we would have become a powerful nation in the Eastern corner 
o f  the Medi te rranean  and Bri t a i  n could have no say i n the  
a f f a i r s  o f  the Suez Canal (1958:207).
Nevertheless, WWI spurred the Egyptian in d u s tr ia l  movement 
and opened new horizons fo r  d i f f e r e n t  ca tegories  o f  the so c ie ty .  But,
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in  the  process, "The moderately wealthy got immoderately so in  commodity 
market specu la tion , f inance , and manufacture, and the uprooted peasants 
who were now employed, o r  a t  any ra te  l iv in g  in c i t i e s  were re lieved  
o f  a t  l e a s t  the notion th a t  poverty must be the  will o f Allah" (Davies, 
1962:13-14).
The Second World War too gave impetus to Egyptian in d u s t r i a l i ­
z a t io n .  This was caused by ". . . th e  r e s t r i c t io n  of shipping space 
a v a ilab le  fo r  imports from Europe, while the  demands o f  the armies fo r  
more so p h is t ica ted  labor than they had needed in 1914-18 encouraged the 
t r a in in g  of Egyptians in  engineering s k i l l s "  (Richmond, 1972:200).
This f a c to r  as well as the  concomitant increasing  migration from the 
countryside to Cairo, the Canal Zone, and the Mediterranean c o as t ,  
enlarged the s ize  o f  the  labor force and eventually  swelled labor- 
re la te d  issues . During the War period , ". . .the  A llies  were employing 
200,000 Egyptians as c le rk s  o r  s k i l le d  and unskilled  laborers"  (Mansfield, 
1971:280).
However, the  in f lu x  o f cheap labor from the rural areas as 
well as the  War-time conditions in g enera l ,  s tra ined  dec is ive ly  the 
Egyptian socioeconomic s t ru c tu re .  According to  Issawi (1954:262),
"Perhaps the  most important s ing le  f a c to r  was the imposition o f a 
tw entie th  century in f l a t io n  on a soc ia l  s t ru c tu re  in many ways reminiscent 
o f  the  eighteenth cen tury ."
In 1945, the  aftermath o f  the  War demonstrated i t s e l f  very 
v is ib ly .  As a concrete  example, about 250,000 workers, o n e -th ird  of the 
to ta l  workers, became jo b le ss  when the War a c t iv i ty  ceased ( e . g . ,  Issawi, 
1954:262). In 1951 a lone, some 40,000 Egyptian employees o f  the  B rit ish
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forces were forced to  give up t h e i r  jobs . They were added to  the already 
overcrowded c iv i l  se rv ices  and y e t  were paid from the  na tiona l and not 
the  A lly 's  resources (Neguib, 1955:94). About th i s  tim e, the  cost o f  
l iv in g  rose to  th ree  times the index o f  1937 (Davis, 1962:13), and th i s  
s teep  r i s e  aggravated the  material conditions o f  the employed as well 
as the unemployed, in d i f f e r e n t  ways. However, in 1947, th e re  were 
about 1,700,000 workers involved in some branch o f industry  ( P la t t  and 
Hefny, 1958:155).
On the o the r  hand, the War was a l l  good fo r  businessmen and the 
c a p i t a l i s t  groups. According to  J .  and S. Lacouture (1958:99), the 
number o f  m il l io n a ire s  in pounds s t e r l in g  increased e ig h t  fo ld  during 
the  War. A ltogether, these  "exp lo ite rs"  consitu ted  a very small group 
in the country but took hold of a l l  spheres of economic a c t i v i t y .  S tated  
d i f f e r e n t ly ,  about t h i s  time "Monopolies, or monopolist co n d it io n s , .  . . 
[were] found in most branches of Egyptian industry" (Issaw i, 1954:160). 
Issawi a lso  observes t h a t  wages did not catch up with the  co s t  of 
l iv in g  because of ". . .low p ro d u c t iv i ty ,  due to  the m a ln u tr i t io n ,  
lack o f  t r a in in g ,  and poor equipment" (1954:171). F in a l ly ,  i t  can be 
concluded th a t
In b r i e f ,  the  p r o le ta r i a t  and the d ispossessed masses 
in the countryside and in c i t i e s  share a s im ila r  re la t io n sh ip  
to  the ex is t in g  system of se rv itude  and t r a n s i t io n :  they are 
d i r e c t ly  oppressed and explo ited  by the  system, and t h e i r  
c la s s  in te r e s t s  c lash  abso lu te ly  with i t s  ex istence" (Hussien, 
1973:43).
The economic conditions o f  the  middle c lasses  may a lso  be 
remembered. According to  Safran, "Economic development, the  expansion 
o f the functions o f  the  government, the  spread o f  education , and the
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increased socia l m obility  th a t  r e s u l te d ,  led to  an enormous expansion of 
the  white c o l l a r ,  p ro fe ss io n a l ,  and s tudent groups" (1971:184). In 
1913 the  number o f  u n iv e rs i ty  s tuden ts  was " n eg l ig ib le " ,  but by 1951, 
th e re  were 41,000 Egyptian s tudents  a t  home and 1,400 studying abroad 
( Issaw i, 1954:67). In f a c t ,  i t  was in  the e a r ly  1930's th a t  a new urban 
c la s s ,  "seeking upward m ob ili ty ,"  en tered  the p o l i t i c a l  s tage . However, 
"the f r u s t r a t io n  t h a t  soon beset t h i s  nebulous c la ss  proceeded d i r e c t ly  
from the  ex is t in g  s o c ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and economic conditions in socie ty"  
(Dekmijian, 1971:18).
On the  o th e r  hand, the  Egyptian middle bourgeoisie  consis ted  
o f  urban and ru ra l  groups which derived th e i r  economic gains from the  
ex p lo i ta t io n  o f  o thers  but who ". . .had no dominant p o l i t i c a l  o r  economic 
p os it ion"  in so c ie ty  (Hussien, 1973:25). I t  is  a lso  t ru e  t h a t ,  "As a 
whole, the p e tty  bourgeoisie  su ffe red  national oppression and in d i r e c t  
forms o f  economic e x p lo ita t io n  a t  the  hands of the  foreign  monopolies, 
the local ru ling  c la s s e s ,  and, to  a le s s e r  e x te n t ,  th e  middle bour­
g eo is ie"  (Hussien, 1973:28).
Taha Hussien (1948) portrays  such a group o f  the white c o l l a r  
workers, id e n t i f ie d  with the "humble o f f i c i a l s "  as "a walking tomb," 
indeed, a "whited sepulchre"; and he a lso  sketches the  "post o f f ic e "  
employees as "h a l f - s ta rv e d ,"  y e t  supporting a la rge  family (Berque, 
1972:617). In the  1940s, the re  a lso  was a ". . . la rg e  number o f  un­
employed ' i n t e l l e c t u a l s '  who were foremost in t h e i r  resentment o f  the 
system fo r  i t s  apparent lack o f  determ ination , and most ac tive  in the  
re v o l t  aga ins t  i t "  (Safran, 1961:207). However, economically, according 
to  Davies (1962:13), white c o l la r  workers and p ro fess io n a ls  probably
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were hu rt  more by in f l a t io n  than unemployment.
F in a l ly ,  as a r e s u l t  of national and in te rn a tio n a l  wars, rapid 
population increase and d is lo c a t io n ,  economic imbalances, and the 
increasing  gap between population growth and growth in resou rces , . . 
The annual per cap ita  income of the e n t i r e  population declined from 
$109.50 in  1907 to  $63.50 in 1950" (Safran, 1961:196). Evidently, in 
th is  s i tu a t io n  th a t  lower c lasses  suffe red  overwhelmingly. Further, the 
s teep  r i s e  in the co s t  o f  l iv in g  d e te r io ra te s  th e i r  conditions dec is ive ly . 
"The gap between r ich  and poor, already g re a t ,  was fu r th e r  enlarged; 
the u n sk il led  ru ral and urban labourers su ffe red  severe p r iv a t io n s ;  
and the s a la r ie d  middle and lower middle c la s s e s ,  whose money income rose 
very l i t t l e ,  were r e l e n t l e s s ly  pressed down" (Issaw i, 1954:262).
In te re s t in g ly ,  to  improve the economic s i tu a t io n  caused by the 
P a le s t in e  War, the government proposed new income taxes a f fe c t in g  cap ita l  
gains and investment dividends. But, t h i s  was re jec ted  by the  Parliament 
as t h i s  " . . . i n s t i t u t i o n  consisted  mainly o f wealthy Deputies and 
Senators. . ."  (V a t ik io t i s ,  1969:367). While the masses were su ffe ring  
co n s ta n t ly ,  the  "King and p o l i t ic ia n s  had d isc red ited  themselves by 
personal luxury and ad m in is tra tive  co rrup tion . . ."  (Richmond, 1977:210). 
In f a c t ,  the Egyptian masses were caught in  a depriving s i tu a t io n  which 
was caused by the common in te r e s t s  o f  the  local fo rces ,  the court 
entourage, the land lo rds , the  bourgeoisie , the a r i s to c r a t s ,  and the 
c o lo n ia l iz in g  B r i t i s h .  In these f r u s t r a t in g  circumstances.
Id leness , precarious l iv e l ih o o d ,  ro o t le s sn e ss ,  crowding, 
d e s ire s  in excess o f  reach, inadequate r e s t r a in t s —a l l  con­
t r i b u te d ,  in tu rn ,  to  turning these  people in to  responsive 
and e a s i ly  access ib le  material fo r  the p o l i t i c a l  a g i t a to r  
and the  social troublemaker, who were not lacking throughout 
th is  period (Safran, 1961:182).
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F in a lly ,  the  gap between the r ic h  and the  poor was so grave 
th a t  . . th e re  seemed no way to redress  th is  d iffe rence  sh o r t  o f  
revo lu tion" (Leiden and Schmitt, 1968:165).
(2) The second proposition r e f l e c t s  upon "P o l i t ic a l  Oppression" 
as a precondition fo r  a nascent p o l i t i c a l  ac tio n .  This, indeed, pre­
v a iled  y e t  with a double fea tu re  in p rerevo lu tionary  Egypt. P o l i t i c a l ly ,  
the Egyptians were dominanted by both indigenous forces represented by 
the  King and h is  entourage, and external forces represented by the 
B r i t i s h  who a lso  supervised and con tro lled  the power of the Egyptian 
ru l in g  c la s s .  Although Egypt was able to  obtain  her independence from 
the p ro te c to ra te  o f  the  B r i t ish  (1922), t h i s  l ib e ra t io n  was "nominal," 
simply "formal," o r  "semi" independence. I t  ". . .had been s tr ipped  
o f a l l  meaning and was merely tangenial in re la t io n  to  any rea l power" 
(Berque, 1972:324).
Even i f  on occasion the Egyptian King, fo r  e i th e r  dynastic  
ambitions or mild na tiona l in t e r e s t ,  attempted to  r e f l e c t  the voice of 
the people, the B r i t i s h  rechanneled these  a t t i tu d e s  in favor o f th e i r  
own c o lo n ia l i s t  i n t e r e s t s  (Mansfield, 1972:264-289). The King, however, 
had no choice but to  comply. Otherwise, ". . .His majesty King Farouk 
must accept the consequences" (V a t ik io t is ,  1969:348).
Although the Egyptians d rafted  t h e i r  f i r s t  C onsti tu tion  in 1923, 
the i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  monarchy under the B r i t i s h  force overlooked the 
C onsti tu tion  and operated mostly a t  w i l l .  The Parliament was funda­
m entally  c o n s ti tu ted  o f  members from the  upper c lasses  and hence was 
a c tu a l ly  concerned with c lass  in t e r e s t  a t  the  cost o f  the in t e r e s t  of 
the masses. Yet, on more than one occasion, both the C onsti tu tion  and
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the Parliament were suspended or dissolved in the  in te r e s t  o f  the 
governing c lass  and i t s  B r i t ish  tu te lag e  ( e . g . ,  Berque, 1972:393; Nutting, 
1972:22; G ab rie l i ,  1961:99).
According to  Baker (1978:103), ". . .one o f  the four major 
p o l i t i c a l  forces in the  country u n ti l  the  N asse r is t  revolu tion  was the  
B r i t i s h —along with the  Egyptian King, the a r is to c ra c y ,  and the  nationa­
l i s t  p a r ty  known as the  Wafd." In l in e  with th i s  observation , Issawi 
(1954:269-1) a lso  suggests th a t ,  in the period of 1923-1952), the 
p o l i t i c a l  power s t ru c tu re  was id e n t i f ie d  with four ca tego rie s .  The 
f i r s t  category included the  King and a pa rty  of "King's F riends,"  th a t  
i s ,  the  " I t t ih a d "  (Unionist) Party. The second category comprised the 
Wafd Party  which, in the course o f  time e sp e c ia l ly  from the 1940's on, 
began to  lose i t s  m i l i t a n t  nationalism and uncompromising s tand . The 
th i r d  category consis ted  o f  the Moderates, which were l ib e ra l  c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l i s t s ,  Shaabists (Popular P a r ty ) , and Saadists  (d is s id en t  
W afdists). F ina lly , th e re  was the B r i t ish  Residency, "which often  had 
the l a s t  word."
Sadat (1978:103) observes th a t  these  ". . . p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  
were themselves a tool a t  the  hands of the  king and the B r i t i s h ,  a l ly in g  
themselves a l te rn a te ly  with one or the  o th e r  to  secure the g re a te s t  
possib le  personal gains a t  the expense o f  th e  people." From the 1920s 
on a t  l e a s t  th ree  p o l i t i c a l  organizations ( i . e . ,  the  Muslim Brotherhood, 
the S o c ia l i s t  Party , and the Communist Party ) emerged, bu t, as the  
opposition p a r t ie s ,  they could not p ra c t ic e  p o l i t i c a l  freedom. However, 
these o rgan izations , in proportion , con tribu ted  to  the  in te n s i f ic a t io n  
of the  p o l i t i c s  of the  opposition and the  provision o f a social s e t t in g
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regime. This opposition was t ra n s la te d  in to  the c rea tion  o f  several 
p o l i t i c a l ,  r e l ig io u s ,  and m il i t a ry  o rg an iza tio n s ,  g u e r r i l l a  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
s t r i k e s ,  dem onstrations, p o l i t i c a l  a s s a s s in a t io n s ,  and even tua lly  the 
emergence o f  the  1952 Revolution. F in a lly ,  t h i s  value-dissensus i s  
accu ra te ly  described and expressed fo r  the King in the "ultimatum" 
th a t  the  Free O fficers  de livered  to  him and he was required to  sign 
as a legal measure in  the  process o f  power transm ission . This u l t i ­
matum reads as follows (Sadat, 1957:125-126):
Whereas the to ta l  anarchy in which the  country has 
of re c en t  months been thrown, and which has spread to  a l l  
domains, i s  a r e s u l t  of your bad ad m in is tra tio n ,  your v io la t io n s  
o f  the  C on sti tu t io n ,  and your d isregard  of the  w ill o f  the  
people to  a poin t where no c i t i z e n  could fee l secure in his 
l i f e ,  d ig n i ty  and property .
Whereas your p e rs is ten ce  in t h i s  course has com­
promised the  name o f Egypt among the n a t io n s ,  and treacherous 
and co rru p t persons have, under your p ro te c t io n ,  continued 
to  amass shameful fo r tunes  and to  squander public funds 
while th e  people remained a prey to  hunger and poverty.
Whereas these  f a c t s  have been brought to  l ig h t  by 
the war in P a le s t in e ,  the  t r a f f i c  in d e fe c t iv e  arms and 
ammunition to  which i t  gave r i s e ,  and the  judgments pro­
nounced by the Courts on those responsib le  revealed your 
in te rv e n t io n —in te rv en tio n  which d is to r te d  t r u t h ,  shook 
confidence in J u s t ic e ,  encouraged t r a i t o r s  in  t h e i r  crimes, 
enriched some and corrupted o thers .
Therefore the  Army, represen ting  th e  power o f the 
People, has authorized me to  demand th a t  your Majesty abdicate  
the Throne in favour o f  the  Heir Apparent, His Highness Prince 
Ahmed Fouad, on t h i s  day, Saturday, Ju ly  26th, 1952, and th a t  
you leave the  country before 6 p.m. o f  t h i s  same day.
The Army holds Your Majesty responsib le  fo r  any 
consequences which may r e s u l t  from your re fusa l  to  conform 
to  th e  w ill o f  the people.
Commander-in-Chief o f  the  armed Forces,
(signed) Mohamed Neguib.
(5) Proposition V is  concerned with "Social S train" which 
p rev a ils  in  a p rerevo lu tionary  so c ie ty .  This s t r a i n ,  however, is  not 
a primary cause fo r  revo lu tion  but i s  a product o f  d i f f e r e n t  s t ru c tu ra l
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shortcomings and d iscr im ina tion  th a t  develops h i s to r ic a l ly  and manifests 
i t s e l f  even tua lly . Such a socia l  s t r a in  ch arac te r ized  the Egyptian 
masses, e sp e c ia l ly  in the  era o f  1940s and the  ea r ly  1950s. According 
to  Richmond,
I t  was a period  o f in tense  f r u s t r a t io n  fo r  the  Egyptian 
people, and was marked by cynical corrup tion  on the p a r t  o f  the  
King and the ru ling  c la s s .  Financial and sexual scandal touching 
the King became the s ta p le  o f  Cairo gossip . S to ries  of fa u l ty  
weapons supplied to  the army in P a le s t in e  under con trac ts  which 
had been p ro f i ta b le  to  the  King and h is  c rea tu res  were widely 
c i rc u la te d .  So were s to r i e s  o f  the  rigg ing  o f the Alexandria 
co tton  market fo r  the  p r o f i t  o f  Wafdist M inisters. Against a 
background o f r i s in g  co s t  o f  l iv in g  and a shortage of basic  
fo o d s tu f f s ,  these s to r i e s  brought s te a d i ly  nearer the end of 
the regime (1977:215).
Indeed, in t h i s  e ra  too much pressu re  from d i f f e r e n t  d irec t io n s  
was imposed on a people who could no longer comply w ith, be in d i f fe r e n t  
to ,  w iths tand , or d if fu se  t h i s  chronic im position.
This s t r a in fu l  s i tu a t io n  wherein the Egyptians were considered 
by a dominant c lass  o f  some 250,000 fo re ig n e rs  second-rate  in  t h e i r  
homeland, " . . .  pointed to  an unprecendented in te n s i f ic a t io n  o f  the 
c r i s i s  leading to  the m i l i t a r y  takeover" (Dekmejian, 1972:36). Such an 
accumulative s t r a in  was c ry s ta l iz e d  in and expressed by several Egyptian 
w r i te r s  who employed a vocabulary of " f r u s t r a t io n ,"  " rep ress ion ,"  
"v io lence ,"  "d ep r iva tion ,"  " su f fe r in g ,"  "hopelessness," "moral d i s in te ­
g ra t io n ,"  and " f u t i l i t y . "  These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  as Berque (1972:647) 
observes, ". . . inaugurate  a new period in  Egyptian and Arab s e n s i t i v i t y . "  
As an example, the Egyptian w r i te r ,  Al-Ahwani (1951), id e n t i f ie d  th is  
s i tu a t io n  in his Asrar Al-Nafs ( i . e . ,  the  se c re ts  o f  psyche) with "qalaq" 
( i . e . ,  anguish), which penetra ted  the  Egyptian soc ie ty .
Ind ica tive  o f  and manifesting these  conditions were th e  ongoing
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r i o t s ,  demonstration, s t r i k e s ,  g u e r r i l l a  a c t i v i t y ,  a s s a s s in a t io n s ,  and a
v a r ie ty  o f  deviant conducts which a l l  p rec ipa ted  the Black Saturday
or Cairo F ire  on 26, January, 1952, — a tu rn ing  point in opposing the
regime and the B ri t ish  dominance as w ell.  -In S ada t 's  words, "Black
Saturday was an orgy of uncontrolled  mob v io lence , motivated by hunger
and despa ir"  (1957:105). S ta ted  d i f f e r e n t ly ,  "Egypt in 1952 was a land
o f  misery with an old regime th a t  o ffered  no hope and an am\y th a t
su ffe red  hum iliation" (Leiden and Schmitt, 1968:166). F in a l ly ,  th i s
overa ll  s t r a i n ,  which was c rea ted  and accumulated throughout a long
period of economic in e q u a l i ty ,  p o l i t i c a l  s tran g u la t io n  and e x is t e n t ia l
bewilderment, was ac t iv a ted  by d i f f e r e n t  revo lu tionary  ca tego ries  and
was f in a l iz e d  in a revo lu tionary  transform ation  led by the  Free O fficers .
*
As i t  is  approached in th i s  work, the  Resource M obilization 
category covers d i f f e r e n t  p ropositions  (VI-X), including the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
of p o l i t i c a l  action  stemming from "Value Dissensus," the em otionalization 
of the  emerging socia l s t r a i n ,  the o rgan iza tion  of an ideological action 
led  by a determined lead e rsh ip , the  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  and awakening of 
socia l s t r a t a ,  and f in a l ly  the favorable e x p lo i ta t io n  of some accidental 
even ts ,  the  "w indfa lls ."  Without these  measures, a revo lu tion  w ill  not 
occur even i f  the  p o ten tia l  fo r  i t s  occurrence is  already th e re .  All 
these  ca teg o r ie s  r e la t in g  to  the  happening o f  the Egyptian Revolution 
w ill  be considered as a composite of v a r ia b le s  to  be approached jo in t ly .
In the process o f  mobilizing t h e i r  resources fo r  anti-regim e and 
a n t i - B r i t i s h  challenges, the Egyptian c o u n te re l i te s  consolidated  th e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  powers, sp ec if ied  t h e i r  demands, developed and defined th e i r
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framework, broadened t h e i r  socia l base, and functioned dec is ive ly  through­
out an eventful period o f ten years (1942-1952). Although throughout th i s  
period th e  s i tu a t io n  was r ip e  fo r  a rad ica l  change through a massive 
a c t io n ,  th i s  did not happen u n ti l  Ju ly ,  1953, and then in the form o f  a 
m i l i t a ry  coup. Paradoxically , such a r e a l i t y ,  as w ill  be seen l a t e r ,  
demonstrated the  q u a l i ty  o f  resource m obilization and the s i tu a t io n a l  
consciousness on behalf o f  the  Free O fficers .
From the la te  1940s on, the leadersh ip  of the  N a t io n a l is t  Wafd 
Party l o s t  i t s  t r a d i t io n a l  base of support owing to  i t s  co n c i l ia to ry  
p o s i t io n ,  f inanc ia l  scandals ,  and moral corrup tion . This fu r th e r  encouraged 
the Egyptians to  s h i f t  to  and develop more hope around the Muslim Brother­
hood, the S o c ia l i s t  p a r t i e s ,  and the sporadic n a t io n a l i s t  fo rces  th a t  
functioned openly and co v er t ly  out o f  the organization  and the leadership  
o f  the  Wafd Party . The Muslim Brotherhood was able to  c rea te  a wide social 
base, to  a t t r a c t  t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  and p a t r i o t i s t  groups, to  i n i t i a t e  par­
t is a n  a c t i v i t i e s  aga ins t  both the  Z ion ist in  P a les t ine  and the C o lo n ia l is t  
B r i t ish  on the Egyptian s o i l .  At the  tim e, the  Muslim Brotherhood was 
able  to  mobilize some 500,000 members fo r  action  ( e .g . ,  V a t ik io t is ,  1978: 
92).
However, with t h e i r  massive fo rce s ,  popular a t t r a c t io n ,  and 
Islamic idea ls  they s t i l l  did not make the 1952 Revolution nor was th i s  
revo lu tion  made in t h e i r  name. Further, they came to  be considered as 
coun terrevo lu tionaries  and became involved in counterrevolutionary  
a c t io n s .  Part o f  th is  f a i l u r e  i s  a t t r ib u te d  to  (1) the a ssass in a tio n  
of t h e i r  prominent lead e r .  Hassan Al-Banna in March, 1949, by the Secret 
P o lice , (2) t h e i r  a ssa ss in a tio n  t a c t i c s ,  (3) the imposition o f  m artia l
333
law in 1952, and (4) the d is so lu t io n  of  th e i r  o rganization  ( e .g . ,  Baker, 
1978:22; V a t ik io t i s ,  1978:39). The o th e r  aspect o f  th e  f a i lu r e  is  
re la ted  to  the  sev e rity  o f  soc ia l  control and the lack o f  a defined 
program fo r  action th a t  would go in to  e f f e c t  a f t e r  the regime was already 
toppled. F in a lly ,  the re  was another determinant f a c to r  which was iden­
t i f i e d  with the well-organized Free O ffice rs ,  the would-be rev o lu tio n a rie s ,
The s o c i a l i s t  forces were not powerful enough to  o r ig in a te  a 
revo lu tion . At th a t  time, re l ig io u s  and n a t io n a l i s t  forces dominated 
the p o l i t i c a l  arena of the country. Yet, they both were a t  ideological 
odds with communism. The c a p i t a l i s t  regime and the  B r i t i s h ,  too, 
e sp e c ia l ly  in  the era of the Cold War, exercised too much pressure  over 
the s o c i a l i s t  ca tegories .  On the  o th e r  hand, as Berque suggests , " . . .  
Marxism in  Egypt was found only among small groups, s t i l l  imbued with 
romantic fe rvour and with a b i t t e rn e s s  j u s t i f i e d  by persecution" (1972: 
643). I t  is  a lso  observed th a t  "Not a s ing le  Egyptian Communist organ­
iza t io n  became an in teg ra l  p a r t  o f  the  p r o l e t a r i a t ,  and c e r ta in ly  not 
o f  the dispossessed masses" (Hussien, 1973:90). N evertheless, i t  could 
be argued th a t  the  communist groups helped to  an e x ten t  to  c rea te  a 
supportive base fo r  anti-regim e ac tion  from whatever s id e .
In th i s  s i tu a t io n ,  when r e l ig io u s ,  s o c i a l i s t ,  and c iv i l  na tiona­
l i s t  p a r t ie s  were powerless, d is i l lu s io n e d ,  suppressed, or disorganized, 
the  i n s t i t u t i o n  of the army and i t s  e n th u s ia s t ic  n a t io n a l i s t  o f f ic e rs  
became the  only source fo r  national hope, p o l i t i c a l  change, and m i l i t a n t  
but nonviolent challenge. Thus, "The army emerged as the  only national 
force which had not been h i t .  . ." (Mohy Ed-Din, 1966:35), but was able 
to  h i t  f i r s t  on behalf of the na tio n .  I t  was from such a c ircum stan tia l
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arniy th a t  the "Society" (or "Association" o r  "Organization") o f  the 
Free O fficers  emerged in 1942 to  m a te r ia l iz e  the id ea ls  o f  the  people 
in the  1952 Revolution.
Nasser, the p res iden t o f  the Free O fficers  and the  leader of 
t h e i r  Revolution, observed th a t :
This s i tu a t io n  demanded th e  ex istence  of a force  s e t  
in one cohesive framework, fo r  removal from the c o n f l i c t  
between ind iv idua ls  and c la s s e s ,  and drawn from the  h ear t  o f  
the  people: a fo rce  composed o f men able  to  t r u s t  each o ther;
a force with enough material s tren g th  a t  i t s  d isposal to  
guarantee a sw if t  and decisive  a c t io n .  The conditions could 
be met only by the  Army (1955:42).
The core o f  the  Free O fficers  number 9 or 10 o r  11 or 13 in the 
e a r ly  1940s, but ten years  l a t e r ,  on th e  eve of the Revolution, hundreds 
o f  the  o f f ic e rs  were rec ru i te d  in the process. Sadat (1978:78) claims 
t h a t ,  "When I was imprisoned in 1942, Nasser took over command o f the 
Free O ff ice rs ' Organization. . . " ;  but Naguib acknowledges th a t  " . . .  
Nasser in v ited  me to  jo in  the Zabat el Ahrar, or Free O ff ice rs ,  the 
s e c re t  organization o f  which he was the founder and the  p res iden t"  
(1955:30). Nevertheless, a l l  the c o n s t i tu e n t  Free O ffice rs  were in 
t h e i r  ear ly  t h i r t i e s  and had middle ranks in  the army. Since these 
m i l i t a r y  men did not only overthrow the  old regime, but a lso ,  a t  l e a s t  
u n t i l  Nasser 's  e ra ,  took the  saddle o f  power, the e n te rp r i s e  o f  th e i r  
resource m obiliza tion  is  of special concern.
The essence o f th is  e n te rp r is e  can be found in N asser 's  (1955: 
105) suggestion t h a t  " I t  i s  not s tren g th  to  shout a t  th e  top  o f  the 
lungs; real s tren g th  l i e s  in ac ting  p o s i t iv e ly  with a l l  the  e f fe c t iv e  
means a t  our command."  (Emphasis added.) In l in e  with such a s tra tegy  
and from the very beginning, Nasser " . . .  re so rted  to  th e  c rea tion  of
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se c re t  c e l l s  within the army, each q u i te  unknown to  the o th e r ,  which 
p ro l i f e r a te d  day a f t e r  day u n t i l  the organization  was represented in 
every co rps , and p a r t ic u la r ly  in such crucial departments as army 
ad m in is tra t io n ,  and so on" (Sadat, 1978:100). In a l e t t e r  to  a f r ien d  
which he wrote a t  the age o f  17, Nasser summarized his ideological 
resource m obilization e f f o r t s  in what "Allah" decrees: "Oppose them
with whatever forces you can muster" (Nasser, 1955: 26-27). I n te r e s t ­
ing ly , some 44 years l a t e r ,  t h i s  v e rd ic t  became one of the themes of 
the  I ran ia n s '  revolu tionary  movement.
The Free O fficers  were not only able to  implant the seed o f  a 
revo lu tionary  action in t h e i r  m il i ta ry  d iv is ions  but a lso  to  approach 
popular f ig u re s ,  to co llab o ra te  and take advantage of s im ila r  organi­
za t io n s ,  to  ex p lo it  the accidental events , and to  do a l l  these sec re t ly  
and anonymously. The following cases are  ind ica tions  o f  these  s t r a te g ie s .  
In add ition  to  the conventional preparation fo r  a c t io n ,  these O fficers  
had p a r t ic ip a te d  in the War o f  P a le s t in e  which caused a humiliation 
fo r  the  army but p e r s i s te n t  determination fo r  anti-regim e action on 
behalf o f  the  Free O ffice rs .  "In P a le s t in e ,  Free O fficer c e l l s  found 
opportunity  to  study and in v e s t ig a te  and to  meet in t h e i r  trenches and 
command posts  . . . .  We s a t  there  in our besieged p o s i t io n s ,  not 
knowing what the outcome could be, but our conversation dwelt only upon 
our country , which i t  was our s o ld i e r 's  duty to  defend" (Nasser, 1955:
2 2 ).
In 1944, Nasser approached Hassan al-Banna, the  in f lu e n t ia l  
leader o f  the  Muslim Brotherhood, to  seek support and conso lidate  power. 
While Nasser had already c o n s t i tu ted  h is  organization  o f  the Free O ffice rs ,
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al-Banna encouragingly advised him: "Begin to  organize in the army
groups which have f a i t h  in what we believe so th a t  when the time comes, 
we w ill be organized in  one rank, making i t  impossible fo r  our enemies 
to  crush us" (Baker, 1978:26). This f a i th fu l  advice , however, implied 
many things to  Nasser including the success o f  the  "secrecy" o f  his 
conspiracy which was c ruc ia l  in the process o f  goal a ttainm ent. Accord­
ing to  Baikal, the secrecy in the revolu tionary  c e l l s  estab lished  by 
Nasser created  "v e i ls"  th a t  screened indiv idual abuses o f  au thority  
and petty  ty rann ies  by the n a t io n a l i s t  o f f ic e r s  (Baker, 1978:28). In 
l a t e  1951, The Voice o f  the  Free O fficers  was es tab lished  (Lacouture, 
1954:134). In ad d i t io n ,  "Inexpensive pamphlets, published i r r e g u la r ly ,  
increasing ly  became commonplace in the o f f i c e r s '  messes" (Wheelock, 
1960:7).
When the Cairo Fire or Black Saturday broke out in  January 26, 
1952, the Free O ffice rs  observed how the peoples ' tension was increasing 
and th a t  the s i tu a t io n  was r ip e  fo r  a c t io n ;  on the  o ther hand, they also 
understood th a t  a v io le n t  anti-regim e ac tion  could be e a s i ly  oppressed 
and s t e r i l i z e d  by the  regime and the present B r i t ish  fo rces . H is to r i ­
c a l ly ,  they learned  th a t  open massive action o r  t e r r o r i s t  a c t iv i ty  would 
be le ss  l ik e ly  to  achieve any defined ob jec t iv e  fo r  the people. This 
was e sp ec ia l ly  confirmed when on July 18, 1952, days before the over­
throw, the King ordered the cance lla t ion  o f  the  e le c t io n 's  re su l ts  o f  
the Officers Club Board. In th is  e lec t io n  the Free O fficers  had won most 
o f  the s e a ts ,  "thus defeating the Loyalis ts"  (Sadat, 1978:104). The 
Free Officers were somehow able to  overcome a t  l e a s t  two r iv a l  groups
within the opposition camp. According to  Dekmijian (1971:22),
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One o f  these—Capt. Mustafa Kama! S id q i 's  band of 
tw enty-three o f f ic e r s —because o f  t h e i r  continuous t e r r o r i s ­
t i c  involvement had come under constant su rv e il lan ce  and 
harassment by the a u th o r i t ie s  th a t  re su lted  in the group's 
p a r t i a l  breakup. On the o th e r  hand, the  Brotherhood had 
d is s ip a te d  i t s  energies in th e  g u e r r i l l a  campaign against 
the  B r i t i s h  in the Canal Zone. Government ac tion  against 
the  Brethren was e sp ec ia l ly  harsh , s ince of a l l  the  conspira­
t o r i a l  groups th is  was the la rg e s t  and most powerful outside 
and in s ide  the army. In ad d i t io n ,  the Brethren in the army 
were l e f t  leaderless  a f t e r  the  death o f  Muhammad Labib in 
1951.
As another example o f  the  Free O ffice rs ' t a c t i c a l  resource 
management and r e a l i s t i c  approach to  the s i tu a t io n ,  p r io r  to  the take­
over, they sought a " fron t man" to  symbolize th e i r  movement and to  
compensate fo r  th e i r  r e la t iv e  youth and unpopularity . Three candidates 
( i . e . .  Generals e l-M assri,  Sadeq, and Mehanna) declined , but General 
Naguib, 51, who was popular and a t  odds with the King, assumed the 
"figurehead" position  (Naguib, 1955:30; Sadat, 1955:107-108; Baker, 
1978:23). According to  Sadat, "u n ti l  Ju ly  21st, 1952, Naguib knew 
nothing o f  the ro le  which we had planned fo r  him, and which he was to  
continue to  play u n t i l  October, 1954" (1955:111). The in s is tence  o f the  
Free O fficers  to  be unknown even a f t e r  the take-over can be traced  to  
N asser 's  s t ra te g y  as he no tes , "I ordered th a t  no name be given any 
p u b lic i ty  except th a t  of Naguib's. I wanted a l l  the l ig h t  cas t  on him.
I gave th i s  o rder p r in c ip a lly  to  avoid a s p l i t  in  the Free O fficers . . . 
I knew how the B ri t ish  and our in te rn a l  enemies would t ry  to  p i t  us one 
aga ins t  the  o th e r ,  i f  we gave them a chance" (Baker, 1978:32).
In the  content of the is su e  of leadersh ip , A l-A layili (1941) 
the Egyptian w r i te r ,  believes t h a t  the Arab people needed a leader 
"powerful and v io len t"  to  mold them toge ther.  L a te r ,  in the course o f
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fu tu re  a c t io n ,  Nasser was labeled  a " re lu c tan t  d i c t a to r , "  a label which 
. . has gained wide credence" (Baker, 1978:31). In f a c t ,  "the c h a r i s ­
matic le ad e r  th a t  Al-Alayili had prescribed  as a cure fo r  Arab backward­
ness appeared in Colonel Nasser o f  Egypt, who made an in d e l ib le  imprint 
on Arab socia lism  in th a t  country" (Goode, 1975:46). Referring to  N asser 's  
leading ro le  in the  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  th e  Free O ff ice rs ,  Sadat (1955:15) 
acknowledges:
I t  need scarcely  be s ta t e d  th a t  our o rgan ization  was 
i l l e g a l .  We worked in darkness, awaiting the  dawn. I t  was 
a long-term plan , and Gamal Abdul Nasser was to  be the  a r c h i te c t  
and th e  s t r a t e g i s t .  His energy, h is  c le a r  th in k in g , his balanced 
judgment equipped him, more than anyone e l s e ,  fo r  th i s  ta sk .
Gamal's wisdom preserved us from premature ac tion  and from many 
dangerous adventures. Revolutionary t a c t i c s  demand patience 
and lu c id  thought. We proceeded cau tiously . I t  was useless 
and dangerous to  make ambitious claims i f  we had not the means 
to  t r a n s la t e  them in to  r e a l i t y .
We swore an oath to  remain f a i th fu l  to  our country and to  
work with a l l  our s treng th  fo r  i t s  regenera tion . The Army had a 
r ig h t  to  in te rvene , since both the government and the opposition 
p a r t i e s  were incapable o f  ending oppression.
In terms o f  s p e c i f ic a t io n ,  i t  is  observed th a t  "the ideological 
persuasion o f  the young men who coalesced around Gamal Abdul Nasser 
covered th e  fu l l  range o f p o l i t i c a l  thought from r ig h t  to  l e f t ,  from 
Muslim fundamentalism to  Marxism. The exigencies o f  conspiracy impelled 
Nasser to  minimize these d iffe rences"  (Baker, 1978:23). However, Sadat 
notes t h a t  "Our o b jec t  was to  have a healthy p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  in the 
country, to  ge t r id  o f  the King, the various p o l i t i c a l  fa c t io n s ,  and 
the B r i t ish "  (1978:110).
Beyond these ob jectives  Nasser spoke o f "a number of c i r c le s  
within which our a c t i v i t i e s  inescapably must be confined and in which 
we must t r y  to  move" (1955:85). The f i r s t  c i r c l e  was the "Arab World"
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to  which the  overwhelming m ajority  o f  the  Muslim Arab Egyptians were 
linked fo r  some th i r te e n  cen tu r ie s .  Based on th i s  commitment, Nasser 
l a t e r  came up with the  United Arab Republic, a union between Egypt and 
S y r ia ,  which was the Arabs' f i r s t  o f  the kind, though s h o r t - l iv e d  (1958- 
1961). Throughout h is  reign (1954-1970), Nasser advocated, nurtu red , 
and to  a g rea t  e x ten t  m a te r ia lized  Arab Nationalism. Harris a lso  
(1964:165) observes th a t  ". . . i t  was not u n t i l  a f t e r  the Revolution 
o f  1952 in Egypt th a t  Egyptians recognized the fu l l  dimensions o f  Arabism 
and the  p o te n t i a l i ty  o f  leadersh ip  in the  Arab world."
The second c i r c l e  was th a t  o f  Africa in which a ". . . t e r r i b l e  
s tru g g le  e x is t s  fo r  i t s  fu tu re  — a s tru g g le  whose re s u l t s  w ill be e i th e r  
fo r  us o r  a g a in s t  us. . ."  (Nasser, 1955:86). In reaction  to  t h i s  
h is to r ic a l-g e o g rap h ica l  attachment to  the Black Continent and i t s  people, 
Nasser l a t e r  became one o f  the  founding fa th e rs  of the Organization of 
African Unity and a ce leb ra ted  backer o f  the  n a t io n a l i s t  movements a l l  
over the  con tinen t.
The th i r d  c i r c l e  was th a t  o f  the  ". . . Islamic world with which 
we are  united  by bonds c rea ted  not only by re l ig io u s  b e l i e f ,  but a lso  
re in fo rced  by h i s to r ic a l  r e a l i t i e s .  . ." (Nasser, 1955:86). Nasser was 
not only a humble, p ra c t ic a l  Muslim but had a lso  a humanitarian and 
progressive  approach to  the Islamic ideology. He advocated Islamic 
values w ith in  a secu la r  s t a t e  and a s o c i a l i s t  t r a d i t io n .  In a word, 
N asser 's  humanitarian Islam can be sought in h is  response to  an i n t e r ­
viewer: "You mentioned what [ the ]  Prophet Muhammed owned and what
King Faysal [o f  Saudi a Arabia] now owns, and you w ill f in d  the answer 
to  h is  a l le g a t io n s  th a t  he represen ts  Islam. Islam c a l l s  fo r  sharing
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the  lo a f  o f  bread with your b o rthe rs ,  which, in the modern age, means 
socialism " (Kramer, 1980:10).
F in a l ly ,  as a new so c io p o l i t ic a l  o rder ,  Nasser and h is  assoc ia tes  
came up with a system th a t  was f i r s t  id e n t i f i e d  with " s ta te  cap ita lism " 
and l a t e r  with Islamic o r  "Arabic socialism " which has been acknowledged 
as the Arab's f i r s t  s o c i a l i s t  o rder in the  modern time.
So f a r ,  the e n te rp r is e  o f  resource m obilization has been con­
s id ered  and discussed in  conjunction with the  o rgan ization , ideology, 
and th e  leadersh ip  o f  the  Egyptian Revolution. Next, the is su es  of 
Stratum Consciousness and the Windfalls w ill  be sketched success ively .
Stratum Consciousness in  the Egyptian socie ty  was p re sen t ,  though 
not widely d ispersed . This consciousness was mostly experienced a t  both 
leadersh ip  and in te l le c tu a l  levels  o f  the r e l ig io u s ,  n a t i o n a l i s t ,  and 
s o c i a l i s t  c i r c l e s ,  but no t n ecessa r i ly  in  the  c i r c le s  of t h e i r  fo llowers. 
This s i tu a t io n  was caused by a t  l e a s t  th ree  v a r iab les .  F i r s t ,  i l l i t e r a c y  
was p reva len t in the so c ie ty  and the mass media was in the hands of the 
government. According to  P la t t  and Henfy (1958:118), in 1947, 77 percent 
o f  the people were "completely i l l i t e r a t e "  and, of those reported  as able 
to  read and w r i te ,  about 90 percent had attended  only elementary school, 
and only 9 percent had c e r t i f i c a t e s  from schools above the elementary 
le v e l .  In ad d it io n ,  as discussed e a r l i e r ,  the m ajority  of the  Egyptians 
were a lso  impoverished and hence developed l i t t l e  involvement in p o l i t i c s .  
They a c tu a l ly  were preoccupied with problems of bread and b u t te r .
Nevertheless, as ear ly  as the 1820s, some Egyptian na tiona ls  
having received t h e i r  education in Europe, became exposed to  the  na tion­
a l i s t  and p a t r io t i c  id ea ls  o f  the European t r a d i t io n .  The leading
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example was Al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) who spent the  years 1826-1831 in 
France and l a t e r  described his  experience in his book in Arabic, Al-  ^
Talkhis. . . ( i . e . ,  d i s t i l l a t i o n ) ,  published in 1905. This leading 
in te l le c tu a l  reformer proposed, among other th in g s ,  th a t  " I f  Egypt took 
care and the too ls  o f  c iv i l i z a t i o n  were applied copiously th e re ,  then i t  
would be the  su ltan  o f  c i t i e s  and the  ch ie f  country in  the  world"
(Dawen, 1973:125). In a word, in the  time o f the  Revolution the re  was 
a g rea t  body o f in t e l l i g e n t s i a  in Egypt, including w r i te r s ,  p ro fesso rs ,  
and u n iv e rs i ty  students who wrote, taugh t, learned , and nurtured na tiona­
l i s t ,  r e l ig io u s ,  p a t r io t ,  and, to  some ex ten t ,  s o c i a l i s t  ideas ( e .g . ,  
H a rr is :1964; Safaran:1961).
Second, the  Egyptian in te l le c tu a l  spheres as well as the  Egyptian 
p o l i t i c s  have somehow been mild and nonviolent ( e . g . ,  Leiden and Schmitt, 
1968:160-162). This fa c t  can a lso  be substan tia ted  by the  Free O ff ice rs '  
nonviolent take-over in 1952 and t h e i r  precautionary and preparatory 
but consp ira to ry  measures throughout a ten-year period. While almost 
a l l  of the  Third World's m i l i t a r y  take-over, including those of the  Arab 
co u n tr ie s ,  had been severe and bloody, in the Egyptian case no blood 
was shed, though through a "coup" a "revolution" was brought about. When 
they heard about the news o f  the  take-over, the Egyptians . . old and 
young, women and ch ild ren ,  were k issing  each o th e r ,  shaking hands, coming 
toge ther in small c lu s te r s  or la rge  c i rc le s  — but a l l  the  time in  to ta l  
s ilence"  (Sadat, 1978:107). However, i f  massive and popular p o l i t i c a l  
consciousness did not c h a rac te r iz e  the  Egyptian p u b lic ,  the  counter­
e l i t e s ,  the  leading forces o f  these  masses, were aware o f  the  ongoing 
s i tu a t io n  o f which the Free O f f ic e r 's  long-planned ac tion  was the  best
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responsive to  and supportive of social and p o l i t i c a l  changes. This is  
a lso  tru e  when the Young Egypt Party , s tudent committees and labor 
unions a re  considered. I t  should be added th a t  in terms o f  mass m obili­
zation the  ro le  o f  the Muslim Brotherhood was prominent. At the tim e, 
th is  o rganization  had a soc ia l  base which mostly was represen ted  by the 
lower c lasses  and layers  o f  the  middle c lasses .
F in a lly ,  "The s t a t e  aparatus was to t a l l y  con tro lled  from the 
palace: the  Egyptian p o l ic e ,  the adm in is tra tive  organs o f  rep re ss io n , 
the  instruments o f  local rep ress ion  in the  countryside—the omdebs 
(based la rg e ly  on the lower t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  stratum o f  the  wealthy 
peasantry)" (Hussien, 1973:67). In te re s t in g ly ,  the "Palace" as such 
was con tro l led  by the  B r i t i sh  Royal Palace represented by 80,000 troops 
s ta t io n ed  in the Canal Zone and a t  the B r i t ish  Embassy in Cairo. Thus, 
th e re  was a power e l i t e  s t ru c tu re  in the country in  which the  c o lo n ia l i s t  
forces and th e i r  adherent indigenous ru ling  c lass  were rep resen ted , but 
not the Egyptian masses. More in te r e s t in g ly ,  while the regime was on 
the verge o f  co llap se ,  le s s  than th ree  months before the  take-over ,
". . .King Faruq made what was to be h is  l a s t  attempt a t  s e l f - l e g i t im a ­
tion  when he proudly announced on May 1952, the t rac in g  o f  h is  ancestry  
to  the Prophet Mohammad" (Dekmejian, 1972:36).
This c r i s i s  s i tu a t io n  led Nasser to  the  observation and 
conclusion th a t
The country was under autocracy. That yoke had to  
be thrown o f f  to  open the  way to  our renaissance . A long 
h is to ry  of negligence, e r ro r  and f r u s t r a te d  p ro jec ts  showed 
th a t  a reform of the s t a t e  was to  accomplish i t .  Jobbery 
and corruption s u l l i e d  the  regime. That cen te r  o f  in fe c t io n  
had to  be e rad ica ted  (1957:ix ) .
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The Egyptians' economic d ep r iv a tio n ,  as d iscussed  e a r l i e r ,  
increased and complicated t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  f r u s t r a t i o n ,  as i t  i s  sketched 
p re sen tly .  These two h i s to r ic a l  dilemmas toge the r  caused, in te rac ted  
w ith , and p re c ip i ta te d  the  peo p le 's  c u l tu ra l  p e rp le x i ty —a fee l in g  o f  
meaninglessness, a s ta t e  o f  a l i e n a t io n ,  and a dubious perception o f 
national id e n t i ty .
(3) As hinted above, "Cultural A lienation ,"  the  subject m atter 
o f  p roposit ion  I I I ,  ch a rac te r ized  the  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  in Egyptian 
so c ie ty .  For c e n tu r ie s ,  the  Egyptians were submerged in several 
r e l ig io u s ,  n a t io n a l ,  e th n ic ,  l i n g u i s t i c ,  c u l tu r a l ,  d y n as t ic ,  and 
sovereignty-based questions t h a t ,  in  d i f f e r e n t  t im es, caused them 
increasing  e x is t e n t ia l  p ressu res . In recen t tim e, the  r iv a l ry  o f  the  
Turks, Frenchmen, Germans, I t a l i a n s ,  and the B r i t i s h  must be remembered. 
This r iv a l r y  occurred in a so c ie ty  th a t  had been p rim ari ly  id e n t i f ie d  
with the  A rabic-Islam ic t r a d i t io n s  from the mid-seventh century; a 
soc ie ty  which a lso  included a m inority  o f  C hris tian  Copt na tio n a ls .  
Accordingly, th e re  a lso  was a mixture o f ,  a c o n f l i c t  among, and a 
confusion about l i f e  s t y l e s ,  h i s to r i c a l  a f f i l i a t i o n s ,  national id e a l s ,  
va luational p re fe rences , and a t t i tu d in a l  o r ie n ta t io n s  in  th i s  so c ie ty .
Such t i t l e s ,  headings, and phrases as "in search o f  id e n t i ty ,"  
"Egypt's d e s t in y ,"  "Lost d ig n i ty ,"  "where i s  na tiona lism ,"  "where i s  
d ig n i ty ,"  "u n ce r ta in ty ,"  " c i ty  o f  wrong," "useless  awareness," "what is  
Egyptianness," " In te rrup ted  coun try ,"  "how are th ings  going to  hold 
to g e th e r  in Egypt," and the  l i k e ,  connote a t a c i t  a sp ec t  o f  the Egyp­
t i e n s '  h i s to r i c a l  bewilderment. Attached to  th i s  s i tu a t io n  and the 
imprecise perception  o f the  Egyptian " s p i r i t  o f t im e ,"  the re  a lso  was an
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ambiguity o r  dissensus about such id ea ls  as "pure Egyptianism," "pan- 
Arabism," "pan-Islamism," o r  a combination o f  the kind. Further, 
there  was an in c l in a t io n  to  perceive o f  Egypt as an European piece o f 
land and c u l tu re  which happened to  be on the o ther s ide  o f  the Medi­
terranean .
These issues  to g e th e r  were examples o f  an id e n t i f ic a t io n a l  
c r i s i s  which i s  pointed in N asser 's  (1955:69-70) observation:
I consider a l l  t h i s ,  and feel a deep understanding 
of confusion th a t  bese ts  our national l i f e  and o f  the  d iso rder  
from which we plan escape. Then I r e f l e c t :  t h i s  soc ie ty  w i l l '  
develop form, conso lidate  and become a s trong , homogeneous 
and u n if ied  whole.
These are the o r ig in s  o f  our present cond itions .
These a re  the  sources from which our d i f f i c u l t i e s  flow. . . 
our p o s i t io n  i s  blown upon by the wind from a l l  d ire c t io n s  
We are  on a f i e ld  roaring with hurr icanes , dazzled by 
l ig h ten in g  and shaken by thunder.
Another observation s p e c if ie s  fu r th e r  d e ta i l s  in  the  context of 
the  Egyptians' e x is t e n t ia l  p e rp le x i ty .  According to  Wynn (1959:10-11),
I f  you had walked through downtown Cairo a few years 
ago, you would have seen l i t t l e  to  in d ica te  you were in an 
Arab-Muslim country. The s t r e e t - s ig n s  and advertisements were 
in French or o ther European languages but ra re ly  in Arabic, 
the language o f  the  country. When shopping, you would speak 
French, I t a l i a n ,  English, or Greek, but almost never Arabic.
The a rc h i te c tu re  was European. The business d i s t r i c t  closed 
on Sunday ins tead  o f  the  Muslim prayer-day o f Friday. In the 
u n iv e r s i t i e s  the  le c tu re s  and textbooks were in English, French, 
or German. Arabic was the  language only o f the se rv an ts ,  the 
uncouth, and the  f a n a t ic a l ly  re l ig io u s  Muslims.
I t  i s  a lso  in te re s t in g  to  understand th a t  Kami 1, the founder of 
the modern n a t io n a l i s t  movement in  Egypt, "Through education, t r a v e l ,  and 
personal f r ien d sh ip  lived  with p a r t  o f  his mind in Europe; and he gives 
the impression o f having always played to  European audiences even when 
he was addressing h is  own people" (Safran , 1961:86). The Muslim King
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Faud (1868-1936) "had been brought up in I ta ly "  (Richmond, 1977:203); 
fu r th e r  he was not a national Egyptian but o f  Albanian-Turkish o r ig in .  
Because o f  th i s  dynastic  a f f i l i a t i o n  with and the t r a d i t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
influence of  the Turks on Egypt, the Egyptians were required to  pay an 
annual "subsistence" to  the  Turkish army u n ti l  th i s  was abolished in 1952 
by the Free Officers (Radwan, 1976:164).
Some "pure" Egyptians, usually  C hris ta in  Copts, s e t  fo r th  ce r ta in  
e th n ic ,  c u l tu r a l ,  and h i s to r ic a l  claims o f  which Salama Musa is  an 
example. According to  Musa, the re  is  no d ifference  between Egyptians 
and Europeans in e th ic a l  and c u l tu ra l  terms; the Arabization of Egypt 
did not wipe out the Egyptian Pharonic cu ltu re ;  Arabic c u ltu re  is  not 
only parochial and unable to  meet modern cond itions , but a lso  is  foreign 
to  the Egyptian mind; and "Although the  sun r is e s  in  the East, the  l i g h t ,  
however, comes from the  West" (Ibrahim, 1979:347-357).
In sharp c o n tra s t  to  th is  s tandpo in t,  there  was an emphasis on 
the Arabic, and e sp ec ia l ly  Islam ic-A rabic, cu ltu re  and t r a d i t io n s  which 
were advocated by the Egyptian Arab n a tio n a ls  or Egyptian pan-Islamic 
Arabs. Hassan Al-Banna, the  founder o f  the Muslim Brotherhood, fo r  
example, emphasized the  a u th e n t ic i ty  o f  Islam and the moral d e te r io ra t io n  
t h a t  was brought into Egypt by the "cu l tu ra l  imperialism" of the West.
He says:
A fter the  l a s t  war and during th is  period which I spent 
in Cairo, there  was an increase  in s p i r i tu a l  and ideological 
d is in te g ra t io n ,  in the name o f  in te l l e c tu a l  freedom. There was 
a lso  a d e te r io ra t io n  o f  behavior, morals, and deeds, in  the 
name o f  individual freedom. . . . Books, newspapers, and 
magazines appeared whose only aim was to  weaken or to  destroy 
the influence of any r e l ig io n  o f  the  masses. . . . Young men 
were l o s t ,  and the educated were in  a s t a t e  of doubt and con­
fusion. . . .  I saw th a t  the socia l l i f e  of the beloved Egyptian
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nation  was o s c i l l a t i n g  between her dear and precious Islamism 
which she had in h e r i te d ,  defended, l ived  with and become 
accustomed to ,  and made powerful during th i r te e n  c e n tu r ie s ,  
and th i s  severe Western invasion which i s  armed and equipped 
with a l l  the d e s tru c t iv e  and degenerative influences o f  money, 
wealth, p re s t ig e ,  o s te n ta t io n ,  m aterial enjoyment, power, and 
means o f  propaganda. . . .  I remember th a t  I was so d is tu rbed  
about the th re a t  to  Islam posed by the West th a t  I spent about 
h a l f  the  month o f  Ramadan of th a t  year  in  a s ta t e  o f  g rea t  
anxiety  and s leep le ssn ess .  And I th e re fo re  decided upon 
p o s i t iv e  action  and I asked myself: Why do I not place th is  
r e sp o n s ib i l i ty  upon the  shoulders o f  Muslim leaders and urge 
them strongly  to  co-operate  in r e s i s t in g  th i s  invasion? (1949:
56-59, 65).
As b r ie f ly  p ic tu red  above, the re  e x is ted  a c r i s i s  o f  m o rta l i ty ,
d ig n i ty ,  and id e n t i ty  in the Egyptian soc ie ty  which coupled with and
complicated the a lready  p reva iling  economic ineq u a l i ty  and p o l i t i c a l
suppression. This was r e f le c te d  in the commitment of Nasser (1955:44)
as the i n i t i a t o r  o f  the  Revolution where he declared th a t  ". . .we [must]
re s to re  l o s t  d ign ity  to  our moral values by not fo rg e tt in g  the p a s t ."
Such a fee l in g  o f  l o s t  d ig n ity  and self-commitment to  i t s  appropria te
trea tm ent was deeply rooted in the p e rso n a li ty  o f  the lead e r  of the
Egyptian Revolution. According to  Wynn (1959:19-20):
. . .Nasser su ffe red  the humiliation th a t  brought home to  
him a maddening f a c t —his family was looked down on as 
in f e r io r  simply because they were Egyptians, because they 
spoke Arabic in s tead  o f French, because they were baladi 
[ i n f e r io r  c i t i z e n s ] .  I t  was there  th a t  the emotional 
groundwork was la id  fo r  the tremendous psychological drive 
in  Nasser—the d rive  to  make himself and h is  people proud, 
and not ashamed, to  be Egyptians.
However, ". . . th e  problem of [the  Egyptian 's] a l ie n a t io n  could 
not be solved by a f a ta l  compromise with fo re ig n e rs ;  i t  permeated the 
very a c t  of l ib e ra t io n "  (Berque, 1972:649). Such a task  o f  l ib e ra t io n  
was even tua lly  performed and gave a new id e n t i ty  to the Muslim-Arab- 
A frican-Egyptians, and the minority of the  C hris tian  Copt na tio n a ls .
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In Baker's  words, . .through th e i r  e f f o r t s  to  destroy  Egypt's co lonial 
dependency, the m il i t a ry  consp ira to rs  [ i . e . ,  the  "Free O ff ice rs" ]  did 
give new meaning to  a h is to ry  th a t  fo r  the  mass o f  Egyptians had become 
meaningless" (1978:11).
(4) Proposition IV centers  around "Value Dissensus" which 
manifests i t s e l f  a f t e r  the  " ru les  o f  the  game" are  played down by, or 
withheld on behalf o f  the  regime in power. In f a c t ,  in such a s i tu a t io n ,  
the m o ra li ty ,  l e g a l i ty ,  and the functioning o f  the regime came in to  
question . In general, such a manifest disagreement develops with the 
emergence o f  economic in e q u a l i ty ,  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t ,  and id e n t i f i c a ­
t io n a l  c r i s i s .  These conditions  surfaced under the  Egyptian old regime 
and thus j u s t i f i e d  i t s  abrogation by the people.
Paradoxically , th e re  was a twofold disagreement concerning 
two p o l i t i c a l  orders in the Egyptian so c ie ty .  One was d irec ted  toward 
the occupying B r i t ish  fo rces  and the o th e r  d e a l t  with the Egyptian 
p o l i t i c a l  regime proper. However, these two disagreements had a common 
source and hence were in te rtw ined . Since c o lo n ia l iz a t io n  i s  i l l e g i t im a te  
in the  abso lu te ,  a t  l e a s t  by the  judgment o f  the  a ffec ted  people, no 
kind of "agreement" can be comprehended in the process. Yet, f o r  some 
th e o re t ic a l  purposes, i t  must be argued t h a t  even within the context 
of t h e i r  imposed c o lo n ia l i s t  p o lic ie s  and t r e a t i e s ,  the B r i t ish  did not 
f u l f i l l  t h e i r  own promises. As was mentioned in  the H is to rica l Back­
ground, the  B r i t ish  occupation o f Egypt, the  pa rtne rsh ip  in the  Condomi- 
num of the  Sudan, the  Control o f  the Canal Company, the s ta t io n in g  of 
the troops in the Canal Zone, the timing o f  the "Evacuation" from Egypt,
and the  l i k e ,  went f a r  beyond the codes and accords th a t  they had a lready
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promulgated to  serve t h e i r  own c o lo n ia l i s t  i n t e r e s t s .  Thus, the  Egyptian 
Revolution (and the following events such as the  n a tio n a l iza t io n  o f  the 
Canal Company and the expulsion o f  the B r i t ish  troops) was a natural 
and le g i t im a te  reaction  to  the i l le g i t im a te  operation o f  the  B r i t i s h .
On the  o the r  hand, dissensus between the  Egyptian people and 
t h e i r  own s t a t e  can be traced  to  the suspension o f  the C onsti tu tion , 
the d is so lu t io n  o f  the  Parliam ent, the abuse o f  a u th o r i ty ,  even under 
the  opera tion  o f  both the Parliament and the  C onsti tu tion , and the  
in e ffe c t iv en e ss  in managing the  country. According to  Musa (1958:166- 
167), the  government " . . .  d issolved the Parliament on [ s i c ]  1925 on 
the very f i r s t  day o f i t s  assembly, suspended th e  C onstitu tion  and thus 
destroyed the  young Egyptian democracy by pu tting  back the nation to  an 
a u to c ra t ic  ru le .  . . . The same was done. . . in 1929 and . . .  in 1930." 
Hence, independence was meaningless ". . . i f  re ac t io n a r ie s  and despots 
govern th e  nation" (Musa, 1960:41).
I t  was not only in  the  beginning o f the  Parliamentary ru le  th a t  
the  democratic t r a d i t io n  was oppressed by the  regime; t h i s  suppression 
a c tu a l ly  la s te d  u n ti l  the  dawn o f the Revolution. Throughout th i s  
period . King Farouk and his "Party of Friends" mostly operated a t  w i l l .  
For example, in reac tio n  to  the  people 's  constan t appeal fo r  free  
p o l i t i c a l  expression but in the  guise o f  the  P a le s t in ian  War, the  regime 
enforced m artial law which continued u n ti l  1950, th a t  i s  two years 
a f t e r  the War. Further , four months before the  Revolution, " I t  d issolved 
Parliament on 24 March and announced fresh  e lec t io n s  fo r  18 May; but 
l a t e r  i t  postponed holding them in d e f in i te ly "  (V a t ik io t is ,  1969:372).
Throughout the 1940s and in the  e a r ly  1950s, i t  became evident
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more than ever before th a t  the  regime was a ffec ted  by "power d e f la t io n ,"  
p o l i t i c a l  scandals, f in an c ia l  misdoings, moral corruption , and a s ta t e  
of dysfunctioning. "With p o l i t i c a l  power in  hand, the king did not, 
and could n o t ,  resolve a s in g le  problem. His resumption of power was 
in f a c t  in c o n s t i tu t io n a l  [ s i c ] .  Inoperative power can hardly be 
regarded as e ffe c t iv e"  (Hussien, 1973:85). While the reigning King 
assumed a governing ro le  in the process, h is  ". . .scandalous behavior. . 
d is c red i ted  both the monarch and the e x is t in g  order" (Issaw i, 1957:264). 
In the  course of time, the  inoperation o f  the  regime in te n s i f ie d  and 
the p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  deepened. Ind ica tive  o f th i s  was the f a c t  t h a t ,  
in th e  f i r s t  h a lf  of 1952, f ive  governments were appointed, none of 
which was ab le  to  control the  s i tu a t io n  ( e . g . ,  Sadat, 1957:113, Baker, 
1978:11).
As fo r  the m orality  of the King, in a land th a t  had long 
known kings, Farouk's " . . .p r iv a te  l i f e ,  however, soon became entangled 
in alcohol and women; he grew enormously obese. . ." (Lieden and 
Schmitt, 1968:165). The decay, in e f fe c t iv e n e s s ,  and the c r i s i s  of 
legitim acy o f the regime is  a lso  re f le c te d  in  S ada t 's  (1957:130-131) 
words: "The old regime had crumbled to  the  ground, the King had fa l le n
without majesty, the leaders  without v i r tu e  o r d ign ity . There was 
nothing l e f t  but the ru ins  they had c re a te d ."
Thus, people l o s t  t h e i r  f a i t h ,  i f  any, in t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
regime and withdrew t h e i r  lo y a lty  as t h i s  was defined by a value 
system re f le c te d  in the  1923 C onsti tu tion . This dissensus must a lso  
be tra ced  to  the Egyptians' l i f e t im e  opposition to  the government, 
which a c tu a l ly  ind ica ted  the ongoing c r i s i s  o f  legitimacy of the old
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example.
Yet, th e re  was a th i r d  fa c to r  which impeded mass consciousness, 
l i b e r a l  p o l i t i c a l  s o c ia l i z a t io n ,  and v io le n t  and widespread demonstration. 
This s i tu a t io n  is  a t t r ib u te d  to  the  s e v e r i ty ,  p o p u la r ity ,  and the  th ree ­
fo ld  nature  o f  socia l co n tro l .  According to  Sadat (1978:100):
At th a t  time f ive  s e c re t  bodies were operating  in Egypt: the
P o l i t i c a l  Police ; the  Criminal In v es tig a t io n  Department; the  
Arrny M ilita ry  In te l l ig e n c e ;  the B r i t i sh  In te l l ig en ce  Service; 
and the U.S. Central In te l l ig e n c e  Agency, which began to  operate 
in Egypt immediately a f t e r  World War I I .  Apart from these  
th e re  was a fu r th e r  body th a t  worked f o r  the  King and was 
d i r e c t ly  responsib le  to  the royal c o u r t—the Royal In te l l ig en ce  
Service .
In te re s t in g ly ,  one of the  Free O ff ice rs '  preoccupations was to  
assure  promptly the  B r i t i s h  and the  American embassies in Cairo th a t  
the  power t r a n s i t io n  t h a t  had a lready occurred on July  23, 1952, was an 
in te rn a l  event whereby th e  fo re igners  would not be a ffec ted .  F ina lly , 
whatever the scope of stratum  consciousness in the Egyptian so c ie ty  and 
however i t  was exp lo ited  by the  re v o lu t io n a r ie s ,  the  case demonstrates 
a c e r ta in  example o f  The P o l i t i c s  o f  Mass Society  (Kornhauser: 1953).
In th i s  approach, in f a c t ,  the  Egyptian " e l i t e s "  (indeed "counter" 
e l i t e s )  were access ib le  to  the masses and the  masses were p o te n t ia l ly  
a v a i la b le  to  the  c o u n te re l i te s .  This a lso  can be su b s tan tia ted  by 
some in te r r e la te d  f a c t s ,  namely th a t  the  m il i t a ry  c o u n te re l i te s  operated 
on b eh a lf  of the  masses; the  masses cheered the Revolution; and fu r th e r ­
more, ". . . n o  Egyptian rose up to  defend the  monarchy. . ."  (Sadat, 
1955:128).
*
The eleventh and l a s t  p roposition  o f  the  syn thesis  revolves
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around c e r ta in  unpredictable  but ex p lo i ta b le  fac to rs  which somehow come 
about in the revolu tionary  process. These Windfalls p re c ip i ta te  the 
revo lu tion  and a f fe c t  the time o f  the revo lu tionary  take-over. In the 
case o f  the  Egyptian Revolution, a v a r ie ty  o f  these acce le ra to rs  can 
be s in g led  out. Mansfield (1971:266) claims th a t  "one s ide  e f f e c t  of 
the  [1936] t r e a ty  u l t im a te ly  paved the way fo r  the 1952 Revolution and 
the end o f the B ri t ish  influence in Egypt." On the o ther hand, students 
o f  the  Egyptian Revolution as well as the  i n i t i a t o r s  o f  th i s  revolu tion  
seem to  acknowledge the observation t h a t ,  "Undoubtedly, the  P a le s t in e  
War [ o f  1948] c o n s ti tu ted  a major condition ing  fa c to r  fo r  the  revolu­
t io n  o f  1952" (Leiden and Schmitt, 1968:165). This acknowledgement 
might be su b s tan tia ted  by the  fa c t  t h a t ,  fo r  several n a t io n a l ,  r e l ig io u s ,  
economic, m i l i t a r y ,  and p o l i t i c a l  va lues , "The ariny's morale was shaken 
by the  P a le s t in e  War. . ."  (Issaw i, 1957:264).
Further , the two events of January 25 and 26, 1952, acce lera ted  
the  occurrence of the Revolution. In the  f i r s t  event, "On January 
25th, 1952, a b a t ta l io n  o f  th e  Egyptian Auxiliary  Police was surrounded 
a t  I sm a i l ia ,  and c a l led  upon to  surrender [ to  the B ri t ish  fo rc e s ] .  The 
b a t ta l io n  re fused , and re s i s te d  h e ro ic a l ly  when attacked by tanks and 
l i g h t  a r t i l l e r y .  There were more than seventy dead. Public opinion 
was outraged by the news" (Sadat, 1957:104-105). This event caused 
the  Cairo F ire  or Black Saturday on the following day, as a re ac tio n  to 
the B r i t i s h  and the Egyptian demoralized regime (which was discussed 
p rev io u s ly ) .  From the eventful Black Saturday, the Free O ffice rs  as 
eye-w itnesses learned two th ings : the s i tu a t io n  was r ipe  fo r  revolu­
t io n  and the  regime was in e f fe c t iv e  in the  face o f  a serious challenge.
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In d ica tive  of th is  was the  "inaction" o f  the police forces during the 
r i o t s  (Issaw i, 1954:264).
Thus, the Executive Committee (or the  Constituent Council) of 
the Free O fficers  decided to  advance the  take-over. "The revolu tion  was 
f ixed  fo r  March, 1952" (Sadat, 1957:107). But, because o f  the  unexpected 
desertion  o f the would-be " f ro n t  man" o f  the  Revolution, General Mehanna, 
the execution o f the plan was postponed to  November, 1952 (Sadat, 1978: 
104), o r  August 5, 1952 (Neguib, 1955:112). Unexpectedly, Nasser learned 
th a t  the King was about to  appoint a new Cabinent whose M in ister of War 
would be Major-General Hussien S ir ry  Amer. This General, ". . .knew 
a g re a t  deal about the Free O ff ice rs ,  and. . . once in power, he would 
e lim ina te  them a l l  and f r u s t r a t e  t h e i r  plans to  show the  King how power­
ful and loyal he was" (Sadat, 1978:105). Accordingly, ". . .we advanced 
the date o f  the  coup to  22 Ju ly . In the  end, though, we found i t  
impossible to  make a l l  the  necessary arrangements in time to  a c t  before
the morning o f  Wednesday, 23 July" (Neguib, 1955:112).
*
In sum, the Free O ffice rs ' overa ll  resource m obilization 
i n i t i a t i v e s  o r  th e i r  "d is t ingu ish ing  q u a l i t i e s "  in the process o f  revo­
lu t io n a ry  take-over, can be traced  to  the following cap a c i t ie s  s tressed  
by Dekmijian (1971:21-22): (1) the  unity  among the inner core of eleven 
o f f i c e r s ;  (2) the e ffec t iv en ess  o f  leadersh ip  charac te rized  by Nasser 
and the  u t i l i z a t i o n  of the  ce l l  system; (3) the a b i l i t y  to  ga ther 
in te l l ig e n c e  from and about d i f f e r e n t  groups and c i r c le s  w ithin  both 
the opposition and the regime; and f in a l l y ,  the a b i l i t y  to  move quickly 
and boldly to  preempt the actions of competing groups and the  Palace.
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*  *  *
Fina lly , In the concluding chapter which fo llow s, c e r ta in  
th e o re t ic a l  and observational is su e s ,  including the relevancy of the  
syn thes is  fo r  the t e s t  case revolution and the generating forces o f  the 
Egyptian and Iranian Revolutions as compared toge ther, w il l  be considered, 
and the  re la t io n sh ip s  between social s t r a in  and resource m obilization 
w ill  be emphasized.
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION
Through the preceding th e o re t ic a l  and observational accounts, 
c e r ta in  issues  re la t in g  to  both revolution and the theory o f  revolution 
were proposed. A concluding sketch , concentrating  on the developed 
sy n th e s is ,  in link  with a comparative glance a t  the two te s t - c a s e  
re v o lu t io n s ,  may be drawn as follows:
A. The Phenomenon of revolution as a sudden, d ra s t i c  social 
change i s  complex and multi-dim ensional. P a r t i a l ly  because o f  th is  
c h a r a c te r i s t i c ,  d i f f e r e n t  theo rie s  o f  revo lu tion  have f a i le d  to  provide 
a s u f f i c i e n t  explanation o f  the phenomenon. Such a f a i lu r e  a lso  stems 
from the  rooting of the  cause of revolu tion  in a s ing le  v a r iab le  of 
socia l m ilieu . I t  was attempted here to  a t t r i b u t e  d i f f e r e n t  causal and 
con tr ibu to ry  va riab les  to  the crea tion  o f  revo lu tion . This approach 
r e l a t e s  to  and is  su b s ta n t ia te d  by the economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and cu ltu ra l  
o rders .  This Weberian scheme about socia l s t ru c tu re s  and processes not 
only a id s  in an accura te  explanation of rev o lu tio n , but a lso  lodges the 
causal analys is  of t h i s  phenomenon in the socio logica l d is c ip l in e .  The 
in t e r e s t s  of sociology a re  broad. "Sociology examines aspects  of social 
l i f e  t h a t  might otherwise be overlooked o r taken fo r  granted. I ts
355
la rg e  and challenging agenda includes e f fo r t s  to  d iscover the basic 
s t ru c tu re  o f  human so c ie ty ,  to  id e n t i fy  the forces th a t  strengthen or 
weaken groups, and to  search out the  conditions th a t  lead  to  social 
change" (Broom e t  a l . ,  1981:5).
However, the  study o f  revolu tion  f a l l s  in the  a rea  of middle- 
range theo rie s  (Dowse and Houghes, 1972:3), but the  complexity o f  r e ­
vo lu tion  requ ires  a comprehensive c ro s s -c u l tu ra l  socio log ica l in v e s t i ­
g a tio n .  I f  adopted, a narrow approach to  revolution e sp e c ia l ly  in  the 
c u r re n t  s tage o f  soc io log ica l  development and the fragmentation o f  
sociology, might not be productive. One may remember Hughes' a sse r t io n  
in 1958 th a t
. .by sociology I do no t mean the highly  specia­
l iz e d  and fragmented d is c ip l in e  with which we are  c u rren tly  
fa m il ia r  in the United S ta te s ,  I mean a more universal social 
theo riz in g  in the  t r a d i t io n  o f Montesquieu and Marx. This 
was the notion o f  sociology held by Weber o r Durkheim or 
Pareto" (1977:22).
B. The re lev an t  l i t e r a t u r e  su f fe rs  from a d e f in i t io n a l  problem 
concerned with what a c tu a l ly  i s  a revo lu tion . As a re ac t io n  to  th i s  
problem, a comprehensive d e f in i t io n  o f  revolution was suggested (see 
pp. 13-14), which covers the whole revolu tionary  process. Such a 
process i s  id e n t i f ie d  with Hopper's (1950:270-779) observation in th a t  
revo lu tionary  development undergoes four d is t in g u ish ab le  s tages: the 
prelim inary s tage of mass ( in d iv idua l)  excitement and u n re s t ;  the formal 
s tage  o f  formulation o f  issues and formation of p o l ic ie s ;  the popular 
s tage  o f  crowd (c o l le c t iv e )  excitement and unrest;  and f in a l ly  the  
i n s t i tu t io n a l i z a t io n  s tage  o f  le g a l iz a t io n  and so c ie ta l  organi­
z a t io n .  In a short word, one should not speak of a "successful"  
revo lu tion  unless v i s ib le  s t ru c tu ra l  and/or valuational changes are
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introduced to  a socia l system, and th a t  in the desired  d ire c t io n .
C. Revolutions, however in freq u en t ,  occur in  varying socia l 
circumstances and are  deeply rooted in human s o c ie t i e s .  Stated d i f ­
f e r e n t ly ,  "Each revolu tion  is  shaped by the  h is to ry  o f  the  people 
involved and by t h e i r  d i s t in c t iv e  genius that" gives shared meaning 
to  the formative events o f  th e i r  past"  (Baker, 1978:1). Therefore, 
students  of the  sociology of revo lu tion  must always be conscious of 
and explore the  socia l  s e t t in g  in  which t h e i r  in v e s t ig a t io n s  take 
p lace . "But to  s t r e s s  th i s  does not e n ta i l  acceptance of a wholly 
r e l a t i v i s t i c  p o s i t io n ,  according to  which the 'v a l i d i t y '  o f  a given 
conception i s  only l im ited  to  the  circumstances which gave r i s e  to  i t "  
(Giddens, 1977:x).
D. Revolution is  but one type o f socia l change, though a 
sudden and d r a s t ic  one. Yet, many fundamental changes can take place 
without revo lu tions . Revolution is  not n ecessa r i ly  a "bad" or "good" 
phenomenon. I f  a revo lu tionary  take-over i s  j u s t i f i e d  by so c io -h is -  
to r i c a l  im peratives, the  p r iv i leg e  o f  the new regime should be judged 
by i t s  p os t-revo lu tionary  performance. However, a sound evaluation or 
a readable "balance-sheet"  o f  revo lu tionary  performance may go beyond
a s c i e n t i f i c ,  and p a r t ic u la r ly  so c io lo g ic a l ,  observation . For in s tance , 
how can one j u s t i f y  the  s a c r i f i c e  which is  made by the  p resent genera­
t io n s  in order to  secure the proposed well-being o f  the  fu tu re  genera­
tio n s?  Questions and evaluations l ik e  th is  are e th i c a l ,  ph ilosoph ica l,  
and sure ly  complicated. On the o th e r  hand, i t  is  a lso  tru e  th a t  " . . .  
revolu tion  cannot be made with rosewater and the t r e e  o f  l ib e r ty  must 
be lav ish ly  watered with blood. . ."  (Brogan, 1966:11). Revolution
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i s  n e i th e r  in e v i ta b le  nor impossible and when i t  occurs, i t  occurs a t  a 
co s t .  In B rin ton 's  words "Revolution may be as ' in e v i ta b le '  as thunder­
storms—and often as useful as a storm in a parched countryside" (1965:6).
E. Both the Egyptian and the  Iranian old regimes were su ffe ring  
from a legitimacy c r i s i s  p r io r  to  t h e i r  downfall. This c r i s i s  was 
c ry s ta l iz e d  in t h e i r  system atic and constant v io la tion  o f  the  "social 
con trac t"  symbolized by the c o n s t i tu t io n s .  This c r i s i s  was a lso  ev i­
denced by the masses' enduring, narrow or broad, easy or  in te n se ,  and 
symbolic and/or instrum ental opposition to  these regimes. Yet, un ti l  
the moment of the take-over ,  the two regimes were, by d e f in i t io n ,  con­
s idered  leg itim ate  and the masses' opposition was not. This i s  a 
paradoxical approach to  the category o f  " leg itim ation" and "authority" 
( i . e . ,  leg itim ized  power) in the  t r a d i t io n  of  social sc iences . Along 
with these  two regimes' c r is e s  of leg itim acy , social theory a lso  su ffe rs  
from a d e f in i t io n a l  c r i s i s  in defining " leg it im a te ."  I t  i s  a serious 
flaw in social theory to  take the leg it im a tio n  q u a li ty  o f  a government 
f o r  granted simply because th is  government is  somehow in power.
Even i f  consensus (or value-agreement) between government and 
people i s  taken fo r  g ran ted , such a "Consensus is  always under s t r e s s ,  
even in  systems with a long t r a d i t io n  o f  legitimacy" (Macridis and 
Brown, 1972:102). This rev e rs ib le  concentration on consensus-dissensus 
s igna ls  the f a c t  th a t  the  challenged regime i s  not undoubtedly l e g i ­
tim ate  nor are i t s  challengers  i l l e g i t im a te  in the abso lu te .  The le ­
g a l i t y  fo r  anti-regim e action  can be sought in  (1) va lue-d issensus , as 
was approached in the  sy n th es is ,  and (2) the "emergent-norms" explana­
t io n  as i t  i s  proposed by Turner (1964). To spec ify , the  "popular"
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(or c o l le c t iv e )  opposition to  the regime must be considered leg it im ate  
on two bases: the regime's v io la t io n  o f  the agreed-upon terms, and 
the developed values and norms on beha lf  o f  the opposition . These 
measures gain both r a t io n a l i ty  and l e g a l i ty  fo r  challenge . In sum, 
the cu rren t approach to  the legitimacy o f  regimes in power tends to  be 
a merely "diplomatic" and not " s c i e n t i f i c " - - t h a t  i s ,  " r e a l i s t i c " — 
d e f in i t io n .
F. Neither "social s t r a i n , "  caused by economic, p o l i t i c a l  and 
cu l tu ra l  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  not "resource m o b iliza tion ,"  id e n t i f ie d  with 
leadersh ip , ideology, and "o rgan iza tion ,"  and su b s ta n t ia te d  by "d issen­
sus ,"  alone is  s u f f ic ie n t  fo r  the m a te r ia l iz a t io n  o f  revo lu tions . These 
o r ig in a tin g  and a c t iv a t in g  fac to rs  can jo in t l y  bring about a revo lu tion . 
More im portantly , the  " in ten s i ty "  and the  "nature" of s t r a i n ,  and the 
"scope" of resource mobilization can a f f e c t  the magnitude of a revolu­
tionary  change and the  q u a li ty  o f  the revo lu tionary  take-over.
S truc tu ra l  s t r a in  involves the  imposition of  tension  to  the 
a ffec ted  people. Such a tension genera lly  a r is e s  out o f  the in te rna l 
co n trad ic t io n ,  d iscr im ina tion , d ep riv a tio n ,  d is ru p t io n ,  and a l ien a tio n  
w ithin a given soc ia l  system. In such a s t r a in fu l  s i tu a t io n ,  d i f f e r e n t  
people may a lso  experience d i f f e r e n t  s t r a in s  o r  d i f f e r e n t  levels  o f  
s t r a in .  People 's level o f  education and p o l i t i c a l  so c ia l iz a t io n  as 
well as t h e i r  economic in te re s t s  and cu l tu ra l  norms a re  not necessa r ily  
a l ik e  and even may be c o n f l ic tu e l .  The opposition to  the  regime may 
have only one common o b jec t ive , the overthrow of the regime. Beyond 
such an end they may have or w ill  develop d i f f e r e n t  in t e r e s t s  or d i f ­
fe re n t  approaches to  the concerning r e a l i t i e s .  I t  i s  a lso  tru e  th a t
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"leaders" and "followers" do not n ecessa r i ly  adhere to  o r  d iges t  the 
same id ea ls  and the  l a t t e r  may be used by the  former. Thus, what i s  
important is  not simply the accumulation o f  s t r a in  and i t s  in te n s i ty  
but the  channeling o f  s t r a in  and the  q u a l i ty  of i t s  a c tu a l iz a t io n .  In 
o the r  words, resource m obiliza tion , as understood in t h i s  work, is  as 
c ruc ia l  as the accumulation of s t r a in  in the revo lu tionary  process.
This contention can be supported by a p a r t i a l  comparative observation 
of the  two te s t - c a s e  revo lu tions .
Although the  p re -revo lu tionary  conditions ( e . g . ,  economic 
in e q u a l i ty ,  p o l i t i c a l  suppression, and cu ltu ra l  a l ie n a t io n )  seemed a l ik e  
in Egypt and Iran , the  Egyptian event demonstrated i t s e l f  in the form 
of a m i l i ta ry  coup in the  cap ita l  c i ty  o f  Cairo, but the  Iranian event 
came about as massive movement and massive take-over , country-wide. 
Further , while the  Iran ian  Army impeded revolu tionary  change (or revo­
lu t io n a ry  tak e-o v er) ,  the Egyptian Army o rig in a ted  such a change. 
Moreover, while the  two so c ie t ie s  enjoyed a common Islamic re l ig io n  and 
even system atic  re l ig io u s  action e x is ted  fo r  some tw enty-five  years 
(1927-1952), in Egypt, the Egyptian Revolution turned out to  be 
n a t io n a l i s t  (with a v i s ib le  c o n f l ic t  with the  re l ig io u s  fundam enta lis ts ) ,  
but the  Iranian Revolution sprang up as re l ig io u s  (with a su b s tan tia l  
c o n f l i c t  with th e "n a t io n a l is ts "an d  e thn ic  a c t i v i s t s ) .
I t  is  understood here th a t  these  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a re  caused, in 
p r in c ip le ,  by the  na ture  and q u a li ty  o f  both s t r a in  and resource 
m obiliza tion , and t h e i r  in te rac t io n  in the two s i tu a t io n s ,  as spec ified  
below.
(1) Egypt was an economically poor country, which lacked ample
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national resources but had too many mouths to  feed. This implies two 
th in g s :  f i r s t ,  t h a t  a p a r t  o f  the  economic deprivation  was not blamed 
on the  system, but on "mother n a tu re ;"  second, th a t  when people are 
improverished, they are  le ss  l ik e ly  to  involve themselves in p o l i t i c a l  
ac tion  fo r ,  "They are  endured in the  extreme case because the physical 
and mental energies o f  people are t o t a l l y  employed in the process of 
merely s taying a l iv e"  (Davies, 1962:7). On the o ther hand, in Iran 
p e tro -d o l la rs  were pouring into the country, economic growth was 
in c reas in g , and economic expecta tions were r i s in g .  What, economically, 
s t ra in e d  the Iran ians  was not widespread poverty but th e  prevalen t 
unequal d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  economic p r iv i leg e s  and socia l se rv ice s .  The 
Iran ians  could no t (and did not) blame th is  s i tu a t io n  on mother nature  
but on t h e i r  u n r e a l i s t i c  regime which, on several occasions produced 
"ev i l"  even i f  i t  meant "good." In a sh o r t  word, as th e  economic 
impulses o f  soc ia l  s t r a in  are concerned, the nature o f  s t r a in  was not 
a l ik e  in the  two so c ia l  s i tu a t io n s .
(2) The overwhelming m ajo rity  o f  the Egyptians were i l l i t e r a t e  
a t  the  time and hence they could not develop a massive p o l i t i c a l  con­
sciousness necessary fo r  ideological mass ac tion . This widespread 
i l l i t e r a c y  in te ra c ted  with th e i r  improverishment and blocked the pos­
s i b i l i t y  o f  a v i s ib le  co n s is ten t and m i l i t a n t  massive ac t io n .  Contrary 
to  t h i s  assumption, the Egyptian w r i te r  Mahmoud Hussien (1973:83) claims 
th a t  "The demonstration [o f  January 26, 1952] revealed an unprecendented 
level o f  unanimous mass consciousness and s treng th . This force merely 
needed a d i r e c t  c a l l  to  be transformed in to  a peop le 's  army ready fo r  
s t ru g g le ."  Hussien a lso  concludes t h a t  "These masses. . . were more
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conscious than the  o th e r  popular c lasses  o f  the  need o f  acting  ou ts ide  
the  normal, legal framework—and p a r t ic u la r ly  the need fo r  violence" 
(1973:83). However, in r e a l i t y ,  none o f the p o l i t i c a l  o rgan izations, 
including the popular Muslim Brotherhood, was able to  mobilize the masses 
fo r  a mass take-over .  Nor did the  masses embrace the Nasser's coup to  
move i t  toward a mass revo lu tion .
In t h i s  re sp e c t ,  Nasser (1952:32-34, 39-40) w rite s  th a t
Before Ju ly  23rd, I had imagined th a t  the  whole nation 
was ready and prepared, w aiting fo r  nothing but a vanguard to  
lead the  charge aga ins t  the ba ttlem ents , where upon i t  would 
f a l l  in behind in  s e r r ie d  ranks, ready fo r  the sacred advance 
towards the g re a t  o b jec t ive . And I had imagined th a t  our 
ro le  was to  be t h i s  commando vanguard. . . the vanguard 
performed i t s  ta sk .  . . [b u t ]  the masses th a t  came were disu­
n i te d ,  divided groups o f  s t ra n g e rs .  . . .  At t h i s  moment I 
f e l t ,  with sorrow and b i t t e r n e s s ,  th a t  the task  o f  vanguard, 
f a r  from being completed, had only begun. . . . I t  was from 
these  f a c t s ,  and no o th e rs ,  th a t  the revolu tion  coined i t s  
slogans.
I can now s ta te  t h a t  we are going through two revo­
lu t io n s ,  no t one revo lu tion . Every people on ea r th  goes 
through two revo lu tions : a p o l i t i c a l  revolu tion  by which i t  
wrests the  r ig h t  to  govern i t s e l f  from the hand o f  tyranny, 
o r  from the army s ta t ioned  upon i t s  so i l  aga ins t  i t s  w i l l ;  
and a socia l  rev o lu tio n ,  involving the c o n f l i c t  o f  c la s se s ,  
which s e t t l e s  down when ju s t i c e  i s  secured fo r  the  c i t iz en s  
o f  the united  na tion .
N asser 's  observations illum ina te  the q u a l i ty  of the revolu­
t io n a ry  process in Egypt, provide some in s ig h t  in to  the  d e f in i t io n  of 
rev o lu tio n ,  and support Lenin's considera tion  th a t  "The t r a n s fe r  of 
s t a t e  power from one c lass  to  another c lass  is  the f i r s t ,  the p r in c ip a l , 
the  basic  sign of a revo lu tion , both in the s t r i c t l y  s c i e n t i f i c  and in 
the  p ra c t ic a l  p o l i t i c a l  meaning of the term" (1917:?). I t  may be of 
value to  in d ic a te  here th a t  the nonviolent m il i ta ry  take-over in Egypt 
(and in s im ila r  cases) should not undermine the p o s s ib i l i ty  of subse­
quent rad ical changes, fo r  as Lauer no tes ,  " I t  is  the  c o l le c t iv e  action
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r a th e r  than violence th a t  i s  c r i t i c a l  to  h is to r ic a l  process" (1978:223). 
Sadat a lso  emphasizes t h a t ,  "In 1952, the  Egyptians did only what the 
English had done under Cromwell th ree  hundred years before; what the 
Americans did in 1776; and the French in 1789. But our revolution was 
le s s  bloody then [ s ic ]  these" (1955:114). To summarize, the Egyptian 
masses e i th e r  did not sense the presupposed s t r a in  d ec is iv e ly ,  or the 
s t r a in  i t s e l f  was not decisive  enough to  se t  them in motion, or the 
leadersh ip  of the opposition in d i f f e r e n t  camps fa i le d  to  a c t iv a te  
the ex is t in g  s t r a in  by means of c o l le c t iv e  revolutionary a c t io n ,  s ig ­
n i f ic a n t ly .
(3) Because o f  the stage o f  social development and economic 
growth, the  Egyptian middle c lasses were not extensive and e ffe c t iv e  
a t  the  time. Although, fo r  example, th e re  was a v is ib le  body of the 
c rea to rs  o f  c u l tu re ,  the re  were few users and d i s t r ib u to r s .  This fa c t  
im plies , among o ther th in g s ,  th a t  in the  absense o f the powerful middle 
c la s s e s ,  the impoverished, s t ra in ed ,  and i l l i t e r a t e  Egyptian peasants— 
th a t  i s ,  the  overwhelming majority o f  the people—could not (and did 
not) make a rev o lu tio n , agrarian  or otherwise. Nor were they used by 
the leadersh ip  o f  the middle c lasses  fo r  a revo lu tion , urban or o ther­
wise. I t  could a lso  be argued th a t  layers  o f  the middle c lasses  as 
such impeded rad ica l change l e s t  t h e i r  cu rren t overall in te r e s t s  be 
c u r ta i le d  and the fu tu re  ones blocked. An example of t h i s  was the 
r ig h t  wing of the n a t io n a l i s t  Wafd Party  whose members had more things 
in  common with the  regime in power than with the demanding people. 
Therefore, i t  can be claimed th a t  fac t io n s  of the Egyptian middle 
c lasses  not only de tes ted  the Revolution but, through t h e i r  represen­
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t a t io n  in the government, eased the  tension  o f the masses and, in tu rn ,  
overturned the p o s s ib i l i ty  of massive ac tio n .
Contrary to  the Egyptian Case, the Revolution o f  Iran has been 
acknowledged as middle c lass  (or urban) revo lu tion . I t  was the ex­
panding and con stan tly  demanding middle c lasses  who, f o r  d i f f e r e n t  and 
d i f f e r in g  c o l le c t iv e  o b jec t iv es ,  challenged the Shah's regime. They a l l  
were s tra in ed  and a v a ilab le  fo r  mass ac tion  even without in te n s i f ie d  
em otionalization  e f f o r t s  and strong o rgan iza tion . (This poin t w ill 
a lso  be reemphasized in the following passages.)
(4) I t  was a f a c t  th a t  the  Egyptians were governed by d ic t a ­
t o r i a l  forces represented  by the King as well as the  c o lo n ia l i s t  
B r i t i s h ;  but i t  was a lso  tru e  th a t  they normally had t h e i r  p o l i t ic a l  
p a r t ie s  which, however powerless, provided some psychological r e l i e f  
w ith in  a pseudo-democracy. What i s  meant here is  th a t  p o l i t i c a l  o rgan i­
za tions  as such a c tu a l ly  functioned in terms of m itig a t in g  p o l i t ic a l  
s t r a in  and i t s  in te n s i f i c a t i o n .  In ad d i t io n ,  as was h in ted  above, on 
occasions the leadersh ip  o f  these p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  o f f s e t  the voice of 
the  opposition through ju s t i fy in g  the s u i ta b le  opera tion  o f  the regime. 
Iran demonstrated a t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  p ic tu re .  Not only were a l l  the 
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  d isso lved  in 1975, but a lso  people were openly obliged 
to  jo in  the Shah's se lf-designed  and imposed Resurgence Party . In such 
a s i tu a t io n ,  p o l i t i c a l  pressure on people was doubled and super-imposed. 
Not only were people forced to give up what they did want, ( i . e . ,  
p o l i t i c a l  freedom) but a lso  they were forced to give in to  what they 
did not ( i . e . ,  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ic ip a t io n ,  benefic ia l to  the  regime). This 
s i t u a t io n ,  in tu rn ,  turned the Iran ians  to  inflamable masses who could
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explode even tua lly , and they did.
(5) In the Revolutionary take-over of I ran ,  fo r  a v a r ie ty  o f  
reasons and cond itions , re l ig io u s  sentiment became the  dominant force 
in the process. In the Egyptian case , although the Muslim Brotherhood 
had a lready  provided a soc ia l  base fo r  action  and were the  dominant 
fo rce  in  the country, the  corresponding sentiment was nationalism .
Not only could Egyptian nationalism  soundly speak fo r  a l l  the Egyptians, 
but i t  was a lso  able to  symbolize Arab nationalism . This was what 
occurred in N asser 's  e ra  (1954-1970). As an in d ica t io n ,  Nasser came up 
with the  "United Arab Republic," a merger between Egypt and Syria ,  
which was the Arab's f i r s t ,  and to -d a te  l a s t .  United S ta te  in the modern 
time. In Egypt (and any o ther Arab country) nationalism  does not 
n e ce ssa r i ly  c o n f l ic t  with Islam universal ism, fo r  what i s  a c tu a l ly  
s t r e s s e d  in Arabism is  th e  Arabic language, the Arabic c u l tu re ,  and the  
Arabic he r i tag e .  All these  are b a s ic a l ly  id e n t i f ie d  with and c rys ta -  
l iz e d  in  the Islamic Arabia, the Prophet Mohammad who was Arab, and the 
holy book, Quran, which is  in Arabic. In a short word, a t  l e a s t  in 
theory  and in the Arabs su b jec t iv e ly ,  Arab nationalism  is  synonymous 
with Islamic sentiment and the h is to ry  o f  Islam. As Richmond observes 
"In the  minds o f  the re l ig io u s  reformers Afghani and Abduh, and of the 
n a t io n a l i s t s  o f  the A rabist movement, th e re  was not c o n f l i c t  between 
the  i n te r e s t s  o f  country and r e l ig io n ,  between nationalism  and Islam" 
(1977:197).
On the o ther hand, although the  Muslim Brotherhood emerged in 
Egypt and gained a popular support among the masses, they were not able 
to  make a rev o lu tio n , o r  to  i n i t i a t e  a m il i ta ry  take-over ,  o r  to  embrace
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(o r to  se ize )  the m il i t a ry  coup th a t  had already been i n i t i a t e d  by the 
Free O fficers .  P a r t  o f  th i s  in a b i l i ty  can be a t t r ib u te d  to  what has 
been concluded p rev ious ly , th a t  i s ,  Arab nationalism  can symbolize 
Islamic sentiment, a t  l e a s t  among the Muslim Arab masses. In o the r  
words, the m i l i t a r y - n a t io n a l i s t  take-over by the Free O ff ice rs ,  who 
a lso  included a t  l e a s t  two O fficers  from the  Brethern, was ab le  to  
s a t i s f y  the re l ig io u s  conscience of the Muslim masses. The o th e r  p a r t  
o f  th i s  f a i lu re  might a lso  be traced  to  the  B re thern 's  a ssa ss in a t io n  
t a c t i c s ,  the a ssa ss in a tio n  o f  t h e i r  leader and founder, A1-Banna in 
1949, the death of t h e i r  m il i ta ry  leader in the Army, Mohammad Labib 
in 1951, the d is so lu t io n  of th e i r  o rgan iza tio n ,  and the lack o f  a c lea r  
and p rac t ica l  program fo r  governance and the maintenance o f  o rder.
Contrary to  the Egyptian case, nationalism  in Iran could barely 
rep re sen t  a h a lf  o f  the  population. The o the r  h a lf  of the  population 
is  id e n t i f ie d  with severa l e thn ic  m ino r it ie s  who had been suppressed 
under the Pahlavi regime. I t  should a lso  be remembered th a t  the  com­
munist l e f t  of Iran was divided and not powerful enough to  lead  or to  
symbolize massive p o l i t i c a l  ac tion . Thus, i t  was a functional necessity  
f o r  re l ig io n  to  lead or symbolize the anti-Shah s tru g g le .  In te re s t in g ly ,  
r e l ig io u s  zeal and re l ig io u s  emphasis in Iran could supply the  Iranians 
with more ideological enthusiasm than the Egyptians fo r  two reasons. 
F i r s t ,  the Iran ians ' version o f Islam is  charac te rized  by Shiism, to 
which the  m ajority o f  the  Iran ians belong. Shiism has not been o f f i ­
c ia l iz e d  anywhere e ls e  but in Iran . By emphasizing Islam, the  Iranians 
a c tu a l ly  emphasize, by in ten tio n  or no t.  Shiism, and e sp e c ia l ly  "red" 
Shiism. The S h i i te  followers are w il l in g  to  see S h ii te  Islam prevailing
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p o l i t i c a l l y  and reviving h i s to r i c a l ly .
Second, i t  seems th a t  n e i th e r  Islam in general o r  S h i i te  Islam 
in p a r t i c u la r  is  emphasized in Iran , the  emphasis bearing i t s  "Persian" 
co lo ra t io n .  In o ther words, i t  i s  the "Iran ian" o r  Persian Islam (with 
i t s  dominant S h i i te  t r a d i t io n )  th a t  is  s t re sse d  and advocated. This 
re l ig io - id eo lo g ica l  concentra tion  can a lso  s a t i s f y  the p a t r io t  and/or 
n a t io n a l i s t  Iranians who, through " re l ig io u s  means," can achieve or 
emphasize " n a t io n a l i s t  e n d s ." Such an a t t i tu d e  may be found among some 
re l ig io u s  f igures  as w ell.  (The ru le  o f  the  Arab dynasties in I ran ,  with 
some exceptions, demonstrated th a t  th is  f a c t  transcends n a t io n a l i ty  indeed.) 
Further, the  Iran ians ' emphasis on re l ig io n  can a lso  s a t i s f y  some e thn ic  
m in o r it ie s  who, id ea l ly  o r  sh o r t  of achieving p o l i t i c a l  ends through 
e thn ic  claim s, seek refuge in re l ig io n .  In th i s  con tex t, the  case o f  the 
Arab Iran ian s ,  a l l  of whom are  S h i i te ,  is  in te re s t in g .  I t  seems th a t  the 
Iran ian  emphasis on Shiism provides, a t  l e a s t  in  theory , some meaning 
to  th e i r  presence in the  in te rn a t io n a l  t e r r i t o r y  o f  the  "non-Arab" Iran ,  
and out o f  the Arab community a t  large which does not recognize Shiism 
as i t s  followers desire  o r  be lieve  they deserve. (However, d iverse they 
a re ,  the a t t i tu d e s  o f  the  Arab s ta te s  toward the "Islamic" Revolution, 
or the  "Islamic" Republic o f  " I ran ,"  can a lso  be analyzed within the  above 
proposed pe rsp ec tiv e .)
In sum, while in the "Arabian" Egypt Arab nationalism  symbolized 
o r cata lyzed  the Islamic re l ig io u s  sentim ent, in  the  "Persian" Iran 
re l ig io u s  sentiment symbolized o r catalyzed Iranian nationalism  in  the  
revo lu tionary  take-overs (and the  following ep isodes). Further, the  
dichotomy o f nationalism  -  Islamic universal ism created  more pressure 
in the  Muslim Iran in comparison to  the  Muslim Egypt. This, in tu rn ,
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helped the massive ch arac te r  o f  the Iranian Revolution.
(6) While the m il i ta ry  forces in Iran impeded the revolu tionary  
process, t h e i r  Egyptian counterparts  i n i t i a t e d  power s h i f t s  and revolu­
tionary  social changes th a t  followed. Further , h i s to r i c a l ly ,  while
the su b s tan tia l  p o l i t ic a l  actions  in Egypt were in i t i a t e d  by elements 
from the Army, the  Iranian Army was always loyal to  the Pahlavis.
These q u a l i f ic a t io n s  mean two th ings . F i r s t ,  when i t  i s  deemed necessary, 
socia l forces from whatever walks of l i f e  and with whatever ideologies 
can i n i t i a t e  d ra s t ic  change and create  revo lu tion . Next, being loyal 
to  the regime and suppressive of the opposition , the Iranian Army in ten ­
s i f i e d  the s t r a in fu l  s i tu a t io n  in which the people were already engulfed. 
These circumstances a lso  helped the organized opposition to  have v is ib le  
access to the masses, and with ease. Probably the Shah had understood, 
though be la ted ly , the  l a t e n t  function of f u r th e r  m il i ta ry  operation 
aga in s t  the  revolutionary  demonstrators, and he discouraged i t .  In Egypt, 
the  Army, which was understandably defeated in 1948, and which was iden­
t i f i e d  with i t s  n a t io n a l i s t  and re l ig io u s  anti-regim e elements, were not 
a source o f  s t r a in  fo r  the masses. Further, the  m il i ta ry  men were a 
hope, o r  the only hope, fo r  the people in confronting the regime.
(7) Compared to  cu rren t  time, na tional and in te rn a tio n a l
consciousness was not widespread and could not be expanded promptly
and e f fe c t iv e ly  in Egypt of 1952 r e la t iv e  to  Iran o f  1978-79. This
d i f f e r e n t ia l  was p a r t i a l ly  caused by the nonexistence of extensive
lo c a l ,  reg iona l,  and in te rn a t io n a l  communication network. Contrary to
the Egyptian s i tu a t io n  in the  ea r ly  1950 's, the  Iranian s i tu a t io n  of
the l a te  1970's was much more awakening and conducive fo r  p o l i t i c a l
action and confronta tion . As a r e s u l t ,  the  Iranians were both favored
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by and ab le  to  e x p lo i t  in te rn a tio n a l  events such as wars of independence, 
aggress ions , c o n f l i c t s ,  and rev o lu tio n s , including N asser 's  Revolution 
and his  anti-Shah p o s i t io n .  To be sure , th i s  kind o f  awareness and 
exposure was lodged on I r a n 's  extending in te rn a t io n a l  r e la t io n s ,  in ­
creasing u rban iza tio n ,  expanding education, and the  l ik e .  This a s s e r ­
t io n  may a lso  j u s t i f y  the proposed claim th a t  the  Shah's modernization, 
i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f  i t s  d i re c t io n ,  magnitude, and n a tu re ,  was a lso  responsi­
ble fo r  th e  r i s in g  o f  the Iran ians . In sum, s i tu a t io n a l ly  speaking, 
the Iran ian  people were more ab le  than the Egyptian to  fee l tension and 
s t r a i n ,  and to  be more access ib le  f o r  mass ac tion  and m i l i t a n t  confron­
ta t io n .
(8) The Egyptian soc ie ty  was, in gen era l ,  a homogeneous 
soc ie ty . All the  people considered themselves "Egyptian," the over­
whelming m ajo rity  o f  whom were Muslims. The m inority  Copt Christians 
could not be considered an oppressed m inority , fo r  re l ig io u s  freedom 
ac tu a l ly  e x is te d  and the  "Arab Muslim" Egyptians did not deny th e i r  
p re -Is lam ic  ( i . e . ,  Coptic) h is to ry  and h e r i ta g e .  Further, a t  l e a s t  in 
terms o f  economic p r iv i le g e s ,  the Copts were a c tu a l ly  represented in 
the upper layers  of so c ie ty .  Ethnic s t r a in  and su b s ta n t ia l  re l ig io u s  
s t r a in  did not e x i s t  to  give b i r th  to  in te rn a l  tension  and c o n f l ic t .
In f a c t ,  a l l  the Egyptian masses were unanimously undermined, in 
economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and c u ltu ra l  terms, by the  governing c la s s .  In 
th is  s i t u a t i o n ,  the  "super-imposed" s t ra in ed  f a i l e d  to  burs t in to  a 
massive re v o lu tio n .  This f a i l u r e ,  in add ition  to  what was discussed 
p rev ious ly , could a lso  be a t t r ib u te d  to  the addressed "homogeneity" 
i t s e l f ,  which could function more in sense o f  o rd e r  and mild p o l i t i c s
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than violence and d iso rder.
In Iran not only did "heterogeneity" e x i s t  in so c ie ty ,  but in 
d i f f e r e n t  c lasses  and n a t io n a l i t i e s  social s t r a in  was superimposed or 
c ro s s -c u t t in g .  The Iranian so c ie ty  i s  id e n t i f ie d  with a p le thora  of 
e t h n i c i t i e s ,  t r i b e s ,  and l o c a l i t i e s .  The m ajority o f  these ca teg o r ie s ,  
e sp e c ia l ly  a t  the  middle and lower le v e ls ,  were economically deprived, 
p o l i t i c a l l y  oppressed, and c u l tu r a l ly  a l ien a ted .  In re l ig io u s  terms 
also  some kind o f  d iffe ren ce  ex is ted .  While the dominant and o f f ic ia l  
re l ig io n  was Shiism, the re  was a lso  a g rea t number o f  Sunnis id e n t i f ie d  
with th ree  d i f f e r e n t  e th n ic i t i e s  ( i . e . ,  the Kurds, the  Baluchis, and 
the Turkomans). In a d d i t io n ,  th e re  a lso  ex isted  such re l ig io u s  minori­
t i e s  as the Jews, the  C h r is t ia n s ,  the Z oroastra ins , and the Bahais, who, 
with whatever re l ig io u s  freedom could enjoy, were surrounded by a "sea" 
o f  Muslims, and S h i i te  Muslim in p a r t ic u la r .
Viewed from a c la ss  p e rspec tive , Iranian so c ie ty  was a lso  
heterogenous with in te rn a l  c o n f l i c t  or d ifference  o f  in t e r e s t s .  For 
example, i t  i s  not th a t  a l l  the  Iran ian  workers were p o l i t i c a l ly  
oppressed o r  economically deprived equally . In f a c t ,  the o i l  workers, 
in  genera l,  had a b e t t e r  s i tu a t io n  than the o th e rs ;  the s k i l le d  workers 
in d i f f e r e n t  sec to rs  enjoyed a b e t t e r  economic conditions than the 
o the rs .  The Bazaari businessmen were economically prosperous, though 
p o l i t i c a l l y  powerless. The i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  regard less  o f  t h e i r  economic 
gains, were id eo lo g ica l ly  undermined by and p o l i t i c a l l y  a liena ted  from 
the system. The government employees, the r o l l e r s  o f  the Shah's bureau­
c r a t i c  machine, enjoy n e i th e r  p o l i t i c a l  power nor s u f f i c i e n t  economic 
rewards. The p o l i t i c a l l y  a c t iv e  re l ig io u s  community was undermined 
by the regime and without power. These d ifferences  and d i f f e r e n t i a l s
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produced and imposed d i f f e r e n t  pressures on the people, and fo r  variab le  
reasons. Although in cases these  pressures could c ro ss -c u t  each o th e r ,  
in the process they jo ined  the mainstream of the tensefu l s i tu a t io n  in 
which s t r a in  was accumulating, even in a super-imposed fash ion . The 
Shah fa i le d  to e x p lo i t  th is  d iffe rence  o f  in te r e s t s  among d i f f e r e n t  
groupings, but the  opposition was able to  c rea te  a confluence of 
i n t e r e s t s ,  a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  the Shah's regime was gone. The "g is t"  of 
t h i s  argument is  t h a t  the in tens ive  s t r a in  in the  case o f  Iran created 
more access ib le  and inflamable masses than in the  case o f  Egypt. Further, 
heterogeneity  in the  socia l s i tu a t io n  of  Iran , which could be functional 
fo r  the regime, was remarkably b en ef ic ia l  to  the rev o lu tio n a r ie s .
G. Based on the comparative analys is  o ffered  in  the above 
passages, four types o f  re la t io n sh ip s  between social s t r a in  and resource 
m obiliza tion , leading to  four types o f  p o l i t i c a l  action  can be observed. 
They are shown below and w ill be sp ec if ie d  immediately:
Resource Mobi1iza t io n  
High Moderate
High
Social S tra in
Moderate
(1) (3)
(2) (4)
(1) I f  in tense  s t r a in  couples with a high level o f  resource 
m obiliza tion , a successful revo lu tionary  change is  very l ik e ly .  In 
t h i s  s t r a in fu l  s i tu a t io n  people are  re a d i ly  av a ilab le  to  the  counter­
e l i t e s  and the l a t t e r  are a lready w ell-organized , a l e r t ,  and committed 
to  exp lo it ing  th is  mass a v a i l a b i l i ty .  When the rev o lu t io n a r ie s  are in 
power, they do not face a d ra s t ic  counter-revo lu tionary  o r  adm in is tra tive
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problem. In th i s  s i tu a t io n ,  the  "reign o f t e r r o r "  w ill be absent or 
very l ig h t ly  v is ib le .  Through th e i r  preceding system atic resource 
m obilization  and constant d e f in i t io n  of  the s i tu a t io n ,  they have a l ­
ready taken the  ro le  o f  the government. In a sense , they were a 
"government in  ex ile"  whose time came to  govern. A proper example o f  
th is  type of  p o l i t i c a l  action might be the Cuban Revolution of 1959.
(2) I f  social s t r a in  i s  somehow moderate, a g rea t deal o f  
resource m obilization  e f f o r t  is  required fo r  the  crea tion  o f  revo lu tion . 
Because o f  th e  easing o f  socia l s t r a in ,  and hence the diminished av a i­
l a b i l i t y  o f  th e  masses, the c o u n te re l i te s  may a lso  deepen but not 
extend the  s t ra teg y  of t h e i r  enduring resource m obiliza tion . Anyway, 
they w ill  probably succeed in the  take-over , confronting no decisive  
re s is ta n c e ;  however, r e la t iv e  to  case (1 ) ,  i t  w ill  take them more time 
to  in s t i t u t i o n a l i z e  t h e i r  values. An example o f  th is  type of revolu­
tionary  ac tion  is  the Egyptian Revolution. For ten  whole years the 
Free O fficers  were engaged in m obilization of  the  ava ilab le  resources, 
s ec re t ly  but system atica lly .
(3) Without in tens ive  and long-planned resource m obiliza tion , 
a highly s t r a in fu l  s i tu a t io n  can also  lead to  revo lu tion . In th is  
case a revo lu tion  may undergo i t s  conventional l i f e - c y c le ,  including 
the "reign o f  t e r r o r , "  shaky order maintenance, and gradual recon­
s t ru c t io n .  In th is  type o f revolu tionary  p rocess , people are so 
inflammable t h a t  in a sho rt  period of time, or with a low degree of
•m obiliza tion , they can bu rs t  in to  revo lu tion . The Revolution o f  Iran 
provides a sound example fo r  th is  type of  s t ra in - - re so u rc e  m obilization 
r e la t io n s h ip s .  What took the Iranians some s ix  months to  produce in
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1 9 7 9 " th a t  i s ,  the overthrow of the  regime—had taken the Free O fficers  
ten " b i t t e r  years" to  i n i t i a t e .  Needless to  emphasize, the  generating 
fac to rs  o f  the two revolutions were h i s to r i c a l .
(4) When both s t r a in  and resource m obilization  are only 
moderate, revolu tion  w ill  be le ss  l ik e ly  o r  ab o rt iv e .  The Revolution 
of Iran in 1906, and the Revolution o f  Egypt in 1919, and a rainbow o f  
coups and palace rev o lts  are good examples. I t  seems th a t  o ther types 
o f  soc ia l  a c t io n ,  c o l le c t iv e  behavior, p o l i t i c a l  v io lence , and the l i k e — 
th a t  i s ,  r e v o l t ,  r e b e l l io n ,  palace revolution e t c . —can be id e n t i f ie d  
with and analyzed within th is  fo u r th  category of revo lu tionary  or 
m i l i t a n t  ac tio n .
In a word, the g rav ity  o f  s t r a in  and i t s  n a tu re ,  in in te ra c t io n  
with the magnitude of  resource m ob iliza tion , as i t  i s  approached in 
th is  work, have a determining, i f  not thie determining, impact on shaping, 
a cc e le ra t in g ,  and conditioning th e  revolu tionary  process.
H. The in teg ra ted  theory of revo lu tion—th a t  i s ,  the "synthesis"  
—developed in th is  d is s e r ta t io n  must be considered "p ro b ab lis t ic"  and 
not "de te rm in is t ic"  in causa lly  approaching rev o lu tions . However, s ince  
"One o f  the  problems of comparing various th e o r i s t s  i s  th a t  they do not 
take the same variab les  as the focus o f  an a ly s is .  . ."  (Lauer, 1978:58), 
th i s  theory has to  an ex ten t minimized the problem. I t  provides a 
comprehensive and multi-dimensional framework fo r  the d e f in i t io n  and 
the causation o f  revo lu tion . The synthesis  roots  the causes o f  revolu­
tions  in the  economic and/or p o l i t i c a l ,  and/or c u l tu ra l  arrangements, or 
a combination o f  them, where the  problem is  r e a l ly  s t ru c tu re d .  In t h i s  
sy n th es is ,  "value-dissensus" and "socia l s t r a in "  a re  viewed successively
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as " j u s t i f i c a t i o n ” and "motivation" fo r  an ti-reg im e ac tio n .  In th is  
scheme, n e i th e r  s t r a in  nor d issensus i s  understood as the cause o r  & 
cause fo r  rev o lu tio n s ,  but m an ifesta tions  o f  a troubled  system, in 
economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and cu l tu ra l  terms.
F urther , in the sy n th es is ,  "resource m obilization" i s  not 
approached as a comprehensive explanation of  revo lu tion . This explana­
t io n  can only provide more thought in to  and sheds more l ig h t  on the 
"qua li ty "  o f  a successful (o r ab o r t iv e )  a c t io n ,  a f t e r  the p re re q u is i te  
fo r  such an action  ( i . e . ,  the  economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and cu l tu ra l  d i f ­
f i c u l t i e s )  are p resen t, leading to  the  mutually re in fo rc ing  value - 
dissensus and socia l s t r a in .  I t  i s  only with the ex istence  of such 
q u a l i f ic a t io n s  th a t  resource m obiliza tion  e f f o r t s ,  id e n t i f ie d  with 
lead e rsh ip ,  ideology, and o rg an iza t io n ,  w ill  be j u s t i f i e d ,  p re c ip i ­
ta te d ,  and probably productive. "People" are  ra t io n a l  and they would 
not respond with enthusiasm to  the  c o u n te r e l i t e s '  c a l l  fo r  action i f  
the re  were not some v is ib le  causes and sensed burdens fo r  s tru g g le .
Yet, whatever resource m obiliza tion  s t r a t e g i e s  and t a c t i c s  achieve 
in the course o f ac tio n ,  th i s  achievement w il l  be r e l a t iv e  to  the 
regim e's c o u n te r -e f fo r ts ,  o r ,  s ta t e d  d i f f e r e n t ly ,  to  the operation of  
socia l co n tro l .
Nevertheless, the syn thesis  su f fe rs  from a serious problem 
the so lu tio n  o f  which c a l l s  fo r  fu r th e r  in te l le c tu a l  c u r io s i ty ,  
so p h is t ic a te d  th eo r iz in g ,  and soc io log ica l  da ta . The problem is  
id e n t i f i e d  with the sequence o f  e v e n ts - - th a t  i s ,  "when," "what" takes 
place in the  revolutionary  process. For example, does value-dissensus 
precede soc ia l  s t r a in ,  or i s  i t  an tedated  by i t ,  or do the two occur
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simultaneously? One may a lso  th ink o f  another problem which is  the  
p red ic t iv e  capacity  o f the  syn thes is .  However, given the complexity 
of socia l phenonmenon in general and revo lu tions  in p a r t ic u la r ,  and 
given the cu rren t s tage  of socio logical development, vigorous p red ic ­
tion  i s  not possib le  in our d is c ip l in e  and the  proposed synthesis  does
not purport to  make such p red ic tions . In one simple word, the
synthesis  can serve as a comprehensive model w ithin which h is to r ic a l  
events can be s u f f ic ie n t ly  analyzed. Where the fu ture  events are 
concerned, th is  model can be approached in  terms o f  "an tic ipa tion"  and 
not "p red ic t io n ."  The fu tu re ,  though rooted in the past and the 
p resen t, belongs to  o ther  socia l s t ru c tu re s  fo r  which we do not now 
have (and cannot) have re levan t da ta . P red ic tion  in sociology is  an 
area s t i l l  obscure and a problem to  be solved.
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